布鲁金斯学会-美中竞争时代的美国印太战略-加强联盟、经济参与和地区稳定（英）-2022.11-10正式版

POLICYBRIEF|NOVEMBER2022ANAMERICANSTRATEGYFORTHEINDO-PACIFICINANAGEOFU.S.-CHINACOMPETITION:ENHANCINGALLIANCES,ECONOMICENGAGEMENT,ANDREGIONALSTABILITYRICHARDC.BUSH,TANVIMADAN,MIREYASOLÍS,JONATHANSTROMSETH,ANDANDREWYEOExecutivesummaryTheUnitedStatesisaleadingIndo-Pacificpowerwithanabidinginterestinsustainingastrongalliancenetworkandmaintainingafreeandopenregionalorderthatdeliverspeace,stability,andeconomicprosperity.TheIndo-Pacificisadynamicregionexperiencingarewiringofthelinesofsecurityandeconomiccooperation,asminilateralnetworkscontinuetogrowandmegatradeagreementstakehold.ThemostsignificantdevelopmentintheIndo-PacificistheemergenceofChinaasapeercompet-itortotheUnitedStates.Chineseactionsthatunder-minevitalU.S.interestsincludetheuseofcoercion—whetherintheformofgray-zonetactics,politicalinterference,economicpressure,ormilitaryforce—toweakentheU.S.alliancesysteminAsia,pressunilat-eralterritorialclaims,andsettleinternationaldisputeswithdisregardtointernationallaw.ChinaalsoseekstounderminedemocraticresilienceintheregionandincorporateTaiwanintothePeople’sRepublicofChina,eventhoughitspeoplerejectthetermsoffered.

TosustainU.S.interestsandeffortsintheIndo-Pacific,weofferthreesetsofrecommendations:Deepeningalliances,partnerships,andcoali-tions.TheU.S.shoulddeepenitssecurityalli-ances,enhanceminilateralcooperationinitiativessuchastheQuad,engageactivelywiththeAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)anditsindividualmembers,includingIndonesia,Singapore,andVietnam;deepenrelationswithIndia;andredoubleeffortstopromotetrilateralU.S.-Japan-Koreacollaboration.Increasingeconomicengagementandoppor-tunity.TheUnitedStatesshouldstrivetoobtaineconomicallymeaningfuloutcomesthroughtheIndo-PacificEconomicFramework(IPEF),devisesupplychainresilienceinitiativesthatfostercohesionwithU.S.partners,partakeindigitaltradeagreements,andrestoretradeliberalizationtoitspolicytoolkit.TheUnitedStatesshouldpursuemembershipintheComprehensiveandProgressiveTrans-PacificPartnership(CPTPP)FOREIGNPOLICYATBROOKINGS  1toadvanceitseconomicandforeignpolicyinterests,anditshouldcoordinatewithalliesandpartnerstodeliverinfrastructurefinancetoenableregionalconnectivityinthephysicalanddigitaldomains.Enhancingdeterrenceandsustainingthelongpeace.OnTaiwanpolicy,theUnitedStatesshouldenhancecommunicationwithbothBeijingandTaipeitostrengthendeterrenceandreassuranceandtoestablishconflict-avoidancemeasures.GivenNorthKorea’snuclearandmissileprov-ocations,theUnitedStatesmustcontinuetoreassureitsallies,particularlySouthKorea,ofitscommitmenttoextendeddeterrence,whileleavingroomforengagementiftheNorthKoreanregimedecidestoreturntothenegotiationtable.SinceChinaiscontinuingtomakeaggressivemovestoenforceitsfar-reachingsovereigntyclaimsintheEastChinaandSouthChinaseas,theUnitedStatesmustcontinuetoasserttheimportanceofarules-basedmaritimeorderthatincludesfreedomoftheseasandunimpededcommerce.WheretheUnitedStatessitsontheIndo-PacificU.S.policyandleadershipintheIndo-Pacificarebasedonstrongfoundations:thebipartisanrecognitionofthecentralityoftheIndo-PacifictoAmerica’slong-termsecurityandeconomicinterests,theunparallelednetworkofbilateralalliancesandgrowingminilateralpartnerships,theUnitedStates’technologicalleadandsupplyofprivateinvestment,andtheUnitedStates’roleasasecurityanchorforarules-basedorder.However,theUnitedStates’Indo-Pacificstrategyhasimportantshortcomings,manyofthemself-inflicted.Twoinparticularstandout.First,acredibilitydeficitduetopolarizationandgridlockindomesticpolitics,whichhaveresultedinsharpfluctuationsinU.S.

foreignpolicyandincreaseddoubtsamongpartnersaboutthestayingpoweranddirectionofU.S.policyintheregion.Second,alopsidedapproachthatrestsonAmerica’smilitaryprowessandsecurityrolebutfailstomaximizeitsdiplomaticheftandunder-whelmsinitseconomicengagementapproach.TheUnitedStateshasdecidedtounilaterallyretireakeytooltoadvancemutualeconomicinterests—tradeliberalization—therebycedinggroundtoChina,whichisrampingupitsdiplomaticandeconomiccloutthroughmembershipinregionaltradeagree-ments.WhytheIndo-PacificregionmattersTheIndo-PacifichasoccupiedprideofplaceinRepublicanandDemocraticadministrationsalike,withtheclearrecognitionthatitwillshapethe21st-centuryworldorder.Itisthemostdynamiceconomicregionandishometoseveralmature,technologicallyadvanceddemocraciesthatarelongtimealliesorpartnersoftheUnitedStates.Astheregioncontinuestomakestrideswithanoutward-lookingeconomicmodel,itisexpectedthatthevastmajorityoftheworld’smiddleclasswilleventuallyresideinAsia.1Unfortunately,theIndo-PacificisbedeviledbyexistingandnewsecuritychallengesthatincludetensionsintheTaiwanStrait,intractableterritorialdisputesintheSouthChinaSea,anexpandednuclearandmissileprograminNorthKorea,arenewedmilitarystandoffalongtheSino-Indiaborder,andthecontinuingfalloutfromthe2021militarycoupinMyanmar.TheIndo-PacificregionisalsoexperiencingcrucialchangesfromthevantagepointofWashington.TheU.S.“hub-and-spokes”bilateralalliancesysteminAsiaisincreasinglyoperatingintandemwithanetworkofstrategicpartnerships,issue-specifictrilaterals,andinterest-basedcoalitionssuchastheQuad(whichincludesAustralia,India,Japan,andtheUnitedStates).Theregion’seconomicarchitectureisalsoexperiencingprofoundchangecharacter-izedbytheemergenceofmega-tradeagreements,ANAMERICANSTRATEGYFORTHEINDO-PACIFICINANAGEOFUS-CHINACOMPETITION  2theproliferationofnationalsecuritycontrolsoverinternationaleconomictransactions,andarecon-siderationofindustrialpolicies.AmostsignificantdevelopmentintheIndo-PacificistheemergenceofChinaasapeercompetitortotheUnitedStates.U.S.interestsintheIndo-Pacific:AnetworkedregionTheUnitedStatesisaleadingpowerintheIndo-Pacific.Ithasanabidinginterestinsustainingastrongalliancenetworkandmaintainingafreeandopenregionalorderthatdeliverspeace,stability,andeconomicprosperity.Assuch,theUnitedStatesoffersapositiveandattractivevisionfortheregionbychampioningfreedomofnavigation;upholdinginternationallyrecognizedborders;preventingeconomic,military,andotherformsofcoercion;creatingbroadeconomicopportunities;enhancingfreedomofchoiceforallactorsintheregion;andsupportinghumanrights.Toadvancethispositivevisionofregionalorder,theUnitedStatesmustworkeffectivelywithallies,part-ners,andotherregionalactorsintheIndo-Pacific.ThismeansdeployingimportantU.S.assetsacrossthesecurity,diplomatic,economic,andtechnologyfieldsandengagingwithmultilateralandregionalinstitutions.Inrecentyears,U.S.policymakershavedescribedtheIndo-Pacificasanetworkedregion.Bilateralalliancesstillformthecoreofthesecurityarchitec-ture,buttheUnitedStateshasplacedanincreasingemphasisonnetworksofcountrieswithsharedinter-estsandstrategicpartnershipsformedamongU.S.allies,aswellasontrilateralssuchastheAustralia-UnitedKingdom-UnitedStates(AUKUS)securitypactandminilateralinitiativessuchastheQuad.TheseflexiblecoalitionsunderscorethatregionalplayersbeyondtheUnitedStatesarealsoconcernedaboutChina’sassertiveness.TheyalsohaveavitalstakeintheIndo-Pacificandcanofferadditionalresources.

Morebroadly,minilateralandmultilateralgroupscanhelpsupplypublicgoodstotheregion;theyfacilitatehabitsofcooperationandforgehorizontaltrustnetworksamongkeyregionalplayers.Twomega-tradeagreementshavesignificantlyadvancedregionaleconomicintegration.TheCPTPPisthemostambitioustradeliberalizationproject,withambitiouseconomicrulesandbroadtariffelimination.TheRegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnershipagreementisthelargesttradedealintheworld,andChinaisamember.TheUnitedStatesisnotapartytotheselargeregionaltradeagree-ments.Instead,theadministrationofU.S.PresidentJoeBidenhasoptedtolaunchnegotiationsundertheIPEFtopromotecooperationonsupplychainmanagement,digitaleconomyandlaborstandards,cleaninfrastructure,andanti-corruption.However,therearenocurrentplanstoprovidemarketaccesspreferences.Thereare,ofcourse,otheroverlappingandparallelnetworksthatoperateintheIndo-Pacificspace.TheyincludetheAsia-PacificEconomicCooperationforum,ASEAN,theASEANRegionalForum,andtheEastAsiaSummitforum;theCompactsofFreeAssociation(inthePacificIslands)andtheIndianOceanRimAssociation;andChinese-ledmulti-lateraleffortssuchastheShanghaiCooperationOrganizationandtheAsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank.FOREIGNPOLICYATBROOKINGS  3FIGURE1TheUSandChinainanetworkedIndo-PacificEconomic&infrastructureSecurity&political

UnitedStatesChinaengagementNeitherengagementBoth•Indo-PacificEconomic•RegionalComprehensive•ComprehensiveandFrame-work(IPEF)EconomicPartnershipProgressiveTrans-Pacific•PartnershipforGlobal•BeltandRoadInitiativePartnershipInfra-structureandInvestment•ASEAN+3•U.S.-Australia-JapanTrilateralPartnershiponInfrastructure•APECInvestment•Alliances(Australia,Japan,•EastAsiaSummitSouthKorea,Philippines,•ASEANRegionalThailand)Forum•ShanghaiCooperation•Quad•G20OrganizationAUKUSG-7BluePacificFiveEyesChina’spoliciesintheIndo-PacificChina’scapabilitiesandambitionshavegrownsubstantially.Thecountryisnowthelargestgoodstradingpartnerformostregionaleconomies,anditexercisesformidablemilitarypowerwithsizableandnontransparentdefenseexpenditures.2China’sinfluenceisfeltmoreacutelyinitsneighborhood,demonstratedbyitsexpansiveclaimsintheSouthandEastChinaseas,itsborderconflictswithIndia,anditsincreasinguseofeconomiccoercionintheregion.Thecountry’slandmarkBeltandRoadInitiativeaimstoclosetheinfrastructurefinancegap,boostregionalconnectivity,expandmarkets,andsecureBeijing’sleadershipintheIndo-Pacific.AlthoughthepolicycommunitycontinuestodebateChina’sultimateobjectivesintheregion,itisclearthatseveralofBeijing’srecentactionsareadirectchallengetotheinterestsoftheUnitedStatesanditsalliesandpartners.Broadlyspeaking,Chineseattemptstoestablishasphereofinfluencethat

aimstomarginalizetheUnitedStatesandcloseoffinternationalseaandairlanesconstituteredflags.Anon-exhaustiveenumerationofChineseactionsthatunderminevitalU.S.interestsincludetheuseofcoercion—whetherintheformofgray-zonetactics,politicalinterference,economicpressure,ormilitaryforce—toweakentheU.S.alliancesysteminAsia,pressunilateralterritorialclaims,andsettleinterna-tionaldisputeswithdisregardtointernationallaw.ItalsoincludesChineseeffortstounderminedemo-craticresilienceintheregionandincorporateTaiwanintothePeople’sRepublicofChina,eventhoughitspeoplerejectthetermsoffered.OtherformidablechallengesfortheUnitedStatesanditspartnersincludethefusionofcivil-militaryrelationsinChinaandtheresurgenceofstatecapitalismpracticesthatseektodominatethemostadvancedtechnologiesandeconomicsectors.ANAMERICANSTRATEGYFORTHEINDO-PACIFICINANAGEOFUS-CHINACOMPETITION  4PolicyrecommendationsTosustainitsleadershipintheIndo-PacificandeffectivelymanagerelationswithChina,itiscrucialfortheUnitedStatestoensureitsowndomesticrenewal.WhattheUnitedStatesaccomplishesdomesticallywillbecloselywatchedbyexternalactorswhowillbemakingchoicesfortheirnationalinterestsbasedonperceptionsofU.S.strengthorweakness.Domesticrenewalprioritiesshouldincludereducingpoliticalpolarization;addressingsocioeconomicgaps;investinginscience,inno-vation,andcompetitiveness;andattractingglobaltalent.Ontheforeignpolicyfront,weofferthreesetsofrecommendations:DEEPENINGALLIANCES,PARTNER-SHIPS,ANDCOALITIONSTheU.S.alliancesystemintheIndo-Pacificshouldcontinuetoplayanessentialroleinsustaininganopenandstableregionalenvironment.U.S.alliancesarecriticalforprojectingpowerandaforwardpresence.Thisinturnprovidesreassur-ancetoregionalpartnersandboostsdeterrence.TheUnitedStatesanditspartnersshouldcontinuetoinnovatethroughthecreationandaugmentationofregionalissue-orinterest-basedgroupingsliketheQuad,AUKUS,andthePartnersintheBluePacific.ThereisaneedtoenhancetrilateralU.S.-Japan-Korea(UJK)cooperationonboththesecurityandeconomicfronts.Ratherthanholdfrequent,adhoctrilateralmeetings,theUnitedStatesmightconsiderfurtherinstitutionalizationofUJKtrilat-eralismbyconveningaregularlyheldUJKstra-tegicdialoguesimilartotheU.S.-Japan-Australiastrategicdialogue.ThiswouldconveyastrongerpoliticalwillbehindUJKtrilateralrelationstobothU.S.alliesandcompetitors.

TheBidenadministrationshouldcontinuetodeepencooperationwithIndiawhereinterestsconverge—bilaterallyandwithotherpartners—whilemanagingdifferences(forexample,onRussia).Inparticular,thereisspaceforaddi-tionalsecurity,economic,andtechnologicalcoordinationandcollaborationintheIndo-Pacificsincebothcountrieshavelargelyoverlappingvisionsandconcerns.Theseincludeensuringamultipolarregion—incontrasttoaunipolarAsiadominatedbyChina—wheretheUnitedStatesisanactiveandwelcomeplayer,principleslikefreedomofnavigationarerespected,andcoun-triesarefreetomakechoiceswithoutthethreatoruseofforceorcoercion.ThetwocountriesshouldalsosharetheirfrankassessmentsandexpectationsofeachotherintheeventofIndo-Pacificcontingencies.TheUnitedStatesshouldalsocontinuetoassistIndiawithenhancingitsdeterrentcapabilities,whilebeingpreparedforadditionalSino-Indiancrises.EngagementwithASEANiscritical.ConsistentandrobustparticipationinEastAsiansummitry,includingthemanyinitiativesandplatformsthatoperateundertheprincipleofASEANcentrality,isabuildingblocktodeeperandmultifacedU.S-ASEANrelations.Atthesametime,U.S.policyshouldrecognizetherichdiversityofSoutheastAsiaanddevelopcustomizedapproachestoadvancemutualinterestswithspecificnationsinthissubregion.TheBidenadministrationshouldcontinuetoengageASEANtoformulatenextstepsinMyanmar,whilesimultaneouslyexertingpres-sureonthemilitaryjuntathroughtheUnitedNations.Thejunta’srecentexecutionoffourdemocracyactivistshassparkeddissatisfactionwithinASEAN,stallingthegrouping’s“five-pointconsensus”plan.3Afreshapproachisneeded.TheUnitedStatesshoulddeepenrelationswithemergingpartnerslikeIndonesiaandVietnam.U.S.relationswithVietnamhaveexpandedFOREIGNPOLICYATBROOKINGS  5considerablyinrecentyears,anditmaysoonbetimetoelevatetherelationshiptoaformalstra-tegicpartnership.ThiswouldsendanimportantsignaltoothersintheIndo-PacificthatU.S.relationshipsareinnovativeandgrowingandthatWashingtoniscommittedtotheregionforthelongterm.TheBidenadministrationshouldworkwithCongresstoensurethattheU.S.-IndoPacificstrategyiswellresourcedacrossthediplo-matic,security,economic,andpeople-to-peopledomains.INCREASINGECONOMICENGAGE-MENTANDOPPORTUNITYTheUnitedStatesshouldstrivetoachieveeconomicallymeaningfuloutcomesviatheIPEF.TheIPEFshouldbecomeaninclusiveframeworkopentofutureaccessionbypartieswillingtoabidebyhigh-qualityeconomicrules.TocomplementtheIPEF,theBidenadministra-tionshoulddevelopaprocessformultitrackdiplomacytocodifyrulesforthedigitaleconomyandshouldseekmembershipincompatibleagreements.TheUnitedStatesshoulddevisesupplychainresilienceinitiativesthataddressvulnerabilitiesincorecomponentsandproductsbydevel-opingtrustedsuppliernetworksandpursuingstockpilinganddiversificationstrategiesthatfacilitatecooperationwithlike-mindedcountries.Discriminatorymeasures,suchastaxincentivesthatfavordomesticassembly,mayrunafoulofinternationaltraderulesandunderminecohesionwithpartners.TheUnitedStatesshouldplayaconstructiveroleinreformingandreactivatingtheWorldTradeOrganization’sdisputesettlementmechanismtohelpensurecompliancewithmultilateraltraderulesandreduceeconomicfriction.

TheUnitedStatesshouldreincorporatemarketaccessnegotiationsintoitstradetoolkit.ReciprocalmarketaccessnegotiationscreateeconomicopportunitiesforAmericanproducersandworkers,reducethecostoflivingforconsumers,andhelpAmericannegotiatorssecureambitiouscommitmentsfromcoun-terpartsoncutting-edgerulesandstandards.JoiningtheCPTPPwouldsecurethesebenefits,helpreassureregionalpartnersofmeaningfulandlong-termU.S.economicengagement,andpreventapotentialhollowingoutoftheCPTPPstandardsifChinaweretosucceedingainingsignificantexemptionsinitsaccessionbid.TheBidenadministrationshouldaccelerateandoperationalizeinfrastructurecoordinationintheregionwithalliesandpartners,especiallyJapan.Inthiseffort,itshouldleverageboththeQuadInfrastructureCoordinationGroupandtherecentlyannounced$600billionglobalinfra-structureprogramtobeimplementedwithG7partners.4Morebroadly,theUnitedStatesshouldthinkaboutdevelopmentpartnershipsmorecreatively;forinstance,itcoulddeployfinancingtosupporttheadoptionanddistributionofhigh-standarddigitalinfrastructureintheregion.ENHANCINGDETERRENCEANDSUSTAININGTHELONGPEACETaiwanTheTaiwanStraitconflictisfundamentallyapoliticalone,butitcarriesmilitarydimensions.Theunprece-dentedmilitaryexercisesconductedbythePeople’sLiberationArmyafterU.S.SpeakeroftheHouseNancyPelosi’svisittoTaiwansignalthatthemilitarydimensionisincreasinginsalience.Thepossibilityofaccidentalclashesandmiscalculationleadingtoadangerouscycleofescalationisnottrivial.TheBidenadministrationshouldenhancecommunicationwithBeijingandTaipeitostrengthenbothdeterrenceandreassuranceandtoestablishconflict-avoidancemeasures.ANAMERICANSTRATEGYFORTHEINDO-PACIFICINANAGEOFUS-CHINACOMPETITION  6Morebroadly,theadministrationmustprovideclear,consistentmessagingconcerningitsChinaandTaiwanpolicies.AkeymessageforChinaisthatitscurrentformulaforresolvingthedisputewithademo-craticTaiwanisanonstarter.Beijing’sinabilitytomakeprogressinfulfillingitspoliticalobjectiveofunificationhasledtofrustrationandincreasedmilitarycoercion.AkeymessageforTaiwanisthatitneedstoenhanceitsmilitarycapabilitiesinasmartwayandimprovetheperformanceofitsdemocraticsystem.TheUnitedStatescanhelpstrengthenTaiwan’spositionbyundertakingsignificanteconomicnegotiationswithTaipei.ThesenegotiationsshouldaimtoliberalizetheTaiwaneconomy,andmakeitmorecompetitiveinterna-tionally,andprovide“cover”forothercountriestonegotiatetheirownagreements.Theendproductofthesenegotiations(forexample,acomprehensiveagreementversusanarrayofsubject-specificagreements)islessimportantthanthecontent.NorthKoreaNorthKorea’snuclearandmissileprogramcontinuestochallengepeaceandstabilityinNortheastAsia.Theregime’smostrecentnucleardoctrinereleasedinSeptember2022outlinesconditionsforthepreemptiveuseofnuclearweaponsanditsdesiretocementitsstatusasanuclearstate.5Butdespitegrowingconcernsintheregion,ChinahasbecomelesswillingtocooperatewiththeUnitedStatesondenuclearizationeffortsontheKoreanPeninsula.Inresponse,theUnitedStatesmustcontinuetoreassureitsallies,particularlySouthKorea,ofitscommitmenttoextendeddeterrence.U.S.strategicassets,includingaircraftcarriers,fighterjets,andnuclearsubmarines,canbedeployedifnecessarytosignalamessagetoPyongyang.

MorefrequentjointexercisesshouldbeconductedtoprepareU.S.andSouthKoreantroopsandtoraisethecostsofescalationforPyongyang.Whilebolsteringdeterrence,theUnitedStatesmustcontinuetoseekopportunitiestoengageNorthKoreaandformulateanengagementplanshouldtheregimedecidetoreturntothenegotiatingtable.Intermediatesteps—includingafreezingofcapabilitiesandarmscontrolmeasures—shouldbeconsideredaspartofaphasedprocesstowarddenuclearization.TheBidenadministrationshouldfurtherpressandencourageBeijingtoplayaconstructiveroleinpromotingdenuclearization,stability,andpeaceontheKoreanPeninsula.EastChinaSeaandSouthChinaSeaChinaiscontinuingtomakeaggressivemovestoenforceitsfar-reachingsovereigntyclaimsinboththeEastChinaSea(overtheSenkaku,orDiaoyu,islands)andtheSouthChinaSea(overareasmarkedbya“nine-dashline”).6AkeychallengeforJapanandrelevantASEANmembers(namelyBrunei,Malaysia,thePhilippines,andVietnam)isthatChinaisunder-takinggray-zoneactivitiesthatindividuallyarenotenoughtoprovokeeffectivepushbackfromoppo-nents.ThisstrategywasespeciallyevidentinMarch2021whenChinasentabout220fishingvesselstocrowdoutWhitsunReef,aterritoryclaimedbythePhilippines.7Inresponse,theUnitedStatesmustcontinuetoasserttheimportanceofarules-basedmaritimeorderthatincludesfreedomoftheseasandunimpededcommerce.TheUnitedStatesshouldupholditsalliancecommitmentstoallterritoriesunderJapaneseadministrativecontrolandshouldcontinuetohighlightandsupporttheinternationalPermanentCourtofArbitration’s2016rulinginfavorofthePhilippines’maritimeclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.FOREIGNPOLICYATBROOKINGS  7SenateratificationofUNCLOSwouldhelpstrengthenU.S.claimsinsupportoftheruleoflawandfreedomofnavigation.TheU.S.militaryshouldcontinuetoconductfreedomofnavigationoperationsintheSouthChinaSeawhendeemedappropriate.TheUnitedStatesshouldalsoencouragemoreU.S.alliesandpartnersintheIndo-Pacifictoparticipateintheseoperations.TheUnitedStatesshouldalsotakestepstooperationalizetheIndo-PacificPartnershipforMaritimeDomainAwareness,launchedattheQuadLeaders’TokyoSummitinMay2022.OneobjectiveistobettertrackChina’sgray-zoneactivitiesandsharetherelateddatawithASEANpartners.

Toreduceriskandavoidconflict,theUnitedStatesanditsSoutheastAsianpartnersshouldengagewithandpressChinatoconductitsoper-ationsintheSouthChinaSeainamannerthatisconsistentwithinternationalnormsandbilateralunderstandingsthatithasagreedtobuthasnotabidedby,includingthe2014CodeforUnplannedEncountersatSea.8Inaddition,theUnitedStatesshouldprovidediplomaticandmaterialsupporttoASEANclaim-ants,especiallythePhilippinesandVietnam.ThissupportshouldincludethetransferofathirdHamilton-classCoastGuardcuttertoimproveVietnam’smaritimesecuritycapabilities.ANAMERICANSTRATEGYFORTHEINDO-PACIFICINANAGEOFUS-CHINACOMPETITION  8References1 HomiKharas,“TheUnprecedentedExpansionoftheGlobalMiddleClass:AnUpdate,”WorkingPaper100,(Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitution,February2017),https://www./wp-content/uploads/2017/02/global_20170228_global-middle-class.pdf.2 InternationalMonetaryFund,“ImportsofGoodsfromitsPartners,Millions,USDollars,”DirectionofTradeStatistics(DOTS),September30,2022,/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85&sId=1514498277103.3DavidRisingandEileenNg,“Myanmarexecutionsof4activistsspurglobaloutrage,”AssociatedPress,July26,2022,/article/myan-mar-united-nations-thailand-antonio-gu-terres-aung-san-suu-kyi-cc89157ce351fe-a2229cc5662951bab2.4AndrewShalal,“G7aimstoraise$600billiontocounterChina’sBeltandRoad,”Reuters,June27,2022,/world/refile-us-aims-raise-200-bln-part-g7-rival-chinas-belt-road-2022-06-26/.5KelseyDavenport,“NorthKoreaPassesNuclearLaw,”ArmsControlToday,October2022,HYPERLINK"/act/2022-10/news/north-korea-p