资源与环境经济学：Chapter 4 Property Rights,Externalities,And Environmental Problems

Chapter4 PropertyRights,Externalities,AndEnvironmentalProblems1.IntroductionMaincontents:Exploretheconceptofpropertyrights（产权）andhowitcanbeusedtounderstandwhytheenvironmentalassetcanbeundervaluedbyboththemarketandgovernmentalpolicy.Discusshowthegovernmentandthemarketcanuseknowledgeofpropertyrightsandtheireffectsonincentivestoorchestrateacoordinatedapproachtoresolvingthedifficult.2.PropertyRights2.1PropertyRightsandEfficientMarketAllocations2.2EfficientPropertyRightStructures2.1PropertyRightsandEfficientMarketAllocationsIneconomics,propertyrights（产权）

referstoabundleofentitlementsdefiningtheowner’srights,privileges,andlimitationsforuseoftheresource.Thepropertyrightscanbevestedeitherwithindividuals,asinacapitalisteconomy（资本主义经济）,orwiththestate,asinacentrallyplannedsocialisteconomy（中央计划经济）.2.2EfficientPropertyRightStructuresAnefficientstructurehasthreemaincharacteristics:Exclusivity（排他性）Transferability（可转让性）Enforceability（可强制执行性）2.2EfficientPropertyRightStructuresExclusivity（排他性）meansthatallbenefitsandcostsaccruedasaresultofowningandusingtheresourcesshouldaccruetotheowner,andonlytotheowner,eitherdirectlyorindirectlybysaletoothers.2.2EfficientPropertyRightStructuresTransferability

（可转让性）meansthatallpropertyrightsshouldbetransferablefromoneownertoanotherinavoluntaryexchange.Enforceability（可强制执行性）meansthatpropertyrightsshouldbesecurefrominvoluntaryseizureorencroachmentbyothers.2.2EfficientPropertyRightStructuresAnownerofaresourcewithawell-definedpropertyrighthasapowerfulincentivetousethatresourceefficientlybecauseadeclineinthevalueofthatresourcerepresentsapersonalloss.2.2EfficientPropertyRightStructuresWhenwell-definedpropertyrightsareexchanged,asinamarketeconomy,thisexchangefacilitatesefficiency.3.ExternalitiesasaSourceofMarketFailure3.1TheConceptIntroduced3.2TypesofExternalities3.1TheConceptIntroducedAnexternality（外部性）

existswheneverthewelfareofsomeagent,eitherafirmorhousehold,dependsnotonlyonhisorheractivities,butalsoonactivitiesunderthecontrolofsomeotheragent.3.2TypesofExternalitiesExternaldiseconomy（外部不经济性）andexternaleconomy（外部经济性）

havebeenusedtorefer,respectively,tocircumstancesinwhichtheaffectedpartyisdamagedorbenefitedbytheexternality.Pecuniaryexternalities（货币外部性）arisewhentheexternaleffectistransmittedthroughhigherprices.4.ImproperlyDesignedPropertyRightsSystem4.1OtherPropertyRightsRegimes4.2PublicGoods4.1OtherPropertyRightsRegimesBesidesprivateproperty（私有产权）,thereareotherpropertyrightsregimes:State-propertyregimes（国有产权制度）wherethegovernmentownsandcontrolstheproperty.Common-propertyregimes（共有产权制度）wherethepropertyisjointlyownedandmanagedbyaspecifiedgroupofco-owners.Openaccessregimes（公开进入制度）inwhichnooneownsorexercisescontrolovertheresources.4.2PublicGoodsPublicgoods（公共物品）aredefinedasthosethatexhibitbothconsumptionindivisibilitiesandnonexcludability.Nonexcludability

（非排他性）referstoacircumstancewhere,oncetheresourceisprovided,eventhosewhofailtopayforitcannotbeexcludedfromenjoyingthebenefitsitconfers.Indivisibility（不可分性）meansthatoneperson’sconsumptionofagooddoesnotdiminishtheamountavailableforothers.4.2PublicGoodsCanwerelyontheprivatesectortoproducetheefficientamountofpublicgoods?Theanswerisno.4.2PublicGoodsSupposethatinresponsetodiminishingecologicaldiversity

（生物多样性）wedecidetotakeupacollectiontoprovidesomemeansofpreservingendangeredspecies（濒危物种）.Wouldthecollectionyieldsufficientrevenuetopayforanefficientlevelofecologicaldiversity?5.ImperfectMarketStructures6.DivergenceofSocialAndPrivateDiscountRatesIfresourcesaretobeallocatedefficiently,firmsmustusethesameratetodiscount（贴现）futurenetbenefitsasisappropriateforsocietyatlarge.Iffirmsweretouseahigherrate,theywouldextractandsellresourcesfasterthanwouldbeefficient.Conversely,iffirmsweretousealower-then-appropriatediscountrate,theywouldbeexcessivelyconservative.6.DivergenceofSocialAndPrivateDiscountRatesWhymightprivateandsocialratesdiffer?6.DivergenceofSocialAndPrivateDiscountRatesThesocialdiscountrate（社会贴现率）

isequaltothesocialopportunitycostofcapital.Thecostofcapitalcanbeseparatedintotwocomponents:Risk-freecostofcapital（无风险资本成本）Riskpremium（风险溢价）6.DivergenceofSocialAndPrivateDiscountRatesTherisk–freecost（无风险资本成本）ofcapitalistherateofreturnearnedwhenthereisabsolutelynoriskofearningmoreorlessthantheexpectedreturn.Theriskpremium（风险溢价）isanadditionalcostofcapitalrequiredtocompensatetheownersofthiscapitalwhentheexpectedandactualreturnsmaydiffer.6.DivergenceofSocialAndPrivateDiscountRatesOnedifferencebetweenprivateandsocialdiscountratesmaystemfromadifferenceinsocialandprivateriskpremiums.7.GovernmentFailureGovernmentfailure

（政府失灵）shareswithmarketfailure

（市场失灵）thecharacteristicthatimproperincentivesaretherootoftheproblem.Specialinterestgroupsusethepoliticalprocesstoengageinwhathasbecomeknownasrentseeking（寻租）.7.GovernmentFailureRentseeking（寻租）

istheuseofresourcesinlobbyingandotheractivitiesdirectedatsecuringprotectivelegislation.Successfulrent-seekingactivitywillincreasethenetbenefitsgoingtothespecialinterestgroup,butitwillalsofrequentlylowernetbenefitstosocietyasawhole.7.GovernmentFailureWhydon’tthelosersriseuptoprotecttheirinterests?Onemainreasonisvoterignorance.7.GovernmentFailureRentseekingcantakemanyforms:Producerscanseekprotectionfromcompetitivepressuresbroughtbyimportsorcanseekpricefloorstoholdpricesabovetheirefficientlevels.Consumergroupscanseekpriceceilingsorspecialsubsidiestotransferpartoftheircoststothegeneralbodyoftaxpayers.8.ThePursuitofEfficiency8.1PrivateResolutionthroughNegotiation8.2TheCourts:PropertyRulesandLiabilityRules8.3LegislativeandExecutiveRegulation8.1PrivateResolutionthroughNegotiationPrivatenegotiationisthesimplestmeanstorestoreefficiencywhenthenumberofaffectedpartiesissmall,makingnegotiationfeasible.8.1PrivateResolutionthroughNegotiationDiscussionofindividualnegotiationsraisestwoquestions:Shouldthepropertyrightalwaysbelongtothepartywhogainedorseizeditfirst?Howcanenvironmentalrisksbehandledwhenpriornegotiationisclearlyimpractical?8.2TheCourts:PropertyRulesandLiabilityRulesThecourtsystemcanrespondtoenvironmentalconflictsbyimposingeitherpropertyrules（产权原则）

orliabilityrules（责任原则）.Propertyrules（产权原则）specifytheinitialallocationoftheentitlement.8.2TheCourts:PropertyRulesandLiabilityRulesEconomistCoaseheldthataslongasnegotiationcostsarenegligibleandaffectedconsumerscannegotiatefreelywitheachother,thecourtcouldallocatetheentitlementtoeitherparty,andanefficientallocationwouldresult.Theonlyeffectofthecourt’sdecisionwouldbetochangethedistributionofcostsandbenefitsamongtheaffectedparties.ThisremarkableconclusionhascometobeknownastheCoasetheorem（科斯定理）.8.2TheCourts:PropertyRulesandLiabilityRulesWhenindividualnegotiationisnotpracticalforonereasonoranother,thecourtscanturntoliabilityrules（责任原则）

whichawardmonetarydamagestotheinjuredparty.Theamountoftheawardisdesignedtocorrespondtotheamountofdamageinflicted.8.2TheCourts:PropertyRulesandLiabilityRulesLiabilityrules（责任原则）alsohasitslimitation:Itreliesonacase-by-casedeterminationbasedontheuniquecircumstancesforeachcase.Thetransactioncosts

（交易成本）areveryexpensive.8.3LegislativeandExecutiveRegulationTheseremediescantakeseveralforms:dictatethatnooneproducemoresteelorpollutionthanQ*imposeataxonsteeloronpollution.establishrulestopermitgreaterflexibilityandyetreducedamage.requiretheinstallationofparticularpollutioncontrolequipment,ordenytheuseofaparticularproductioningredient.9.AnEfficientRoleforGovernmentTheeconomicapproachsuggeststhatgovernmentactioncouldwellbeusedtorestoreefficiency,italsosuggeststhatinefficiencyisnotasufficientconditiontojustifygovernmentintervention.Objectives&Requirements:l

Understandthemeaningofpropertyrightsandtherelationshipbetweenpropertyrightsandefficientmarketallocationsl

GrasptheefficientpropertyrightstructureslUnderstandthemeanin