版权说明:本文档由用户提供并上传,收益归属内容提供方,若内容存在侵权,请进行举报或认领
文档简介
.09.2022Monetarypolicyintheeuroarea:wheredowestandandwherearewegoing?vosCEDEBilbaonndezdeCosor1YourMajesty,authorities,ladiesandgentlemen,LetmestartbythankingtheorganisersfortheopportunitytoaddressyouatthisXXICEDECongress.Today,IwillelaborateonhowwecanbringpricestabilitybacktoEuropeancitizensinthecontextofcurrentturmoilasitistheresponsibilityoftheECB’sGoverningCounciltobringinflationdownto2%inthemediumterm,theinflationtargetthatoperationalisesourpricestabilitymandate.1Andwehavetodothisinnonetooeasytimes.AfterapandemicthathascostmorethanaofaggressioninUkraineEuropeanhouseholdsareexperiencingadrasticsurgeintheircostsofliving.Consumerpricesintheeuroarearoseby9.1%inAugustcomparedtothepreviousyear,anall-timehighforthemonetaryunionTheincreaseinpriceshasbeenespeciallyacuteintheenergyandfoodcomponentsoftheconsumptionbasket.Butithasbecomemoregeneralovertime,asreflectedinanunderlyinginflationrateof4.3%inAugust,anotherrecordhigh,reflectingtoalargeextentindirecteffectsofhigherenergyandfoodcommoditypricesthroughfirms’productioncosts.Asrecentresearchshows,thissurgeininflationhasaffectedsomeofthemostvulnerablegroupsinoursociety,likelow-incomeindividuals.2So,wheredowestandintermsofinflationdevelopmentsintheeuroarea?ndevelopmentsandoutlooknflationstartedrisinginearlyafterabriefspellinnegativeterritoryattheonsetofthepandemic.Energypriceshavebeenthemaindriverbehindthissharprise,duetolargeincreasesingasandoilprices.Otherimportantcontributorshavebeenanincreaseinfoodcommodityprices,andbottlenecksinglobalsupplychainscausedbydemand-supplyimbalancesaseconomiesaroundtheworldrelaxedtheirpandemic-relatedcontainmentmeasures.TheoutbreakofthewarinUkraine,theeconomicsanctionsonRussia,andtheretaliationintermsofgassupplyreductions,haveaggravatedthesedevelopments.UkraineandRussiaarealsomajorcerealexporters.3Roughlytwothirdsofthecurrentinflationareduetoenergyandfood.Lookingforward,ECBstaffprojectionspublishedthismonthexpecteuroareainflationtodeclinefromanaverageof8.1%in2022to5.5%in2023and2.3%in2024,owinglargelytodownwardbaseeffectsintheenergycomponent,predominantlyarisingfromthefuelscomponent.Fromthebeginningof2023electricitypricesand,inparticular,gaspricesareexpectedtocontributetothemoderationininflation.1IamgratefultoIrmaAlonso,PabloAguilar,SamuelHurtado,PeterPaz,andPedrodelRíofortheircontributionstotheanalyticalmaterialinthisspeech.2SeeChapter3ofthe2021AnnualReportofBankofSpain,2022,andCardoso,M.,C.Ferreira,J.Leiva,G.Nuño,A.Ortiz,T.Rodrigo,andS.Vazquez,“TheHeterogeneousImpactofInflationonHouseholds'BalanceSheets",BancodeEspañaWorkingPaper,forthcoming,2022.3FurtherinformationcanbefoundinBorrallo,F.,L.Cuadro-SáezandJ.J.Pérez,“Risingfoodcommoditypricesandtheirpass-throughtoeuroareaconsumerprices”,BancodeEspaña,AnalyticalArticles,2022.2Inthecurrentcontext,however,thiscentralscenarioissurroundedbysignificantuncertainty.LetmedescribewhereIseethemainsourcesofuncertainty,inparticularinrelationtofutureinflationdynamics.First,thepotentialemergenceofsecond-roundeffects.Second-roundeffectsoccurwhenanincreaseininflationistransmittedtowageincreasesandthelatter,inturn,aretransmittedtoprices–asfirmsattempttopreserveorevenincreasetheirprofitmargins–,potentiallyleadingtoaprice-wagespiral.ThishasnotbeenthecasesofarintheeuroareaandaccordingtothelatestECBprojections,significantprice-wagespiralsarenotexpectedovertheforecasthorizon.4Growthinunitlabourcostsisexpectedtosignificantlycontributetodomesticinflationin2023,butlesssoin2024owingtoboththemoderationinwagegrowthandthepick-upinproductivitygrowth.Nevertheless,highandpersistentinflationerialisingviahigherwagesandprofitmarginsSecond,thereistheriskofinflationbecomingentrenchedduetoade-anchoringofinflationexpectations.Ifinflationexpectationsbecomede-anchored,thatwoulddramaticallyincreasethepersistenceoftheinflationaryepisode,potentiallycausingittobecomeself-sustained,andwouldrequiremoreradicalactionsbythecentralbanktoquenchit.Sofar,thereisnoclearevidenceofde-anchoringofinflationexpectations,althoughsomeindicatorsofmedium-terminflationexpectationsstandslightlyabove2percent,whichneedscloselymonitoring.MostsurveysofmonetaryanalystsandprofessionalforecastersionatorslightlyaboveThisisalsosupportedbyinflationlinkedswapratesadjustedforthepresenceofriskpremia.Bycontrast,consumerexpectationsurveysofferamoreworrisomepicture,asthemedianof3-yearaheadinflationexpectationshasrisento3%.Asinthecaseoftheriskofsecond-roundeffects,weshouldremainextremelyvigilantaboutthesedevelopments.Third,thereisalotofuncertaintyregardingfuturegeopoliticaleventsandtheirimpactonishigherandmorepersistent.Ontheotherhand,inthissamescenario,ifdemandweretoweakenfurtheroverthemediumtermduetolowerrealincomes,itwouldlowerpressuresonprices.Indeed,theECBpublishedinSeptemberanalternative“downsidescenario”.Inthisscenario,energyandfoodcommoditypricesareassumedtoincreasesubstantiallyduetoseveresupplydisruptionsassociatedwithanintensificationofthewarinUkraine,combinedwithothernegativeshockstotheEuropeaneconomy.5Theresultwouldbeaninflationrateof6.9%in2023and2.7%in2024.Letmeemphasise,however,thatdespitealltherecentdevelopmentsregardinggassupplythroughtheNordstreampipeline,onecannotassumethatwearealreadyinthedownsidescenario.Thisisbecausetheothershocksassumedinthisdownsidescenariohavenotmaterialisedyet.Indeed,severalkeycommodityprices–includingenergyprices-arecurrentlybelowtheECBbaselinescenario(andmoresoincomparisontothedownsidescenario),whichmayreflectlowerthanexpecteddemand.4Foradiscussionofsecondroundeffectsintheeuroarea,seeBattistini,N.,H.Grapow,E.HahnandM.Soudan“Wagesharedynamicsandsecond-roundeffectsoninflationafterenergypricesurgesinthe1970sandtoday”,ECBEconomicBulletin,Issue5/20225SeeBox3oftheSeptemberECBstaffmacroeconomicprojectionsfortheeuroarea,3Finally,anadditionalelementofuncertaintyisrelatedtothesynchronisedtighteningofmonetarypolicyacrosscountriesanditsimpactonactivity–includingglobalspill-overs–andinflation.6etarypolicystrategyAsIsaidbefore,itistheECB’sresponsibilitytopreservepricestabilityintheeuroarea.Giventhenatureoftherecentriseininflation,thefirstquestionweshouldaskourselvesishowourmonetarypolicyshouldrespondtoit.InJuly2021,theECBadoptedanewmonetarypolicystrategy,thecornerstoneofwhichisasymmetricinflationtargetof2%inthemediumterm.TheaimoftheECBisthereforenottostabilisecurrent,observedinflation,buttostabiliseinflationoverthemediumrun.Thismedium-termorientationrespondstotwoconsiderations.First,monetarypolicyaffectsinflationwithvariablelags.Thetransmissionmechanismofmonetarypolicyoperatesfirstbyaffectingbanks’,firms’andhouseholds’financingconditions.This,inturn,affectscredit,investment,andconsumptiondecisions.Theresultingchangesinaggregatedemandexertpressureonfirms’productionneeds,thusloweringtheirdemandforlabourandotherinputs,andhenceonproductioncosts,andwillendupaffectingprices.Thisprocesshowevertakestime.Empiricalstudiestypicallyshowthatmonetarypolicydecisionshavetheirmaximumeffectoninflationafterone-and–a-halftotwoyears.Therefore,attemptingtostabiliseobservedinflationatalltimesisafutile,andprobablycounterproductivetask,asitincreasesthevolatilityofmacroeconomicaggregates.Second,theoptimalresponseofmonetarypolicydependsonthenatureoftheshocksthatcauseinflationtorise.Forinstance,anenergyshockistypicallyconsideredasasupplyor“cost-push”shock,asitincreasesproductioncostsforfirms.Inthiscase,thecentralbankfacesatrade-offbetweeninflationontheonehand,andeconomicactivityandunemploymentontheother:ifitreactstoostronglytotheincreaseinpricesresultingfromthecost-pushshock,theoutputandemploymentlossescausedbythesupplydisturbancewillbefurtheramplified,andunemploymentwillsuffer.If,ontheotherhand,itrespondstoofeebly,inordertominimiseeconomicandemploymentlosses,inflationmayincreasetoomuch.Theoptimalpolicyinthiscaseisto“leanagainstthewind”,tighteningpolicyenoughtoallowforacertaintransitoryincreaseininflationabovetargetaswellasareductioninoutputbelowitspotentiallevelandanincreaseinunemployment.7Thepreviousprescriptionisbasedhoweverontheassumptionthatfirms’andworkers’long-runinflationexpectationsremainanchoredatalltimestothecentralbank’starget,astheyfullytrustthecentralbank’scommitmenttoeventuallybringinflationbacktotarget.Inthisrespect,recentresearchshowsthat,whenagentslonger-runinflationexpectationsareendogenoustotheinflationenvironmenttheyexperience,theninacontextofhighand6SeeM.ObstfeldandH.Zhou,“TheGlobalDollarCycle.Brookingspapersoneconomicactivity,BPEAConferenceraftsonetaryPolicyInflationandtheBusinessCyclePrincetonUniversityPressModelsincludingmorerealisticcharacterisationsofoilorgasmarketsofferconceptuallysimilarresponses,asinforinstance,Nakov,A.,andA.Pescatori“MonetaryPolicyTrade-OffswithaDominantOilProducer”,JournalofMoney,CreditandBanking,42:1-32,2010.4persistentinflationsuchexpectationscanbecomehighlysensitivetodeviationsofrealisedinflationfromtheirownforecast.8Thus,anadequatemonetarypolicyconductshouldtakeintoaccounttheriskofde-anchoringbymovingtheinterestratemoreaggressivelythanintheabsenceofsucharisk.9Theoptimalmonetarypolicytheninvolvesastrongresponsetomovementsinagents’long-runinflationexpectation.Thisstrongresponseensuresthatwheneverthepublicissurprisedbyinflationinthewakeofrecentevents,andexpectationsstarttode-anchor,thecentralbankdoesnotallowthemtodriftabovethemedium-termanchorpersistently.Insum,themedium-termorientationofourinflationtargetrecognisesboththeimperfectcontrolofinflationbymonetarypolicyintheshortrun,owingtothevariabletransmissionlagstotheeconomyandinflation,andthefactthatcertainkindsofshocksmaycreateatemporarytrade-offbetweeninflationandeconomicactivity,asinthecaseofcost-pushshocks.Themedium-termorientationprovidesthepolicyflexibilitytoassesstheoriginofshocksandlookthroughtemporaryshocksthatmaydissipateoftheirownaccord.Byfollowingthismedium-termorientation,theECBavoidsunnecessaryvolatilityinactivityandemployment.Importantly,themedium-termorientationdoesnotimplythatcentralbanksshouldignoreshort-runinflationdevelopments.Instead,itimpliesthatthelatestinflationdatamatterinsofarastheycontaininformationregardingmedium-terminflationarypressures.Byitsverynature,themedium-termorientationrequiresprojectingthefuturepathofinflation.Surveysandfinancialmarketinstrumentsprovideuswithausefultoolinthisrespect,astheygiveusevidenceofhowdifferentagents(experts,households,firms,andfinancialmarketparticipants)seeinflationevolvinggoingforward.Inaddition,centralbanksrelyontheirstaff’sforecastsforinflationandeconomicactivity–whichtypicallydrawonahugeamountofeconomicandmonetaryanalyses–asakeyinputintheirdecision-makingprocess.Summingup,ourtaskisnottorespondtothelatestinflationdatapoint,afutileand–especiallyinthefaceofadversesupplyshocks–counterproductivetask,buttostabiliseruninflationexpectationsremainanchoredtothetarget.ReturninginflationtooverthemediumrunInthecontextofasteadyincreaseinmedium-terminflationexpectations,aseconomiesrecoveredfromtheworstphaseofthepandemiccrisis,attheendof2021westartedattheECBGoverningCouncilaprocessofprogressivenormalisationofourmonetarypolicy.ThefirststepwastowithdrawtheextraordinarypolicystimulusthatwehadlaunchedattheonsetofthepandemicTothisendinMarchwestoppedthenetassetpurchasesunderthePEPP.InourJunemeetingweconcludedthattheconditionsinourforwardguidanceforraisinginterestrateshadbeenfulfiled;wethereforecommunicatedourintentiontoraiseratesinJulyandagaininSeptember,and–consistentlywithourchainedforwardguidance8See,forinstance,Carvalho,C.,S.Eusepi,E.MoenchandB.Preston,“AnchoredInflationExpectations”,AmericanEconomicJournal:Macroeconomics(forthcoming).9SeeGáti,L.,“MonetaryPolicyandAnchoredExpectations:AnEndogenousGainLearningModel”ECBWorkingPaperNo2022/2685,2022.5betweenratehikesandassetpurchases-weannouncedthatnetpurchasesundertheAPPwouldendatthestartofJuly.Inthatmonthweraisedourratesby50basispoints,alargerincreasethanwehadsignalledinJune,basedonourupdatedassessmentofinflationrisksandthereinforcedsupportprovidedbythenewTransmissionProtectionInstrument(TPI)fortheeffectivetransmissionofmonetarypolicyacrosstheeuroarea.Earlierthismonthwehikedratesbyanunprecedented75basispoints,motivatedbyinflationlevelsthatwerefartoohighandlikelytostayaboveourtargetforanextendedperiod.10Thismajorstepfrontloadsthetransitionfromtheprevailinghighlyaccommodativelevelofpolicyratestowardslevelsthatwillsupportatimelyreturnofinflationtoourtwopercentmedium-termtarget.Asyoucansee,wedecidedtostartthenormalisationofourpolicybyraisingourinterestrates,insteadofbyreducingthesizeofourbalancesheet–theso-called“quantitativengthesizeofourbalancesheetIseethreeimportantreasons.First,weunderstandbetterthetransmissionmechanismofinterestraterisesthanthatofquantitativetightening.Wehavedecadesofexperiencewiththeformerbutwehaveneverreducedthesizeofourbalancesheetfromsuchlargelevels.Second,quantitativetighteningcouldpotentiallycausemarketturmoilincertainmarketsegments,assupplymayoutgrowdemandandliquiditymaydryup.Thiscouldimperilthepolicynormalisationpathatatimeinwhichalloureffortsshouldbefocusedonit.Third,monetarypolicytransmissionintheeuroareaisheavilydependentonbankcredit.Loanpricingistypicallybenchmarkedtoshort-andmedium-termrates.Policyratesarethusamoreeffectiveinstrumenttotightenmonetarypolicy.Goingforward,akeyquestionis:byhowmuchshouldourkeyinterestrateseventuallyaseThatiswhatisthevalueofinterestratesthatguaranteesthatinflationconvergesto2%bytheendofourmedium-termhorizon?Iwillcallthislevelthe“target-compatibleterminalrateAsecondrelatedquestionishowfastshouldthisterminalratebereached?erminalghtawayThiswouldhardlybeadvisable,however,giventhehugeuncertaintythatcharacterisesthecurrenteconomicenvironmentandalsotheuncertaintythatsurroundstheimpactofourpolicyactionsontheeconomyinthiscontext.Thesourcesofthisuncertaintyaremultiple.Wefaceuncertaintyregardingthenatureofcurrentshocks,thatis,towhatextenttheyreflectsupplyordemandfactors,whichasexplainedbeforedetermineshowswiftthepolicyreactionshouldbe.Wearealsouncertainabouttheirpersistence,whichisacriticaldeterminantoftheinflationoutlook.Wefaceuncertaintyabouthowouractionseventuallyaffectinflationalongthemonetarypolicytransmissionchannel:wedonotknowforcertainhowsensitiveoverallfinancingconditions(includingbanklendingconditions)aretoourpolicydecisions,howsensitiveaggregatedemandistofinancingconditions,andhowresponsiveinflationistoeconomicactivity–thatis,theslopeoftheso-called“Phillipscurve”.Forallthesereasons,itisverydifficulttoascertainhowmuchtighter,relativetoa“neutral”path,ourpolicyshouldbeinthenextfewquartersinordertoreturnmedium-terminflationbackto2%.epthexplanationoftherationalebehindourbprateincreaseinSeptemberseeHernndezdeCoseofothereconomicpoliciesspeechatJolyAndalucíaForum.BancodeEspaña.6Theeconomicliteratureisalongwayfromprovidingaclearcutanswerastohowmonetarypolicyshouldreactinahighlyuncertainenvironment.Aclassicreferenceisthe“Brainardprinciple”,whichstatesthatpolicyshouldexhibitprudenceinthefaceofuncertaintyabouttheimpactoninflationofunderlyingshocksorofanypolicymis-calibration.11Itistypicallysummarisedas“inadarkroomyoumovewithsmallsteps”.Indeed,thehighertheuncertainty,thegreaterthelikelihoodthatamoreaggressivemonetarypolicyresponsetoshocksmaypushinflationawayfromthetarget.12However,thisviewhasbeenqualifiedbysubsequentresearch.Forinstance,whenthereisuncertaintyaboutthepersistenceofinflation–asisclearlythecaseinthecurrentcontext–,itmaybeoptimalforthecentralbanktorespondtorisinginflationmoreaggressivelyinordertoreduceuncertaintyaboutthefutureinflationdevelopments.13Thereasonisthatwhenthedynamicsofinflationareuncertain,theamountofuncertaintyfacingthecentralbankisgreaterthefurtherawaytheinflationrateisfromitstarget.Consequently,toreducetheamountofuncertaintyaboutthefuturepathofinflation,optimalpolicybecomesmoreaggressive,pushinginflationclosertotarget.entlinesofreasoninghelpexplainwhymostcentralbanksincludingushavefollowedatighteningpaththatcombinessomegradualism(inthesenseofreachingtheterminalrate–whicheverthatturnsouttobe–throughasequenceofinterestratehikes,asopposedtodoingsoinoneortwogoes)withacertainfront-loadingoftheadjustmentpathtowardstheterminalrate(asexemplifiedbyour75pbhikeearlierthismonth)inanefforttopreservetheanchoringofinflationexpectations.Atourlatestmeetingwealsoannouncedthatfurtherratehikeswillfollow.Howmuchwillourratesincreaseeventually?LetmecomebacktothefirstofthetwoquestionsIraisedbefore:whereisthetarget-compatibleterminalrate?Wheredowego:thetarget-compatibleterminalrateLetmebeclearaboutit:nooneknowswheretheterminalratelies.ThisisnotonlyaconsequenceoftheuncertaintyImentionedbefore:italsodependsonfutureevents,suchastheeventualcourseofthewarinUkraineandtheassociatedgeopoliticaldevelopments.This,however,doesnotmeanthatwearecompletelycluelessaboutwhatterminalrateseemsmorelikelyfromtoday’spointofview.Indeed,giventhecurrentstateoftheeconomy,wecanemployourmacroeconomicmodelstoobtainarangeofthemostlikelyrminalrateThesevaluesareconditionalontheinformationavailabletodaysotheymustbeandwillberevisedasnewinformationarrives.Butatleasttheyprovideaconditionalassessmentofhowmuchweexpectourratestoincreaseinordertobringdownmedium-terminflationtoour2%target.11SeeBrainard,W.C.“UncertaintyandtheEffectivenessofMonetaryPolicy”,AmericanEconomicReview57(2),pp.7.12Itwilldependonthedegreeofpersistenceoftheshocksthathittheeconomy,asshownbyFerrero,G.,M.Pietrunti,andA.Tiseno.“Benefitsofgradualismorcostsofinaction?Monetarypolicyintimesofuncertainty”,Bancad’ItaliaTemidiDiscussioneWorkingPaperNo1205,2019.13SeeSöderström,U."MonetaryPolicywithUncertainParameters,"TheScandinavianJournalofEconomics,vol.pages5,2002.7BancodeEspañastaffhaveconductedsuchanexerciseusingasuiteofmacroeconomicmodels.TheexerciseassumesthatECBratesincreaselinearlyuntilMarch2023,andthenstaythereformostof2023and2024.14Thelevelofshort-terminterestratesinMarch2023consistentwitha2%projectedinflationratebyend-2024wouldbetheterminalrate.Theresultsshowthat,onthebasisofcurrentinformation,themedianterminalratevalueacrossmodelsisat2.25%-2.50%.Indeedthisisestimatedwithsignificantuncertainty,asillustratedbythewiderangeoftheestimatedterminalrateacrossmodels15.Letmeemphasise,inparticular,thatthesemodelscannotcapturetheriskofexpectationsbecomingunanchoredortheseverityofsecond-roundeffectsandhowtheyareaffectedbychangesintheterminalrate.Couldtheseestimatesbeconsideredtoamounttoacommitmentconcerningtheterminalrate?Ofcourse,not.Again,itisjustamodel-basedforecastbasedoncurrentinformation.Beingaforecast,thisrangeisentirelydata-dependentandmaychangeastimegoesby.anceregardinghowmuchweexpectourinterestratestoadjustinordertofulfilourpricestabilitymandate.Noticethatthistarget-compatibleterminalrateisnotnecessarilythesameasthenaturalorneutralrate.Thenaturalrateistherealinterestratethatiscompatiblewithinflationatitstarget.Whenrealratesareabovethenaturalrate,themonetarypolicystanceiscontractionary,andwhentheyarebelow,monetarypolicyisexpansionary.Theproblemisthatthenaturalratecannotbeobserved.Atbestwehavesomeestimatesaboutitslong-rangefromtoequivalenttolongrunnominalratesThisrangeisconsistentwiththelong-runexpectationsofmarketparticipants,whichiscurrentlyat1.5%.16Ourcurrentestimateofthetarget-compatibleterminalrateisthushigherthanthelong-runnaturalrate.Thisimpliesthatnominalrateswillovershootthelong-run(nominal)naturalrate,andhenceitisexpectedthatrateswilldecreaseagainovertimeIwouldliketoflagafinalconsideration.ThisrangefortheterminalratehasbeenobtainedassumingthattheEurosystemmaintainsthesizeofitsassetportfolioundertheAPPandPEPPconstantoverahorizonconsistentwithourcommunicationonthePEPP(forwhichreinvestmentsareforeseentoextenduntilend2024)andwithsurvey-basedexpectationsonAPP(forwhichthereinvestmenthorizonismoreopen-ended).However,inthecaseoftheAPPtheECBcouldpotentiallydecidetostartreducingitsassetstockearlierthanmarketscurrentlyanticipate.Givenourunderstandingofthewayassetpurchaseprogrammeswork,suchacourseofactionwouldhaveadownwardeffectontheterminalrate.17Thisisbecause,ifweannounceourintentiontoinitiatetheunwindingofourAPPportfolioearlierthanexpectedbyinvestors,bondyieldswillincrease,especiallythoseatWeconsiderbothfullystructuralDynamicStochasticGeneralEquilibriumDSGEmodelssemistructuralmodels,likedlargemacroeconometricmodelsestimatedtoreplicatetheeuroareaeconomyInthecaseoftheDSGEandthemacroeconometricmodel,wesetthemtoreproducetheSeptemberECBMPEprojectionsandthenconsidercounterfactualpathsforrates,whereasinthatoftheNiGEMweemployitsbuilt-inprojections.AgentsintheDSGEmodelhaverationalexpectations.NiGEMissolvedbothwithrationalandadaptiveexpectations.Adaptiveexpectationsbyalongperiodofbelow-
温馨提示
- 1. 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。图纸软件为CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.压缩文件请下载最新的WinRAR软件解压。
- 2. 本站的文档不包含任何第三方提供的附件图纸等,如果需要附件,请联系上传者。文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
- 3. 本站RAR压缩包中若带图纸,网页内容里面会有图纸预览,若没有图纸预览就没有图纸。
- 4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
- 5. 人人文库网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对用户上传分享的文档内容本身不做任何修改或编辑,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
- 6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
- 7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。
最新文档
- 汽车维修检验工创新方法知识考核试卷含答案
- 陶瓷工艺品彩绘师操作水平测试考核试卷含答案
- 智能硬件装调员安全文化竞赛考核试卷含答案
- 继电器调整工班组管理水平考核试卷含答案
- 婚姻家庭咨询师安全教育水平考核试卷含答案
- 冠心病护理的基本知识与技能
- 胃造瘘管的护理
- 广播电视天线工技术基础竞赛考核试卷含答案
- 遗体防腐师进度管理知识考核试卷含答案
- 2026年齐齐哈尔高等师范专科学校高职单招笔试化学历年参考题库含答案解析
- 2026年消防设施操作员(初级)实操考核试题及答案
- 七年级(上)历史63个核心必背考点
- 《CSCO胰腺癌诊疗指南(2026)》更新要点解读
- 儿童情绪调节量表
- 基于核心素养的小学语文大单元教学设计与实施指南
- 2026年新教材人教版九年级上册英语Unit 2 Inspiring people 教案
- 学校校务公开及信息发布管理办法
- 预制管桩雨季施工方案
- 人教版川教版 三年级上册《生命生态安全》简述式教案
- SLT 336-2025水土保持工程全套表格
- 2026年前程无忧性格测试题目及答案
评论
0/150
提交评论