长电报英文版

TheLongTelegramGeorgeKennanMoscow22February1946AnswertoDept’s284,Feb.3,11involvesquestionssointricate,sodelicate,sostrangetoourformofthought,andsoimportanttoanalysisofourinternationalenvironmentthatIcannotcompressanswersintosinglebriefmessagewithoutyieldingtowhatIfeelwouldbedangerousdegreeofoversimplification.Ihope,therefore,DeptwillbearwithmeifIsubmitinanswertothisquestionfiveparts,subjectsofwhichwillberoughlyasfollows:(1)BasicfeaturesofpostwarSovietoutlook.(2)Backgroundofthisoutlook.(3)Itsprojectioninpracticalpolicyonofficiallevel.(4)Itsprojectiononunofficiallevel.(5)PracticaldeductionsfromstandpointofUSpolicy.Iapologizeinadvanceforthisburdeningoftelegraphicchannel;butquestionsinvolvedareofsuchurgentimportance,particularlyinviewofrecentevents,thatouranswerstothem,iftheydeserveattentionatall,seemtometodeserveitatonce.Therefollows:Part1:BasicFeaturesofPostwarSovietOutlookasPutForwardbyOfficialPropagandaMachine,AreasFollows(a)USSRstilllivesinantagonistic"capitalistencirclement"withwhichinthelongruntherecanbenopermanentpeacefulcoexistence.AsstatedbyStalinin1927toadelegationofAmericanworkers:"Incourseoffurtherdevelopmentofinternationalrevolutiontherewillemergetwocentersofworldsignificance:asocialistcenter,drawingtoitselfthecountrieswhichtendtowardsocialism,andacapitalistcenter,drawingtoitselfthecountriesthatinclinetowardcapitalism.Battlebetweenthesetwocentersforcommandofworldeconomywilldecidefateofcapitalismandofcommunisminentireworld.(b)Capitalistworldisbesetwithinternalconflicts,inherentinnatureofcapitalistsociety.Theseconflictsareinsolublebymeansofpeacefulcompromise.GreatestofthemisthatbetweenEnglandandUS.(c)Internalconflictsofcapitalisminevitablygeneratewars.Warsthusgeneratedmaybeoftwokinds:intra-capitalistwarsbetweentwocapitaliststatesandwarsofinterventionagainstsocialistworld.Smartcapitalists,vainlyseekingescapefrominnerconflictsofcapitalism,inclinetowardlatter.(d)InterventionagainstUSSR,whileitwouldbedisastroustothosewhoundertookit,wouldcausereneweddelayinprogressofSovietsocialismandmustthereforebeforestalledatallcosts.(e)Conflictsbetweencapitaliststates,thoughlikewisefraughtwithdangerforUSSR,neverthelessholdoutgreatpossibilitiesforadvancementofsocialistcause,particularlyifUSSRremainsmilitarilypowerful,ideologicallymonolithicandfaithfultoitspresentbrilliantleadership.(f)Itmustbeborneinmindthatcapitalistworldisnotallbad.Inadditiontohopelesslyreactionaryandbourgeoiselements,itincludes(1)certainwhollyenlightenedandpositiveelementsunitedinacceptablecommunisticpartiesand(2)certainotherelements(nowdescribedfortacticalreasonsasprogressiveordemocratic)whosereactions,aspirationsandactivitieshappentobe"objectively"favorabletointerestsofUSSR.TheselastmustbeencouragedandutilizedforSovietpurposes.(g)Amongnegativeelementsofbourgeois-capitalistsociety,mostdangerousofallarethosewhomLenincalledfalsefriendsofthepeople,namelymoderate-socialistorsocial-democraticleaders(inotherwords,non-Communistleft-wing).Thesearemoredangerousthanout-and-outreactionaries,forlatteratleastmarchundertheirtruecolors,whereasmoderateleft-wingleadersconfusepeoplebyemployingdevicesofsocialismtoserveinterestsofreactionarycapital.Somuchforpremises.TowhatdeductionsdotheyleadfromstandpointofSovietpolicy?Tofollowing:(a)EverythingmustbedonetoadvancerelativestrengthofUSSRasfactorininternationalsociety.Conversely,noopportunitymustbemissedtoreducestrengthandinfluence,collectivelyaswellasindividually,ofcapitalistpowers.(b)Sovietefforts,andthoseofRussia’sfriendsabroad,mustbedirectedtowarddeepeningandexploitingofdifferencesandconflictsbetweencapitalistpowers.Iftheseeventuallydeepenintoan"imperialist"war,thiswarmustbeturnedintorevolutionaryupheavalswithinthevariouscapitalistcountries.(c)"Democratic-progressive"elementsabroadaretobeutilizedtomaximumtobringpressuretobearoncapitalistgovernmentsalonglinesagreeabletoSovietinterests.(d)Relentlessbattlemustbewagedagainstsocialistandsoial-democraticleadersabroad.Part2:BackgroundofOutlookBeforeexaminingramificationsofthispartylineinpracticetherearecertainaspectsofittowhichIwishtodrawattention.First,itdoesnotrepresentnaturaloutlookofRussianpeople.Latterare,byandlarge,friendlytooutsideworld,eagerforexperienceofit,eagertomeasureagainstittalentstheyareconsciousofpossessing,eagerabovealltoliveinpeaceandenjoyfruitsoftheirownlabor.Partylineonlyrepresentsthesiswhichofficialpropagandamachineputsforwardwithgreatskillandpersistencetoapublicoftenremarkablyresistantinthestrongholdofitsinnermostthoughts.Butpartylineisbindingforoutlookandconductofpeoplewhomakeupapparatusofpower--party,secretpoliceandGovernment--anditisexclusivelywiththesethatwehavetodeal.Second,pleasenotethatpremisesonwhichthispartylineisbasedareformostpartsimplynottrue.Experiencehasshownthatpeacefulandmutuallyprofitablecoexistenceofcapitalistandsocialiststatesisentirelypossible.Basicinternalconflictsinadvancedcountriesarenolongerprimarilythosearisingoutofcapitalistownershipofmeansofproduction,butareonesarisingfromadvancedurbanismandindustrialismassuch,whichRussiahasthusfarbeensparednotbysocialismbutonlybyherownbackwardness.Internalrivalriesofcapitalismdonotalwaysgeneratewars;andnotallwarsareattributabletothiscause.TospeakofpossibilityofinterventionagainstUSSRtoday,aftereliminationofGermanyandJapanandafterexampleofrecentwar,issheerestnonsense.Ifnotprovokedbyforcesofintoleranceandsubversion,"capitalist"worldoftodayisquitecapableoflivingatpeacewithitselfandwithRussia.Finally,nosanepersonhasreasontodoubtsincerityofmoderatesocialistleadersinWesterncountries.Norisitfairtodenysuccessoftheireffortstoimproveconditionsforworkingpopulationwhenever,asinScandinavia,theyhavebeengivenchancetoshowwhattheycoulddo.Falsenessofthesepremises,everyoneofwhichpredatesrecentwar,wasamplydemonstratedbythatconflictitself.Anglo-AmericandifferencesdidnotturnouttobemajordifferencesofWesternworld.Capitalistcountries,otherthanthoseofAxis,showednodispositiontosolvetheirdifferencesbyjoiningincrusadeagainstUSSR.Insteadofimperialistwarturningintocivilwarsandrevolution,USSRfounditselfobligedtofightsidebysidewithcapitalistpowersforanavowedcommunityofaims.Nevertheless,allthesetheses,howeverbaselessanddisproven,arebeingboldlyputforwardagaintoday.Whatdoesthisindicate?ItindicatesthatSovietpartylineisnotbasedonanyobjectiveanalysisofsituationbeyondRussia’sborders;thatithas,indeed,littletodowithconditionsoutsideofRussia;thatitarisesmainlyfrombasicinner-Russiannecessitieswhichexistedbeforerecentwarandexisttoday.AtbottomofKremlin’sneuroticviewofworldaffairsistraditionalandinstinctiveRussiansenseofinsecurity.Originally,thiswasinsecurityofapeacefulagriculturalpeopletryingtoliveonvastexposedplaininneighborhoodoffiercenomadicpeoples.Tothiswasadded,asRussiacameintocontactwitheconomicallyadvancedWest,fearofmorecompetent,morepowerful,morehighlyorganizedsocietiesinthatarea.ButthislattertypeofinsecuritywasonewhichafflictedRussianrulersratherthanRussianpeople;forRussianrulershaveinvariablysensedthattheirrulewasrelativelyarchaicinform,fragileandartificialinitspsychologicalfoundations,unabletostandcomparisonorcontactwithpoliticalsystemsofWesterncountries.Forthisreasontheyhavealwaysfearedforeignpenetration,feareddirectcontactbetweenWesternworldandtheirown,fearedwhatwouldhappenifRussianslearnedtruthaboutworldwithoutorifforeignerslearnedtruthaboutworldwithin.Andtheyhavelearnedtoseeksecurityonlyinpatientbutdeadlystrugglefortotaldestructionofrivalpower,neverincompactsandcompromiseswithit.ItwasnocoincidencethatMarxism,whichhadsmoulderedineffectivelyforhalfacenturyinWesternEurope,caughtholdandblazedforthefirsttimeinRussia.Onlyinthislandwhichhadneverknownafriendlyneighbororindeedanytolerantequilibriumofseparatepowers,eitherinternalorinternational,couldadoctrinethrivewhichviewedeconomicconflictsofsocietyasinsolublebypeacefulmeans.AfterestablishmentofBolshevistregime,Marxistdogma,renderedevenmoretruculentandintolerantbyLenin’sinterpretation,becomeaperfectvehicleforsenseofinsecuritywithwhichBolsheviks,evenmorethanpreviousRussianrulers,wereafflicted.Inthisdogma,withitsbasicaltruismofpurpose,theyfoundjustificationfortheirinstinctivefearofoutsideworld,forthedictatorshipwithoutwhichtheydidnotknowhowtorule,forcrueltiestheydidnotdarenottoinflict,forsacrificestheyfeltboundtodemand.InthenameofMarxismtheysacrificedeverysingleethicalvalueintheirmethodsandtactics.Todaytheycannotdispensewithit.Itisfigleafoftheirmoralandintellectualrespectability.Withoutittheywouldstandbeforehistory,atbest,asonlythelastofthatlongsuccessionofcruelandwastefulRussianrulerswhohaverelentlesslyforcedcountryontoevernewheightsofmilitarypowerinordertoguaranteeexternalsecurityoftheirinternallyweakregimes.ThisiswhySovietpurposesmustalwaysbesolemnlyclothedintrappingsofMarxism,andwhynooneshouldunderrateimportanceofdogmainSovietaffairs.ThusSovietleadersaredriven[by]necessitiesoftheirownpastandpresentpositiontoputforwardadogmawhich[apparentomission]outsideworldasevil,hostileandmenacing,butasbearingwithinitselfgermsofcreepingdiseaseanddestinedtobewrackedwithgrowinginternalconvulsionsuntilitisgivenfinalcoupdegracebyrisingpowerofsocialismandyieldstonewandbetterworld.ThisthesisprovidesjustificationforthatincreaseofmilitaryandpolicepowerofRussianstate,forthatisolationofRussianpopulationfromoutsideworld,andforthatfluidandconstantpressuretoextendlimitsofRussianpolicepowerwhicharetogetherthenaturalandinstinctiveurgesofRussianrulers.BasicallythisisonlythesteadyadvanceofuneasyRussiannationalism,acenturiesoldmovementinwhichconceptionsofoffenseanddefenseareinextricablyconfused.ButinnewguiseofinternationalMarxism,withitshoneyedpromisestoadesperateandwar-tornoutsideworld,itismoredangerousandinsidiousthaneverbefore.ItshouldnotbethoughtfromabovethatSovietpartylineisnecessarilydisingenuousandinsincereonpartofthosewhoputitforward.Manyofthemaretooignorantofoutsideworldandmentallytoodependenttoquestion[apparentomission]self-hypnotism,andwhohavenodifficultymakingthemselvesbelievewhattheyfinditcomfortingandconvenienttobelieve.Finallywehavetheunsolvedmysteryastowho,ifanyone,inthisgreatlandactuallyreceivesaccurateandunbiasedinformationaboutoutsideworld.InatmosphereoforientalsecretivenessandconspiracywhichpervadesthisGovernment,possibilitiesfordistortingorpoisoningsourcesandcurrentsofinformationareinfinite.TheverydisrespectofRussiansforobjectivetruth--indeed,theirdisbeliefinitsexistence--leadsthemtoviewallstatedfactsasinstrumentsforfurtheranceofoneulteriorpurposeoranother.ThereisgoodreasontosuspectthatthisGovernmentisactuallyaconspiracywitinaconspiracy;andIforoneamreluctanttobelievethatStalinhimselfreceivesanythinglikeanobjectivepictureofoutsideworld.HerethereisamplescopeforthetypeofsubtleintrigueatwhichRussiansarepastmasters.InabilityofforeigngovernmentstoplacetheircasesquarelybeforeRussianpolicymakers--extenttowhichtheyaredeliveredupintheirrelationswithRussiatogoodgracesofobscureandunknownadviserswhomtheyneverseeandcannotinfluence--thistomymindismostdisquietingfeatureofdiplomacyinMoscow,andonewhichWesternstatesmenwoulddowelltokeepinmindiftheywouldunderstandnatureofdifficultiesencounteredhere.Part3:ProjectionofSovietOutlookinPracticalPolicyonOfficialLevelWehavenowseennatureandbackgroundofSovietprogram.Whatmayweexpectbywayofitspracticalimplementation?Sovietpolicy,asDepartmentimpliesinitsqueryunderreference,isconductedontwoplanes:(1)officialplanerepresentedbyactionsundertakenofficiallyinnameofSovietGovernment;and(2)subterraneanplaneofactionsundertakenbyagenciesforwhichSovietGovernmentdoesnotadmitresponsibility.Policypromulgatedonbothplaneswillbecalculatedtoservebasicpolicies(a)to(d)outlinedinpart1.Actionstakenondifferentplaneswilldifferconsiderably,butwilldovetailintoeachotherinpurpose,timingandeffect.Onofficialplanewemustlookforfollowing:(a)InternalpolicydevotedtoincreasingineverywaystrengthandprestigeofSovietstate:intensivemilitary-industrialization;maximumdevelopmentofarmedforces;greatdisplaystoimpressoutsiders;continuedsecretivenessaboutinternalmatters,designedtoconcealweaknessesandtokeepopponentinthedark.(b)Whereveritisconsideredtimelyandpromising,effortswillbemadetoadvanceofficiallimitsofSovietpower.Forthemoment,theseeffortsarerestrictedtocertainneighboringpointsconceivedofhereasbeingofimmediatestrategicnecessity,suchasnorthernIran,Turkey,possiblyBornholm.However,otherpointsmayatanytimecomeintoquestion,ifandasconcealedSovietpoliticalpowerisextendedtonewareas.Thusa"friendly"PersianGovernmentmightbeaskedtograntRussiaaportonPersianGulf.ShouldSpainfallunderCommunistcontrol,questionofSovietbaseatGibraltarStraitmightbeactivated.Butsuchclaimswillappearonofficiallevelonlywhenunofficialpreparationiscomplete.(c)RussianswillparticipateofficiallyininternationalorganizationswheretheyseeopportunityofextendingSovietpowerorofinhibitingordilutingpowerofothers.MoscowseesinUNOnotthemechanismforapermanentandstableworldsocietyfoundedonmutualinterestandaimsofallnations,butanarenainwhichaimsjustmentionedcanbefavorablypursued.AslongasUNOisconsideredheretoservethispurpose,Sovietswillremainwithit.Butifatanytimetheycometoconclusionthatitisservingtoembarrassorfrustratetheiraimsforpowerexpansionandiftheyseebetterprospectsforpursuitoftheseaimsalongotherlines,theywillnothesitatetoabandonUNO.Thiswouldimply,however,thattheyfeltthemselvesstrongenoughtosplitunityofothernationsbytheirwithdrawal,torenderUNOineffectiveasathreattotheiraimsorsecurity,andtoreplaceitwithaninternationalweaponmoreeffectivefromtheirviewpoint.ThusSovietattitudetowardUNOwilldependlargelyonloyaltyofothernationstoit,andondegreeofvigor,decisivenessandcohesionwithwhichthesenationsdefendinUNOthepeacefulandhopefulconceptofinternationallife,whichthatorganizationrepresentstoourwayofthinking.Ireiterate,MoscowhasnoabstractdevotiontoUNOideals.Itsattitudetothatorganizationwillremainessentiallypragmaticandtactical.(d)Towardcolonialareasandbackwardordependentpeoples,Sovietpolicy,evenonofficialplane,willbedirectedtowardweakeningofpowerandinfluenceandcontactsofadvancedWesternnations,ontheorythatinsofarasthispolicyissuccessful,therewillbecreatedavacuumwhichwillfavorCommunist-Sovietpenetration.Sovietpressureforparticipationintrusteeshiparrangementsthusrepresents,inmyopinion,adesiretobeinapositiontocomplicateandinhibitexertionofWesterninfluenceatsuchpointsratherthantoprovidemajorchannelforexertingofSovietpower.Lattermotiveisnotlacking,butforthisSovietsprefertorelyonotherchannelsthanofficialtrusteeshiparrangements.ThuswemayexpecttofindSovietsaskingforadmissioneverywheretotrusteeshiporsimilararrangementsandusingleversthusacquiredtoweakenWesterninfluenceamongsuchpeoples.(e)RussianswillstriveenergeticallytodevelopSovietrepresentationin,andofficialtieswith,countriesinwhichtheysensestrongpossibilitiesofoppositiontoWesterncentersofpower.ThisappliestosuchwidelyseparatedpointsasGermany,Argentina,MiddleEasterncountries,etc.(f)Ininternationaleconomicmatters,SovietpolicywillreallybedominatedbypursuitofautarchyforSovietUnionandSoviet-dominatedadjacentareastakentogether.That,however,willbeunderlyingpolicy.Asfarasofficiallineisconcerned,positionisnotyetclear.SovietGovernmenthasshownstrangereticencesinceterminationhostilitiesonsubjectforeigntrade.Iflarge-scalelong-termcreditsshouldbeforthcoming,IbelieveSovietGovernmentmayeventuallyagaindolipservice,asitdidin1930’s,todesirabilityofbuildingupinternationaleconomicexchangesingeneral.OtherwiseIthinkitpossibleSovietforeigntrademayberestrictedlargelytoSoviet’sownsecuritysphere,includingoccupiedareasinGermany,andthatacoldofficialshouldermaybeturnedtoprincipleofgeneraleconomiccollaborationamongnations.(g)Withrespecttoculturalcollaboration,lipservicewilllikewiseberenderedtodesirabilityofdeepeningculturalcontactbetweenpeoples,butthiswillnotinpracticebeinterpretedinanywaywhichcouldweakensecuritypositionofSovietpeoples.ActualmanifestationsofSovietpolicyinthisrespectwillberestrictedtoaridchannelsofcloselyshepherdedofficialvisitsandfunctions,withsuperabundanceofvodkaandspeechesanddearthofpermanenteffects.(h)Beyondthis,Sovietofficialrelationswilltakewhatmightbecalled"correct"coursewithindividualforeigngovernments,withgreatstressbeinglaidonprestigeofSovietUnionanditsrepresentativesandwithpunctiliousattentiontoprotocol,asdistinctfromgoodmanners.Part4:FollowingMayBeSaidastoWhatWeMayExpectbyWayofImplementationofBasicSovietPoliciesonUnofficial,orSubterraneanPlane,i.e.,onPlaneforWhichSovietGovernmentAcceptsNoResponsibility.Agenciesutilizedforpromulgationofpoliciesonthisplanearefollowing:1.InnercentralcoreofCommunistpartiesinothercountries.Whilemanyofpersonswhocomposethiscategorymayalsoappearandactinunrelatedpubliccapacities,theyareinrealityworkingcloselytogetherasanundergroundoperatingdirectorateofworldcommunism,aconcealedComintern12tightlycoordinatedanddirectedbyMoscow.Itisimportanttorememberthatthisinnercoreisactuallyworkingonundergroundlines,despitelegaityofpartieswithwhichitisassociated.2.RankandCommunistparties.Notedistinctionisdrawnbetweentheseandpersonsdefinedinparagraph1.Thisdistinctionhasbecomemuchsharperinrecentyears.WhereasformerlyforeignCommunistpartiesrepresentedacurious(andfromMoscow’sstandpointofteninconvenient)mixtureofconspiracyandlegitimateactivity,nowtheconspiratorialelementhasbeenneatlyconcentratedininnercircleandorderedunderground,whilerankandlongereventakenintoconfidenceaboutrealitiesofmovement--arethrustforwardasbonafideinternalpartisansofcertainpoliticaltendencieswithintheirrespectivecountries,genuinelyinnocentofconspiratorialconnectionwithforeignstates.Onlyincertaincountrieswherecommunistsarenumericallystrongdotheynowregularlyappearandactasabody.Asaruletheyareusedtopenetrate,andtoinfluenceordominate,ascasemaybe,otherorganizationslesslikelytobesuspectedofbeingtoolsofSovietGovernment,withaviewtoaccomplishingtheirpurposesthrough[apparentomission]organizations,ratherthanbydirectactionasaseparatepoliticalparty.3.Awidevarietyofnationalassociationsorbodieswhichcanbedominatedorinfluencedbysuchpenetration.Theseinclude:laborunions,youthleagues,women’sorganizations,racialsocieties,religioussocieties,socialorganizations,culturalgroups,liberalmagazines,publishinghouses,etc.4.Internationalorganizationswhichcanbesimilarlypenetratedthroughinfluenceovervariousnationalcomponents.Labor,youthandwomen’sorganizationsareprominentamongthem.Particular,almostvital,importanceisattachedinthisconnectiontointernationallabormovement.Inthis,MoscowseespossibilityofsidetrackingWesterngovernmentsinworldaffairsandbuildingupinternationallobbycapableofcompellinggovernmentstotakeactionsfavorabletoSovietinterestsinvariouscountriesandofparalyzingactionsdisagreeabletoUSSR.5.RussianOrthodoxChurch,withitsforeignbranches,andthroughittheEasternOrthodoxChurchingeneral.6.Pan-Slavmovementandothermovements(Azerbaijan,Armenian,Turcoman,etc.)basedonracialgroupswithinSovietUnion.7.GovernmentsorgoverninggroupswillingtolendthemselvestoSovietpurposesinonedegreeoranother,suchaspresentBulgarianandYugoslavgovernments,NorthPersianregime,ChineseCommunists,etc.NotonlypropagandamachinesbutactualpoliciesoftheseregimescanbeplacedextensivelyatdisposalofUSSR.Itmaybeexpectedthatcomponentpartsofthisfar-flungapparatuswillbeutilized,inaccordancewiththeirindividualsuitability,asfollows:(a)TounderminegeneralpoliticalandstrategicpotentialofmajorWesternPowers.Effortswillbemadeinsuchcountriestodisruptnationalself-confidence,tohamstringmeasuresofnationaldefense,toincreasesocialandindustrialunrest,tostimulateallformsofdisunity.Allpersonswithgrievances,whethereconomicorracial,willbeurgedtoseekredressnotinmediationandcompromise,butindefiant,violentstrugglefordestructionofotherelementsofsociety.Herepoorwillbesetagainstrich,blackagainstwhite,youngagainstold,newcomersagainstestablishedresidents,etc.(b)OnunofficialplaneparticularlyviolenteffortswillbemadetoweakenpowerandinfluenceofWesternPowers[on]colonial,backward,ordependentpeoples.Onthislevel,noholdswillbebarred.MistakesandweaknessesofWesterncolonialadministrationwillbemercilesslyexposedandexploited.LiberalopinioninWesterncountrieswillbemobilizedtoweakencolonialpolicies.Resentmentamongdependentpeopleswillbestimulated.Andwhilelatterarebeingencouragedtoseekindependence[from]WesternPowers,Sovietdominatedpuppetpoliticalmachineswillbeundergoingpreparationtotakeoverdomesticpowerinrespectivecolonialareaswhenindependenceisachieved.(c)WhereindividualgovernmentsstandinpathofSovietpurposespressurewillbebroughtfortheirremovalfromoffice.ThiscanhappenwheregovernmentsdirectlyopposeSovietforeignpolicyaims(Turkey,Iran),wheretheysealtheirterritoriesoffagainstCommunistpenetration(Switzerland,Portugal),orwheretheycompetetoostrongly(likeLaborGovernmentinEngland)formoraldominationamongelementswhichitisimportantforCommuniststodominate.(Sometimes,twoiftheelementsarepresentinasinglecase.ThenCommunistoppositionbecomesparticularlyshrillandsavage.)(d)InforeigncountriesCommunistswill,asarule,worktowarddestructionofallformsofpersonalindependence--economic,politicalormoral.Theirsystemcanhandleonlyindividualswhohavebeenbroughtintocompletedependenceonhigherpower.Thus,personswhoarefinanciallyindependent--suchasindividualbusinessmen,estateowners,successfulfarmers,artisans--andallthosewhoexerciselocalleadershiporhavelocalprestige--suchaspopularlocalclergymenorpoliticalfigures--areanathema.ItisnotbychancethateveninUSSRlocalofficialsarekeptconstantlyonmovefromonejobtoanother,topreventtheirtakingroot.(e)EverythingpossiblewillbedonetosetmajorWesternPowersagainsteachother.Anti-BritishtalkwillbepluggedamongAmericans,anti-AmericantalkamongBritish.Continentals,includingGermans,willbetaughttoabhorbothAnglo-Saxonpowers.Wheresuspicionsexist,theywillbefanned;wherenot,ignited.Noeffortwillbesparedtodiscreditandcombatalleffortswhichthreatentoleadtoanysortofunityorcohesionamongother[apparentomission]fromwhichRussiamightbeexcluded.Thus,allformsofinternationalorganizationnotamenabletoCommunistpenetrationandcontrol,whetheritbetheCatholic[apparentomission]internationaleconomicconcerns,ortheinternationalfraternityofroyaltyandaristocracy,mustexpecttofindthemselvesunderfirefrommany,andoften[apparentomission].(f)Ingeneral,allSovieteffortsonunofficialinternationalplanewillbenegativeanddestructiveincharacter,designedtoteardownsourcesofstrengthbeyondreachofSovietcontrol.ThisisonlyinlinewithbasicSovietinstinctthattherecanbenocompromisewithrivalpowerandthatconstructiveworkcanstartonlywhenCommunistpowerisdominant.Butbehindallthiswillbeappliedinsistent,unceasingpressureforpenetrationandcommandofkeypositionsinadministrationandespeciallyinpoliceapparatusofforeigncountries.TheSovietregimeisapoliceregimeparexcellence,rearedinthedimhalfworldofTsaristpoliceintrigue,accustomedtothinkprimarilyintermsofpolicepower.ThisshouldneverbelostsightofingaugingSovietmotives.Part5.PracticalDeductionsfromStandpointofUSPolicyInsummary,wehavehereapoliticalforcecommittedfanaticallytothebeliefthatwithUStherecanbenopermanentmodusvivendi,thatitisdesirableandnecessarythattheinternalharmonyofoursocietybedisrupted,ourtraditionalwayoflifebedestroyed,theinternationalauthorityofourstatebebroken,ifSovietpoweristobesecure.Thispoliticalfor