俄罗斯论战中的神话与误解

Mythsand

misconceptionsinthe

debateonRussia

HowtheyaffectWesternpolicy,

andwhatcanbedone

DuncanAllan,AnnetteBohr,MathieuBoulegue,KeirGiles,NigelGould-Davies,PhilipHanson,

JohnLough,OrysiaLutsevych,KateMallinson,AnaisMarin,JamesNixey,BenNoble,NikolaiPetrov,

EkaterinaSchulmann,JamesSherr,KatarynaWolczukandAndrewWood

ChathamHouse,theRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs,

isaworld-leadingpolicyinstitutebasedinLondon.

Ourmissionistohelpgovernmentsandsocietiesbuild

asustainablysecure,prosperousandjustworld.

Contents

Summary3

Introduction14

JamesNixey

01'RussiaandtheWestareas,,bad,'aseachother'18

JamesSherr

02'RussiaandtheWestwantthesamething'23

KeirGiles

03'RussiawaspromisedthatNATOwouldnotenlarge'28

JohnLough

04'RussiaisnotinaconflictwiththeWest'33

MathieuBoulegue

05'Weneedanewpan-Europeansecurityarchitecture38

thatincludesRussia'

DuncanAllan

06'WemustimprovetherelationshipwithRussia,even42

withoutRussianconcessions,asitistooimportant'

AndrewWood

07'Russiaisentitledtoadefensiveperimeter-asphere47

of''privilegedinterests"includingtheterritoryofotherstates'

KateMallinson

08'WemustdriveawedgebetweenRussiaandChinatoimpede51

theirabilitytoactintandemagainstWesterninterests'

AnnetteBohr

09,TheWest'srelationswithRussiamustbenormalized57

inordertocountertheriseofChina'

JamesNixey

10TheEurasianEconomicUnionisagenuineandmeaningful63

counterparttotheEU'

KatarynaWolczuk

11'ThepeoplesofUkraine,BelarusandRussiaareonenation'70

AnaisMarin

12'CrimeawasalwaysRussian'75

OrysiaLutsevych

13'Liberalmarketreforminthe1990swasbadforRussia'82

PhilipHanson

14'Sanctionsarethewrongapproach'86

NigelGould-Davies

15It'sallaboutPutin-Russiaisamanuallyrun,91

centralizedautocracy'

BenNobleandEkaterinaSchulmann

16,WhatcomesafterPutinmustbebetterthanPutin'96

NikolaiPetrov

Conclusion101

KeirGilesandJamesNixey

Abouttheauthors104

Acknowledgments109

Summary

Thisreportdeconstructs16ofthemostprevalentmythsthat

shapecontemporaryWesternthinkingonRussia,andexplains

theirdetrimentalimpactonthedesignandexecutionofpolicy.

WesternpoliciestowardsRussiahavefailedtoachievetheirbasicgoalof

establishingastableandmanageablerelationshipwithMoscowbecausethe

thinkingbehindthemhasoftenbeenunrealisticorsimplyflawed.Thisstudy

encouragesWesterngovernmentsandinstitutionstoreassesstheirassumptions

aboutRussiainordertodevelopmoreeffectiveresponsestotheincreasing

challengesthecountrypresents.<Effective,inthiscontextmeans,inparticular,

deterringRussianaggressionabroadandultimatelysecuringalessadversarial

relationshipwithRussiawithoutcompromisingprinciplesofsovereigntyand

securityandthevaluesonwhichtheyarebased.

Tothisend,thereportpresents16ofthemostprevalent'myths'-inabroadly

definedsense-thatdistorttheWesternpolicydebateonRussia.Itoutlineshow

specificmisconceptionshavegainedunwarrantedtractioninpolicymakingcircles

inthetWest*(understoodhereprincipallyasWesternEuropeandNorthAmerica).

ItdescribestheimpactofthesemisconceptionsonWesternpolicytowardsRussia,

andineachcasesuggestswhatbetter-informedpolicywouldlooklike.

Theoriginsandcausesofthesemythscanbedividedintoseveralbroadcategories.

SomeoriginateintheWest,basedonthedefaultassumptionsofpoliticiansand

policymakerswhoseformativeexperiencehasbeenrestrictedtooperatingin

Westerndemocraticsystemsandinteractingwithlike-mindedcountries.Thebelief,

forexample,thatRussiaandtheWesthavethesamedesiredendstatefortheir

relationshipariseswhenweprojectourownvaluesontoMoscowandassumethat

weshareadefaultcommonunderstandingofbasicprinciples.So,too,doesthe

argumentthatitisnecessaryordesirablefortheWesttomakeconcessionstowin

Russiancooperationonparticularissues.Similarly,thenotionthattheproblemin

relationswithRussiaisalackofdialoguepresupposesthatmoredialoguewill

narrowdifferences,wheninfactRussia'scurrentleadershipisstronglymotivatedto

maintainconfrontationasameansofforcingconcessionsfromtheWest.

OtherprevalentmythssimplyreflectinadequateknowledgeofRussia.Forexample,

thewidespreadimpressionthattheregimeiseffectivelyaone-manshowcontrolled

byVladimirPutinisaconsequenceofinsufficientunderstandingofhowthecountry

isreallygoverned,andofthesignificantrolesplayedbyotherindividualofficials

andtheinstitutionstheycontrolinshaping,negotiatinganddelivering

MythsandmisconceptionsinthedebateonRussia

HowtheyaffectWesternpolicy,andwhatcanbedone

policy.Similarly,theassumptionthatwhatcomesafterPutinmustnecessarilybe

betterthanthecurrentleadershipderivesfromanentirelyhumaninclination

towardsoptimismwhichhasnotbeentemperedbyexposuretotherealitiesof

Russianpoliticsandhistory.

Afurther,distinctcategoryofmythrelatestoRussia'srelationshipwithChina.

Forexample,theideathattheWestasawholecanfindcommoncausewithRussia

againstChina,orcontriveameanstosetRussiaandChinaagainsteachother,

isaconfectionofmultiplemyths-mostnotablyregardingthecomplexnature

oftheSino-Russianrelationshipitself,andRussia'slong-termobjectivesforits

ownrelationshipswithEuro-Atlanticstatesandinstitutions.

However,themajorityofthemythspresentedherehavebecomeembedded

inWesternpolicydiscourseasadirectresultofdeliberateRussianlobbyingand

disinformation.Severalofthemythsareprevalentnotonlybecausetheyarise

spontaneouslyandoutofgoodfaith,butalsobecauseitisintheKremlin'sinterest

tocultivatethem.Somereflectlong-standingaspirationsonthepartofRussia-

itsquestforapan-EuropeansecuritysystemonaRussiandesignhaspersisted

invariousformssincethe1950s.Equally,certainmythsreflectbroaderstrategic

narrativesthatprovideaframeworkforlegitimizingRussianforeignpolicygoals-

fbrexample,thenotionthatRussiacanrightfullylayclaimtoasphereofprivileged

interests；orthesuggestionthatUkrainiansandBelarusianstogetherwithRussians

areoneSlavicpeopleratherthanhavingtheirownidentitiesandseparateforms

ofstatehood.Atothertimes,Russia'saiminpropagatingamythcanbelinked

toadiscreteforeignpolicyoutcomesuchaspromotingtheEurasianEconomic

UnionasaneconomicintegrationprojectequivalenttotheEU.

Manyofthesemyths,whetherdeliberatelypromotedandpromulgatedby

Russiaornot,findawillingaudienceintheWestbecausetheysitcomfortably

withaudiencesnotattunedtoRussia'sunderstandingofhistoryanditscurrent

leaders'definitionofnationalinterests.Adherencetomythscansometimes

provideconvenientexcusesforinaction-orcopingstrategiesinthefaceoffear

anddiscomfortovertheideaofRussiaasastrategicadversary,andintheface

ofRussianactionsthatshouldotherwisebeunacceptable.Assuch,themyths

exertaperniciousinfluenceonWesternpolicy,distortingittofavourorpermit

outcomesdesirablefbrRussiabutnotfortheWest.

Oneoftheaimsofthisreportistocalloutthesemythsandencourage

areappraisalbyWesternpolicymakerswhohavemisconstruedthenatureofthe

relationshipwithRussiafbrtoolong.Bychallengingincorrectassumptionsabout

Russia,andtheflawedpolicyargumentsthatarebasedonthem,thisreporturges

Westernpoliticiansandofficialstore-examinetheirpositionsonRussiaandthe

effectsoftheirassumptionsonpolicy.

InApril2021,USPresidentJoeBidenstatedadesirefbr'predictableand

stablerelations'withRussia.Thiswasnotanaivecallforareset.Theexplicit

invitationtode-escalate,accompanyingacarefullycalibratedpackageofnew

sanctions,showedaclearintenttoinfluenceRussia'srisk-benefitcalculus

andofferRussiaaroutetoabetterandlessfraughtrelationshipwiththe

USandtheWestmorebroadly.

MythsandmisconceptionsinthedebateonRussia

HowtheyaffectWesternpolicy,andwhatcanbedone

Russia'simmediateandemphaticrejectionofthisoffermeansthatthe

relationshipseemstohavereturnedtoitsusualunstablepath.Thatsaid,inone

respecttherelationshipwithRussiaispredictable-theanalysespresentedinthis

reportstronglysuggestthatRussia,fortheforeseeablefuture,willcontinueto

trampleoninternationallyacceptedprinciplesofbehaviourandcommitfurther

aggressionsundeterred,usingsomeofthemythsbelowasjustification.

TheRussianleadershipwill,ofcourse,alsocontinueitseffortstoredefine

thebalanceofglobalpowerandnegotiatewithWashingtoninacontextmore

favourabletoRussia.ForUSpolicymakersandtheirallies,aswellastheir

respectivepublics,unravellingmythfromrealityindealingwithRussiahas

arguablyneverbeenmoreimportant.

Themyths

Myth01:'RussiaandtheWestareas"bad"aseachother)

Thispervasiveviewignoressignificantdifferencesinpolicyandconduct.'The

West'isacommunityofsharedinterestsandvalues；NATOandEU

enlargementshavebeendemand-driven.Russiainsteadseekstoimpose"firm

goodneighbourliness5onotherstateswhethertheyagreeornot,andregards

a'sphereofprivilegedinterests,asanentitlement.ControversiesoverWestern

militaryinterventionsbearnocomparisontotheduplicity,theabsenceof

diplomacyandthewholesaleabrogationoftreatiesthatprecededRussia's

interventionsinGeorgiaandUkraine.TheWestrequiresgreaterclarityin

presentingitsownpolicies,butthereisnoequivalencetoacknowledge.

Myth02:'RussiaandtheWestwantthesamething)

WesternpoliciesthataimtoengagewithRussiafailiftheyarefoundedon

thenotionthatatsomelevelRussianandWesterninterestsmustalignoratleast

overlap.Thedrivetonormalizerelationswithoutaddressingthefundamental

causesofdiscordmakesthingsworsenotbetter.Bothstrategicallyandin

detailonspecificissues,Russianobjectivesandunderlyingassumptionsabout

relationsbetweenstatesareincompatiblewithwhatWesternstatesandsocieties

findacceptable.RecognizingthatWesternandRussianvaluesandinterests

arenotreconcilable,andadjustingforthatrealityinthelong-termconduct

oftherelationship,iskeytomanagingtheseconflictsandcontradictions.

Myth03:'RussiawaspromisedthatNATOwouldnotenlarge'

ContrarytothebetrayalnarrativecultivatedbyRussiatoday,theUSSRwas

neverofferedaformalguaranteeonthelimitsofNATOexpansionpost_1990.

Moscowmerelydistortshistorytohelppreserveananti-Westernconsensus

athome.In1990,whenMikhailGorbachevagreedtoaunitedGermany's

incorporationintoNATO,heneitheraskedfornorreceivedanyformalguarantees

thattherewouldbenofurtherexpansionofNATObeyondtheterritoryof

aunitedGermany.ThedissolutionoftheWarsawPactandthecollapseofthe

USSRtransformedthesecuritysituationinEurope.Russia'snewleadersdid

MythsandmisconceptionsinthedebateonRussia

HowtheyaffectWesternpolicy,andwhatcanbedone

notquestiontheprinciplethatcountriesinEuropewerecompletelyfreetomake

theirownsecurityarrangements.Similarly,theNATO-RussiaFoundingActsigned

in1997recognizedthe'inherentright'ofallstates'tochoosethemeanstoensure

theirownsecurity5.

Myth04:'RussiaisnotinaconflictwiththeWest'

Euro-Atlanticpolicymakersmaybereluctanttoadmitit,butMoscow'snatural

stateisoneofconfrontationwiththeWest.Akeyfeatureoftheconflictistheuse

ofunconventionalhostilemeasuresthatremainabovethethresholdofaccepted

peacetimeactivitiesbutbelowthatofwarfare.TheKremlinseekstoundermine

Westernintereststhroughawell-establishedtoolkit,suchaselectioninterference,

targetedstate-sanctionedassassinations,andinformationwarfare.Crucially,

unconventionalhostilemeasuresandindirectactionsarenotjustfEATUResofthis

conflict,butcontributetothe(mistaken)perceptionoftherebeingnoconflict.

Myth05:'Weneedanewpan-Europeansecurityarchitecture

thatincludesRussia'

Russianleadersadvocateatreaty-basedandcontinent-wideEuropeansecurity

systemthatwouldreplaceexisting'Euro-Atlantic'structures,particularlyNATO.

Thisproposalisproblematic-itignoresbasicdifferencesbetweenRussiaand

Westerncountriesovertheissueofsovereignty.Russiawants'greatpower'

privilegesforitself,limitsonthesovereigntyofneighbouringcountries,and

agreementthatstatesshouldnotbecriticizediftheyruntheirdomesticaffairsin

waysinconsistentwiththevaluesofdemocracy,humanrightsandtheruleoflaw.

ThisperspectiveclasheswithcoreWesterninterestsandvalues.Assuch,evenif

anewpan-Europeansecurityarchitectureweretobeestablished,thefundamental

differencesinoutlookbetweenthetwosideswouldstopsuchasystemfrom

functioning.Westernpolicymakersshouldbeclearthatdisagreementswith

RussiaovertheEuropeansecurityarchitectureareprofoundandunlikely

tobereconciledsoon.

Myth06:'WemustimprovetherelationshipwithRussia,

evenwithoutRussianconcessions,asitistooimportant'

Thismythrestsonthepremisethatacombinationofsupposedlyself-evident

geopoliticalweight,mutualeconomicinterestsandcompensationforlosingthe

ColdWarareoverridingimperativesforasuccessfulresetwithRussia-leadingto

anecessarilyfullyfunctionalrelationship.Thatthismayleave'lesserpowers,more

vulnerabletointimidationorinfluenceis,accordingtothosewhosubscribetothe

myth,anunfortunatesideeffectand/orapriceworthpaying.Yetquiteapartfrom

thedeepethicalambiguitiessuchanaccommodationimplies,thearrangement

simplywouldnotwork.

Partly,thisisbecausethepresentationoftheWest,andtheUSinparticular,

asathreatto'FortressRussia,isanessentialsupporttotheKremlin'sincreasingly

authoritariandomesticrule.FewareasshowpromiseforcooperationwithRussia.

Effortsinthosemostfrequentlymooted-cybersecurity,theMiddleEastand

MythsandmisconceptionsinthedebateonRussia

HowtheyaffectWesternpolicy,andwhatcanbedone

NorthAfrica,trade-haveallfailedsofarbecauseofRussia'silliberalapproach

toeachsubject.ItisalsoworthrememberingthatMoscowitselfisnotputting

forwardcooperationwishlists；theyareinvariablytheworkofWesternpoliticians

anddiplomats.WesternpolicymakersmustexpectthattheKremlin'svisionof

Russiaasafortressentitledtoacommandingroleintheworldyetthreatenedby

outsidepowers,andbytheUSinparticular,willremainattheheartofitsbeliefs.

Myth07:'Russiaisentitledtoadefensiveperimeter-asphere

of"privilegedinterests"includingtheterritoryofotherstates'

TheideathatRussiashouldbeentitledtoanexclusivesphereofinfluencein

otherstates,notablyinEasternEuropeandCentralAsia,isdeeplyproblematic.

ItisincompatiblewithprofessedEuro-Atlanticvaluesaroundstates'sovereignty

andrightstoself-determination.Itisdetrimentaltogeopoliticalorderand

internationalsecurity,asitimplicitlygiveslicencetoRussianactions-territorial

aggression,annexation,evenoutrightwar-thatriskcreatinginstabilityinRussia's

neighboursandEuropemorewidely.IteffectivelyentitlesRussiatodominate

neighbouringstatesandviolatetheirterritorialintegrity.Anditmisconstrues

contemporarygeopoliticalrealities,suchasRussia'sgrudgingacceptanceof

asecondplayerinitsvicinity-China(specifically,inrelationtotheexpansion

ofChina'sinfluenceinCentralAsia).Betrayalaside,itisdoubtfulthatitiseven

withinthegiftoftheWesttoconcedeasphereofinfluencetoRussia-orthat

suchanunderstandingwouldworkifsomehowestablished.Failuretocritically

re-examinegeopoliticaldoctrinesonthissubjectrisksreproducingreductiveCold

Warerapostures.Andwhilesomepost-SovietandEasternEuropeanstates-and

eventheirpopulations-maydesirecloserrelationswithRussia,noneofthem

wanttosacrificetheirsovereignrights.

Myth08:'WemustdriveawedgebetweenRussiaandChinato

impedetheirabilitytoactintandemagainstWesterninterests'

ThenotionthattheWestcanexploittensionsbetweenRussiaandChinaboth

misunderstandsthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenthetwocountriesand

overestimatesitssusceptibilitytoexternalleverage.Acorollaryofthemythisthe

assumptionthatRussiaandChinaformasinglestrategicentitythatwassomehow

'allowed'todevelopbynegligentWesternpolicymakers.YetjustastheWestdid

notjoinRussiaandChinatogether,itcannotputthemasunder.Thetwopowers

haveanaturalideologicalcompatibilityaswellascomplementaryeconomies

andinterestsinarangeofspheres,includingtechnology,cybercooperationand

defence.Atthesametime,themythdistortsthenatureoftheSino-Russian

relationshipbyascribingtoitabehaviouralconvergenceandagrandconspiratorial

character,whileoverlookingeachstate'scommandingimperativetoretainfull

autonomyindecision-making.Giventhatthetwopowerscurrentlyhavemore

togainfromcooperationthancompetition,bothRussiaandChinahavechosen

topushtheirdifferencestothebackgroundfortheforeseeablefuture.Butlatent

bilateraltensionscouldcometotheforeinthefutureasChina'sascendancy

continues.Theemergenceofan'axisofauthoritarianism'isthusnotinprospect.

MythsandmisconceptionsinthedebateonRussia

HowtheyaffectWesternpolicy,andwhatcanbedone

Myth09:'TheWest'srelationswithRussiamustbe

normalizedinordertocountertheriseofChina'

RapprochementwithRussiaasastrategicmeansofcounteringChinawould

likelytakeplaceontheKremlin'sterms,andwouldmeansacrificingthehard-won

sovereigntyofotherpost-Sovietstates.Moreover,tosubscribetothismythis

toassumethattheKi'emlinevenwantsnormalizedrelationswiththeWest,

andtoforgetthatabetterrelationshipwithRussia,whateveritsprice,would

dolittletopreventChina'sreachandcapabilitiesfromcontinuingtogrow.Most

importantly,whileChina'stransgressionsofinternationallawandviolationsof

humanrightsarenomoretobeexcusedthanthoseofRussia,analliancewith

theKremlinimplicitlyremovesthepossibilityofChinaandtheWesthaving

sustainablerelationsinthelongerterm.Westernnationsdonothavetheluxury

offocusingsolelyonthechallengesposedbyChinawhilesomehowglossing

overRussia'saggressivebehaviour.

Myth10:'TheEurasianEconomicUnionisagenuineand

meaningfulcounterparttotheEU'

RussiapresentstheEurasianEconomicUnion(EAEU)asapartnerfortheEU

inaproposedfree-tradeareastretching'fromLisbontoVladivostok\Inreality,

theEAEUisapoliticalprojectlackingthefeaturesofatruecommonmarket.

Russiadisregardstherulesoftheveryorganizationthroughwhichitseeksto

reassertitspower,andwithwhichitwantstheEUtocooperate.Tradepolicy

doesnotconstituteaseparate,non-politicizedtrackinRussia'sforeignpolicy；

itissubordinatedtoit.Duetothisinstrumentaluseanddeeppoliticizationof

economicdiplomacy,theEAEUisfunctionallyunabletoactasanintegrationbody

inEurasia,notleastbecauseRussiahasnoeconomicinterestincomprehensive

tradeliberalizationeitherinsidetheEAEUorviaafree-tradeareawiththeEU.

Myth11:'ThepeoplesofUkraine,BelarusandRussia

areonenation'

TheKremlinmisrepresentstheregion'shistoryinordertolegitimizetheideathat