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经济学人:信息不对称之柠檬市场理论与效应(上)Economics
brief:
six
big
ideas.经济概要:六大经济思想。Information
asymmetry:
Secrets
and
agents信息不对称:秘密和代理George
Akerlof's
1970
paper,“The
Market
forLemons”,
is
a
foundation
stone
of
informationeconomics,
the
first
in
our
series
on
seminaleconomic
ideas.六大经济思想之一,乔治·阿克洛夫1970年的论文——《柠檬市场》,它是信息经济学的一块基石。In
2007
the
state
of
Washington
introduced
a
new
rule
aimed
at
making
the
labour
marketfairer:
firms
were
banned
from
checking
job
applicants'
credit
scores.2007年,华盛顿州引入了一项旨在让劳动力市场更公平的新法律:企业被禁止核查求职者的信用得分。Campaigners
celebrated
the
new
law
as
a
step
towards
equality—an
applicant
with
a
lowcredit
score
is
much
more
likely
to
be
poor,
black
or
young.发起这项运动的人欢呼庆祝,认为这是通向平等的一步——信用得分低的求职者极有可能是穷人、黑人或者年轻人。Since
then,
ten
other
states
have
followed
suit.自那以后,又有十个州如法炮制。But
when
Robert
Clifford
and
Daniel
Shoag,
two
economists,
recently
studied
the
bans,
theyfound
that
the
laws
left
blacks
and
the
young
with
fewer
jobs,
not
more.但是,日前,当两位经济学家——罗伯特·克利福德和丹尼尔·绍格——研究了这些禁令时,他们发现,这些法律带给黑人和年轻人的工作更少了,而不是更多。Before
1970,
economists
would
not
have
found
much
in
their
discipline
to
help
them
mull
thispuzzle.放在1970年之前,经济学家是不会在这门学科中找到太多的东西来帮助他们仔细思考这个迷的。Indeed,
they
did
not
think
very
hard
about
the
role
of
information
at
all.实际上,他们当时根本就没有很努力地去思考信息的作用。In
the
labour
market,
for
example,
the
textbooks
mostly
assumed
that
employers
know
theproductivity
of
their
workers—or
potential
workers—and,
thanks
to
competition,
pay
themfor
exactly
the
value
of
what
they
produce.例如,那时的教科书大都假设,在劳动力市场中,雇主知道他们的工人——或者潜在的工人——的生产率,而且,由于竞争,是按照工人所生产的东西的价值给他们开工资的。You
might
think
that
research
upending
that
conclusion
would
immediately
be
celebrated
asan
important
breakthrough.人们可能认为,颠覆这一论断的研究立即会被誉为一项重大突破。Yet
when,
in
the
late
1960s,
George
Akerlof
wrote
“The
Market
for
Lemons”,
which
did
just
that,and
later
won
its
author
a
Nobel
prize,
the
paper
was
rejected
by
three
leading
journals.然而,当乔治·阿克洛夫于上世纪60年代末期写出恰恰实现了这种突破并为作者赢得了诺贝尔奖的《柠檬市场》时,这篇论文曾遭到三家主要期刊拒绝。At
the
time,
Mr
Akerlof
was
an
assistant
professor
at
the
University
of
California,
Berkeley;
hehad
only
completed
his
PhD,
at
MIT,
in
1966.那时,阿克洛夫是加州大学伯克利分校的一名助教;仅于1966年在麻省理工完成了博士学位。Perhaps
as
a
result,
the
American
Economic
Review
thought
his
paper's
insights
trivial.也许是因为这个原因,《美国经济评论》认为他的论文的观点微不足道。The
Review
of
Economic
Studies
agreed.《经济研究评论》同意了这个看法。The
Journal
of
Political
Economy
had
almost
the
opposite
concern:
it
could
not
stomach
thepaper's
implications.《政治经济学杂志》有着几乎完全相反的担忧:它可能消化不了这篇论文深远意义。Mr
Akerlof,
now
an
emeritus
professor
at
Berkeley
and
married
to
Janet
Yellen,
the
chairman
ofthe
Federal
Reserve,
recalls
the
editor's
complaint:“If
this
is
correct,
economics
would
bedifferent.”如今已是伯克利分校名誉教授并同美联储主席珍妮特·耶伦成婚的阿克洛夫还记着那位编辑的不满:“如果这是正确的,经济学会截然不同。”In
a
way,
the
editors
were
all
right.从某种程度上来说,这些编辑当时都是对的。Mr
Akerlof's
idea,
eventually
published
in
the
Quarterly
Journal
of
Economics
in
1970,
was
atonce
simple
and
revolutionary.最终于1970年在《经济学季刊》上发表了的阿克洛夫的思想即是简单的,也是革命性的。Suppose
buyers
in
the
used-car
market
value
good
cars—“peaches”—at
$1,000,
and
sellers
atslightly
less.假设,二手车市场中的买方给好车——“桃子”——估价1000美元,卖方要稍微少一点。斯彭斯指出,顶层的工人或许会以收集荣誉——如大学学位——的行为为信号,向企业展示自己的才华。Crucially,
this
only
works
if
the
signal
is
credible:
if
low-productivity
workers
found
it
easy
toget
a
degree,
then
they
could
masquerade
as
clever
types.关键是,这只有在信号是可信的时候才管用:如果低生产力的工人发现得到学位很容易,他们就可能把自己装扮成聪明之人。This
idea
turns
conventional
wisdom
on
its
head.这一思想彻底颠覆了传统的智慧。Education
is
usually
thought
to
benefit
society
by
making
workers
more
productive.一般认为,教育之有益于社会,是因为它让工人变得更高效。If
it
is
merely
a
signal
of
talent,
the
returns
to
investment
in
education
flow
to
the
students,who
earn
a
higher
wage
at
the
expense
of
the
less
able,
and
perhaps
to
universities,
but
not
tosociety
at
large.如果它仅仅是才华的一个象征,教育投资的所得就会流向学生,使他们以才华较少之人为代价获得更高的工资;或者也可能是各个大学,但不是整个社会。One
disciple
of
the
idea,
Bryan
Caplan
of
George
Mason
University,
is
currently
penning
a
bookentitled
“The
Case
Against
Education”.这个思想的一位信徒——乔治梅森大学的布莱恩·卡普兰目前正在撰写一本名为《反对教育之种种》的书。(Mr
Spence
himself
regrets
that
others
took
his
theory
as
a
literal
description
of
the
world.)(斯彭斯本人后悔的是,被人把他的理论当成是对这个世界的一种文字描述。)Signalling
helps
explain
what
happened
when
Washington
and
those
other
states
stopped
firmsfrom
obtaining
job-applicants'
credit
scores.信号行为有助于解释华盛顿等州在阻止企业获得求职者信用得分时所发生了的事情。Credit
history
is
a
credible
signal:
it
is
hard
to
fake,
and,
presumably,
those
with
good
creditscores
are
more
likely
to
make
good
employees
than
those
who
default
on
their
debts.信用历史是一个可信的信号:它难以造假,而且,可以假定,信用得分良好的人比债务违约的人更有可能成为好雇员。Messrs
Clifford
and
Shoag
found
that
when
firms
could
no
longer
access
credit
scores,
theyput
more
weight
on
other
signals,
like
education
and
experience.克利福德先生和绍格先生发现,当企业不再能得到信用得分时,会把重点放在其他信号上面,如教育和资历。Because
these
are
rarer
among
disadvantaged
groups,
it
became
harder,
not
easier,
for
themto
convince
employers
of
their
worth.因为这些信号在弱势劣群体中较为少见,因而,对他们而言,让雇主相信自己的价值就变得更难,而不是更容易。1.nolonger不再例句:Afteraboutthreemonths,Iwas
nolongeraddictedtonicotine.
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