2023年移民与发展简报

Contents

1.TrendsinRemittanceFlows 1

1.1RemittanceFlowsRemainaMajorSourceofExternalFinanceforDevelopingCountries 1

1.2StrongGrowthofRemittancesin2022 3

1.3RemittanceOutlookfor2023 5

2.RegionalTrendsinMigrationandRemittanceFlows 12

2.1EastAsiaandPacific 12

2.2EuropeandCentralAsia 1

6

2.3LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean 2

0

2.4MiddleEastandNorthAfrica 2

4

2.5SouthAsia 2

7

2.6Sub-SaharanAfrica 3

1

References 36

Endnotes 39

ListofFigures

Figure1.1aRemittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-

andMiddle-IncomeCountries,2000–2024f 2

Figure1.1bRemittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-

andMiddle-IncomeCountries,ExcludingChina,2000–2024f 2

Figure1.2TopRecipientsofRemittancesamongLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,2022 3

Figure1.3EmploymentLevelsofHispanic,Foreign,andNativeBornintheUnitedStates 3

Figure1.4RemittanceFlowsbyLMICRegion,2022-24f 5

FigureB1.1.1InflationSeemstoHavePeaked,ButItRemainsHigh 7

Figure1.5HowMuchDoesItCosttoSend$200?RegionalRemittanceCosts,2021-22 9

Figure1.6USSouthwestBorderApprehensions/Inadmissibles,FY20-FY23 9

Figure2.1ResourceFlowstotheEastAsiaandPacificRegion,2000–23f 12

Figure2.2TopRemittanceRecipientsintheEastAsiaandPacificRegion,2022 1

3

Figure2.3RemittanceFeestothePhilippinesAreAmongtheLowestinEast

AsiaandPacific

14

Figure2.4RemittancesforCISCountriesAreLikelytoRemainWellabovePrewarLevels,ButThereAre

SignsofNormalization,2019–24f 1

6

Figure2.5ResourceflowstoEuropeandCentralAsia,2000–23f 1

7

Figure2.6TheAppreciationoftheRubleagainsttheUSDollarIncreasedtheValueofMoneyTransfers

fromRussiatoManyCISCountries,ButthePaceHasSlowedinRecentMonths 17

Figure2.7TopRemittanceRecipientsinEuropeandCentralAsia,2022 1

8

Figure2.8CostofSendingMoneyinEuropeandCentralAsiaRoseSlightlyin2022Q4 1

9

Figure2.9CostofSendingMoneyfromUkraineHasBeenLowerthanPrewarLevels,2021–22 1

9

Figure2.10Remittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLatin

AmericaandtheCaribbean,2000–23f 2

0

Figure2.11TopRemittanceRecipientsinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,2022 2

1

Figure2.12RemittanceFlowstoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanGrewataSlowerPaceduring20222Q

1,

exceptforNicaragua 2

2

Figure2.13TheCostofSendingMoneytoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanHasRemainedStable 22

Figure2.14RemittancestoMiddleEastandNorthAfricaOfferSupportagainstOtherFlows’Volatility,

2000–23f 2

5

Figure2.15TopRemittanceRecipientsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,2022 2

6

Figure2.16SendingMoneywithinMiddleEastandNorthAfricaisLessExpensivethanSendingMoney

fromOutside 2

6

Figure2.17RemittanceFlowstoMiddleEastandNorthAfricatoDeceleratein2022,ButExpectedto

RecoverModestly 2

7

Figure2.18ResourceFlowstoSouthAsia,2000–23f 2

8

Figure2.19TopRemittanceRecipientsinSouthAsia,2022 2

8

Figure2.20ExchangeRateImpactonRemittancesintheSouthAsiaRegion 2

9

Figure2.21TheCostsofSendingRemittancestoSouthAsiaVaryacrossCorridors 30

Figure2.22ResourceFlowstoSub-SaharanAfrica,2000–23f 32

Figure2.23TopRemittanceRecipientsintheSub-SaharanAfricaRegion,2022 32

Figure2.24CostsofSendingRemittancestoAfricanCountriesVaryWidelyacrossCorridors 3

3

ListofBoxes

Box1.1GlobalEconomicOutlookin2023 6

Box1.2RemitStatDevelopingGuidelinestoImproveDataonRemittances 7

ListofTables

Table1.1EstimatesandProjectionsofRemittanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeRegions....................1

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief38

vii

Summary

ThisMigrationandDevelopmentBrief(number38intheseries)describeskeydevelopmentsinremittanceflowsthathaveoccurredsincethepreviousbrief,publishedinNovember2022.Projectionsofremittancetrendsin2023aremadeinlightofaslowingglobaleconomy,continuedhighinflationandincreasedinterestrates,andRussia’sinvasionofUkraineandtheconflictinSudan.

Remittancetrends.Inthepost-COVIDperiod,remittanceshavebecomeevenmoreimportantasasourceofexternalfinancing.Theyhaveprovedtoberesilient.In2022,remittanceflowstolow-andmiddle-incomecountriesincreasedby8percent,toreach$647billion,registeringhighergrowththanourexpectationssixmonthsago.Thisincreaseisremarkable,giventhatitfolloweda10.6percentgrowthratein2021andtheeconomicenvironmentseemeddifficultduetoslowingeconomiesaroundtheworld,inflation,andthewarinUkraine.

In2023,however,thegrowthofremittancesisexpectedtomoderateto1.4percent,toalevelof$656billionduetoslowingeconomicgrowthinmajorsourcecountries.Slowergrowthinremittancesisexpectedinallregions,notablyinEuropeandCentralAsia(1percent)andSouthAsia(0.3percent).InEuropeandCentralAsia,thegrowthinremittancesisslowingdownbecauseofahighbaseeffect,lingeringweaknessinflowstoUkraineandRussia,andtheweakeningoftherubleagainsttheUSdollar.InSouthAsia,growthinremittancesisexpectedtocontractduetoworldwidelayoffsintheinformationtechnologysector,loweroilpricesthatareexpectedtodecreaseremittanceflowsfromtheGulfCooperationCouncilcountries,andthecontinueddiversionofremittanceflowstoinformalchannelsaseconomicuncertaintiesworseninsomerecipientcountries.

Bycontrast,thegrowthrateofremittancesisexpectedtocontinuetoberelativelystronginLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(3.3percent).MostsendersofremittancestothisregionarebasedintheUnitedStates,whereboththeemploymentlevelsandwagesofHispanicandforeign-bornworkershavebeenstrong.Growthratesofremittanceflowsareexpectedtobe1.7percentintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,1percentintheEastAsiaandPacificregion,and1.3percentinSub-SaharanAfrica.

Besideseconomicgrowthandtheemploymentlevelsofforeignworkers,theothertwovariablesthataffectremittanceflowsareoilprices(especiallyintheRussianFederationandmembercountriesoftheGulfCooperationCouncil),andexchangeratesoflocalcurrencieswithrespecttotheUSdollar.Whenthelocalcurrencyofasourcecountry(e.g.,theruble)weakensagainsttheUSdollar,thevalueofremittancesinUSdollartermsdeclinescorrespondingly.SuchvaluationeffectsaresignificantinthecaseofremittanceflowstoCentralAsiancountries(whereremittancesoriginateinrubleterms)andinthecaseofNorthAfrica(whereremittancesoriginateintermsofeuroorpoundsterling).Inmanyremittance-recipientcountriesthatarefacingbalanceofpaymentsdifficultiesandtheemergenceofgapsbetweentheofficialandthemarketexchangerate,remittanceflowsmayshifttoinformalchannels,inwhichcasetheofficialdataonremittanceswouldunderestimatethetruesizeofflows.ThisislikelythecaseinseveraleconomiesinSouthAsiaandSub-SaharanAfrica.

Remittancecosts(UnitedNationsSustainableDevelopmentGoalindicator10.c.1).AccordingtotheWorldBank’sRemittancePricesWorldwideDatabase,theglobalaveragecostofsending$200tolow-andmiddle-incomecountrieswas6.2percentinthefourthquarterof2022,morethantwiceashighastheSustainableDevelopmentGoaltargetof3percent.Amongdevelopingcountryregions,thecostwaslowestinSouthAsia,atabout4.9percent,whileSub-SaharanAfricacontinuedtohavethehighestaveragecost,atabout8.0percent.

Migrationtrends.Migrationflowsareatrecordlevelsinrecenthistory.BordercrossingscontinuetobehighintheUnitedStatesandinEuropesincepre-COVIDlevels.Tighteningofbordercontrolsinsomehostcountrieshasledtoanincreaseinthenumberoftransitmigrantsinmanycountries(includingMexico,Egypt,andMorocco).RefugeeflowshavegrownduetoconflictsinSudanandUkraine.Thenumberofinternallydisplacedpersonsisrisingduetoclimatedisasters(e.g.,intheHornofAfricaandtheSahel).

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief38

viii

Acknowledgments

ThisbriefwaspreparedbyDilipRatha,VandanaChandra,EungJuKim,NyashaKurasha,andBaranPradhanoftheMigrationandRemittancesUnitoftheGlobalUnitEngagementintheSocialProtectionandJobsGlobalPractice,andSoniaPlazaoftheFinance,Competitiveness,andInnovationGlobalPractice.ThankstoErgysIslamaj,HodaYoussef,IvailoV.Izvorski,PabloGarriga,ZeinaElKhalilforhelpfulcomments,andtoMichalRutkowskiandLoliArribas-Banosforsupportandguidance.ThecontributionsofRebeccaOngforcommunicationssupport,WilliamShawforcontentediting,andFayreMakeigforcopyeditingareespeciallyrecognized

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief38

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1.TrendsinRemittanceFlows

1.1RemittanceFlowsRemainaMajorSourceofExternalFinanceforDevelopingCountries

In2022,remittanceflowstolow-andmiddle-incomecountries(LMICs)areestimatedtohaveincreasedby8percent,reaching$647billion(accordingtorevisedofficialdata).Theremittancegrowthrateisexpectedtomoderateto1.4percentin2023,resultingintotalinflowsof$656billion(table1.1).Fortheworld,remittanceflowsareexpectedtoreach$840billionin2023.Onaglobalscale,theremittancesgrowthrateisprojectedtoincreaseto2.0percentin2024,increasinginflowsby$18billion.

Overthepastyear,remittanceshavecontinuedtorepresentanevenlargersourceofexternalfinanceforLMICs,relativetoforeigndirectinvestment(FDI),officialdevelopmentassistance(ODA),andportfolioinvestmentflows(figure1.1a).TheimportanceofremittancesasapremiersourceofexternalfinanceforLMICsismoreapparentwhenChinaisexcludedfromthesample(figure1.1b).

Table1.1EstimatesandProjectionsofRemittanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeRegions

($billions)

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022e

2023f

2024f

Low-andmiddle-incomecountries

435

475

522

548

542

599

647

656

666

EastAsiaandPacific

122

128

137

143

131

129

130

131

132

excludingChina

61

65

70

74

72

76

79

81

83

EuropeandCentralAsia

43

52

59

62

58

66

79

80

80

LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean

73

81

89

96

103

130

145

150

154

MiddleEastandNorthAfrica

48

54

55

57

60

67

64

65

67

SouthAsia

111

117

132

140

147

157

176

177

178

Sub-SaharanAfrica

39

42

49

49

43

50

53

54

56

World

590

640

695

727

717

791

831

840

858

Growthrate(percent)

Low-andmiddle-incomecountries

-1.5

9.3

9.8

5.0

-1.1

10.6

8.0

1.4

1.5

EastAsiaandPacific

-0.9

5.3

7.0

4.0

-8.0

-2.0

0.7

1.0

1.0

excludingChina

3.0

5.8

8.4

6.4

-3.4

5.5

3.8

3.0

2.9

EuropeandCentralAsia

2.2

21.1

12.9

4.7

-6.9

15.3

19.0

1.0

-0.2

LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean

7.2

11.0

9.9

8.3

7.1

26.5

11.3

3.3

2.7

MiddleEastandNorthAfrica

-1.2

13.4

2.2

4.1

3.7

12.2

-3.8

1.7

1.8

SouthAsia

-5.9

6.0

12.3

6.1

5.2

6.7

12.2

0.3

0.8

Sub-SaharanAfrica

-8.6

9.6

16.9

0.0

-13.0

16.3

6.1

1.3

3.7

World

-1.0

8.4

8.6

4.5

-1.4

10.4

5.1

1.1

2.0

Memoitems:RemittancestoLMICsaccordingtothe2021countryclassificationusedinMDBrief36

($billion)

442

482

529

556

550

609

656

666

677

(%growth)

-1.3

9.2

9.7

5.1

-1.2

10.8

7.8

1.5

1.5

Source:WorldBank–KNOMADstaffestimates.SeetheappendixtoMigrationandDevelopmentBrief32forforecastingmethods(WorldBank/KNOMAD2020).

Note:e=estimate;f=forecast;LMICs=low-andmiddle-incomecountries.

*Inthe2022countryclassificationofBrief37,PanamaandRomaniamovedtothehigh-incomegroupfromtheupper-middle-incomegroup.WhilePalaumovedtotheupper-middle-incomegroupfromthehigh-incomegroup,Venezuelahasbeen

unclassifiedduetoalackofavailabledata.

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief38

2

800

600

400

200

0

Figure1.1aRemittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,2000–2024f

(US$billion)

FDI

Remittances

ODA

Figure1.1bRemittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,ExcludingChina,2000–2024f

(US$billion)

700

Remittances

600

500

FDI

400

300

ODA

200

100

0

Sources:WorldBank–KNOMADstaff;WorldDevelopmentIndicators;IMFBalanceofPaymentsStatistics.AlsoseeWorldBank/KNOMAD(2016)forsources,methods,andchallengesofcollectingremittancedata.

Note:FDI=foreigndirectinvestment;ODA=officialdevelopmentassistance;e=estimate;f=forecast.

Thetopfiverecipientcountriesforremittancesin2022wereIndia,whichreceivedatotalof$111billionintheyear,followedbyMexicowithinflowsof$61billion,thenChina($51billion),thePhilippines($38billion),andPakistan($30billion)(figure1.2a).Amongeconomieswhereremittanceinflowsrepresentverylargesharesofgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)–highlightingtheimportanceofremittancesforfundingcurrentaccountandfiscalshortfalls–Tajikistan(51percentofGDP),Tonga(44percent),Lebanon(35percent),Samoa(34percent),andtheKyrgyzRepublic(31percent)standinthetopten(figure1.2b).

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May-08

Nov-08

May-09

Nov-09

May-10

Nov-10

May-11

Nov-11

May-12

Nov-12

May-13

Nov-13

May-14

Nov-14

May-15

Nov-15

May-16

Nov-16

May-17

Nov-17

May-18

Nov-18

May-19

Nov-19

May-20

Nov-20

May-21

Nov-21

May-22

Nov-22

May-23

Figure1.2TopRecipientsofRemittancesamongLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,2022

a.US$billion,2022

111.2

61.1

51.0

38.0

29.928.3

21.520.1

b.PercentageofGDP,2022

51

44

3634

31

2927

242323

Source:WorldBank–KNOMADstaff;WorldDevelopmentIndicators;IMFBalanceofPaymentsStatistics.Note:GDP=grossdomesticproduct.

1.2StrongGrowthofRemittancesin2022

RemittancereceiptsbyLMICsincreasedby8percentin2022,reaching$647billionandexceedingtheforecastgiveninMigrationandDevelopmentBrief37(publishedinNovember2022).Stronggrowthinremittancesin2022,whichfolloweda10.6percentincreasein2021,cameinthefaceofslowergrowthandhighinflationinsomecountriesoftheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),whichmayhavereducedtherealincomesofmigrants.RemittancesweresupportedbytheoilboominmembercountriesoftheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC),whichincreasedmigrants’incomes;largemoneytransfersfromtheRussianFederationtocountriesinCentralAsia;andthestronglabormarketintheUnitedStatesandtheOECDcountries.

Figure1.3EmploymentLevelsofHispanic,Foreign,andNativeBornintheUnitedStates

EmploymentintheU.S.,Index(Feb.2020=100)

115

105

95

85

75

65

Nativeborn

Foreignborn

Hispanic

Sources:U.S.BureauofLaborStatisticsandWorldBank/KNOMADstaffcalculations.

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief38

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ThejobmarketintheOECDcountriesrecoveredaftertheonsetoftheCOVID-19pandemicandimprovedmostquicklyforimmigrants.InmanyOECDcountries,immigrantsreturnedtoorexceededtheirpre-crisislevelsofemploymentin2021(OECD2022);intheUnitedStates,foreign-bornemploymentrecoveredtotheprecrisislevelrapidly(seefigure1.3andsectiononLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeaninchapter2).

RemittancestotheEastAsiaandPacificregionincreasedby0.7percenttoreach$130billionin2022.ExcludingChina,remittancestotheregionroseby3.8percentrelativetogrowthof5.5percentin2021.RemittancestoChinahavedeclinedinrecentyearsasanagingpopulationandrisingprosperityslowedthepaceofless-skilledemigration.RemittancegrowthinthePhilippines,thefourth-largestremittancerecipientgloballyin2022($38billion),benefitedfromrecentbilateralarrangementswithdestinationgovernments.OutsideofChina,growthinremittancesin2022isattributabletoincreasedpost-pandemicdemandinOECDcountriesforEastAsia’shigh-skilledmigrants,themanagementofoverallinflationintheGCCcountries(whichpreservedthevalueofrealmigrantincomes),andincreasedemploymentopportunitiesinAustraliaandNewZealandforEastAsianmigrants.

RemittanceflowstoEuropeandCentralAsiaamountedtoarecordhighof$79billionin2022,representinga19percentincreasefromayearprevious.RemittancegrowthintheregionwasuninterruptedbyRussia’sinvasionofUkraine,andthemajorityofremittanceflowstotheregionoriginatedfromtheRussianFederation.TherobusttrendwasduemainlytorecordhighamountsofRussianremittancestoRussia’sneighboringcountries.AsharpincreaseinoutboundRussianremittanceswasdrivenbymoneytransfersthroughtherelocationofRussiancompaniesandpeople,theappreciationoftheRussianruble,andtheincreaseddemandformigrantlaborinRussia.

Afterarecordincreaseinremittancesin2021(26.5percent),remittanceflowsintoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanincreasedby11.3percenttoreach$145billionin2022.ThestronglabormarketintheUnitedStateshadapositiveimpactonremittanceflowsduring2022.RemittancestoMexicoreached$61.1billionin2022,representinganincreaseof12.9percent.Mexicoreceivesthehighestlevelofremittancesintheregionbyfarandistheworld’ssecond-largestrecipientofremittances.Thegrowthofremittancesvariedwidelyacrosscountriesin2022,rangingfromariseof50percentinNicaraguato18percentinGuatemala,17.8percentinHonduras,and9.7percentinColombia.

GrowthinremittancestotheMiddleEastandNorthAfricadeterioratedin2022afterpostingstrong12.2percentgrowthin2021.Flowstotheregionfellbyabout4percentto$64billionin2022,drivenmainlybyadropinflowstoEgyptanddownturnsinflowstoAlgeriaandJordan.Meanwhile,remittanceflowstotheMaghrebcountriesexperiencedaslightgain(withanexceptionofAlgeria),offsettingsomeofthedecline.

RemittanceflowstoSouthAsiaincreasedbyover12percentin2022toreach$176billion,benefitingfromstronglabormarketconditionsintheregion’shigh-incomeOECDdestinationeconomies,highdemandforless-skilledmigrantsinGCCcountries,andmeasurestocombatinflationinfoodpricesthatsupportedmigrantincomesinGCCcountries.Indiaremainedthelargestglobalrecipientwithinflowstotaling$111billionin2022,agrowthrateofmorethan24percent.OtherregionalplayerswithglobalrankingswerePakistan(rankedfifth)andBangladesh(seventh),withremittanceinflowsin2022reaching$30billionand$22billion,respectively.AmongthecountrieswithremittanceinflowsthatformasignificantpartofGDP,Nepalranksninthwithremittancesequalto23percentofGDP.

RemittanceflowstoSub-SaharanAfricagrewby6.1percentin2022,to$52.9billion.Regionalgrowthinremittancesin2022waslargelydrivenbystrongremittancegrowthinGhana(11.9percent),Kenya(8.5percent),Tanzania(25percent),Uganda(17.3percent),andRwanda(21.2percent).RemittancestoNigeria,accountingforabout38percentoftotalremittanceinflowstotheregion,increasedby3.3percentto$20.1

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief38

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20222023f2024f

3.02.9

-0.2

billion.TheincreaseinremittanceflowstotheregionsupportedthecurrentaccountsofseveralAfricancountriesdealingwithfoodinsecurity,supplychaindisruptions,severedrought(HornofAfrica),floods(inNigeria,Chad,Niger,BurkinaFaso,Mali,andCameroon),anddebt-servicingdifficulties.

1.3RemittanceOutlookfor2023

ThegrowthofremittancestoLMICsisexpectedtoslowto1.4percentin2023asGDPgrowthinhigh-incomecountriescontinuestoslow(from2.8percentin2022toaprojected0.8percentin2023),furtherreducingmigrants’wagegainsinhostcountries(box1.1).ThegrowthofremittancesislikelytobehighestinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(forecastof3.3percent;figure1.4),asthelabormarketintheUnitedStatescontinuestoholdstrong.Bycontrast,remittancegrowthisexpectedtobelowestinSouthAsia(0.3percent),largelybecauseoftheveryhighlevelin2022,andduetoslowingdemandforhighlyskilledinformationtechnology(IT)workersintheUnitedStatesandEurope.Inaddition,slowingdemandformigrantsintheGCCcountriesandweakbalance-of-paymentsconditionsandexchangecontrolsareexpectedtodivertremittancestoinformalmoneytransferchannelsinPakistan,Bangladesh,andSriLanka.InEuropeandCentralAsia,thegrowthinremittancesisexpectedtofallto1percent,duetoahighbaseeffect,lingeringweaknessinflowstoUkraineandRussia,andaweakerRussianruble(againsttheUSdollar).RemittancesmayrecoversomewhatintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricawithadeclineinoilprices,asremittancestoEgyptareexpectedtorebound.Intheotherregions–EastAsiaandPacific,aswellasSub-SaharanAfrica–theexpectedgrowthrateforremittancesin2023isabout1percent.

Therisingimportanceofremittancesasafinanciallifelineinmanyeconomies,especiallyduringandintheaftermathoftheCOVID-19pandemic,hasignitedeffortstoimprovethequality,frequency,andgranularityofdataonremittances.TheWorldBankhaslaunchedRemitStat,anInternationalWorkingGrouptoImproveDataonRemittanceFlows,undertheauspicesofKNOMAD(GlobalKnowledgePartnershiponMigrationandDevelopment)andincoordinationwith45topsourceanddestinationcountriesforremittances,andtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),theUnitedNations(UN),OECD,andEurostat(box1.2).

Asummaryoftrendsdrawingonglobaleconomicdevelopments,inflationtrend,andcommoditypricesispresentedinbox1.1.Section2ofthisbriefoffersgreaterdetailonregion-specifictrends.

Figure1.4RemittanceFlowsbyLMICRegion,2022–24f

Growthrate(percent,year-on-year)

20

15

10

5

0

-5

19.0

12.2

11.3

8.0

6.1

3.3

1.71.8

0.3

1.41.5

0.8

3.8

3.7

2.7

1.0

1.3

-3.8

SouthAsia

MiddleEast

andNorth

Sub-SaharanAfrica

EastAsiaand

Pacific(excl.

China)

LatinAmerica

andthe

Caribbean

LMICs

Europeand

CentraAsia

Africa

Source:WorldBank–KNOMADstaffestimates.

Note:f=forecast;LMICs=low-andmiddle-incomecountries.

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief38

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RemittanceflowstoEastAsiaandPacificarelikelytoinchupto$131billionin2023,withthepotentialofincreasingby1percentin2024.ExcludingChina,theremittancesgrowthrateisexpectedtodropfrom4percentin2022to3percentin2023and2024(figure1.4),leadingtoremittancelevelsof$81billionin2023and$83billionin2024.Lowergrowthinhostcountrieswilladverselyaffectrealincomesandemploymentprospects,inturnleadingtoareductioninremittancestotheregionin2023.Lowerfuelpricesin2023willfurtherdampendemandformigrantsintheGCCcountries,reducingremittanceflowstoEastAsiaandthePacificIslands.

RemittanceflowstoEuropeandCentralAsiaareprojectedtogrowataslowerpaceof1percentin2023ascontinuedoutboundremittanceflowsfromRussiatotheregionareoffsetbyahighbaselevelpostedin2022andlingeringweaknessinflowstoUkraineandRussia.Lookingahead,remittancesareprojectedtoremainaboveprewarlevelsin2023,butthegrowthisexpectedtoslowamidsignsofsomedegreeofnormalizationinflowstotheregion.ForcountriesthatreceivedlargeamountsofRussianremittancesin2022,suchasArmenia,Georgia,theKyrgyzRepublic,andUzbekistan,normalizationisexpectedtobegradual,andfromunusuallyhighlevels,whereasforUkraineandRussia,itinvolvesareturntoprewartrends.

OfficialdataforUkraineindicatethatremittanceinflowswilldeclineby5percentto$16.2billion(about11percentofGDP)in2023.Thisislikelyanunderstatement,giventhatremittancesfromneighboringcountriessuchasPolandandtheCzechRepublicoftencomethroughunofficialchannels.Whenmigrantfamiliesareseparated,withmenstayingandwomenandchildrenmovingtoanothercountry,moneytransfersinbothdirectionsareexpectedtobehigh.SuchtransfersarealsolikelytobecarriedbyhandbypeoplecrossingbackandforthbetweenUkraineandothercountries.

Box1.1GlobalEconomicOutlookin2023

Globaleconomicgrowthisexpectedtodeceleratesubstantiallyin2023,reflectingcumulativeeffectsofmonetarytighteningamidpersistentinflationpressures,tighteningfinancialconditions,andongoinguncertaintiesrelatedtoRussia’sinvasionofUkraine.Theslowingpaceofgrowthismostpronouncedinadvancedeconomies,especiallytheeuroareaandtheUnitedKingdom.However,thereisasubstantialpickupinChina.AccordingtothelatestGlob