国际可持续发展研究所-印尼能从南非的公正能源转型进程中学到什么？（英）

POLICY

BRIEFWhat

Can

Indonesia

Learn

fromSouth

Africa’s

Experience

of

theJust

Energy

Transition

Process?AnissaSuharsono,MarthaMaulidiaJuly

2023Just

Energy

Transition

Partnerships

and

the

Importance

ofAccelerating

Energy

TransitionJustEnergyTransitionPartnerships(JETPs)areessentiallyafinancingmechanismagreedbetweenagroupofindustrializedcountriesandadevelopingcountry,

designed

tofundatransitionof

thecoal-dependentdevelopingnationawayfromfossilfuelproductionandconsumption

towardlow-carbonenergy

whileaddressing

thesocialconsequencesinvolved.

AsofMay2023,

JETPdealshavebeenannouncedforSouth

Africa,

Indonesia,

and

Vietnam.Inanation

wherecoalplaysanimportantrolein

theeconomy,

robustsocialandeconomicmeasuresmustbe

takenandincludedin

theJETPplans,

as

transitioningawayfromcoal

willaffectasignificantportionof

thepopulation.Financeprovidedunder

theJETPmayincludegrants,

loans,

andinvestments,

and,

asofMarch2023,

thedonorgroupincludes

theInternationalPartnersGroup(IPG)and

theGlasgowFinancial

AllianceforNetZero

Working

Group.TheIPGrepresents

thedonorcountries,

madeupofCanada,

Denmark,

theEuropeanUnion,

France,

Germany,

Italy,

Japan,Norway,

theUnitedKingdom,

and

theUnitedStates.The

GlasgowFinancial

AllianceforNetZero

Working

Grouprepresentsover

550majorfinancialinstitutionsfrom50countries,

suchasHSBCandCitibank(Kusuma,

2023).TheJETPscheme

wasfirstannouncedat

theUNClimateChangeConference(COP26)inNovember2021.

It

wasdescribedat

the

timeasalong-termpartnershipdesigned

tosupporttheRepublicofSouth

Africaindecarbonizingitsenergysystem—preventingup

to1–1.5gigatonnesofemissionsoverthenext20

years—andhelp

thecountryaccelerateits

transitionfromcoal

toalow-emission,

climate-resilienteconomy.

It

waslaunched

withafundingcommitmentofUSD8.5billionin

thefirstphaseoffinancing,

with

thecomprehensiveinvestmentplanmadepublicafewdaysbeforeCOP27(EuropeanCommission,

2022).©2023

InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopmentWhat

CanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’s

Experienceof

theJustEnergyTransitionProcess?ThesecondJETPdeal

wasannouncedduring

theG20SummitinNovember2022.TheIPG—ledby

theUnitedStatesandJapan—pledgedtomobilizeUSD20billion(aroundIDR300

trillion)overthenext3–5

years

toaccelerateIndonesia’senergy

transition

throughearlyretirementofcoalpower

plantsanddeploymentofrenewableenergy.

Thedealappears

toheraldadramaticshiftinenergypolicy,

settinganew

targetforrenewables—which

willneedtoaccountfor34%of

thecountry’spower

productionby2030.Indonesiaiscurrentlyin

theprocessofpreparingitscomprehensiveinvestmentplan.Thisbrief

willassess

theJETPprocessSouth

Africa

wentthrough1

yearafterit

wasannouncedtohighlightany

relevantfindingsandlessons

toassistpolicy-makersimplementing

theIndonesianJETP.Process

and

Organizational

Structure

ofSouth

Africa’s

JETPSince

theannouncementof

theJETPatCOP26inNovember2021,

severalpolicyreformsthat

willbenefitandenable

theSouth

AfricanJETPhavebeenstartedorannounced.Thesereformsinclude

thefollowing:•••••anupdatedClimateChangeBill;proposedchanges

toelectricitysectorregulations;releaseofaJust

TransitionFrameworkandajustenergy

transitioninvestmentplan;greenhydrogendevelopments,

includingaHydrogenEconomyRoadmap;theSouth

AfricanGreenfinance

taxonomyandSustainabilityandClimateChangeDisclosureGuidance,

with

thecarbon

taxrateexpected

toincreaseprogressivelyevery

year;••aNationalMineClosureStrategyanddiscussiononSouth

AfricanRenewableEnergyMasterPlan;furtherroundsofbidsforrenewableenergyprojectsareunderway,

and

thelicensingthresholdfornewgenerationcapacityhasbeenraised

to100MW,openingnew

waysforprivatesectorinvestmentinrenewableenergyprojects(PresidentialClimateFinance

Task

Team

&IPG,

2022a,

2022b).Collectively,

thesepolicymeasuresaim

toreducebarriers

tocleanenergydeploymentandtoalignenergypolicy

with

theagreedphase-downofcoalgeneration.

Despite

thehigh-levelagreementandmovestowardpolicyreform,

thesereformsarestillcontroversial.TheSouth

AfricanJETInvestmentPlan(JETIP)

wasdevelopedthroughout

thecourseof2022,

anditarticulated

theneedforZAR1,48

trillion(USD98billion)investmentin

threeprioritysectorsover

aperiodof5

years.

Itisimportant

tonote

that

theJETIPonlysetsout

theguidingprinciplesforimplementationof

theJust

TransitionFrameworkandisnotexhaustiveofall

the

transitionneedsinSouth

Africa.The

USD8.5billionin

thefirstphaseoffinancing

willbespenton

themosturgentprogramsidentifiedunder

theI

P.IISD.org2What

CanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’s

Experienceof

theJustEnergyTransitionProcess?In

thepastfew

years,

South

Africahasbeenundergoing

theprocessofelectricitysectorreform.This

reformprocessisalsorecognized

tobeoneof

thekeymeasures

tosupport

theimplementationof

theJETI

P.

In

the12monthsfollowingtheannouncementof

theJETP(PresidentialClimateFinance

Task

Team

&IPG,

2022),

thepresidentannouncedseveralstepsin

the

transformationof

theelectricitysector,

suchas•••••••removinglicensing

thresholdsforembeddedgeneration

toenableprivateinvestmentsinlarge,

utility-scalegenerationprojects;reviewing

theIntegratedResourcePlan2019

toreflect

theneedforadditionalgenerationcapacityandSouth

Africa’sclimatecommitments;reducingdesignatedlocalcontentforsolarpanelsfrom100%

to35%(ThePresidencyRepublicofSouth

Africa,

2023);offeringincentivesforrooftopsolar,

developingfeed-in

tariffsfor

thepurchaseofelectricitysurplusfromresidentialcustomers,

andfurther

workon

taxincentives;enhancing

theeffort

torestructureEskomas

wellasaddressingcrimeandcorruptionthroughalaw-enforcement

team;usingclimatefundingprovidedthrough

theJETP

toinvestin

transmissiongrid

andrepurposecoalpower

plants

thathavereachedendoflife;establishingaNationalEnergyCrisisCouncil

tostrengthenPresidentialoversightofdeliveryagainstannouncedreforms.

South

Africa’ssevereload-sheddingdue

to

theongoingenergycrisisisalsopartly

thereasonfor

theestablishmentof

theNationalEnergyCrisisCouncil(Proctor,

2023).Theelectricitysectorreformmeasuresarealsobroadlyaimedatincreasing

therateofdeploymentofnew(and,

inmanycases,

privatelyowned)generation,

muchofitrenewable.However,

therearestillelements

within

thegovernment

whoareopposed

toreforms,remainingunconvincedthatrenewablescanreplace

thermalgenerators.Theseelementsmaycontinue

toseek

toundermineorreverse

thereforms.

Asinmanycountries,

inSouth

Africa,thereisoftenagapbetweenpolicyandimplementation,

andnotallof

theseinitiativeshavetranslatedintopracticalchanges.OrganizationStructureandRolesChairedby

theUnitedKingdom,

theIPG

wasestablished

tocoordinate

thepartnershipannouncedatCOP26betweenitsmembersand

thegovernmentofSouth

Africa.

InFebruary2022,

thePresidentialClimateFinance

Task

Team

wasformed,

anditservesasacounterpartfor

theIPG.

Itengages

with

theIPG

toadviseCabineton

thefinancingpackage’scomposition,affordability,

andalignment

with

theregulatoryenvironment.

Italsocoordinates

withrelevantgovernmentdepartmentsand

theprivatesector

todeveloprelevantfinancingmechanismsandfacilities

toenableinternationalclimatefinance.IISD.org3What

CanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’s

Experienceof

theJustEnergyTransitionProcess?Figure

1.SouthAfrican

JETP

governance

structureSouth

African

CabinetInter-Ministerial

Committee

(IMC)Just

EnergyTransitionChairPresidential

Climate

FinanceTask

Team

(PCFTT)International

Partner

Group(IPG)Members:Individualswithrelevant

experienceMembers:CapitalsandlocalteamsMandate:Mandate:Financingoffer

andendorsedInvestment

PlanFinalrecommendationsforInvestmentPlanandfinancingpackageJETP

SecretariatIndependentteam:Coordinatingtechnicalworkinggroups,accountableto

JET

(SA

andIPG)Mandate:Coordinatethejointworkingprogramof

PCFTTandIPGforfinalrecommendationsof

theInvestmentPlanandfinancingpackage,draft

thereports,coordinatemediaengagementsof

JETPSource:European

Commission,2022.TheJETPsecretariatis

tasked

withprovidingtechnicalandcoordinationsupport

to

thepartnershipinaneutralandobjectivemanner.

Inorder

toassist

with

thesecretariat’swork,

theClimateInvestmentFundBoard

willprovidethesupportandresourcesneeded.

Severalconsultationscoveringkeyissues—suchas

thenatureof

thefinancialoffer,

sharedunderstandinginpriorityareas,

JETPIPoutlineandcontents,

and

thescopeandresponsibilitiesof

thesecretariat—wereheldinMay2022.They

involvedthePresidentialClimateFinance

Task

Team,

IPG,

governmentfocalpoints,

anddevelopmentfinanceinstitutions.Theseconsultationsincludedanassessmentofrelevantpoliciesandguidelines,

preliminaryreviewofinvestmentandpolicyimplications,

andmappingdevelopmentfinanciers’

activitiesandprograms

thatcansupport

thejustenergy

transition.

At

thesame

time,

thesecondmissionof

the

AcceleratingCoal

TransitionInvestmentProgramme(fundedby

theClimateInvestmentFundandledby

the

World

BankGroupand

The

AfricanDevelopmentBank)

washeldinorder

toalign

theprogramandsupport

thebroaderJETP.To

support

thesecretariat,

JETPhasalsoestablishedfiveworkinggroups

togather

technicalexpertiseandexperiencein

thefollowingareas:

finance,

implementation,

power,

greenIISD.org4What

CanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’s

Experienceof

theJustEnergyTransitionProcess?hydrogen,

and

transport.

Terms

ofreferenceforeach

workinggrouparestillbeingdeveloped,butthey

willcentrearoundinvestmentsequencinginrelation

toSouth

Africa’sgoalsandchallenges.HighlightedShortcomingsof

theSouthAfrica

JETP

ProcessTheJETPdealmayserveasacatalystforenergy

transitionandcouldalsoopen

thedoor

tomoreclimatefunds.

However,

becauseitisanewmechanism

whereall

thedetailsarestillunderdevelopment,

thereisalwaystheriskof

thedealfailing

todeliveronitspotential.

Oneof

theaspects

thatmustbemetinorder

tofulfill

the

“just”

aspectof

theenergy

transitionis

toensureabalancebetweentacklingcleanenergyissuesanddeliveringasociallyjust

transition.Raisingfinancesimplyforenergyinfrastructureisrelativelyeasydue

to

theprospectoffavourableinvestmentreturns,

butthesamecannotbesaidaboutraisingfinance

tosupportcoal

workersandcommunities.

Ensuring

thatJETPprogramsareable

todeliverajustenergytransitionas

wellasinfrastructureinvestmentisasignificantchallenge(Halsey,

2022).Box

1.

The

policy

implementation

gap

and

the

South

African

JETPThe

gapbetween

stated

targets

andpolicy

objectivesandtheirimplementation(thepolicy

implementationgap)

isanoften-observed

phenomena.New

initiatives,particularly

thosethatareambitiousandunprecedented,face

atoughjourneyto

realization.Three

key

factors

influencethelikelihoodof

delivery;Indonesianpolicy-makers

shouldconsiderand,wherepossible,mitigatethesefactors

inthedevelopment

of

theJETP.1.

Shortcomings

atthe

feasibility

stage.Policiesdeveloped

withoutfullunderstandingof

theeconomic,social,andinstitutionalbarriersmay

proveimpossibleto

implement.

To

avoid

this,transparency

andconsultationatthedesignstage

arecritical.

The

reportedlackof

civilsociety

consultationinSouthAfrica

may

have

given

riseto

policy-making

blindspots.2.

Misestimationof

thepolitical

landscape

and

cross

departmental

coordination.Proposalsaretypically

developed

by

aleadgovernment

ministry.

Withoutadequatecoordination,theproposalsmay

notcarry

thesupportof

allgovernment

stakeholders.

InSouthAfrica,theoriginalpremiseof

thedeal—earlyphase-outof

coalgenerationinexchange

forinternationalfinanceforcleanenergy—is

currently

beingopenly

questionedby

government

ministers.

Thisindicatesthatthepoliticallandscapewas

notfactored

into

thedealattheinceptionphase.3.

As

theJETP

moves

towards

implementation,further

problemswillarise.Monitoring

and

evaluation

willbecomeincreasingly

importantto

identifyproblemsanddevelop

mitigationmeasures.

The

development

of

structurestomonitorandevaluate

theJETP

willbecomeincreasingly

important.TheSouth

AfricanJETPdesignprocesshasbeencriticizedfornotbeinginclusiveof

thepeoplemostaffectedbyitsimplementation.

Prior

to

thepublicationof

theJETPIPinIISD.org5What

CanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’s

Experienceof

theJustEnergyTransitionProcess?November2022,

eventhough

variouspolicydocumentshadbeendiscussedandformalized(and

theSouth

Africa

task

teamand

the

workinggroupshadbeen

workingon

theinvestmentplan),

thegeneralpublicdidnothavethechance

toconsult

thesedocuments,

norhadanyrepresentativesofaffectedcommunities.TheJETforumsconvenedby

thePresidentialClimateCommissionarealsoseenasnot

yetsufficient

toaddress

theseconcerns.Thereisalso

thefact

thateven

with

theinclusionofacomprehensivedefinitionof

“just”transition,

thereisa

verynarrowfocuson

themitigationofdecarbonizationand

thehistoricalimpactsofcoalmininginSouth

Africa.The

currentstateof

theenergysystem—where

thereisstill

“unjustness”

in

termsofaccess

toandaffordabilityofelectricity—isalsonotaddressedin

theJETPdeal,

sinceuniversal,

affordableaccessisnotidentifiedasaJETPfocusarea.Thisshowsalackofalignmentbetweentheinterestsof

theJETP

with

theself-identifiedinterestsinthepower

of

themajorityofSouth

Africans(Public

AffairsResearchInstitute,

2023).Theissueof

vestedinterestsand

widespreadcontinued(andpossiblyevenincreasing)supportforcoalinSouth

Africa

wouldalsobearelevantissueforpolicy-makersinIndonesiatoconsider.

In

thecaseofSouth

Africa,

theelectricitysupplycrisis,

which

wouldhavebeenanidealargumentfor

transitioning

towardrenewables,

isdrivingdemands

toextendthelifeofcoalassetsandpossiblyevenbuildoutmorecoalinfrastructure(Public

AffairsResearchInstitute,

2023).The

ruling

AfricanNationalCongress

wentasfar

asissuingarecommendationforEskom

todelay

thedecommissioningofitsagingcoalpower

plants

tominimizeload-shedding.Thecontradictionbetweenthediscussionofacceleratedphase-outsunder

theJETPandlifeextensionsreflects

thecontroversyaroundelectricityplanningandtheimplementationof

theenergy

transition.Despiteannouncementsand

targets,

manypoliciesdonotcome

tofruition.

Box1outlinesthreedriversfor

thisgapbetweenpolicyandimplementation.Overview

of

the

South

Africa

JETP

IP

and

Comparisonwith

the

Indonesian

ContextThissectiondescribes

thekeyfeaturesandchallengesofSouth

Africa’sJETPIPandidentifieskeysimilaritiesanddifferences

with

theIndonesiancontext.BudgetAllocationsandPriority

SectorsSouth

Africacreated

theJETPIP

todefineitsprimary

investmentneedsin

thefieldsofelectricity,

new-energy

vehicles,

andgreenhydrogenfor

thenext5

years

tosupporttheobjectivesofenergysecurity,

economicgrowth,

andjust

transition.The

JETPIPalsohighlightsinitiativesrelated

to

theelectricitysector’stransitionin

theMpumalangaProvince,

as

wellasoutliningtwo

crucialcross-cuttingpriorities(skillsdevelopmentandmunicipalcapacity).TheJETPIPestimates

that

totalinvestmentin

theidentifiedsectorsisUSD98.7billion.Itshouldbenoted,

therefore,

that

theIPG’s

pledgeofUSD8.5billioncannotfundall

theinvestmentslisted.

Instead,

themostcatalyticprogramsandprojects

thatareready

tobeimplementedin

theJETIP’s

portfolioofneedsshouldbeprioritized.

Inaddition,

thereisaneedforadditionalfunding

toimplementall

theidentifiedactions.IISD.org6What

CanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’s

Experienceof

theJustEnergyTransitionProcess?Tables

1and2showthe

totalJETIPfundingrequirementspersectorfor

thenext5

years,

aswellas

theindicativeallocationof

thepledgedUSD8.5billion.Table

1.SouthAfrica

JET

IPfundingrequirementsper

sector,

2023–2027Funding

requirements

2023–2027Electricity

sectorZARbillion

(USD

billion)711.4(47.2)New

energy

vehicle

sectorGreenhydrogen

sectorSkillsdevelopmentMunicipalcapacityTOTAL128.1(8.5)319

(21.2)2.7

(0.18)319.1

(21.3)1,480

(98.7)Source:

The

Presidency,

Republicof

SouthAfrica,2022.As

Tables

1and2show,

highpriorityisgiven

to

theelectricitysector,

which

takesup48%ofthe

totalbudgetallocation.The

primary

investmentareasforinfrastructurein

theelectricitysectorareasfollows:•tohandle

thedecommissioningof

theretiringcoalgenerationfleetinaccordance

withtherevisedIntegratedResourcePlan

whilesimultaneouslyimplementing

therapidandlarge-scalegenerationofrenewableenergy;••topromptlyenhance

the

transmissiongrid

infrastructure

toaccommodate

thetransition

torenewableenergy;toupdateandmodernize

theelectricitydistributionsystem.Table

2showsthatover

73%of

thebudgetforelectricitygoes

towardnewsolarPVandnewwind,

whileabout20%of

thebudgetgoes

to

transmission.Table

2.SouthAfrica

nationalelectricity

sector’s

infrastructureinvestment

needs,2023–2027National

electricity

sector’s

infrastructure

investment

needsZARbillion4.1CoalplantdecommissioningTransmissionDistribution131.813.8New

solarPVNew

wind233.2241.7New

batteriesTOTAL23.11,480

(98.7)Source:

The

Presidency,

Republicof

SouthAfrica,2022.IISD.org7What

CanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’s

Experienceof

theJustEnergyTransitionProcess?The

Importanceof

Upgradingthe

TransmissionGridTheSouth

AfricaJETPIPallocatesZAR647.7billion(35.4USDbillion)

toelectricityinfrastructure,

or48%of

the

totalJETPinvestmentneedsofZAR1,480billion(USD98.7billion).

Around20%of

theinfrastructurefundisallocatedfor

thedevelopmentoftransmissionsystem.

South

Africa’selectricitylandscapeoperatessimilarly

toIndonesia’sin

termsof

thestrongpresenceof

thegovernment,

whereitsstateutilitycompany,

Eskom,controls

thesupplychainfromgeneration

todistributionandis

thesolebuyerofpower.However,

recentregulatorychangeshavegraduallyeroded

thismonopoly.

For

example,independentgeneratorsarenowpermitted

todevelopprojectsandselloutputdirectlythrough

theEskom-ownedpowernetworktolargeconsumers.Since2019

thePresidentofSouth

Africa,

CyrilRamaphosamandated

thesplitofEskominto

threedivisions:

generation,

transmissionanddistribution(Paton,

2019).This

move,part

oflargerreformefforts,

willspread

thecontroloverthe

threefunctionsandmaycreateopportunities

toaccelerategrid

strengtheningandupgrade.

However,

implementationremainsdifficultandcontroversial.In

termsof

transmission,

thetwo

countries’

situationsaresomewhatcomparable.

SouthAfrica’stransmissioninfrastructurelacks

thecapacity

toacceptelectricity,

especiallyfrom

thenewrenewableenergypower

plants.

Indonesiaalsourgentlyneeds

toupgradeitsoutdated

transmissionsystem

toadapt

to

theflexiblenatureof

theincreasedshareofrenewablesin

thegrid.TransformingIndonesia’selectricity

transmissionsystemiscritical

toensuring

thereliabilityofpower

supplyfromrenewablesources:

therefore,

theJETPIPcouldbeakeyopportunitytoraiseambitionsin

thisarea.

Currently,

Java–Baliis

theonlyinterconnectedgrid

systeminIndonesia,

withothersystemsremainingisolated.

Indonesiaaspires

tocomplete

theinterconnectionofallmajorislands

tobefollowedbyinter-islandpower

grid

connectionasstatedin

theGrandStrategyofEnergy(NationalEnergyCouncil,

2022).

However,

thefeasibilityof

theplanremainsquestionabledue

to

thelengthyplanninganddevelopmenttimesandcapital-intensivenatureofinterconnectionprojects.

It

willbeevenmorechallengingifitis

tobeadoptedaspart

ofJETP.

Thebrief

time

windowofJETP(only3

to5

years)demandsquick

wins

tobeincludedin

theprojectpipeline.

Onlycertain

transmissionprojectsarelikely

tomeet

thecriteria,

suchasanupgradeoranexpansionofexistingsystemsoraconnectionbetweentwo

systemslike

theongoingJava–Baliconnectionproject.

Generally,it

takesaround10

years

tobuildagreenfield

transmissionline.This

caneventakelongerconsidering

the

time-to-builddelays.Thecurrent

transmissionplanisstillnotinline

with

theambition

tohaveinterconnectedgridsystems

thataredesirableforanincreasedshareof

variablerenewableenergy.

In

theNationalElectricityCompany(PerusahaanListrikNegara/PLN)’scurrentbusinessplan(NationalElectricitySupplyBusinessPlan/RencanaUsahaPenyediaan

Tenaga

Listrik/

RUPTL2021–2030),

PLNplans

tobuild1.4

times

thecurrent

transmissionlines’

lengthand2.2

times

thecurrentcapacityofmainsubstationsbetween2021and2030(PLN,

2021)

Thisnumberisbasedon

theobjectiveofbuildingreliable

transmissionsystems

thatconnectlocallyavailableenergysources

withdemand,

minimizing

theneedforaninterconnectedgrid.With

ahigherIISD.org8What

CanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’s

Experienceof

theJustEnergyTransitionProcess?targetofrenewableenergy,

asagreedinJETP,

PLNneeds

tobuildmore

than

whatithasalreadyplanned.Onepotentialbarrier

toexpansionis

thecurrentownershipstructure.The

currentsystemisownedandoperatedbyPLN,

allowinglittleroomforprivatesectorparticipation.

Gridimprovement

willrequirealargeamountofinvestmentthatPLNneeds

torecover.ThedevelopmentofNusantaraGrid

willneedinvestmentofUSD100billionuntil2050(InstituteforEssentialServicesReform[IESR]etal.,

2021)

whichdoesnotincludeinter-islandconnectivity(Guitarra,

2022).

PLN’s

smart-gridprogram,

aimedatimprovingtheefficiencyandproductivityof

thegrid,

requirescapitalexpendituresofup

toIDR25

trillion(aroundUSD1.7billion)in

thefirstphase.The

secondphase,

whichfocusesonresilience,

customerengagement,

sustainability,

andself-healing,

willrequirecapitalexpenditureofup

toIDR50

trillion(aroundUSD3.4billion)(Arifin,

2021).The

totalinvestmentofUSD5billionisalmostsix

timesPLN’s

netprofitofUSD887millionin2021.

Delivering

these

volumesofinvestment

willrequireinnovation.Overall,

themoves

inSouth

Africa

toprioritize

thedevelopmentof

the

transmissionnetworkalongsideinstitutionalreforms

toenableadditionalmodelsofownershipandinvestmentshouldbeincludedinpolicy-makingdiscussionsinIndonesia.Focus

on

Coal-DependentRegionsSouth

Africa’sJETPIPputsanemphasisonjust

transitionmeasuresinitscoal-dependentprovince,

Mpumalanga,

whichaccountsformore

than80%of

thecountry’scoalproduction.Transitioningintocleanenergy

willaffectaround90,000peopleemployedin

thecoalminesandpower

plantsin

thisregion,

moreemployeesin

thecoalsupplychainandservices,

localcommunitiesaffectedby

thecoalphaseout,

andsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises,

as

wellaspeopleself-employedeitherformalorinformallyincoal-relatedbusinesses.

Mpumalangaishome

to12ofEskom’s15CFPPs,

including

thelargestCFPPin

thecountry,

KusilePowerPlant.

Afterstartingoperationin2017,

Kusile’s

lasttwo

units

willbecompletedin2024,

foratotalcapacityof4,800M

W.Meanwhile,

EastKalimantan,

thelargestcoal-producingprovinceofIndonesia,

has21CFPPsthatsuppliedmore

than45%of

theprovince’selectricityin2022(EastKalimantanProvincialGovernment,

2023).The

largestCFPPsaremostlylocatedonJava

island,

home

to55%ofIndonesia’spopulation.

To

lowertheshareofcoalinpower

production(andhenceincreaserenewableenergy’sshareof

theenergymix),

PLNplanned

toretireoldandinefficientCFPPsinJava

andSumatra,

witha

totalcapacityofaround4.8G

W.

Even

with

thisgoal,

it

willnotmeet

theJETP’stargetofreaching34%ofrenewableenergyshareby2030.

To

meettheJETP

target,

IndonesiashouldconsidercancellingallCFPPscurrentlyinRUPTL’spipeline(2.9GW),

retiremoreCFPPs(including

thoseownedbyindependentpowerproducersandcaptivepl