国际事务研究院-非盟-欧盟和平与安全关系（英）-2021.11-19正式版

POLICYBRIEFOctober2021AU–EURELATIONSONPEACEANDSECURITYABSTRACTPeaceandsecurity(P&S)isakeycomponentoftherelationsbetweentheAfricanUnionandtheEuropeanUnion,andislikelytocontinuetoplayacentralroleinthefuture.Yet,somesignificantchangesarepossibleintheroleplayedbytheAfricanUnionduetothelaunchoftheEuropeanPeaceFund.Againstthisbackdrop,thispaperaimstoanalysethe“stateoftheart”ofAU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurityandtoconsideritsmaintrajectories.Inthisframework,itanalysessomekeylessonslearnedfromAU–EUcooperationonpeaceandsecurityfromthelastseventeenyears.Itthenconsidersthemainstructuralasymmetriesanddriversbetweenthetwocontinents.Theassumptionisthatasymmetriescontinuetoplayanindirectbutrelevantrole,eveniftheyarerarelyaddressedsystematicallyoronlyspecifically.Furthermore,thepaperanalysestheEuropeanPeaceFacilityandthecurrenttrajectoryinAU–EUrelationsonP&S.Finally,asetofpolicyrecommendationsareprovidedtotheAUandEU.AUTHORBERNARDOVENTURIDirectorandCo-FounderoftheAgencyforPeacebuilding(AP),IAIResearchAssociateTABLEOFCONTENTS1.Stateoftheart:TrendsandpracticesinAU–EUpeaceandsecurityrelations..............................................................................................................................32.Lessonslearned.............................................................................................................43.Themainstructuralasymmetries....................................................................94.Thewayforward:theEuropeanPeaceFacilityandothertrends....105.Conclusionsandrecommendations..............................................................14References.............................................................................................................................16Abouttheauthor..............................................................................................................18THEFOUNDATIONFOREUROPEANPROGRESSIVESTUDIES(FEPS)EuropeanPoliticalFoundation-Nº4BE896.230.213AvenuedesArts461000Brussels(Belgium)www.feps-europe.eu@FEPS_EuropeFONDATIONJEANJAURÈS12CitéMalesherbes,75009Paris+33(0)140232400@j_jauresINPARTNERSHIPWITHISTITUTOAFFARIINTERNAZIONALIViadeiMontecatini,17,00186Roma+39066976831www.iai.it/en@IAIonline2AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity1.Stateoftheart:TrendsandpracticesinAU–EUpeaceandsecurityrelationsPeaceandsecurity(P&S)isakeycomponentoftherelationsbetweentheAfricanUnion(AU)andtheEuropeanUnion(EU).TheEUistheAU’ssecondmostimportantfinancialpartneronpeaceandsecurityaftertheUnitedNations(UN).Comparedwithothertopics,suchasmigrationoreventrade,overallobjectivesonpeaceandsecuritylargelyconvergeonjointinterestsandFromtheEU’sperspective,since2016andtheintroductionoftheEUGlobalStrategy(EUGS),5Brusselshastriedtointegrateitsexternalprojectionthroughtwoapproaches–firstly,byenhancingtheintegratedapproach,includingmorespheresofinterventionandimprovingfieldcoordinationandpolicyconsistency;secondly,byapplyingthe“principled-pragmatism”approachwherebyEuropeaninterestsandvaluescoexistwithoneanother.TheEUGSstatesthattheunion“willinvestinAfricanpeaceanddevelopmentasaninvestmentin[its]ownpriorities.AddisAbabaandBrusselscanboth1benefitfromacommonapproachtoaddressarmedconflictsandviolentextremism.Yet,themodusoperandi,mutualperceptionsandtheEU’snewfinancialarchitecturecouldincreasedivergenciesinthecomingyears.securityandprosperity”.6FromtheAU’sperspective,thepartnershiponpeaceandsecuritywithBrusselsisparamount.However,thereisaperceptionthatEU’sapproachesareincreasinglymoreinfluencedbydomesticneedsandperceivedthreatsInthepast,relationsbetweenthetwocontinentsweremainlybasedontheeconomicanddevelopmentdimension,butissuesofpeaceandsecurityhaveprogressivelygrowninimportancesincetheearly-/mid-1990s.2relatedtoextremismandirregularmigration.7P&SgainedrelevanceintheframeworkoftheJointAfrica–EUStrategy(JAES)adoptedattheLisbonSummitinDecember2007.TheJAESwasdesignedtoaddressissuesofFurthermore,manyAfricanleadersandinstitutionswanttodiversifytheirpartners–fromChinatoRussiaorTurkey–eventhoughthosepartnersstillhavelimitedengagementonP&S.commonconcern,andto“jointlypromoteand3sustainasystemofeffectivemultilateralism”–mentioning,inparticular,“thereformoftheUnitedNations(UN)systemandofotherkeyWhilethenextAU–EUSummitwillnotnowbehelduntilFebruary2022,somesignalscanbededucedfromthecommunication“Towardsainternationalinstitutions”.41VolkerHauckandLidetTadesseShiferaw,“ContinuityandChangeinEuropeanUnion-AfricaRelationsonPeaceandSecurity,”ACCORDAnalysis,March24,2021,https://.za/?p=32199.2FernandaFaria,“CrisisManagementinSub-SaharanAfrica.TheRoleoftheEuropeanUnion,”EUISSOccasionalPapers,no.51(2004),https://www.iss.europa.eu/node/68.AfricaSummit,Lisbon,December8-9,2007,point8(ii),/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf.4Ibid.,point8(iii).5EuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS),SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy,June2016,https://europa.eu/!Tr66qx.3Including“peace,security,democraticgovernance6Ibid,p.36.andhumanrights,fundamentalfreedoms,genderequality,sustainableeconomicdevelopment,includingindustrialisation,andregionalandcontinentalintegrationinAfrica”,asdetailedin:EU–AfricaSummit,TheAfrica-EUStrategicPartnership.AJointAfrica-EUStrategy,2ndEU–7AlfonsoMedinillaandChloeTeevan,“BeyondGoodIntentions:TheNewEU-AfricaPartnership,”ECDPMDiscussionPapers,no.267(March2020),https://ecdpm.org/?p=38799.AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity3comprehensiveStrategywithAfrica”releasedbytheEuropeanCommissionandtheEuropeanotherdocumentsandissues,aspresentedinthelastsectionofthispaper.However,officersoftheEEAShavedefineditas“comprehensive”and“stillthebaseofourthinking”.10Atthesametime,they“missaclearandsimilarresponsefromtheAfricancounterpartinordertodefinenewjointprioritiesforthefuture”.11ExternalActionService(EEAS)inMarch2020.8Sectionfourofthedocumentisdedicatedtopeace,security,governanceandresilience.TheEUindicatesthatpriorityshouldbegiventostrategiccooperationonthemaincrisisareaswhilemaintaininganintegratedapproachtotheentirecycleofconflicts(Actionno.6).Cooperationshouldalsofocusonimprovinggovernance(Action7)asapreconditionforsecurityanddevelopment,andonactionstoincreasetheresilienceofAfricancountries(Action8).Beyondtwogeneralpoliticalmessagesoncoordination(“EUinstrumentsandAfricancapacitiesshouldbefurtheraligned”)andfinances(“despiteprogressontheAUPeaceFund,thefinancingofAfrican-ledpeacesupportinitiatives,includingthroughUN-assessedAgainstthisbackdrop,thispaperaimstoanalysethestateoftheartofAU–EUrelationsonP&Sandtoconsideritsmaintrajectories.Inthisframework,thefollowingsectionwillanalysesomekeylessonslearnedfromAU–EUcooperationonP&Sfromthelastseventeenyears.Asubsequentsectionisdedicatedtothemainstructuralasymmetriesanddriversbetweenthetwocontinents.Theassumptionisthatasymmetriescontinuetoplayanindirectbutrelevantrole,eveniftheyarerarelyaddressedsystematicallyoronlyspecifically.ThepaperthenanalysestheEuropeanPeaceFacilityandthetrajectoryinAU–EUrelationsonP&S.Finally,asetofpolicyrecommendationsisprovidedtotheAUandEU.contributions,remainstobeaddressed”),the9impressionisthatthisdocument–overall,ratherfocusedonEuropeanneedsandwithlittleattentionpaidtoreciprocity–willnotreceivemuchattentioninthefuture.ThismeansthatthenextAU–EUSummitwillgrounditsworkon2.LessonsLearnedSince2004,theEUhasprovidedfundingtotheAU,toAfricanRegionalEconomicCommunities(RECs)andtoothercoalitionsthroughtheAfricanPeaceFacility(APF).TheAPFrepresentsoneofthepillarsunderpinningtheAU–EUrelationship;itsgoalisthreefold:enhanceddialogue,operationalisingtheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture(APSA)andunderpinningpeace-supportoperationsinAfrica.TheAPSAwasestablishedbytheAUasastructuralandlong-termresponsetoAfricanP&Schallenges,anditsoperationalisationhasalwaysbeenoneofthepriorityactionsfortheAfrica–EUpeaceandsecuritypartnership,asdiscussedbelow.Againstthisbackdrop,whatarethelessonslearnedfromAU–EUcooperationwithinthisframework?Overall,P&Shasbeenakeypriorityareaforcooperationbetweenthetwocontinents.8EuropeanCommissionandEEAS,Towardsa9Ibid,p.11.ComprehensiveStrategywithAfrica(JOIN/2020/4),March9,2020,https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52020JC0004.10IAIinterview,EEAS(1),September2021.11Ibid.4AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurityBetween2004and2019,theEUprovidedapproximately€2.9billioninfinancialassistancetotheAPSA–channelledthroughtheAPF.TheAPF,financedfromtheextra-budgetaryEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF),12hascontributedsignificantlytoenhancingdialogueandcooperationbetweentheEUandtheAU.ThefacilitywasaimedatbackingAfricaninstitutionstoprogressinproviding“AfricansolutionstoAfricanproblems”bysupportingtheAU,theRECsandRegionalMechanisms(RMs)incarryingoutP&Soperations.Forinstance,thisfundenablestheAUtocarryoutPeaceSupportOperations(PSOs)decidedonbythePeaceandSecurityCounciltogetherwithinterventionsauthorisedbytheAU’sAssembly.AU’sCommissionPaneloftheWiseAfricaPeaceFundPeaceandSecurityCouncilAfricanStandyForceContinentalEarlyWarningSystemFigure1-AfricaPeaceandSecurityArchitecture(APSA).12TheEDFisthemaininstrumentforprovidingaidfortheRepresentativesoftheMemberStates.From2021,EDFprogrammesareincludedintheEU’sMultiannualFinancialFramework(MFF)andthusaresubjecttoEUfinancialregulationsinthesamewayasotherEUfundingprogrammes.developmentcooperationtotheAfrican,CaribbeanandPacificstatesandtooverseascountriesandterritories.EDFprogrammesarenotfundedbytheEUbudgetbutwereinitiallyestablishedbyanInternalAgreementofAU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity5TheAPFhasalsobeenacontestedfinancialtoolduetoitsrootsinEuropeandevelopmentcooperation,theultimategoalofwhichistoreduceextremepoverty.TheEUhassupportedAfricanstatesandregionalorganisationsformanyyearsthrougharangeofcivilianP&Sactivities,withtheobjectiveofstrengtheningthelinkagesbetweensecurityanddevelopment.13Infact,EU–Africasecurityrelationshavebeendominatedbythe“security–developmentnexus”mantra.14AllthecurrentmainEUdocumentsonmigrationalsorefertodevelopment-andsecurity-relatedissues.15Inthe2014–17Roadmap,forinstance,peaceandsecuritycomprisethefirstpriorityoutofthefivelisted,while“humandevelopment”and“sustainableandinclusivedevelopment[togetherwith]growthandcontinentalintegration”occupytwootherslots.16isparamountinthisregard.Security-relevantdevelopmentactivitiesareusuallyimplementedinaconflict-affectedarea,wheresecurityarrangementsandaconflict-sensitiveapproacharenecessary(workinginconflict).SecuritytargetreferstoscenariosinwhichP&Sisthedirecttargetoftheactivity(workingonconflict).Clearly,manydevelopmentmeasuresaresecurity-relevant,fromeducationtogovernance,butthisdoesnotmeanthattheworkisdirectlyintendedtoinfluencesecuritydynamics.Whileallpartiesagreeontheneedtoconnectthetwoareas,acleardistinctionbetweentheirrespectivemandatesandfinancialinstrumentsisparamount.AnotherlessoncouldbelearnedfromtheweightofthethreecomponentsoftheAPF:AfricanPeaceSupportOperations(PSOs),theoperationalisationoftheAPSAandinitiativesundertheEarlyResponseMechanism(ERM).17ThebulkofAPFfunding(approximately93percent)isallocatedtoPSOs,around6percentisspentoncapacitybuildingandapproximately1percentgoestotheConflictEarlyResponseMechanism.Theselattertwocomponentsare,therefore,ratherweakanddeservemoreresourcesinthefuture.18Thesecurity–developmentnexusisconsolidatedbutatthesametimecontroversial–especiallyfornon-governmentaldevelopmentactors.Forsomestakeholders,purelysecurity-relatedactionsbelongtothesphereoftheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP).Otherdecision-makersareinfavourofastrongcomponentofsecurityindevelopingcountries,embeddedindevelopment.Thedifferencebetween“security-relevant”and“securitytarget”13HauckandTadesseShiferaw,“ContinuityandChangeinEuropeanUnion-AfricaRelations.”14UeliStaegerandTshepoT.Gwatiwa,“PeaceandSecurityintheContextofEU-AfricaRelations,”inTheRoutledgeHandbookofEU-AfricaRelations,ed.ToniHaastrup,LuísMahandNiallDuggan(London/NewYork:Routledge,2021),175-187.2014fourthEU–AfricaSummit.SeeAfricanUnionandEuropeanUnion,Roadmap2014-2017,4thEU–AfricaSummit,Brussels,April3-4,2014,point6,http://www./en/node/7911.17TheERMisaquick-reactionfundingmechanismprovidingtheAU,RECsandRMswithimmediatelyavailablefundstopreventandmanageviolentconflict.TheEUiscommittedtoapproveorrejectrequestsforERMsupportreceivedfromAfricanpartnerswithinjust10workingdays.18MoreinformationisavailableonthewebsiteoftheAfrica–EUPartnership:/en/financial-support-partnership-programme/african-peace-facility.15Forinstance,seethedocumentsoftheEuropeanCommission:AEuropeanAgendaonMigration(COM/2015/240),May13,2015,https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52015DC0240;TheGlobalApproachtoMigrationandMobility(COM/2011/743),November18,2011,https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52011DC0743.16The2014–17Roadmapisthemainoutcomeofthe6AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity28171.8PeaceSupportOperationsCapacity-BuildingEarlyResponseMechanism2681.2Figure2-APFcontractedamountspertypeofactivity,2004–2019(inmillioneuro).Source:EuropeanCommission,AfricanPeaceFacility.AnnualReport2019(Luxembourg:PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion,2020),10,https://op.europa.eu/s/s5Vg.TheEUalsoconductsnineCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP)missionsinAfrica(outofatotalofeighteen)–threeofthemintheSahelandthreeinSomalia.19TheCOVID-19crisishasreducedpersonnelonthegroundandthenumberofactions,butthemissionshavecontinuedtobeoperational.Furthermore,inJuly2021theEuropeanCounciladoptedadecisiontosetupanEUmilitary-trainingmissioninMozambique(EUTMMozambique),20alsowithstronginputfromthePortugueseEUPresidency.ManylessonscouldbelearnedfromCSDPdeploymentinAfrica.Akeyissuethatcouldbeparamountforfuturecooperationbetweenthetwocontinentsistoestablishstrongerconnectionsbetweenthetechnical19Thecurrentmissionsare:EUBorderAssistanceMission(EUBAM)inLibya;EUCAPSomalia,assistingthatcountryindevelopingself-sustainingcapacityfortheenhancementofmaritimesecurity;EUCAPSahelMaliandEUCAPSahelNiger,supportingtheinternalsecurityforcesinthosecountries;EUNAVFORAtalanta,counteringpiracyoffthecoastofSomalia;EUTMMali,atrainingmissionfortheMalianarmedforces;EUTMRCAintheCentralAfricanRepublic,tocontributetothecountry’sdefence-sectorreform;andEUTMSomalia,amilitarytrainingmissioninSomalia;andEUTMMozambique.20TheaimofthemissionistotrainandsupporttheMozambicanarmedforcesinprotectingthecivilianpopulationandrestoringsafetyandsecurityinCaboDelgadoProvince.CounciloftheEU,“Mozambique:EUSetsUpaMilitaryTrainingMissiontoHelpAddresstheCrisisinCaboDelgado,”PressReleases,July12,2021,https://europa.eu/!VJ4fuw.AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity7workofthemissionandthebroaderpoliticalvision.Governance,forinstance,ismentionedrelativelyofteninCSDPpolicydocumentsbutreceiveslimitedconsiderationinallitscomponents.Thisrecognitionoftheimportanceofgovernancereformtopeaceandstabilisationisstillinitsearlystages.Forexample,EUCAPSahelMalihassupportedthegovernment’ssecurity-sectorreform(SSR)–despitethefactthatMalihasyettoundertakecomprehensiveSSR21–byofferingtrainingtothecountry’sjudicialpoliceandinintelligencegatheringandcounterterrorism.22havefunctionedwellasconsultativeforumsmainlytodiscusstheongoingconflictandcrisissituationsinAfrica,aswellastheEU’ssupportfortheAUonP&Smatters.Finally,theEUCouncilhasadoptedregionalstrategiesfortheHornofAfrica,theGulfofGuineaandtheSahel;andtheEUhasabilateraltradepactwithSouthAfrica.ThetendencyoftheseframeworkshasbeentogiveconsiderableattentiontotheEU’ssecurityconcernsdespitemanyreferencestoanintegratedapproach.ThisisquiteevidentintheSahel,wheretheEUsupportstwokeyregionalinitiatives:theG5SahelitselfandtheAlliancefortheSahel.ThesupportfortheG5Sahelremainspredominantlyinthefieldsofsecurityanddefence.EstablishedinFebruary2014andoriginallypresentedasavehicleforstrengtheningthebondbetweeneconomicdevelopmentandsecurity,theG5soonbecameheavilyfocusedonsecurityconcerns.Alltheselessonsarealsotiedtostructuralasymmetriesanddriversthatarestillheavilypresent–butoftenneglected–intheAU–EUPartnership.Anotherdimensionthatdeservestobementionedhereisthefactthatpolicydialogueonsecurityandotherissueshasbeenjeopardisedbyinsufficientcommunicationandcoordinationatalllevels–technical,seniorofficialandpolitical.Asaconsequence,itsimpactisstillverylimited.23Forinstance,thisisthecasefortheannualjointmeetingsbetweentheEU’sPoliticalandSecurityCommitteeandtheAU’sPeaceandSecurityCouncil,whichhavebeenorganisedeveryyear(alternativelyinBrusselsandAddisAbaba,butvirtuallyinthelastcoupleofyears)sinceOctober2008.ThesemeetingshavefocusedonP&Sissuesofcommonconcern–especiallyEUsupportforAUPeaceSupportOperations(PSOs),asduringthelastone:the12thAnnualJointConsultativeMeetinginOctober2020.24Inpractice,they21BernardoVenturi,“AnEUIntegratedApproachintheSahel:TheRoleforGovernance,”IAIPapers,no.19|03(2019),https://www.iai.it/en/node/9957.22AndrewLebovich,“HaltingAmbition:EUMigrationandSecurityPolicyintheSahel,”ECFRPolicyBriefs,September25,2018,https://ecfr.eu/?p=4211.23Thereareanumberoftechnicaldifficulties,suchastheissueofchanginginterlocutors–themembershipoftheAU’sPeaceandSecurityCouncilisrotating,whereasallEUmemberstatesarealwayspartoftheEU’sPoliticalandSecurityCommittee–aswellasthedifferentapproachesoftherespectivepresidencies.Somecommentatorsalsopointoutthattheagendasofthesemeetingsaretoolongandveryambitious,and,asaconsequence,meetingsarerushedastheyonlylastaday.Consequently,therecanbenoin‐depthdiscussionorcommonanalysis–asituationexacerbatedbypoliticalsensitivitiesoncertainissues.24CounciloftheEU,“EU-AfricanUnionRelations:JointCommuniquéoftheAUPeaceandSecurityCouncilandtheEUPoliticalandSecurityCommittee,”PressReleases,October26,2020,https://europa.eu/!kY77Td.8AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity3.ThemainstructuralasymmetriesDespitethenarrativeon“Africarising”anda“partnershipamongequals”,EU–AfricarelationsremainasymmetricalandtheEUanditsmemberstatescontinuetoimposeformsandformatsofrelationsonitsAfricanpeers.TheseasymmetriesplayacentralroleinP&S.forAUoperations,butthishasthusfarbeenhinderedbytheUnitedStates.28Tiedtofinanciallimitation,anotherasymmetryisrepresentedbytheAU’slimitationsinsufficientlybargainingforitspreferences.Forinstance,in2011theAfricansunsuccessfullylobbiedforanAfricansolutioninLibyabutmetresistancefromtheEUdelegationtotheAUandBrussels.ThiswasperceivedbymanyAUdiplomatsandpolicy-makersasanaffronttotheiragencyinAfrica.AsimilarsituationofbypassingtheAUandeventheRECscanbecomemorefrequentwiththenewEuropeanPeaceFacility(EPF),aspresentedinthenextsection.Africanpartners’dependencyonforeignfundshasbeenconsideredoneofthekeyfactorsjeopardisingthecontinent’saspirationstoprovide“AfricansolutionstoAfricanproblems”.25TheAU’sinstitutionshaveshownalimitedcapacityforabsorbingexternalfunding,whichisalsoconnectedwiththeproliferationoffundingsourcesandreportingrules.Onaverage,theAUcollects67percentofassessedcontributionannuallyfromitsmemberstates.However,eachyearonaveragearound30memberstatesdefaulteitherpartiallyorcompletely.AsrecognisedbytheAU,thiscreatesasignificantgapbetweenplannedbudgetandactualfunding,whichhinderstheeffectivedeliveryofitsagenda.26ThisfinancialasymmetryclearlyplaysaheavyroleinP&S–allthemoresobecauseoftheAU’sstruggletofindsignificantco-fundstomatchEUresources.AddisAbabahasbeenprogressivelygatheringAfricanresourcesfortheAUPeaceFund,27andistryingtomobiliseUN-assessedcontributionsFurthermore,thetendencyonthepartoftheEUinrecentyearstosecuritiseandexternalisethemigrationagendahasfurtherreinforcedtheAfricanperceptionofaone-waydialogue–ultimatelyaimedatimposingtheEU’sagendaonitscounterpart.SincetheVallettaSummit(11–12November2015),29dominatedbytheEU’smigrationagendawithitsstrongfocusonsecurityaspects,migrationhasbecomenotjustapriority30butalsosomethingofanobsessionfortheEU.31ThisasymmetricalrelationshipcanalsobedetectedintheEU’sintentiontomoderniseAfricansecurity,and25NicolettaPirozzi,NicolòSartoriandBernardoVenturi,TheJointAfrica–EUStrategy(Brussels:EuropeanParliament,2017),https://op.europa.eu/s/s5VS.26AfricanUnionwebsite:WhyIntroduceaLevy?,https:///web/en/introduce-levy.27ThePeaceFund–establishedbytheAU’sAssemblyinJuly2016–isanintegralpartoftheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture,establishedtoprovidethenecessaryresourcesforpeace-supportmissionsandotheroperationalactivitiesrelatedtoP&S.TheresourcesofthePeaceFundaretobemadeupoffinancialappropriationsfromtheregularbudget,voluntarycontributionsfrommemberstatesandothersources.28MedinillaandTeevan,“BeyondGoodIntentions.”29TheVallettaSummitproducedapoliticaldeclarationandanactionplan,includingtheestablishmentofanEmergencyTrustFundforstabilityandaddressingtherootcausesofirregularmigrationanddisplacedpersonsinAfrica,madeupof€1.8billionfromtheEUbudgetandEuropeanDevelopmentFund,combinedwithcontributionsfromEUmemberstatesandotherdonors.SeeAfrica–EUPartnership,2015VallettaSummitonMigration,November18,2015,http://www.africa-eu-/en/node/8325.30TheframeworkdocumentfortheEUis:EuropeanCommission,AEuropeanAgendaonMigration.AU–EUrelationsonpeaceandsecurity9isencapsulatedinthenotionofasecurity–developmentnexusasdefinedbytheEUGlobalStrategyandoperationalisedthroughtheAfricanPeaceFacilityInstrument.32TheEUhasfailedtoincorporatecontextandlocalneedsintothedevelopmentofitsAfricansecurityagenda,pursuingunrealisticlong-termgoals.IfitwantstoremainarelevantpartnerinAfricansecuritymatters,ithastofindanewbalanceinitsagenda-settingandcreatespacefor“Africanagency”withinitssecuritysystem.33mechanismtosignalitsconcerns.35Thisstructuralasymmetrycouldthereforeaffectthebroaderpartnershipincludingintheareaofpeaceandsecurity.TheEUalsolamentsthefactthattheAUmissesaspecificstrategybecauseAgenda2063andthedocument“SilencingtheGuns”are“gooddocuments,buttoogeneric”.36Overall,theseasymmetriesarelikelytopersistinthenextfewyears.Movingforwardwithanabstractrhetoricofequalpartnership,theEUrisksunderestimatingthisrisk.Instead,makingthemexplicitcouldhelptoovercomesomeofthesedifficulties.ThisapproachcouldbedecisivefortheEuropeanPeaceFacility,especiallyintermsofAfricanagency,aselaboratedinthenextsection.Finally,asymmetriesinaccountabilityandstructurehaveasignificantimpactonP&S.34Intermsofaccountability,forinstance,whiletheAUhasofferedtheEUaseatontheBoardoftheAU-managedAfricanPeaceFund,togetherwiththeUNtheAUhasnocomparableinstitutional4.Thewayforward:theEuropeanPeaceFacilityandothertrendsP&Swillremain“oneofthestrongestdriversofinstitutionalcooperationandanareacarryingagreatpotential”37toachievecommonobjectivesanddeliverables.38Yet,howcanAU–EUcooperationpromoteajointandsustainableapproachtopeaceandsecurityoverthecomingyears?economiccommitmentsforeachpolicyarea–willimpactontheEU’scooperationwithAfrica.Intermsofdevelopmentfunding,theresourcesallocatedthroughthenewNeighbourhood,DevelopmentandInternationalCooperationInstrument(NDICI)willbesimilartothepreviousMFF(over€70billionforsevenyears).Approximately€900millionoftheNDICIisdedicatedto“globalstabilityandpeace”and€2.8billionisspecificallyfor“‘rapidresponseactions’,torespondtocrisesworld-wide”.39Certainly,theframeworkoftheEU’sMultiannualFinancialFramework(MFF)for2021–27–the“ceiling”andbudgetarysystemthatdetermines31MahamadouDanda,“TheSecu