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EnvironmentalEconomics
andPolicyToday’sAgenda
GettoknoweachotherPHDDissertation:EnvironmentalInsuranceResearchAreas:EnvironmentalEconomics;EnergyEconomics;Sustainability;CSR;ESG
IntroductiontothiscourseImportantThingstoKnowGradeswillbecalculatedasfollows:20% AttendanceandParticipation40% Exam40% CourseProjectTimelineforthegroupprojectPleasefinditinthesyllabusEnvironmentalChallengesEconomicGrowthPopulationGrowthEnvironmentalImpactTheCausesofEnvironmentalPollutionareEconomicNewYorkTimes,1970TheConsequencesofEnvironmentalPollution
TheConsequencesofEnvironmentalPollution
haveimportantEconomicDimensions1.Producer
Producer
(steelproduction&laundryservices)2.Producer
Consumer
(paperproduction&recreationalfishing)3.Consumer
Consumer
(secondaryexposuretocigarettesmoke)4.Consumer
Producer
(litteringinamovietheatre)Economicconsequences≥financialconsequencesEconomicsisnotthesameasaccountingEconomicsisUsefulforAddressingEnvironmentalChallengesThecausesofenvironmentalproblems(inamarketeconomy)areeconomic.Theconsequencesofenvironmentalproblemshaveimportanteconomicdimensions.•Therefore,aneconomicperspectiveisessentialfor
Understandingenvironmentalproblems
Andthereforecanbeexceptionallyhelpfulforthedesignofsolutionsthatwillbeeffective,economicallysensible,andpoliticallypragmatic.EvaluationofEnvironmentalDamagesDemandsEconomicTools•Youdrinkdirtywater:feelsickfortwodays,stayhomefromwork,goseethedoctor•Howshouldweeconomicallyvaluethedamagesofyourexposuretothispollution?1.Medicalcosts(whetherpaid,insured,or“free”)?2.Lostwages(reducedproductivity)?[OpportunityCost]3.Painandsuffering?“Pain-and-suffering”cannotbeobservedTheeconomicvalueofthedamagesarewhateveryoutrulyfeel(believe)thattheyare!Notwhatyousaythedamagesare,butwhatyoureallyfeelthattheyare.
Yourminimumwillingnesstoaccept(WTA)compensationtotolerateexposureYourmaximumwillingnesstopay(WTP)toavoidexposurePolicyInterventionsNeedsEconomicsThinkaboutyourownpollution-controlpolicies.Weallexercisepollutioncontrolpolicies,wherewegetthebenefitsandwepaythecostsKeepingthekitchenfloorcleanDoyoukeepitperfectlyclean?Andhowcleandoyoukeepyourgaragefloor?Whataboutthecleanlinessyouexpectinasurgicaltheatre?Whydoweindividuallyandcollectivelychoosedifferentlevels(standards)ofacceptablecleanlinessinthesedifferentcases?Itseemsthatbenefitsandcostsmatter.
Infact,webehaveasifwe’redoingaveryspecifickindofanalysis!PolicyDesignNeedsEconomicsExternality:Tax;Publicgoods:Pollutionrighttrading;Informationasymmetry:Informationregulation;Riskmanagement:Insurance.EvaluationsofEnvironmentalPolicyNeedsEconomicsEconomicefficiencycriterion—>benefit-costanalysisMoremodestcriterion:cost-effectiveness—doespolicyaccomplishgivenpurposeintheleastcostlyway?RationaleforEnvironmentalPolicySourceofEnvironmentalProblems
TwoPerspectives:NegativeExternality【负外部性】ProblemsoftheCommons(PublicGoods)【公共物品】NegativeExternalityPublicGoodsWhatConcernsYouMoreTragedyoftheCommons【公用地灾难】ASimpleModeloftheFisheryTaxandPermitTrading
TheNewEnglandlobsterfisheryIn1966,theefficientnumberoftrapssetwouldhavebeenabout450,000;Whiletheactualnumberwasnearlyonemillion.ThePacifichalibutfisheryintheBeringSeaTheefficientnumberofshipswasnine;Whiletheactualnumberwas140(DanielD.Huppert1990).
TheNorthAtlanticstockofminkewhaleTheefficientstocksizewasabout67,000adultmales;Whereastheopen-accessstockhadbeendepletedto25,000(Amundsen,BjorndalandConrad1995).Intermsofsocialcosts,ananalysisoftwolobsterfisheriesineasternCanadafoundthatlossesduetounrestrictedentryamountedtoabout25percentofmarketvalueofharvests(HendersonandTugwell1979).AnnualHarvestofAtlanticCod,1950-20081984环境保护局EnvironmentalProtectionAdministration2008环境保护部MinistryofEnvironmentalProtection2018生态环境部MinistrofEcologyandEnvironmentElevationoftheImportanceofEPPossiblePolicyTreatments
LimitannualcatchesRestrictionsonallowedtechnologiesClosureofparticularareasImpositionoflimitedseasonsQualifyingfishermanPossiblePolicyTreatmentsNewYorkCity’soysterfishery:In1860,12millionoystersweresoldinNewYorkCitymarkets.By1880,productionwasupto700millionoystersperyear.Theoysterbedswerebeingdepleted.Firstthecityrestrictedwhocouldharvestoysters,then
whentheywerepermittedtodoso.Eventually,thecitylimitedtheuseofdredgesandsteampower.Nevertheless,in1927,thelastofthecity’soysterbedsclosed.Overcapitalizationisgreater,asistheconsequentwelfareloss.Commonphenomena:overfishingoccurs,thefisherystockisdepleted,thegovernmentrespondsbyregulatingthecatch,therebydrivingupthecostoffishing,fishermencomplainthattheycannotmakeaprofit,andharvestscontinuetofall.Example:PacificHalibutIndustry1975:125天1980:25天1994:2天Theresult,ofcourse,wasmoreeffortexpendedinashortertime.Overcapitalizationofthefisherywasrampant;Ghostfishingfromabandonednets;Lossesfromby-catches;Freshhalibutbecameararity;Thetargetedtotalallowablecatchexceededintwooutofthreeyears.(HomansandWilen1997).Theory-basedEnvironmentalPolicyEnvironmentalpollutionasaclassic—indeed,textbook—exampleofanegativeexternality(ArthurC.Pigou1920).
PointstoemissiontaxEnvironmentalpollutionasapublic-goodproblem,thatis,aproblemofincompletepropertyrights(RonaldCoase1960).
PointstoTradablePermitsSystemTheExampleofthePacificHalibutFisheryAnIndividualTransferableQuotasystemwasestablishedin1995.Theseasonlengthincreasedfromtwodaystomorethan200days
Safetyproblemswerediminished,by-catchwasreducedby80percent,ghostfishinglossesfellby77percent,andthequalityoffishinthemarketincreased.From1994to1999,thenumberoffishingvesselsdecreasedby10percent,whilethevalueoftheharvestincreasedby34percent.Totalallowablecatchhasnotbeenexceededsincetheinceptionoftheprogram.QuestionstoThinkOver
FormsofCommandandControlRegulationsValuationofEnvironmentalBenefitsContingentValuationMethod:ExampleCarson,Mitchell,Hanemann,Kopp,PresserandRuud,2003DamagesfromtheExxonValdezOilSpillTheStateofAlaskafortheExxonValdezlitigation/6396954143756239105DecomposingBenefits
UseValueBenefitsfromusingthegood/service,directlyorindirectly.Forexample,benefitsofcleanairtoGrandCanyonvisitors.OptionValueBenefitspeoplereceivenowfromhavingoptiontousegood/serviceinthefuture.Forexample,forpeoplewhomightvisitGrandCanyoninthefuture,benefits(now)ofpreservingGrandCanyon.ExistenceValueBenefitspeoplereceivefromknowledgeoftheexistenceofgood/service(theyneverintendtouse).Forexample,forpeoplewhomightnevervisitGrandCanyon,benefitsofpreservingGrandCanyon.Foroptionandexistencevalue,wehavenochoice—mustusestatedpreferencemethodsWillingnesstoPayandWillingnesstoAccept
Willingnesstopay(WTP)isthemaximumamountapersonwouldbewillingtopay,sacrificeorexchangeinordertoreceiveagoodortoavoidsomethingundesired,suchaspollution.LinkstoDemandFunction.Willingnesstoaccept(WTA)istheminimumamountanindividualiswillingtoreceivetogiveupagoodortoacceptsomethingundesirable.EstimateDemand(WTP/WTA)forEnvironmentalGoods/Services
RevealedPreferenceMethod:Usepeople’sobservedbehaviorinmarketstoinfertheirWTPforenvironmentalgoods/services;Hedonics:priceofaconventionalgoodvariesasquantityofclosely-relatedenvironmentalgoodchanges(propertyandwage)HouseholdProduction:consumerscombineprivategoodwithenvironmentalgoodto“produce”another,whichisrealsourceofutilityEstimateDemand(WTP/WTA)forEnvironmentalGoods/Services
StatedPreferenceMethod:DesignsurveysthataskpeoplewhattheywouldbeWTPorWTA(ContingentValuation)ChoiceExperimentEconomistspreferrevealedpreferencemethods(reliable)ContingentValuationMethod
Components:Collectinformationonconsumers’past,presentandexpectedfutureuseofgoods;Presenthypotheticalscenariodescribingchangeingoodstobeevaluated;Presentpaymentvehicles,forexample,tax,userfee,productprices,mustbeplausibleandunderstandable;ContingentValuationMethod
ElicitWTPRemindtheexistenceofsubstituteandbudgetconstraint;ElicitationmethodAskforWTPdirectlyBiddinggame;StartingpointbiasReferendumNOAAAdministrationmethodMail;phone;web;InterviewNOAAContingentValuationMethod
Respondentsdonotunderstandwhattheyareaskedtoevaluate;Hypotheticalnottakenseriously;Strategicbias;Insensitivitytoscope;WarmgloweffectSeipandStrand1992studyofcontributiontospecificleadingNorwegianNGO63%vs.10%ContingentValuationMethod:ExampleUsingCVM,Carson,Mitchell,Hanemann,Kopp,PresserandRuud(2003)reportedanestimateof$2.8billion(1990)dollarsasthelowerboundontheestimatedaggregatelostpassiveusevalues.TheStateofAlaskaandtheU.S.GovernmentsettledtheirlawsuitsagainstExxonfor1billiondollarsinnaturalresourcedamagesandrestitutionforinjuries.Inaddition,Exxonspentover2billiondollarsonoilspillresponseandrestoration.ContingentValuationMethod:ExampleAdamowiczetal.(1995),StatedPreferenceApproachesforMeasuringPassiveUseValues:ChoiceExperimentsversusContingentValuation,WorkingPaper.
ChoiceExperiment
ChoiceexperimentAdvantages:Isbasedonattributesandallowtheresearcherto“value”attributes.Decreasesconcernsoverphenomenasuchasstrategicbehaviorand“yea-saying”.Islesssensitivetoissuesofembedding,scopingandsequencing.
ChoiceExperiment:ExampleStepsforChoiceExperimentChoiceExperiment:Design
IdentifyattributesandthelevelsofattributesPropertiesforscenariosBalanced:Eachleveloccursequallyoftenwithineachfactor;Orthogonal:Everypairoflevelsoccursequallyoftenacrossallpairsoffactors.Statisticalsoftware:SAS,R+References:Kuhfeld,WarrenF.(2010),MarketingResearchMethodsinSAS:ExperimentalDesign,Choice,Conjoint,andGraphicalTechniques。AizakiandNishimura(2008),DesignandAnalysisofChoiceExperimentusingR:ABriefIntroductionChoiceExperiment:DataAnalysisCommandandControlRegulationsCommandandControlRegulationEnvironmentalPoliciesinChina
Laws:EnvironmentalProtectionLawofChina(2015)
andmanymoreonspecificenvironmentalissues.
Regulations:
Rules:https:///ywgz/fgbz/CommandandControlRegulation
Forms:PublicProvision:GovernmentagencyandState-ownedenterprisesRegulateinput:eliminatetheuseofcertainmaterialsMontrealProtocolonSubstancesThatDepletetheOzoneLayerphasesouttheuseofanumberofsubstancesbelievedtoberesponsibleforozonedepletion,notablyCFC.RegulateoutputRegulatepollutionRegulateprocessRegulatetechnologyCommandandControlRegulation
Maxp∑qi-∑Ci(qi,ai)-∑Di(qi,ai)Implications:Forquantityofproduction:pricereflectsnotonlyproductioncostbutalsothecostofenvironmentaldamages.Forquantityofpollutionabatement:themarginalcostofpollutionabatementequalstothemarginalbenefitofpollutionabatement.OutputRegulation
LimittheuseofelectricityAnEconomicExplanationforElectricityShortagePerformanceRegulationTheEnvironmentalProtectionLawofChina(2015)Article43:MEPorlocallyEPBshoulddevelopstandardsforpollutantdischarge;TheWaterPollutionPreventionandAbatementLawofChina(1984;1996;2008;2016)MEPorlocallyEPBshoulddevelopstandardsforwastewaterdischarge;ManyStandardsatTheEnvironmentalProtectionLawofChina(2016)Article59:Industrialenterprisesandpublicinstitutionsthatcauseseriousenvironmentalpollutionmusttakecorrectivestepsinacertainperiodoftime.
Keychallenges:ProcessRegulation
U.S.OccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministration(OSHA)ProcessSafetyManagement(PSM)programandtheU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)RiskManagementProgram(RMP).TheEPA’sRMPregulationrequiresfacilitiestoassessboththelikelihoodofaccidentsandtheirconsequencesandtosubmitariskmanagementplan.TheEnvironmentalProtectionLawofChina(2015)Article19:EnvironmentalImpactAssessmentReport:Assessingenvironmentalimpact,Sketchingoutpreventionmeasures,Beingauditedbysupervisoryagency,GettingapprovalfromEnvironmentalProtectionBureau.
Keychallenges:TechnologyRegulationTheCleanAirActof1970andtheFederalWaterPollutionControlActof1972mandatedtheinstallationofpollutionabatementequipmentdeemedtobethebestavailabletechnology(BAT).UndergroundStorageTank(UST)TechnicalStandards:USTsystemsinstalledbeforeDec.22,1988musthaveleakdetectionnolaterthanDec.1993,andspillandoverfillprotectionandcorrosionprotectionbyDec.22,1998.TheEnvironmentalProtectionLawofChina(2015)Article40:Whendevelopinganewindustrialenterprisesorretrofittingexistingindustrialenterprises,theenterprisesshouldusetechnologythatusesresourcesefficientlyandcausedlesspollution,andshouldusewastereusingandtreatmenttechnology.
Keychallenges:EnforcementExpensiveTietenberg(1985)foundthattheratioofactualaggregatecostsofthecommandandcontrolapproachtotheaggregatecostofleastcostbenchmarksrangedfrom1.07forsulfateemissionsintheLosAngelesareato22.0forhydrocarbonemissionsatalldomesticDupontPlants.单位:亿元数据来源:《中国环境统计年鉴(2017)》TheEnvironmentalinvestmentwas2.9billionRMBor0.15%ofGDPin1986.Itreached922.0billionRMBin2016or1.24%ofGDP.Theannualgrowthrateisabout21.17%.IncentiveAlignmentIncentiveAlignmentIn1989,MexicoCityintroducedapolicythatbannedmostdriversfromusingtheirvechiclesoneweek-dayperweek.IncentiveAlignmentIncreaseinnewautomobilesalesrepresentslessthan2percentofthetotalnumberofregisteredvechicles.Consequently,theobservedincreaseinregisteredvehiclesmustbecomposedoverwhelminglyofusedvehicles,importedfromotherpartsofMexicoorfromthemuchlargerU.S.market.PolicyRoadstotheFuture
Traditionalenvironmentalprotectiontoolsdonotworkwell.Thegeneralpublicshowsconcernstotheenvironmentandarewillingtotakeactionstoprotectit.StrengthenCommand&ControlRegulations
2014amendmenttotheenvironmentalprotectionlawofChina;
2015effective,viewedasthemoststringentEPLever.DailyFineEnvironmentalLawsuitsCitizenParticipationCriminalChargeNaturalResourcesandEnvironmentalAuditsCEIP:CentralEnvironmentInspectionProgramEnvironmentalEconomicPolicy
EnvironmentalInsurance:2007;2013EnvironmentalInformationDisclosure:2014;2017;2022EnvironmentalTax:2018PollutionRightTrading:2011;2013;2015;2017;2021CapandTradeSystemChina’sCarbonCommitment2020.11.2,MEE《全国碳排放权交易管理办法》&《全国碳排放权登记交易结算管理办法》2021.7.16,NationalCarbonMarket2020.09.22;theGeneralDebateofthe75thSessionofTheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly2030
CarbonPeak;2060CarbonNeutrality资料来源:清华大学能源环境经济研究所张希良团队2020CarbonEmissioninChina2020CarbonEmissionPhenomenalEconomicDamagesClimateDisastersNo.1ChinaShanghaiafter2-meterSeaLevelRiseElevationShanghai2.19metersElevationJiangsu2.04
metersEnergySecurityEnergySecurityDataSource:EnergyStatisticsYearbookGlobalCarbonMarketCorporateImpactofCarbonTradingHowiscarbonmarketsupposedtowork?01TheoreticalFoundationEmissionsTradingGameScientistshavediscoveredthatapollutantisdangerousandcausessevereeconomicdamageifannualemissionsexceed40milliontons.Emissionsarecurrently80milliontonsandcomefrom1of4powercompanies.Thegovernmentisrestrictingemissionsto40milliontons.Eachpowercompanyisallottedpermitstoemit10milliontons.Thepermitsaretradeable.SampleTableReducingthe____milliontonofemissions(andmaintainingproduction)Willincuramarginalcost(inmillionsof$)of:1st02nd233445566TradablePermit:HowItWorks?公司SouthernAEPCo.DTEDukeEnergyMarginalcostofcleaning1thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning2thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning3thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning4thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning5thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning6thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning7thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning8thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning9thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning10thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning11thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning12thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning13thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning14thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning15thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning16thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning17thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning18thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning19thmilliontons,inmillionsof$Marginalcostofcleaning20thmilliontons,inmillionsof$44556677788888999991000011122223445677891066777777788888999991001222223333334444455TradablePermitSystemSetanaggregatepollutionlevelforacertaingeographicareaAllocateinitialpollutionrights(permits)Allowfirmstotrade(buyandsell)pollutionrightsfreelyCantorFitzgeraldSecuritiesCorporations/EnvironmentandEnergyExchangesTheoreticalFoundationCoaseTheorem(1937,thenatureofthefirm)Thetheoremstatesthatiftradeinanexternalityispossibleandtherearenotransactioncosts,bargainingwillleadtoanefficientoutcomeregardlessoftheinitialallocationofpropertyrights.Inpractice,obstaclestobargainingorpoorlydefinedpropertyrightscanpreventCoasianbargaining.MarketablePermitsAbatementMCA$/TonAbatementMCBTotalAbatementA*A*/2ABAA$P/tonPracticesofCapandTradeDoubleCreditsSysteminAutoindustriesIndividualTransferableQuoteSystemRenewableEnergyPortfoliosSO2CapandTradeCarbonCapandTrade/LessonsfromtheFieldSO2CapandTradeSystemsintheUS02TradingProgramsintheFieldSO2CapandTradeprogramintheU.S.createdbyTitleIVofthe1990CleanAirActAmendments.EmissionTradingSystem(ETS),createdbyEuropeanUnionin2005,coverssome11,000powerstationsandindustrialplantsin30countries.HistoryofSO2RegulationintheUSInthe1970s,utilitycompaniesconstructed429tallstacks,manyover500feet,oncoal-firedboilers(RegensandRycroft1988)tohelpalleviatethecontributionofSO2emissionstolocalairqualityproblems.The1970CleanAirActimplementedperformancestandardsfornewsources,aswellasforthosethatundertookmajormodification,basedonemissionsperunitofheatinput.
DesignofSO2TradingProgramTheelectricitygeneratingindustryisallocatedafixednumberofallowances;FirmsarerequiredtosurrenderoneallowanceforeachtonofSO2emittedbytheirplants;Firmsmaytransferallowancesamongfacilitiesortootherfirmsorbankthemforuseinfutureyears;Thelawassignsallowancestoeachaffectedpowerplantunitbasedonitsheatinputduringahistoricalbaseperiod(1985–1987);PhaseIbeganin1995andaffectedthe110dirtiestcoal-firedelectricity-generatingfacilities.PhaseIIstartedin2000andcoveredallothercoal-firedelectricity-generatingfacilitieswithacapacitygreaterthan25megawatts,plussmalleronesusingfuelwitharelativelyhighsulfurcontent,totalingabout1,420generatingunits.AcidRainSO2EmissionsTrends,1970through2021UnderTitleIV,theannualSO2allowanceallocationsareultimatelytobecappedat8.95milliontons.EnvironmentalBenefits
Changesinparticulateconcentrationshavebeenmeasuredandsimulationmodelsdemonstratedramaticimprovementsinpublichealththatoutweighcostsbyoveranorderofmagnitude(U.S.EPA2001).Environmentalhotspots:Swift(2000)presentsevidencesupportingthenotionthatthelargest,dirtiestplantscleanupthemost.Withplantsarrangedinquartiles,thelargestplantsreducedemissions24%belowallocationonaverage,andthesmallestreducedby6%.From1994to1998interregionaltradesconstitutedonly3%ofthetotalvalueofalltrades.SO2AllowancePriceUnit-levelEmissionsTrading,1997Thevolumeofbetween-firmtradingpeakedin2000atjustunder15millionallowancesandhasdeclinedeachyearsince.In2003,roughly8millionSO2allowancesweretransferredbetweeneconomicallyunrelatedparties.EconomicPerformanceCostSavings:Ellermanetal.(2000)estimatethecostsavingsfromemissiontradingtobeabout55%oftotalcompliancecostsunderacommand-and-controlapproach.Efficiency:Carlsonetal.(2000)findthat,inthefirsttwoyearsofPhaseI,marginalcostsdifferedamongfacilitiesandactualcompliancecostsexceededtheleast-costsolutionby$280millionin1995andby$339millionin1996(1995$).From1994to1998interregionaltradesconstitutedonly3%ofthetotalvalueofalltrades.Manystatesfeltagreatdealofuncertaintyabouthowregulatorswouldtreatallowancetransactionsinsettingregulatedrates,andthisuncertaintydampedutilities’enthusiasmforusingtheallowancemarket(Burtraw1996;Bohi1994).China’sEfforts03PermitTradinginChina
Datedbackto1987whenMinhangDistrictofShanghaiInitiatedWaterPollutionPermitTransferSystem;NEPAstartedAirPollutionPermitTradingSysteminsixcitiesin1994;NEPAstartedSO2tradingpilotprogramin2002inShandong,Shanxi,Jiangsu,Henan,Shanghai,TianjinandLiuzhou;ThetenthfiveyearplanforpreventionofacidrainandSO2pollutioninregionsthataremonitoredforacidrainandSO2pollutionin2002clearlystatedthataSO2capandpermitprogramshouldbeimplementedintheseregions.PerformanceofSO2PilotWangetal.(2009)"MostSO2permittradingsarenotrealmarketbehavior.TheyarecarriedoutunderthecoordinationoflocalenvironmentalprotectionbureauInthiskindofarrangedtransactioin,thepermitpriceismoreguidedbygovernment,anddoesnotreflecttherelationshipbetweensupplyanddemand."TaoandMah(2009)"Thedilemmashaveresultedinthedevelopmentofa'state-led'psedudomarket,insteadofafulland'autonomous'market,foremissiontradinginChina."AnIssueofPolicyCoordinationsCarbonTradinginChina
NDRCpublishedthenoticeofstartingcarbontradingpilotsattheendofOctober,2011.2013Beijing,Tianjin,Shanghai,Chongqing,Hupei,GuangdongandShenzhen;But2015……2016ParisConference;But2017……202075thUNgeneraldebateassembl2021Finally……China’sCarbonMarketNineLocalCarbonandTradeMarketCarbonMarketinChina“Inthefirstyear,amongthe4.5Billionstonsofcarbonpermit,only194milliontonsaretraded,accountingforlessthan”。
XiaomingLai04ProspectsFortheFutureAuctionFuturesRoleofFinancialInstitutionsUnifiedorLocalizedMarketsFutureCarbonMarketinChinaTheFutureofChina’sCarbonMarket:SizeoftheMarketTheFutureofChina’sCarbonMarket:PermitAllocationMarch,30,2021,MinistryofEcology:《关于公开征求碳排放权交易管理暂行条例(草案修改稿)意见的通知》,implementorexpandtheauction.TheFutureofChina’sCarbonMarket:TheRoleofFinancialInstitutesDeadlineforDemonstratingComplianceAllowingInsitutionalInvestorstoParticipateStartingfromSeptember3.TheFutureofChina’sCarbonMarket:TheRoleofFinancialInstitutesFiguresshowwhatwehaveinShanghai.InmanyotherlocalmarketsincludingBeijing,GuangdongandHubei,individualsarealsoallowedtoparticipateinthemarket.TheFutureofChina’sCarbonMarket:PriceTrendsTheFutureofChina’sCarbonMarket:PriceTrendsTheFutureofChina’sCarbonMarket:PriceTrendsOtherIssues05BusinessimplicationsCarbonaccountsCarbonfinanceAlternativeenergyEnergysavingReducingCarbonEmissionCostMaximizingSocialBenefit?
WhatifmarginalbenefitsfrompollutionreductionsvaryacrossregionsorovertimeThegoalof“minimizethetotalpollutionabatementcostgivenacertainlevelofreduction”andthegoalof“maximizenetsocialbenefits”donotalwaysalign.Maxp∑qi-∑Ci(qi,ai)-∑Di(qi,ai)BankingSomeoftheallowancesbankedinearlieryearsmaynotrepresentrealemissionreductions.Hadbankingbeenallowed,sourceswithlowcostabatementoptionswouldhavehadanincentivetousethemearlyandretaintheallowancesforthefuture.EnvironmentalTaxandSubsidyPollutionChargeorTaxSystems
Pollutionchargeortaxsystemsassessacertainamountofmoneyontheamountofpollutionthatafirmorsourcegenerates.
ExamplesEffluentCharges;UserCharges;Sale/ProductionTaxes;InsurancePremiumTaxes;DepositRefundSystemsPollutionChargeinChinaPilot:1979
“EnvironmentalProtectionLawofChina”1981PilotforPollutionDischargeFeein27provincesImplementation:1982.7“TemporaryGuidelinesforPollutionDischargeFeeCollection”1987
PollutionDischargeFee1.4BillionCNYDevelopment:1988.7
“TheUseofPollutionDischargeFee”1990sUnifyth
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