2024年世界就业和社会展望趋势（英）

ILOFlagshipReportWorldXꢀEmploymentandSocialOutlookTrends2024WorldEmploymentXꢀandSocialOutlookTrends2024InternationalLabourOffice•GenevaCopyright©InternationalLabourOrganization2024Firstpublished2024Attribution4.0International(CCBY4.0)ThisworkislicensedundertheCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0International.Toviewacopyofthislicence,pleasevisit(/licenses/by/4.0/).Theuserisallowedtoreuse,share(copyandredistribute),adapt(remix,transformandbuildupontheoriginalwork)asdetailedinthelicence.TheusermustclearlycredittheILOasthesourceofthematerialandindicateifchangesweremadetotheoriginalcontent.Useoftheemblem,nameandlogooftheILOisnotpermittedinconnectionwithtranslations,adaptationsorotherderivativeworks.Attribution–Theworkmustbecitedasfollows:WorldEmploymentandSocialOutlook:Trends2024.Geneva:InternationalLabourOffice,2024.©ILO.Translations–Inthecaseofatranslationofthiswork,thefollowingdisclaimermustbeaddedalongwiththeattribution:ThisisatranslationofacopyrightedworkoftheInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO).Thisꢀtranslationhasnotbeenprepared,reviewedorendorsedbytheILOandshouldnotbeconsideredanofficialILOtranslation.TheILOdisclaimsallresponsibilityforitscontentandaccuracy.Responsibilityrestssolelywiththeauthor(s)ofthetranslation.Adaptations–Inthecaseofanadaptationofthiswork,thefollowingdisclaimermustbeaddedalongwiththeattribution:ThisisanadaptationofacopyrightedworkoftheInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO).Thisꢀadaptationhasnotbeenprepared,reviewedorendorsedbytheILOandshouldnotbeconsideredanofficialILOadaptation.TheILOdisclaimsallresponsibilityforitscontentandaccuracy.Responsibilityrestssolelywiththeauthor(s)oftheadaptation.Third-partymaterials–ThisCreativeCommonslicencedoesnotapplytonon-ILOcopyrightmaterialsincludedinthispublication.Ifthematerialisattributedtoathirdparty,theuserofsuchmaterialissolelyresponsibleforclearingtherightswiththerightsholderandforanyclaimsofinfringement.AnydisputearisingunderthislicencethatcannotbesettledamicablyshallbereferredtoarbitrationinaccordancewiththeArbitrationRulesoftheUnitedNationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLaw(UNCITRAL).Thepartiesshallbeboundbyanyarbitrationawardrenderedasaresultofsucharbitrationasthefinaladjudicationofsuchadispute.QueriesonrightsandlicensingshouldbeaddressedtotheILOPublishingUnit(RightsandLicensing)atrights@.InformationonILOpublicationsanddigitalproductscanbefoundat:/publns.ISBN9789220400418(print);9789220400425(webPDF)ISSN2709-7080(print);2709-7099(online)DOI:/10.54394/HQAE1085labourmarket/labourshortage/economicconditions/inflation/wages/report/ILOpub13.01.2ILOCataloguinginPublicationDataAlsoavailableinFrench:Emploietquestionssocialesdanslemonde:Tendances2024,ISBN9789220400432(print),9789220400449(webPDF);andinSpanish:PerspectivasSocialesydelEmpleoenelMundo:Tendenciasꢀ2024,ISBN9789220400456(print),9789220400463(webPDF).ThedesignationsemployedinILOpublicationsanddatabases,whichareinconformitywithUnitedNationspractice,andthepresentationofmaterialthereindonotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheILOconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,areaorterritoryorofitsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationofitsfrontiersorboundaries.Theopinionsandviewsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyreflecttheopinions,viewsorpoliciesoftheILO.ReferencetonamesoffirmsandcommercialproductsandprocessesdoesnotimplytheirendorsementbytheILO,andanyfailuretomentionaparticularfirm,commercialproductorprocessisnotasignofdisapproval.PhotocreditsFrontcover:©KrulUA/iStockProducedbythePublicationsProductionUnit(PRODOC)oftheILO.TheILOendeavourstousepapersourcedfromforestsmanagedinanenvironmentallysustainableandsociallyresponsiblemanner.Code:DESIGN/WEI/PMSERV3PrefaceThisyear’sWorldEmploymentandSocialOutlook:Trendsprovidesacomprehensiveassessmentofthelatestlabourmarkettrends,includingunemployment,jobcreation,labourforceparticipationandhoursworked.Importantly,italsolinksthesetrendswiththeirsocialoutcomes,anditisthesefindingsthatarethemostrevealingwhenweassessthefullsignificanceofthesedevelopments–forbothpolicyformationandthelivesofindividuals.Thereportfindsthatalthoughsomeofthedataareencouraging–notablyongrowthandun-employment–adeeperanalysisrevealsthatlabourmarketimbalancesaregrowingandthat,inthecontextofmultipleandinteractingglobalcrises,thisiserodingprogresstowardsgreatersocialjustice.So,althoughin2023globalunemploymentdroppedtothelowestlevelsincethestartofthepan-demic,andworkingpovertyandinformalityapproachedpre-pandemicrates,theILO’sprojectionssuggestthatlittlepositivechangeintheseindicatorscanbeexpectedin2024.Productivitygrowthandlivingstandardshavealsonotimproved,inspiteoftechnologicalprogressthatwaswidelyprojectedtogivetheseaboost.Indeed,thereareindicationsthatthenatureofthetechnologyroll-outunderwaycouldwidenratherthanweakendisparities,nationallyandglobally.Measurestoaddressinsufficientpay,poorjobquality,andmajorinequalities–ofgender,pay,skills–arenotjustsignificantforoureconomicgood;theyarealsoessentialcomponentsinbuildingsocialjustice.Andwithoutgreatersocialjusticewehavelittlechanceoftacklingthemajorproblemsofourage.Peoplewillnotsupportthehardchoicesthatneedtobemade,onclimatechange,healthcare,technologyandemployment,ifthecostsandopportunitiesarenotseentobesharedequitablyandifdecentworkisnotavailabletogivethemthechancetobuildabetterfuture.Inthisdifficultcontext,policymakersareconfrontedwithtoughdecisions.Boostingeconomicgrowthwillbeessentialtoescapefromourcurrentcrisisvortex,butitmustbequalityeconomicgrowththatnotonlycreatesmorejobsbutalsomakesworkingconditionsbetter,oursocietiesmoreresilientandourfuturesustainable.Whatisclearfromthisreportisthattheproblemswefacearetoolargeandcomplexforanyonegroup,countryorregiontosolvealone.Thepoliciesandactionschosenneedtobecoordinatedandmutuallyreinforcing,atbothcountryandmultilaterallevels.What’smore,thiscoordinationneedstoextendtotheallocationoffinancialandtechnologicalresources.AmoreeffectivelycoordinatedresponsewillalsohelptoputusontracktoachieveboththeUNSustainableDevelopmentGoalsandthecommitmentsmadeatCOP28–which,encouraginglyandforthefirsttime,includedreferencetotheimportanceoflabourrights,socialdialogue,socialprotectionanddecentworkinachievingthejusttransitionweallneed.TherecentdecisionbytheILO’sGoverningBodytoendorseaGlobalCoalitionforSocialJusticewillfacilitatethiscoordination.TheCoalitionwillbringtogethertheknowledgeandskillsofauniqueanddiversegroupofinternationalbodiesandstakeholderstopromotecoordinatedresponses,atnational,regionalandgloballevel.Thiswillhelptoensureahuman-focusedapproach,andsoensurethatsocialjusticeisrecognizedasthekeystoneofasustainableglobalrecovery.GilbertF.HoungboILODirector-General5ContentsPreface3Acknowledgements9Executivesummary:Jobresilienceamidstrisingfragility111.LabourmarketresiliencewillbetestedintheneartermGrowthhasprovedtoberesilientamidstrisingfragilityEconomicresilienceheldlabourmarketconditionssteadyin2023Lookingahead,therearerisksthatjobcreationwilldeterioratefurtherPersistentdecentworkdeficitsareundermininglong-runprogressReferences1717202628332.Employmentandsocialtrendsbyregion35Overview35Africa36363738LabourmarkettrendsinNorthAfricaLabourmarkettrendsinsub-SaharanAfricaDatachallengesforevidence-basedlabourmigrationgovernanceinAfricaAmericas40404242LabourmarkettrendsinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanStagnatinglabourproductivitygrowthinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanLabourmarkettrendsinNorthAmericaArabStates434345LabourmarkettrendsintheArabStatesLabourmarketimplicationsofforceddisplacementsAsiaandthePacific464748LabourmarkettrendsinAsiaandthePacificInformalityandnewformsofworkinAsiaandthePacificEuropeandCentralAsia505052LabourmarkettrendsinEuropeandCentralAsiaMixedpicturesofyouthunemploymentinEuropeReferences546X

ꢀWorldEmploymentandSocialOutlook|Trends20243.Labourshortagesamidstunmetdemandfordecentwork59Overview59Agrowingdemandforlabour606062Labourdemand:UnfilledvacanciesinadvancedeconomiesLocalandglobalconsequencesoflabourandskillsshortagesLaboursupply6263656770Labourforceparticipation:Arefewerpeopleworkingorlookingforjobs?Hoursworked:MeanandtotalhourshavedivergedDolabourmarketsfailtoadjust?LabourshortagesmightbecomeentrenchedConcludingremarks:PrioritiesforactionReferences7173AppendicesA.GroupingsofcountriesbyregionandincomelevelB.ILOmodelledestimates808384C.TablesoflabourmarketindicatorsbyregionalgroupsListofboxes1.1.

Investmentlevelsfellmodestlyinthefaceofhigherborrowingcosts18191.2.

Globalspillovers:RisksofdeterioratingGDPthatcouldexacerbateemploymentchallenges1.3.

Babyboomversusbabybust:Thelabourmarketimpactsofinflationinthe2020scomparedwiththe1970s3243722.1.

ImpactoftheIsrael–HamasconflictontotalemploymentintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory3.1.

Dual-trackglobalskillspartnershipsListoffigures1.1.

ProjectedGDPgrowthin2023,comparingOctober2022andOctober2023outlooks(percentages)181.2.

GDPgrowthoutlook(percentagechange)19202122231.3.

Recentandprojectedchangesininflation(percentages)1.4.

Totallabourforceparticipationrates(percentagepoints)1.5.

Unemploymentrates(percentages)1.6.

Employmentgrowth,2020–23,bysexandcountryincomegroups(percentages)1.7.

Meanweeklyhoursactuallyworkedperemployedperson,2019and2023,bycountryincomegroupandsex24251.8.

Annualrealwagegrowthin2023(percentages)Contents71.9.

Employmentgrowth,2023–25,bysexandcountryincomegroups(percentages)1.10.

Gendergapinparticipationrates,2023and2025(percentagepoints)1.11.

Youthandadultunemploymentrates(percentages)262929301.12.

Informalemploymentasshareoftotalemployment,2004–24(percentages)1.13.

Growthofpopulationaged20to64,bytimeperiodandcountryincomegroup(compoundannualpercentages)32394245492.1.

Internationalstockofmigrantworkers,Africaandsubregions,totalandfemaleshare,2010–192.2.

Averageannualproductivitygrowthrate,2015–23(percentages)2.3.

GenderdisparitiesinlabourmarketoutcomesintheArabStates,20232.4.

Informalemploymentrates,AsiaandthePacificandsubregions,2004–23(percentages)2.5.

Prevailingyouthunemploymentrates,comparedwithhighsandlowsbetween2003and2023,EuropeanUnion(percentages)53603.1.

Channelsoflabourmarketadjustmentandresultingimbalances3.2.

Jobvacanciesinselected(advanced)economies,January2002toSeptember2023(standarddeviationsfrommean)613.3.

Femalelabourforceparticipationratescomparedwiththepre-pandemichistoricaltrend(deviationfromtrendinpercentagepoints)63646566673.4.

Youthlabourforceparticipation(percentages)3.5.

YouthNEET,bysexandincomegroup(percentagesofthepopulationaged15to24)3.6.

Totalhoursversusmeanhoursactuallyworkedperemployedperson3.7.

Numberofsickdaysperworkerandyearandpercentageincrease,2019–22Listoftables1.1.

Jobsgapandjobsgaprate,2019–23,bysex,worldandincomegroup1.2.

Labourforceparticipationratesbyincomegroup,2019–25232728301.3.

Unemploymentandunemploymentrate,2019–25,bysex,worldandincomegroup1.4.

Workingpoverty,2020–23,worldandbycountryincomegroup2.1.

Estimatesandprojectionsofworkinghours,employment,unemploymentandlabourforce,regionalandsubregional,Africa,2010–2537414447512.2.

Estimatesandprojectionsofworkinghours,employment,unemploymentandlabourforce,regionalandsubregional,Americas,2010–252.3.

Estimatesandprojectionsofworkinghours,employment,unemploymentandlabourforce,regionalandsubregional,ArabStates,2010–252.4.

Estimatesandprojectionsofworkinghours,employment,unemploymentandlabourforce,regionalandsubregional,AsiaandthePacific,2010–252.5.

Estimatesandprojectionsofworkinghours,employment,unemploymentandlabourforce,regionalandsubregional,EuropeandCentralAsia,2010–259AcknowledgementsWorldEmploymentandSocialOutlook:Trends2024waspreparedbytheMacro-economicPoliciesandJobsUnitoftheILOResearchDepartment,ledbyEkkehardErnst.ThereportwaswrittenbyStevenTobin,RichardHorne,LisaFeist,MiguelSanchezMartinezandPascalKampert,undertheoverallcoordinationandleadershipofEkkehardErnst.ThereportwasproducedundertheoverallguidanceofRichardSamans,DirectoroftheILOResearchDepartment.TheauthorsaregratefulforalltheinputandsuggestionsreceivedfromtheILORegionalOfficesforAfrica,theArabStates,AsiaandthePacific,EuropeandCentralAsia,andLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.TheILOmodelledestimatespresentedinthisreportwereproducedbytheDataProductionandAnalysisUnit,ledbyStevenKapsos,intheILODepartmentofStatisticsandbytheMacro-economicPoliciesandJobsUnitoftheILOResearchDepartment.TheauthorsespeciallyacknowledgethemodellingworkcarriedoutbyEvangeliaBourmpoula,PalomaCarrillo,RogerGomis,StefanKühn,AvichalMahajanandMiguelSanchezMartinez.TheunderlyingdatabaseofinternationallabourmarketindicatorsusedtoproducetheestimateswaspreparedbytheDataProductionandAnalysisUnitoftheILODepartmentofStatistics.TheauthorsalsowishtoacknowledgetheeffortsofDavidBescond,VipasanaKarkee,QuentinMathys,YvesPerardelandMabelinVillarreal-Fuentes.ExcellentcommentsandsuggestionswereprovidedbyJamesHoward,SeniorAdvisertotheILODirector-General.TheILOResearchDepartmentwishestoacknowledgethecommentsandsuggestionsprovidedbythefollowingILOcolleagues:YukikoArai,Marie-FranceAuer,TulioCravo,SuktiDasgupta,SaraElder,ElisendaEstruch-Puertas,RogerGomis,TiteHabiyakare,ClaireHarasty,SusanHayter,MarenHopfe,AyaJaafar,StevenKapsos,StefanKühn,JesseMertens,MichaelMwasikakata,DavidMosler,YvesPérardel,GerhardReinecke,DorotheaSchmidt-Klau,OliverLiang,JuanMarceloCuautleSegovia,KenChamuvaShawa,SergeiSuarezDillonSoares,TheoSparreboom,JuanJacoboVelasco,ChristianViegelahn,FelixWeidenkaff.TheauthorsalsothankcolleaguesfromACTEMPandACTRAVfortheirexcellentcommentsandsuggestions.WewouldliketoexpressourgratitudetoJudyRaffertyandourcolleaguesinthePublicationsProductionUnitforassistingwiththeproductionprocess,andtoourcolleaguesintheILODepartmentofCommunicationandPublicInformationfortheircontinuedcollaborationandsupportindisseminatingthereport.11ExecutiveꢀsummaryJobresilienceamidstrisingfragilityTheeconomicrecoveryhasslowed…Themacroeconomicenvironmentdeterioratedsignificantlyover2023.Ongoinggeopoliticaltensionsaswellaspersistentandbroadeninginflationtriggeredfrequentandaggressivemovesbycentralbanks.Monetaryauthoritiesinadvancedandemergingeconomiesimplementedthefastestincreaseininterestratessincethe1980s,withsignificantglobalrepercussions.LargeemergingeconomiessuchasChina,TürkiyeandBrazilsloweddownconsiderably,causingadverseimpactonglobalindustrialactivity,investmentandtrade.Growthinadvancedeconomieswasnearlyhalved.Giventhesignificantandhighlypersistentdeviationofinflationfromtargets,centralbanksareexpectedtomaintainatightstanceonmonetaryconditions,atleastuntiltheendof2024.Consequently,thepost-pandemiceconomicandsocialrecoveryremainsincompleteandnewvulnerabilitiesareerodingprogressinsocialjustice.…whilejobgrowthprovedtoberesilientandtheunemploymentratecontinuedtofall…Despitetheeconomicslowdown,globalgrowthin2023wasmodestlyhigherthananticipated,andlabourmar-ketsshowedsurprisingresilience.Onthebackofstrongjobsgrowth,boththeunemploymentrateandthejobsgaphavedeclinedbelowpre-pandemicvalues.Theglobalunemploymentratein2023was5.1percent,amodestimprovementon2022.Theglobaljobsgapalsosawimprovementsin2023,but,atcloseto435million,remainedelevated.Moreover,in2023,labourmarketparticipationrateshadlargelyrecoveredfromtheirpandemiclows,especiallyamonglower-middle-incomeandhigh-incomecountries,althoughwithlargedifferencesacrosslabourmarketgroups,whichhavecontributedtolabourmarketimbalances,notablyinadvancedeconomies.Averagehoursremainbelowtheir2019pre-pandemiclevels,weighingontheoverallavailablelabourinputandcausinglabourmarketimbalances,especiallyinkeysectorsinadvancedandsomeemergingeconomies.Althoughtheimbalanceseasedsomewhatin2023,concernsarerisingthattheselabourmarketimbalancesarestructural,ratherthancyclical,innature.12X

ꢀWorldEmploymentandSocialOutlook|Trends2024…althoughrealwagesdeclinedandworkingpovertyhasꢀbottomedoutDespitelowerunemploymentandpositiveemploymentgrowth,realwagesdeclinedinthemajorityofG20countriesaswageincreasesfailedtokeeppacewithinflation.Moreover,in2023,thenumbersofworkerslivinginextremepoverty–earninglessthanUS$2.15perdayperpersoninpurchasingpowerparity(PPP)terms–grewbyabout1millionglobally.Astrongerpatternemergeswhenonelooksatmoderateworkingpoverty,thatis,earninglessthanUS$3.65perdayperpersoninPPPterms.Thenumberofworkerslivinginmoderatepovertyincreasedbyabout8.4millionin2023;adeclineinmoderatepovertywasobservedonlyinupper-middle-incomecountries.Onthepositiveside,informalityrateshavereturnedclosetopre-pandemiclevels,eventhoughthenumberofinformalworkersreached2billionpeoplein2023becauseofthegrowinggloballabourforce.Financialconditionsstartedtodeteriorate,buildingupfragilityUnderneathbenigntrendsinheadlinejobnumbers,fragilityhasstartedtoemergethatislikelytofirsthitcountriesthatwerealreadystrugglingbeforethepandemic.Highlyindebteddevelopingcountriesareparticularlyatriskofquicklyrunningintofinancialdistressasglobalfinancialconditionstighten,withsignificantrepercussionsforjobs,workingconditionsandwagegrowth.Sofar,theseproblemshavere-mainedlocalizedandhavehadfewregionalorglobalrepercussions.However,shouldfinan-cialstressaffectmoresystemicallysignificantcountries,anotherglobalfinancialcrisiscannotbeexcluded.Investmentremainedresilient…Globalinvestmentrateshaverecoveredsig-nificantlysincethehistoriclowduringtheglobalfinancialcrisisandcontinuedtodosothroughoutthepandemic.Risingfinancingcostsandariseinthelevelofuncertaintyhavenotpreventedareturntohigherinvestmentactivity,especiallyamongEuropeancountries.Thankstostrongcommoditydevelopments,countriesinsub-SaharanAfricahaveexperiencedsignificantaccelerationininvestmentandareexpectedtosus-taininvestmentratesatoneofthehighestlevelsinthatsubregioninmorethanthreedecades.Ontheotherhand,countriesinEastandSouth-EastAsiahaveexperiencedmoderateinvestmentslowdown,albeitfromveryhighlevels.Overall,atemporarydeclineininvestmentistobeexpected,butglobalinvestmentratesareexpectedtoremainsignifi-cantlyabovethelevelsseenduringthe2010s.…butproductivitygrowthcontinuedtodecelerateamidstrisingpricepressuresAfterashortgrowthspurtascountriesrecov-eredfromthepandemic,aggregatelabourproductivitygrowthquicklyreturnedtothelowpaceobservedoverthepreviousdecade.Thisslowdownhappeneddespitetheapparentaccelerationoftechnologicalprogress,especiallythatofdigitaltechnologies.Inthisregard,theriseininvestmentinmanyadvancedandsomedevelopingcountriesdoesnotseemtohaveliftedproductivitygrowth,presumablybecauseofstronginvestmentgrowthinlow-productivityservicesandconstruction.Duringperiodsofslowproductivitygrowth,realdisposableincomeandrealwagesareoftenvulnerabletosuddenpriceshocks.Asonlyafewfirmshaveseentheirprofitsaccelerate,mostworkershavebeenunabletoaskforstrongerincreasesintheirearnings,andsotheyandtheirhouseholdsarefacinganacceleratingerosionoftheirrealdisposableincome.Moreover,giventheExecutivesummary:Jobresilienceamidstrisingfragility13largesectoralheterogeneityofearnings,afurtherwideningofwithin-countryincomeinequalityhasensued.Macro-policymakersmightwelcometheabsenceofawage–pricespiral,but,inanenvir-onmentofalreadylacklustregrowthandwhereearningswerelostduringthepandemic,suchanerosionofrealdisposableincomebodesillforaggregatedemandandamoresustainedeco-nomicrecovery.Moreimportantly,whendemandfalters,productivitygrowthsuffersasfirmsfailtogenerateenoughrevenuetoinvestinandadjusttothelatesttechnologicaldevelopments.Labourimbalanceswerecompoundedbyweakproductivitygrowthandloweraveragehoursworked…Concernsaboutlabourandskillsshortageshaveremainedhighontheagendaofpolicymakers,atleastinadvancedeconomiesandsomeemergingeconomies.Despiteaquickrecoveryinaggregatelabourforceparticipationrates,sectorswithessentialworkershaveexpresseddifficultiesinattractingpeopletotakeuptherisingdemandforcare,transportationandretailwork.Therehavealsobeenpersistentshortagesinothersectorssuchasmanufacturing,constructionandICT.Partofthechallengewithrespecttoshortagesofessentialworkershastodowiththepoorworkingconditionsinthesesectors.Slowingproductivitymakesitdifficultforemployersinthesesectorstoofferhigherwages.Inaddition,restructureddemandacrosssectorsandsupportivefiscalpolicyhavecreatedasignificantoverhanginvacancies,inspecificsectors,thataredifficulttofill.Suchsectoralmismatchhasbeenoftencompoundedbylowgeographicalmobilitybecauseworkershavesufferedfromalackofaffordablehousing.Althoughtheseshortagesseemtohaveeasedwithtightermacroeconomicpolicies,labourmarketimbalanceshavepersisted.particularlyamongyoungwomen,causingsig-nificantchallengesforindividuals’long-termlabourmarketattachment.Althoughpeoplehavereturnedtothelabourmarket,theytendnottobeworkingthesamenumbersofhoursasbeforethepandemic.Acrosscountriesofallincomelevels,averagehoursworkedhaveexpandedlessthantotalhoursworked;thereareacutelabourshortagesinsome–contact-intensive–sectors.Thesearepartlyrelatedtoongoinglonger-termhealth-relatedproblemsthathavebuiltupoverthepastthreeyears.Thenumbersofsickdayshaveincreasedsignificantlyfrompre-pandemiclevels,indicatingongoingCOVID-19-relatedeffectsonpeople’shealth.Policymeasurestokeepworkersinjobsregardlessofthenumberofhoursworkedarefadingonlyslowlyandhavepreventedafasterrecoveryofaveragehoursworked.Finally,theincreaseintheincidenceofpart-timeemploymentiscontributingtolonger-termreductionsinaveragehoursworked,sincepart-timeemployeesoftenfinditdifficulttoreturntoafull-timejob.Astheeconomycontinuestoslowdown,partoftheselabourshortageswillbeabsorbedbyfirmsissuingfewervacancies.Nevertheless,asproductivitygrowthremainsweak,labourshort-agesarelikelytopersist.Incountrieswherethepopulationisageing,employerswillfaceincreasingdifficultiesinfillingtheirvacanciesdespitetheslowinggrowth.Olderworkerstendtoswitchjobslessfrequently;henceanolderpopulationmeanstherewillbefewerofthejobhopperswhoconstitutemanyofthecandidatesforopenvacancies.Improvementsinworkingconditionsandrisingproductivitycouldhelpaddresssomeoftheselabourmarketimbalances,ascouldmoreequitabledistributionofjobopportunitiesacrosscountriesthathavesevereexcesslabour.Therecoveryinlabourforceparticipationratestopre-pandemiclevelshasbeenunevenandhasnotbenefitedalllabourmarketgroupsthesameway.Femaleparticipationrateshaverecoveredfasterthanexpectedbutthegenderpar-ticipationgapremainslarge,especiallyinemerginganddevelopingcountries.Mostconcerningisthesituationforyoungpeople.Althoughyouthlabourforceparticipationhasrecoveredabovetrend,adisproportionatelylargeproportionofyouthwhodroppedoutofthelabourmarketarenotpursuinganyformoftrainingandcontinuetofacesignificantobstaclestoreturningtowork.Therateofthosenotintraining,educationoremployment(NEET)remainshighacrossincomelevelsand14X

ꢀWorldEmploymentandSocialOutlook|Trends2024…anindicationofstructuralproblemsthataffectlabourmarketadjustmentAsthecyclicalfactorsimpactingonlabourmarketshaveslowlybeenabsorbed,struc-turalissuesinlabourmarketadjustmenthavebecomemorepressing.Jobretentionschemes–suchasthoseputinplaceinmanyadvancedeconomies–provedessentialtopreventfirmsandworkerslosingvaluableexperienceandskills.However,theseschemesmadeworkerslesslikelytoswitchrapidlytonewopportunitieswiththeonsetoftherecovery.Moreover,long-termtrendsinproductivityandpopulationageingamongadvancedandsomeemergingeconomieshavesloweddowntheadjustmentnecessarytoabsorbthepandemic-inducedlabo