阿尔金地的存在概念

BeforeEssenceandExistence:

al-Kindi，sConceptionofBeing

PeterAdamson

Inthepersonofal-Kindi(diedca.870A.D.),theArabictraditionhad

itsfirstself-consciously"philosophical"thinker.Thosefamiliarwith

al-Kindimayknowhimchieflybecauseofhisroleinthetransmissionof

Greekphilosophy,thoughitishistransformationoftheideashe

inheritedthatwillinterestusmosthere.Whileitisnotclearwhether

al-KindihimselfcouldreadGreek,1itiswelldocumentedthatheguided

theeffortsofseveralimportantearlytranslators.TheseincludedUstath,

translatorofAristotle，sMetaphysics]Yahyab.al-Bitriq,who

paraphrasedseveralPlatonicdialoguesaswellastranslatedAristotle，s

DeCaelo\andIbnNa'imaal-Himsi.Al-Himsitranslatedlogicalworksof

AristotleandpartsoftheEnneadsofPlotinus,thelatterinaparaphrase

thathascomedowntousasagroupofthreetextsdominatedbythe

so-calledTheologyofAristotle.2(Iwillreferbelowtothesethreetexts

collectivelyastheArabicPlotinus.)Al-Kindi，scircleoftranslators

alsoproducedasimilarparaphraseofProclus，sElementsofTheology,

whichwentfirstbythenameBookonthePureGoodinitsArabicversion

andlater,initsLatinversion,bythetitleLiberdeCausis.Translations

intheBaghdadcircleweremadefrombothGreekandSyriac,andwere

supportedbythe'Abbasidcaliphsal-Ma，mun[EndPage297](reigned813-33)

andal-MuJtasim(reigned833-42).-Inhisownworks,manyofwhichare

lettersaddressedtoal-Mu，tasim，ssonAhmad,al-Kindirepeatedand

developedideasandterminologyfromthephilosophicalworkshereadin

translation,ofteninanswertoquestionsposedbytherecipient.

Itwouldappearthatal-Kindiconsideredthestudyofmetaphysicstobe

primaryinhisendeavortoreconstructGreekthought.Hismostsignificant

remainingwork,OnFirstPhilosophy,assimilatesmetaphysicsor"first

philosophy"totheology,thestudyof"theFirstTruthWhoistheCause

ofeverytruth.〃1HissurveyoftheworksofAristotlelikewiseconfirms

thattheMetaphysicsstudiesGod,HisnamesandHisstatusastheFirst

Cause.2AsimilarconceptionunderliestheProloguetotheTheologyof

Aristotle,whichclaimsto,/completethewholeof[Aristotelian]

philosophy,，zandpromisesa"discussionoftheFirstDivinity...and

thatitistheCauseofcauses./zbTheProloguealsoseemstoportraythis

projectascontinuouswiththatoftheMetaphysics.Wemightsuspect,then,

thatal-KinditookAristotle，saimintheMetaphysicsofstudying"being

quabeing"ascentraltohisownundertaking,andindeedascentralto

anadequatephilosophicalunderstandingofGod.

InthispaperIshalltrytoconfirmthissuspicionthroughastudyof

al-Kindi'scorpus,focusingspecificallyonhisconceptionofbeing,or,

rather,onhisconceptionsofbeing;forasweshallseetherearetwo

competingtreatmentsofbeinginal-Kindi.First,incommonwiththe

ArabicPlotinusandtheLiberdeCansis,hehasaconceptionthat

emphasizesthesimplicityofbeing,andopposesbeingtopredication.

Second,hehasacomplexconceptionofbeingindebtedtoAristotle.These

[EndPage298]twoconceptionscanbereconciled:simplebeing,Iwill

argue,ispriortoandunderliescomplexbeing.Finally,Iwillsuggest

thatal-Kindi'ssimpleconceptionofbeinganticipatesAvicenna，s

distinctionbetweenexistenceandessence,butonlytoalimitedextent.

1.Terminology

Beforeembarkingonthisexaminationofbeingitmaybehelpfultoprovide

abriefdiscussionoftheterminologyusedfor"being"byal-Kindiand

histranslators.Iwillbeexaminingpassagesfromthreemainsources:

first,theaforementionedBookonthePureGoodorLiberdeCausis\'second,

theArabicparaphraseofPlotinusproducedinal-Kindi'scircle;"and

third,al-Kindi'sbest-knownwork,entitledOnFirstPhilosophy

(hereafterFP).Partofthepurposeofsuchtextswastoestablish

technicaltermsforuseinphilosophy.Towardthisendneologismswere

invented,oftenforuseinrenderingGreektechnicaltermsinArabic.This

isthecasewiththreetermswefindusedtomean"being”:anniyya,huwiyya,

andays.

Ofthesethree,theonethathasreceivedthemostattentionisanniyya.

EveninmedievaltimesArabicscholarsspeculatedonthederivationof

theword,offeringsometimesfancifuletymologies."Thoughmyargument

doesnotturnonanyparticularetymology,themostlikelyderivation

seemstobethatsuggestedbyGerhardEndress:itisasubstantification

oftheArabicanna,whichmeans"that”(asin"itistruethatal-Kindi

isaphilosopher,7).!uItmakesitsfirstappearanceinArabicliterature

atthetimeofal-Kindi'scircle,andisprominentintheArabicPlotinus

andtheLiberdeCausis.Thesamegoesforthewordhuwiyya,whichlater

acquiresadifferent,technicalmeaninginal-FarabiandIbnSina,but

inourtextsistreatedasasynonymforanniyya.(Theexceptionisa

passageintheArabicPlotinuswherehuwiyyaisusedtotranslate

Plotinus，stautotes,“identity.〃~ThisledthescholarGeoffreyLewis

mistakenlytorenderhuwiyyaas“identity"throughouthisgroundbreaking

translationoftheArabicPlotinus.-)Inthepluralbothhuwiyyatand

anniyyatareusedassynonymsoftheGreekontay"beings.〃-These

terminological[EndPage299]featuresarecarriedoverintoal-Kindi's

ownworks,sothathuwiyyaandanniyyaseemtobeacceptedtechnicalterms

fortheGreekeinaiandoninallthetextswewillbeconsidering.-

Thetermaysismoreunusual,andtomyknowledgeappearsatthistime

onlyinal-Kindi，sownwritingsandinthetranslationsproducedwithin

hiscircle.且Al-Kindiseemstohavecoinedthewordbyimaginatively

splittingtheArabiclaysa,〃isnot,“intola(〃not〃)andays("being").

Healsouseslaysasanounmeaning〃not—being.〃Likeanniyyaandhuwiyya,

theneologismayscanrefertoaparticularexistent,withlaysmeaning

anon-being(thisusageappearsrepeatedlyinalongpassagetobeexamined

below,FP123.3-124.16[RJ41.3-43.7]).Butlikeanniyyaandhuwiyya,ays

canalsosignifybeingabstractlyconsidered;aswewillseebelow,for

al-Kindiathingcangofromlays,non-being,toays,being.-

2.SimpleBeing

Withtheseterminologicalconsiderationsinmind,wemaynowturntoa

philosophicalanalysisofthetexts.LetusbeginwiththeLiberdeCausis:

(A)LiberdeCausis,Proposition1:Andwegiveasanexampleofthisbeing

{anniyya),living,andman,becauseitmustbethatthethingisfirst

being,thenliving,thenman.Livingistheproximatecauseoftheman,

andbeingisitsremotecause.Thusbeingismoreacauseforthemanthan

living,becauseit[sc.being]isthecauseofliving,whichisthecause

oftheman.Likewise,whenyoupositrationalityascauseoftheman,being

ismoreacauseforthemanthanrationality,becauseitisthecauseof

itscause.Theproofofthisisthat,whenyouremovetherationalpower

fromtheman,hedoesnotremainman,butheremainsliving,ensouled,

[and]sensitive.Andwhenyouremovelivingfromhim,hedoesnotremain

living,butheremainsabeing{anniyya),becausebeingwasnotremoved

fromhim,butratherliving,forthecauseisnotremovedthroughthe

removalofitseffect.Thus,themanremainsabeing.Sowhenthe

individualisnotaman,itisalivingthing,and[when]notaliving

thing,itisonlyabeing{anniyyafaqaf).-

Thepassagesuggestsathoughtexperiment,inwhichwestripawaythe

featuresorattributesfromman.Ofparticularinteresttousisthatwhen

alltheattributeshavebeenremoved,whatremainsisanniyyafaqat,“only

abeing"or"beingalone.z，

Comparethiswiththefollowingpassage,fromtheArabicPlotinus:

(B)SayingsoftheGreekSageI.10-11:Theintellectbecameallthings

becauseitsOriginatorisnotlikeanything.TheFirstOriginatordoes

notresembleanything,becauseallthingsarefromHim,andbecauseHe

hasnoshapeandnoproperformattachedtoHim.Forthe[EndPage300]

FirstOriginatorisonebyHimself,ImeanthatHeisonlybeing{anniyya

faqat),havingnoattribute(sifa)suitabletoHim,becauseallthe

attributesarescatteredforthfromHim.

Justasinpassage(A),thephraseanniyyafaqatisusedheretorefer

tothepurebeingthatremainswhenalldeterminatefeatures,or

“attributes”(sifat),areremoved.ThisiswhatImeanbysayingthatfor

bothauthors,beingaloneis"simple”:itisfreeofattributesor

predicates.ThedifferenceisthatintheArabicPlotinus,purebeingis

nottheoutcomeofathoughtexperiment,butisGodHimself,theFirst

OriginatorwhoisequatedwithPlotinus'sOneandhenceisalsosaidto

bethecauseofIntellect.ThattheauthorofthePlotinianparaphrase

shouldcallGod"beingalone"hasoccasionedcommentelsewhere.-The

historicalandphilosophicalimportanceoftheclaimisheightenedbythe

factthatitiscontrarytoPlotinus，sstatementsthattheOneis,inthe

wordsofPlato5sRepublic,epekeinatesousias,“beyondbeing.〃-

Now,itistemptingtotaketheclaimthatGodisbeingaloneor"being

itself"astantamounttotheclaimthatGodispureactuality,asAristotle

holdsintheMetaphysics.SuchlatermedievalwritersasIbnSinaand

ThomasAquinasexplicitlytakethisoverfromAristotle.Norissuchan

understandingofGodasactualityforeigntotheArabicPlotinus,since

wefindtherearemarkablepassagewheretheauthorwritesthatGod〃is

thethingexistingtrulyinact.Nayrather,Heispureact〃(huwaal-shay"

al-kafinbi-fl-fif1haqqan,balhuwa1al-mahd).-Whilethis

passagedoesmostlikelyrepresentanAristotelianinfluenceonthe

Plotinusparaphrase,itisanisolatedexampleofthatinfluence.(The

thoughtthatGodisactualitymayalsoaccountforal-Kindi，sfrequent

descriptionsofGodasan"Agent"orthe"FirstAgent.〃-)Itismuchmore

frequenttofindtheparaphrasecallingGod"beingalone"becauseofHis

lackofattributes.-Thuswhentheauthorsaysinpassage(B)and

elsewherethatGodisanniyyafaqat,heseemsabovealltohaveinmind

God，sabsolutesimplicity,andHisresultinglackofattributes.Itis

likelythatthisconcernwithsimplicityandtheexclusionofattributes

isrelatedtocontemporaneousdebatesoverdivineattributes{sifat),

whichalreadyragedintheninthcentury,whentheArabicPlotinuswas

composed.-

Itissignificantforourunderstandingofpassage(A)thatwefindthe

sameconceptionofGodintheLiberdeCausis.InProposition4,theauthor

ofthatparaphrasewritesthatGodis"thepurebeing,theOne,theTrue,

inwhomthereisnomultiplicityinanyway”{al-anniyyamahda,al-wahid,

al-haqq,alladhilaysafihi[EndPage301]kathraminal-jihatalsshkhas).

AsintheArabicPlotinus,Godisnothingbutbeing,becauseHeissimple.

Beingiscontrastedtoattributes,becausethebeingofathingisdistinct

fromthemultiplefeaturesthatarepredicatedofthatthing.Ofcourse

itisessentialtocreatedthingslikehumansthattheyhavetheir

predicatedfeatures,becausesomethingcannotbeahumanwithoutbeing

alive,rational,andsoon.Butbeingisnotjustanotherofthese

predicates,essentialoraccidental.Rather,itispriortothe

predicates.

Whatsortofpriorityisthis?Ananswerissuggestedbyaremarkof

al-Kindi's:

(C)FP113.11-13[RJ27.17-19]:Corruptionisonlythechangingofthe

predicate,notofthefirstbearerofpredication.Asforthefirstbearer

ofpredication,whichisbeing{ays),itdoesnotchange,becausefor

somethingcorrupted,itscorruptionhasnothingtodowiththemaking

be〃(tafyis)ofitsbeing^aysiyyatihi).

Thispassageisnotparticularlyclear,butitdoesexplicitlymakethe

pointthatays,“being,“isthe"firstbearerofpredication”

al-awwal).Themeaningofthisassertionbecomescleareragainstthe

backgroundoftexts(A)and(B).Beingispriortothepredicatesofa

thing,forexample"living"and"rational"inthecaseofahuman,because

itisthesubjectofpredication.

Ifthisisright,then"being"istreatedasanalogoustoAristotelian

matter.Theanalogyissuggestedbybothpassages(A)and(C).-Passage

(A)isreminiscentofAristotle，sdiscussionintheMetaphysicswhere,

ononetraditionalinterpretation,hedescribesmatterastheultimate

subjectofpredicationthatunderliesallthefeaturesofathing.-Also

likeAristotelianmatter,beingsubsiststhroughchange,asbecomesclear

inpassage(C)whenal-Kindisaysthatbeing"doesnotchange.z，Thepoint

isanintelligibleone:eveninthecaseofsubstantialcorruption(such

asdeathinthecaseofahuman),thereisnotanabsolutedestruction

ofbeingbutmerelyofthewaythethingis.Thisiswhythecorpsethat

remainswhenthehumanisnolongeraliveisyetsomethingthatexists.

Finally,likeAristotelianmatter,merebeingmustbesimple,where

“simple“againmeanswithoutpredicates.For,astheultimatesubjectof

predication,beingitselfcannotbefurtheranalyzedintoacomplexof

subjectandpredicates.Theanalogydoesbreakdowninsofarasmatteris

associatedwithpotentiality,whereasbeing(accordingtotheArabic

Plotinus,aswesawabove)ismoreaptlyassociatedwithactuality.

AsintheNeoplatonictranslations,foral-Kindithisanalysisofbeing

inthecaseofcomplex,createdthingsislinkedtoaconceptionofGod.

Al-KindifollowstheauthorsofthetwoparaphrasesinsayingthatGod

isbeing.Forexample,he[EndPage302]saysthatGodis"thetrueBeing”

{al-anniyyaal-haqq),"andassertsthatGodcreatesz/throughHisbeing”

{bi-huwiyyatihi).-Moreover,hefollowstheminemphasizingthatGodis

beingbecauseHeissimple,orone:

(D)FP161.10-14[RJ95.24-96.3]:Thecauseofunityinunifiedthings

istheTrue,FirstOne,andeverythingthatreceivesunityiscaused.For

everyonethatisnottrulytheOneisonemetaphorically,notintruth.

Andeveryoneoftheeffectsofunitygoesfrom[God，s]unitytowhatis

otherthan[God's]being{huwiyya),Imeanthat[God]isnotmultiplewith

respecttoexisting{minhaythyuJadu).[Theeffect]ismultiple,not

absolutelyone,andby^absolutelyone“Imeannotmultipleatall,so

thatHisunityisnothingotherthanHisbeing{wa-laysawahdatuhushay'an

ghayrhuwiyyatihi).

Itisclearfromtheendofthispassagethatforal-Kindi,unityis

convertiblewithbeinginthecaseofGod,*andthatunityishereto

beunderstoodasexcludingmultiplicity.Indeedtext(D)isthe

culminationofal-Kindi"seffortsinthefinalsurvivingchapterofFP

toarguethatGodhasnoattributes.Thisfitswellwithtext(C)andthe

oppositionitmakesbetweenbeingandattributes.Soitwouldseemthat

thenotionofGodinFPisthesameastheonewediscernedinthe

Neoplatonicparaphrases:Godisbeing,whichistosaythatHehasno

multiplicityofattributesdistinctfromHisbeing.~

Wenowneedtomakesenseofthenotionthatthissimplebeingisthe

subjectofpredicationincomplexthings.Wecandothisbybearingin

mindthatcomplexthingsarecreatedthings.Hencethecontrastinpassage

(D)isbetweenGod,asimpleandineffableFirstCausewhoisidentical

withHisownbeing,andthecomplexthingsthatarenotidenticalwith

theirownbeing.Yetthebeingofthosecreatedthingsisinitselfsimple,

asweseeinpassages(A)and(C),foritisdistinctfromorpriorto

thepredicates.Furthermore,thesimplebeingofacreatedthingisthe

directeffectofGod.Indeedthisiswhatcreationamountsto:thebestowal

ofthesimplebeinguponwhichthecreatedthing，scomplexityisfounded.

ThustheLiberdeCausisassertsthat"thefirstoforiginatedthingsis

being"andthatcreatedbeingthen,'receivesmultiplicity.，z-The

Neoplatoniclineamentsofthe[EndPage303]theoryareclearenough:

creatednessamountstoreceivingsimplebeingfromasimpleOnethatis

theprincipleofbeing,orpurebeing."

ItisinthissensethatGod'screatingsomethingisGod，smakingthat

thingexist.Thusal-Kindiusesthesameterminologyof"beingalone"in

thefollowingcontext:

FP101.5~7:Therearefourscientificinquiries:[...]"whether”^hal),

〃what,〃“which"and〃why〃[...]and"whether“isaninvestigationof

beingalone(fananniyyafaqat).

Hereal-KindiisdrawingonAristotle,whodifferentiatesquestions

regarding"whether”(tohoti)fromthoseregardingwhatathingis(to

tiestin)inPosteriorAnalyticsII.1.Al-Kindi'sexplicitdiscussions

ofcreationbearouttheequivalenceofbeingcreatedandreceivingbeing.

Ingeneral,thegenerationofanygiventhingisa^coming-to-beofbeing

{ays)fromnon-being("anlays)(FP118.18[RJ33.25]).Andinparticular,

“origination”(al-ibda')orcreationiszzthemanifestation{izhar)ofthe

thingfromnon-being('anlays)./z"Suchpassagesarefurtherevidence

thatal-Kindicouldusetermsmeaning〃being"torefertothesheer

existenceofsomething,thefactthatitis:tohoti,inAristotle's

terminology.Thisactofexistingwillbedistinctfromthepredicates

trueofthecreatedthing;indeed,itwillbeontologicallypriortothose

predicatesastheirsubject.

3.AnObjection:UnlimitedBeing

ItmightbeobjectedthatIamascribingaremarkablyimpoverishedview

ofGodandbeingtoal-Kindi.Whythink,thisobjectormightsay,that

simplebeinghastoexcludeattributes,insteadofcontainingthemall

implicitly?Wemightsupposethat,onthecontrary,Godisthefullness

ofBeing,containingallthingsasaunitywithinHimself,sothatina

senseHehasallattributesratherthannone.Hispropereffectwouldstill

becreatedbeing,whichlikeGodwouldvirtuallycontainallpredicates

untilitbecamespecifiedasacertainsortofthing.Perhaps,then,we

shouldtalkofGodas"unlimited"beingratherthan"simple"being:as

thePrincipleandCauseofallthings,Godwouldinfacthaveallthe

attributesasasimultaneousunity,muchinthemannerofPlotiniannous.

OurimaginaryobjectorwouldfindsupportintheNeoplatonicparaphrases

citedabove.TheArabicPlotinusentertainsthenotionthatGodmust

possessthesameattributesasHiseffects,butinamoreeminentway,

ratherthanexcludingallattributes.-InadiscussionofGodascause

ofthevirtues,theauthoralsosuggeststhatGod'sbeingisidentical

withthedivineattributes:[EndPage304]

ThAIX.71[B130.9-10]:ThevirtuesareintheFirstCauseinthemanner

ofacause.Notthatitisinthepositionofareceptacleforthevirtues;

ratheritsentiretyisabeing{anniyya)thatisallthevirtues.

HeretheemphasisonGod，snotbeinga"receptacle”{wifa)forthevirtues

isintendedtostressthatthereisnodistinctionbetweenGodandthe

virtues.Evenpriortoal-Kindi'stranslationcircle,asimilarposition

wastakenbytheKalamthinkerAbu'1-Hudhayl,whoissaidtohaveclaimed

that〃[God]isknowinginanactofknowingthatisHeandispowerful

inapowerofefficientcausalitythatisHeandislivinginalifethat

isHe.~

Wecanillustratethedifferencebetween"simple"and"unlimited"being

bydistinguishingtwowaysinwhichasubjectcanrelatetoitspredicate.

Take,forexample,thestatements〃a”Kindiisrational"and〃a『Kindi

isthefirstArabicphilosopher.，zIntheformer,thesubjectandpredicate

aredistinct,sothatal-Kindiisnotthesamethingashisrationality,

whereasinthelatterthesubjectisbeingidentifiedwiththepredicate.

-IfweapplythistothecaseofGodwehavethedifferencebetweensimple

andunlimitedbeing.Abelieverinsimplebeingholdsthatasubjectmust

bedistinctfromitspredicate,asal-Kindiisdistinctfromhis

rationality.Theinsightbehindthenotionofbeingasunlimitedisthat

ifthesubjectisidenticalwiththepredicate,thenpredicationneednot

implymultiplicity.Inthedivinecase,wemaysaythat〃Godisjust"and

〃Godiswise,〃butHeisnotthreethings(justice,wisdom,andthesubject

ofjusticeandwisdom).Rather,God,Hisjustice,andHiswisdomareall

identical.Godwillstillbesimple,if"simple"meansnotmultiple,but

Hewillnotbesimpleinthestrictersenseoflackingallattributes.

[EndPage305]

However,therearegoodreasonsforsupposingthatal-Kindi,aswellas

theauthorsoftheNeoplatonictranslationswehaveconsidered,usually

supposedthatasubjectmustbedistinctfromitspredicate,sothatbeing

mustlackallpredicatesifitistobesimple.Thiscomesoutmost

obviouslyinthefinalsurvivingsectionofFP,whereal-Kindiarguesat

lengththatnothingcanbepredicatedofGod.Aftersystematicallyshowing

thateverykindofpredicateisincompatiblewiththedivineunity,he

concludes:"therefore[God]isonlyandpurelyunity(wahdafaqatmahd),

Imeannothingotherthanunity”(FP160.16-17[RJ95.13-14]).Similarly,

themostexplicitstatementondivinepredicationintheArabic

NeoplatonictextsisthethoroughlynegativeoneinLiberdeCausis,

Proposition5.Furtherconsiderationofpassage(C)aboveyieldsthesame

result.Hereal-Kindinotonlysaysthatbeingisthesubjectof

predication,butalsothatthepredicatecanchangewhilethesubject

remains.Thismakesclearthatbeing,thesubject,isnotidenticalto

thepredicate.Rather,wesawthatas"thefirstbearerofpredication”

beinginitselflackspredicates,afterthefashionofAristotelianmatter.

Likewise,passage(A)fromtheLiberdeCausisenvisions"onlybeing"as

theresultofremovingpredicates,notasaricherprinciplethat

implicitlycontainsorisidenticaltoallpredicates.Thusthepassages

consideredsofarpresupposethatsubjectandpredicatearedistinct,and

drawtheconclusionthatbeing(inthecaseofbothGodandcreatedthings)

issimpleinthesenseoflackingattributes.Yetwewillnowseethat

al-Kindidoeshaveanotionofbeingthatincludescomplexityand

attributes.This"complex"beingisappropriateonlytocreatedthings,

andpresupposes"simple"being.

4.ComplexBeing

Others,suchasMarie-Theresed'Alverny,独havenotedadoublemeaning

ofanniyyainthetextsproducedbyal-Kindi，scircle.Onetheonehand,

aswehaveseen,anniyyacanrefertomereexistence.Ontheotherhand,

itcanincludetheactualnatureoressenceofathi