联合国亚太经社会（UNESCAP）：促进尼泊尔的结构转型

SectiononSustainableDevelopmentandCountriesinSpecialSituations

Fosteringstructural

transformationinNepal

ParasKharel

WORKINGPAPERSERIESNOVEMBER2023

2ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

Disclaimer:ThedesignationsemployedandthepresentationofthematerialinthispolicybriefdonotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheSecretariatoftheUnitedNationsconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,territory,cityorarea,orofitsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationofitsfrontiersorboundaries.Wherethedesignation“countryorarea”appears,itcoverscountries,territories,citiesorareas.Bibliographicalandotherreferenceshave,whereverpossible,beenverified.TheUnitedNationsbearsnoresponsibilityfortheavailabilityorfunctioningofURLs.Theopinions,figuresandestimatessetforthinthispublicationshouldnotnecessarilybeconsideredasreflectingtheviewsorcarryingtheendorsementoftheUnitedNations.ThementionoffirmnamesandcommercialproductsdoesnotimplytheendorsementoftheUnitedNations.

3ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

Pleasecitethispaperas:Kharel

(2023),FosteringStructuralTransformationinNepal.UnitedNationsESCAP,SectiononSustainableDevelopmentandCountriesinSpecialSituations,November2023.Bangkok.

Availableat:

/kp

Trackingnumber:CSSWorkingPaperNo.23-2

Abouttheauthor:ParasKharel,ResearchDirector,SouthAsiaWatchonTrade,EconmicsandEnvironment.

Email:

paras.kharel@

4ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

TableofContents

ABSTRACT 5

1.INTRODUCTION 6

2.NEPAL’SECONOMY:KEYFEATURESANDSTRUCTURALCHANGES 8

2.1KEYFEATURES 8

2.2STRUCTURALTRANSFORMATION 12

3.WHERESHOULDNEPALLOOKFORINDUSTRIALTRANSFER 23

3.1NATIONALDEVELOPMENTPLANS 24

3.2INTERNALIZATIONOFSUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENTGOALS 25

3.3IMPLEMENTATIONOFINDUSTRIALPOLICY 26

4.CONSTRAINTSTOECONOMICGROWTHANDSTRUCTURAL

TRANSFORMATION 29

5.LDCGRADUATION 34

5.1EXPORTS 34

5.2OFFICIALDEVELOPMENTASSISTANCE 36

5.3POLICYSPACE 39

5.4FOREIGNDIRECTINVESTMENT 42

6.THESOCIO-ECONOMICIMPACTSOFCOVID-19 43

7.REGIONALCOOPERATIONANDTHEBELTANDROADINITIATIVE 47

7.1SAARC,BBINANDBIMSTEC 47

7.2NEPAL-CHINACOOPERATION:BRIANDBEYOND 49

8.WAYFORWARD 52

9.REFERENCES 61

10.APPENDIX 68

5ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

Abstract

SustainedandhigheconomicgrowthhaseludedNepal.Whiletheeconomyhasundergonestructuraltransformationinthelastthreedecadesthegrowth-enhancingeffectofthisstructuralchangehashadlimitedimpactscontributingtoaper-capitavalueaddedgrowthof2%inthelasttwodecades.Moreitisprimarilythestaticreallocationoflaborthathascontributedtothevalue-addedgrowth,withdynamicreallocation,wheresectorsreceivinglaborsurplusexperienceproductivitygrowthisinfactslightlynegativeforNepalintheperiod,implyingthat,inaggregate,thesectorsdrawinginlaborexperiencednegativeproductivitygrowth.ProximatecausesofthisincludesNepal’sprematurede-industrializationwhichisoccurringatamuchlowerlevelofincomeanditsmanufacturingsharesinvalueaddedandemploymenthavebeenmuchlowercomparedtotheaveragecountry.Theboomingservicessector

hasnotgeneratedenoughdecentjobstoabsorbanexpandinglaborforce.Thishasledtomassivetemporarywork-relatedoutmigration.Obstaclesrangefrominfrastructuregaps,inadequateelectricitysupplyandrealibletransportationservices,uncertaintysurroundingreformagendaandpolicyimplementation;labormarketissues(weakindustrialrelationsandlabormarketdistortionscausedbylargeoutboundlabormigration);lackofenablingbusinessenvironmentmarkedbycumbersomeproceduresassociatedwithopeningandclosingbusinessesandpayingtaxes,limitedaccesstofinance,andlowavailabilityofbusinesssupportservices.Toalleviatetheseconstraints,acompreshensivereformagendaisproposed,whichamongothersincludesreviewtheexistingIndustrialPolicytoimproveitsdesignandimplementation,andensurealignmentwiththechangingcontext.

KeyWords:Nepal,StructuralTransformation,IndustrialPolicy,LeastDevelopedCountry,

BeltandRoadInitiative

6ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

1.Introduction

SustainedandhigheconomicgrowthhaseludedNepal.Thestructureofitseconomyhastransformedsignificantlyinthelastthreedecades,withagriculture'sshareinGDPfallingandservices'shareincreasing.Butthegrowth-enhancingeffectofthisstructuralchangehasbeenlimited.Manufacturing-ledindustrializationhasbypassedtheeconomy,whiletheboomingservicessectorhasnotgeneratedenoughdecentjobstoanexpandinglabourforce.Thishasledtomassivetemporarywork-relatedoutmigration.

Partlythankstoworkers'remittances,NepalachievedormadesignificantprogresstowardsmanyoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,includingpovertyreductionandbettereducationandhealthoutcomes,despiteitspoorperformanceonthestructuraltransformationandeconomicdiversificationfront.Nepalhasmainstreamedintoitsnationalplanthe2030AgendaoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoals

(SDGs).OfspecialsaliencetoNepalareSDGs8

(decentworkandeconomicgrowth)and9(industryandinfrastructure),which,besidesbeingimportantendsintheirownright,arealsothemeanstoachievingandsustainingotherdevelopmentgoals.Nepal'slandlockedgeographyandvastinfrastructureneedsraisethepotentialbenefitsofregionalcooperationaswellasnewdevelopmentcooperationinitiativesinitsneighbourhood,includingtheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI).

Thesetbacktosocio-economicoutcomesfromtheCovid-19pandemicposesadditionalchallengestorealizingthecountry'sdevelopmentgoals.Furthermore,Nepalisscheduledtograduatefromtheleastdevelopedcountry(LDC)groupin2026,butwithaweakproductivecapacity.Thisraisesconcernsabouttheimplicationsoftheresultinglossofinternationalsupportmeasuresforthecountry'sindustrialization,economicdiversificationandjobcreationgoals.

Figure1:AnnualrealGDPgrowth,1961-2019

RealGDPgrowth(annual,%)

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

Year

Source:TheWorldBank2022.WDIDataBank:WorldDevelopmentIndicators,[NV.SRV.TETC.ZS,NV.IND.TOTL.ZS,NV.IND.MANF.ZS,NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS],asaccessedAug.2022.

7ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

Figure2:AverageannualrealGDPgrowth

AverageannualrealGDPgrowth(%)

5.004.504.003.503.002.502.001.501.000.500.00

4.344.594.39

3.43

1991-20002001-20102011-20191991-2019

Year

Source:TheWorldBank2022.WDIDataBank:WorldDevelopmentIndicators,[NV.SRV.TETC.ZS,NV.IND.TOTL.ZS,NV.IND.MANF.ZS,

NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS],asaccessedAug.2022.

Againstthisbackdrop,thispaperdissectsthechallengesfacedbyNepalinfosteringgrowth-enhancingstructuraltransformation,andsuggestspossiblemeasuresandactionstowardsthatend.Section2presentsthekeyfeaturesofNepal'seconomyandthestructuralchangesithaswitnessed.Section3summarizesthepolicyenvironment.Section4discussesthemajoridentifiedconstraintstoeconomicgrowth,structuraltransformationandeconomic

diversification.Section5analysestheimplicationsofLDCgraduationforareasrelevanttostructuraltransformationandeconomicdiversification.Section6discussestheimpactofthepandemic.Section7providesanoverviewofNepal'sengagementinregionalcooperationinitiativesandtheBRI.Finally,Section8suggestspossibleactionsforachievinggrowth-enhancingstructuraltransformation,coveringbothcross-cuttingandsectoralissues.

2.Nepal’seconomy:Keyfeaturesandstructuralchanges

2.1Keyfeatures

Nepal'seconomicgrowthhasremainederratic,butmostlylimited,overtheyears(Figure1).Theeconomygrewatamodestrateof4.39percentperannumintheperiod1991-2019(Figure2).Theaverageannualgrowthratewasparticularlylowintheperiod2001-2010(Figure2),aperiodmarkedbyinsurgencyandextremepoliticalinstability.Whiletheeconomyhasgrownatafasterpaceintherecentdecade(2010-2019),theaveragegrowthremainsmodestat4.59percentperannum,partlybecauseoftwomajoreventsintheperiod2015-2016—acatastrophicearthquakein2015thatshookthenationanddisruptedeconomicactivitiesandsevereborderdisruptions(economicblockade)alongtheborderwithIndiaintheperiod2015-2016.

Nepal'seconomicgrowthintheperiod1991-2019wasthelowestwhencomparedwithsomecomparatorcountries1(Figure3;seealsoAnnex1figure).

Althoughtherehasbeenasignificantriseinthelasttwodecades,Nepal'spercapitaincomeremainslow.In2019,Nepal'snominalpercapitaGDP,nominalpercapitaGNI,andnominalpercapitaGNDI,stoodatUS$1159,US$1171,andUS$1470respectively.2TheannualrealGDPpercapitagrowthhasbeenerratic,butmodest,onaverage(Figure4).Nepal'sannualpercapitarealGDPgrowthwasamodest3percentintheperiod1991-2019(Figure5),whichplacedNepalatthebottomamongthecomparatorcountries(Figure6;seealsoAnnex2figure).

Figure3:AverageannualrealGDPgrowth(%)ofNepalcomparedwiththecomparatorcountries,1991-2019

LaoPDR Vietnam Bhutan IndiaBangladeshCambodiaNepal

6.66

6.63

6.33

6.21

5.55

5.38

4.39

0.001.002.003.004.005.006.007.00

Source:TheWorldBank2022.WDIDataBank:WorldDevelopmentIndicators,[NV.SRV.TETC.ZS,NV.IND.TOTL.ZS,NV.IND.MANF.ZS,NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS],asaccessedAug.2022.

Note:ForCambodia,theaverageannualrealGDPgrowthisfortheperiod1993-2019

1ComparatorcountriesarederivedfromBasnettetal.(2014)andXuandHager(2017).

2Thedataisforthefiscalyear2018/19,whichendsinmid-July.Thefigurespresentedherearefromthelatestrebasednationalaccountsstatistics.

8ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

9ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

Figure4:AverageannualrealpercapitaGDPgrowth,1961-2019

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

Source:TheWorldBank2022.WDIDataBank:WorldDevelopmentIndicators,[NV.SRV.TETC.ZS,NV.IND.TOTL.ZS,NV.IND.MANF.ZS,NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS],asaccessedAug.2022.

Expendituresonprivateconsumption,fuelledbyremittanceinflows,contributesignificantlytoGDP(Figure7).Demandforconsumptionismetsignificantlythroughimports,andhence'netexportsofgoodsandservices'isasignificantcomponentoftheGDP(Figure7).Oneimportanttrendinthelatterpartofthedecadeistherisein

thegrosscapitalformationandasubsequentriseinnetexportsofgoodsandservices(imports)(Figure7),primarilybecauseofthereconstructionworkthathavetakenplaceagainstthemassivedestructionofassetsandinfrastructureintheearthquakeof2015.

RealGDPpercapitagrowth(annual,%)

1961

1964

1967

1970

1973

1976

1979

1982

1985

1988

1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

2006

2009

2012

2015

2018

Year

Figure5:AverageannualrealpercapitaGDPgrowth

AverageannualrealGDPper

capitagrowth(%)

4.504.003.503.002.502.001.501.000.500.00

3.93

3.00

2.36

1.69

1991-20002001-20102011-20191991-2019

Year

Source:TheWorldBank2022.WDIDataBank:WorldDevelopmentIndicators,[NV.SRV.TETC.ZS,NV.IND.TOTL.ZS,NV.IND.MANF.ZS,NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS],asaccessedAug.2022.

10ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

Figure6:AverageannualrealGDPpercapitagrowth(%)ofNepalcomparedwiththecomparatorcountries,1991–2019

Vietnam Bhutan LaoPDR IndiaBangladesh CambodiaNepal

3.43

3.00

4.

3.98

5.43

5.034.86

65

0.001.002.003.004.005.006.00

Source:TheWorldBank2022.WDIDataBank:WorldDevelopmentIndicators,[NV.SRV.TETC.ZS,NV.IND.TOTL.ZS,NV.IND.MANF.ZS,NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS],asaccessedAug.2022.

Figure7:Expenditurecategories’sharesinrealGDP

%

100

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

Consumption(C)

Consumption(G)

Formation(I)

GoodsandServices

80.077.0

59.1

46.7

11.5

Private

Government

GrossCapital

NetExportsof

(NX)

-37.7

-47.5

10.9

2010-20192016-2019

Source:Author,usingCBSdata

Note:Privateconsumption(C)headingincludesprivateconsumptionexpendituresofresidenthouseholdsandconsumptionexpendituresofnonprofitinstitutionsservinghouseholds.GrossCapitalformation(I)includesbothprivateandpublicgrosscapitalformation.

Intermsofeconomicactivities,agriculturestillcontributessignificantlytothetotalrealvalue-added(26.8percentin2019),butitsshareisindeclineandlagssignificantlybehindtheservicesector(57.6percentin2019)(Figure8).The

industrysector's(includesmanufacturing)contributionhasdeclinedsince2000sandhasbeenstagnantinthecurrentdecade(Figure8),atrendthatisalsoseeninthemanufacturingsector(Figure9).

11ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

Figure8:Realvalueaddedbybroadeconomicsectors(%oftotalrealGVA)

1973

1975

%

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Year

AgricultureIndustryServices

Source:TheWorldBank2022.WDIDataBank:WorldDevelopmentIndicators,[NV.SRV.TETC.ZS,NV.IND.TOTL.ZS,NV.IND.MANF.ZS,

Figure9:Realvalueaddedbybroadeconomicsectors(%oftotalrealGVA)

10

%

9

8

7

6

5

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

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2017

2018

2019

4

3

2

1

0

Source:TheWorldBank2022.WDIDataBank:WorldDevelopmentIndicators,[NV.SRV.TETC.ZS,NV.IND.TOTL.ZS,NV.IND.MANF.ZS,

Valueaddedintheservicesectorcontributedthemost(62.4percent)tothegrowthofGVAinthecurrentdecade(2010-2019),followedbytheagriculturesector(22.6percent)andtheindustrysectormakingamodestcontributionof15.1percent(Figure10A).Intheservicesector,

wholesaleandretailtradecontributedthemost(19.1percent),followedby'transport,storage,andcommunications'contributing10.3percenttotheGVAgrowthintheperiod(Figure10B).Themanufacturingsectorcontributedamodest5.5percent.

12ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

Figure10:Economicactivity'scontributiontotheGVAgrowth,2010–2019(%)

B.InternationalStandardIndustrialClassification

%

25

20

15

10

5

0

Source:Author,usingCBSdata

2.2Structuraltransformation

Nepalhaswitnessedamodeststructuraltransformation—transitionoflaborfromtraditionalandlow-productivitysectorstomodernsectorswithhigherproductivity—overthelastthreedecades.Agriculture'scontributiontothegrossvalueaddedhasdeclinedfrom34

percentin1998to32percentin2008and27percentin2018,withservicesectormakingincreasingcontributions(Figure11A).Moreimportantly,adecentshareofworkershasmovedfromtheagriculturesectortomore-productivesectors—industryandservices(Figure11B).

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

A.Broadeconomicactivities

62.4

15.1

22.6

Services

Industry

Agriculture

%

74

63

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

B.Sectoralsharesofemployment

76

21

161415

1011

AgricultureIndustryServices

199820082018

Figure11:Sectoralcontributiontothevalueaddedandemployment

A.Sectoralsharesofvalueadded

%

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

57

5053

3432

27

161515

AgricultureIndustryServices

199820082018

Source:PanelA:AuthorcomputationusingWDIdata;PanelB:Bulmer,Shrestha,andMarshalian(2020)usingNationallaborForceSurvey(NLFS)1998,2008,and2018data

Note:NLFS2018employsdifferentmethodologythanNLFS1998andNLFS2018.Bulmer,Shrestha,andMarshalian(2020)updatetheNLFS2018datatomakeitcomparabletothepreviouseditionsofNLFS

However,evidenceshowsthatthestructuraltransformationhasbeenslow.Asignificantshareoflaborisstillengagedintheagriculturesector,whichremainslargelytraditionalandsubsistence-based—overhalfoftheagricultureworkforcedoesnotproduceenoughtosellsurplusoutputinthemarket(Bulmer,Shrestha,andMarshalian,2020).

AnotherfeatureofNepal'sstructuraltransformationisthatwhilelabourhasmovedfromlow-productivitysectorstohigh-productivitysectorsandeconomy-wideproductivity(measuredasGVAperworker)hasincreased,thestructuraltransformationprocesshasbeenproductivity-decreasingintheindustryandservicessector—exceptforthe‘transport,storage,andcommunications’sector,allothernon-agriculturesub-sectorshavewitnessedproductivitydownfalls(Figure12).

Bulmer,Shrestha,andMarshalian(2010)depictthisnuanceofNepal’sstructuralchangethroughtheirdecompositionofpercapitavalue-addedgrowth(Figure13).Whilestructuraltransformationhascontributedtothepercapita

value-addedgrowthofabout2percentperannumobservedintheperiod1998-20183,itisprimarilythestaticreallocationoflabor(wherelaborsimplymovesfromlowerproductivitysectortohigherproductivitysector)thathascontributedtothevalue-addedgrowth(Figure13).However,dynamicreallocation,anothertypeofstructuraltransformationwheresectorsreceivinglaborsurplusexperienceproductivitygrowth(forinstance,throughlaborgainingknowledge,skills,andcapabilitiesandaccesstotechnology),isinfactslightlynegativeforNepalintheperiod,implyingthat,inaggregate,thesectorsdrawinginlaborexperiencednegativeproductivitygrowth(inotherwords,themarginalproductivityofmovementofanextraworkertothesectorwasnegative)4(Figure13).This,inpart,explainsthelimitedgrowthphenomenon—higher-productivitysectorshaveexperiencedproductivitydownfallsassociatedwiththemovementoflabortothesesectors.Furthermore,within-sectorproductivitygrowth,whichwasthebiggestcontributortopercapitavalue-addedgrowthduring1998-2008,turnednegativeduring2008-2018.

3Besidesthestructuraltransformation,theothercontributorstotheper-capitavalue-addedgrowthintheperiod1998–2018arewithin-

sectorproductivity(increaseinproductivityofsectorsirrespectiveofstructuraltransformation),whichwaslargefortheperiod1998–2008

butnegativefortheperiod2008–2018,anddemographicchange(expansionoftheworkingagepopulation),whichwaslargerintheperiod2008–2018.

4See,forinstance,DeVries,Timmer,andDeVries(2015)foranaccountofdynamicreallocationeffectandstaticreallocationeffect.

13ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

14ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

Figure12:Laborproductivity(GVAperworker)trendsacrosssectors

Source:Panel:Bulmer,Shrestha,andMarshalian(2020)

Figure13:Decompositionofpercapitavalue-addedgrowth

Source:Panel:Bulmer,Shrestha,andMarshalian(2020)

Theslowpaceofgrowth-enhancingstructuraltransformationinNepalhaslinkageswiththestateofmanufacturingsectorinNepal.Manufacturingsector,believedtodrivethestructuraltransformationprocessbecauseofitshighlabor-absorptioncapacityandmuchhigherproductivitylevelsthanagriculture,hasnotbeenabletodosoinNepalgivenitsmodestgrowth.Whilethemanufacturingsectorwitnessedtwoshortburstsofhighgrowthintheperiods1984–1986(18.7percent)and1991-1994(17percent)owingto“investmentsininfrastructure,

industrialzonesandpolicyreforms”(Basnettetal.,2014),itsgrowthinthefollowingperiodshasbeenmediocre,primarilyinthelasttwodecades(Figure14).Whileprematurede-industrialization(definedasthepeakingofmanufacturing'sshareintotalvalueaddedandtotalemploymentatlowerlevelsofincome,andtheloweringofthepeaks)hasbeenobservedinmanycountries,includingdevelopingones(see,forexample,Rodrik,2016),Nepal'sprematurede-industrializationhasoccurredatamuchlowerlevelofincomeanditsmanufacturing

15ApplyingtheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFrameworktoNepal:2023Update

sharesinvalueaddedandemploymenthavebeenmuchlowercomparedtotheaveragecountry(Kharel,2020).Theshareofmanufacturingintotalemploymenthashardlybudgedbetween2008and2018,under7percent(Figure15).Theprematurede-industrializationobservedinNepalisnotafaitaccompliresultingfromaprocesscompletelybeyondthecontrolof

policymakers,butrather,toasignificantextent,aresultoflowproductivecapacity(Kharel,2020),discussedlaterinthispaper.Themodestgrowthofmanufacturingsectorhasresultedinmanyworkersbeingpushedawayfromtheagricultureandothertraditionallow-productivityactivitiesintoforeignmigration.

Figure14:Averageannualvalue-addedgrowthofthemanufacturingsector

%

9.0

8.0

7.0

6.0

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

0.0

4.4

4.0

0.5

8.1

1991-20002001-20102011-20191991-2019

Source:TheWorldBank2022.WDIDataBank:WorldDevelopmentIndicators,[NV.SRV.TETC.ZS,NV.IND.TOTL.ZS,NV.IND.MANF.ZS,

Figure15:Shareofmanufacturingsectoremploymentintotalemployment

Manufacturingshareof

employment(%)

9

7

5

3

1

6.66.8

5.8

199820082018

Year

Source:NLFS1998andNLFS2008;Bulmer,Shrestha,andMarshalian(2020)for2018

AnimportantfeatureofNepal’sstructuraltransformationisthatithasnotbeenabletocreatesubstantialqualityjobs.Thelaboroverwhelminglyentersortransitionsintoinformalemployment(eitheremployedininformalsectorestablishmentsoraredevoidof

socialprotectionbenefits)—accordingtotheNLFS2018,84.6percentoftheemployedwereinformallyemployed(CBS,2019).Wagejobsarescarce—therearenearlyasmanyNepalimeninwageemploymentabroadasthereareinNepal(Bulmer,Shrestha,andMarshalian,2020).

Likewise,anotherimportantfeatureofNepal'sstructuraltransformationisthatwomenhavebeenlargelyleftoutofthestructuraltransformationprocess.Whiletheeconomyaddedasignificantnumberofnewwagejobs(mostoftheminformal)intheperiod2008-2018—1.8millionnewjobswereadded,increasingtheshareofwagejobsintotalemploymentfrom17percentin2008to24percentin2018—thesejobshavepredominantlygonetomaleworkersandalargeshareofwomenstilloccupyunpaidorself-employedfarmjobs(Bulmer,Shrestha,andMarshalian,2020).Accessingwageemployment,althoughachallengeforbothmenandwomen,isdisproportionatelyharderforwomen—onlyabout13percentofworkingwomenareemployedaswageemployeescomparedto38percentforworkingmen—andwomen'sparticipationinthelabormarketasemployerorself-employedisseverelylimited(ibid).Gendernormsthatcompelwomentoshoulderadisproportionateshareofhouseholdchores,inturnreducingtheiravailabilityforwageemployment,andotherfactors,includingthosepartlyrootedingenderinequalityanddiscrimination,contributetowomen'ssignificantexclusionfromthestructuraltransformationprocess(ibid).

TheGenderInequalityIndex(GII),which

estimatesthelossinhumandevelopmentthatoccursduetotheinequality