Devinit-非洲气候危机的优惠贷款：谁的财政努力 Concessional loans for Africa's climate crisis Whose fiscal effort 2024

August2024

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?

factsheet

Contents

Overview 3

Introduction 4

Two-thirdsofclimate-actionODAtoAfricacomesintheformofloans 6

Overhalfofclimate-actionODAtoAfricatargetsadaptation 7

45.2%ofalladaptationgrantswereconcentratedinjustfivecountries 8

AfricanLDCsgetmostadaptationODAasloans 9

IDA,themainfinancerofclimateactioninAfrica,gave83%ofadaptationODAasloans

10

IDAusedloansmoreoftenforclimate-relatedprojectsthanfornon-climaterelated

projectsinAfrica 12

83.5%ofIDA’sloansforadaptationinAfricaareconcentratedinfivecountries 13

ChinaisAfrica’sthird-largestproviderofconcessionalclimateloans,basedonour

estimates 15

Chineseconcessionalloansforclimatearemoreexpensivethannon-climateloans.16

Keymessages 18

Prioritisinggrant-basedfinancing 18

RefocusingIDA’ssupportforclimateaction 18

Attributionoffiscaleffort:countingloansasAfrica’scontribution 18

Reformingtheglobalfinancialarchitecture 18

Enhancingtransparencyforaccountability 19

Annex 20

Acknowledgements 23

Notes 24

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/2

Overview

ThisfactsheetanalysesdebtresultingfrompublicconcessionalloansforclimateactionreceivedbyAfricancountries.Itexploresloansforadaptation,mitigationorboth.

Ithighlightsthatasignificantvolumeandproportionofpublicconcessionalfinance

directedataddressingclimatechallengesinAfricaisbeingprovidedintheformofloans.Althoughthesewillberepaidatlower-than-marketratesand/orhavelongermaturityandgraceperiods,theywillultimatelyneedtoberepaid.

Financesupportingsub-SaharanAfricancountries’responsetoclimatechange,

particularlytheleastdevelopedAfricancountries1andthoseatriskofclimatedisaster,shouldbeprimarilygrant-based,coveringasmanyeligiblecountriesaspossible.Non-grant-basedfinancingrisksexacerbatingnationaldebtburdensthatarealready

significantformanyAfricancountries.Italsoraisesthequestionofwhoisultimatelypayingforclimateactionincountriesthatcontributedtheleasttotheclimatecrisis.

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/3

Introduction

Closetotwo-thirds(64%)ofAfricancountriesareclassifiedasamongtheworld’smostvulnerabletothenegativeimpactsofclimatechange.2Thecontinentalsohostscloseto60%oflow-incomecountriesthatareeitheralreadyinexternaldebtdistressorathighriskofexternaldebtdistress.3Africa’sdebtburdenhasbeengrowingsincethe2008

globalfinancialcrisis.

Sincetheearly2010s,theriskofafiscalcrisisinAfrica,particularlyinsub-Saharan

Africa,hasmorethandoubled.Additionally,theinterestpaymentstorevenueratiointhisregionisapproximatelyfourtimeshigherthanthatofadvancedeconomies.4Africa’s

publicandpubliclyguaranteed(PPG)externaldebttripledtoUS$657billionbetween

2008and2022,representing60%ofitsexternaldebt.By2022,itsmediantotalexternaldebthaddoubledtonearly50%ofGDP(withPPGexternaldebtaccountingformostofthisdebt).5ThisisespeciallyalarmingbecauseAfricandebtheldbyprivatecreditorshasbeengrowingduetothehighcostofborrowing,andAfricandebtisespeciallysensitivetogrowthandfiscalshocks.6

VulnerabilitytoclimatecrisesandlimitedfiscalspacecreatetheperfectstormforAfrica.Ofthe10countriesmostatriskfromclimatedisaster,sevenareintheregion.7Many

Africancountrieshavelowadaptivecapacity,whichmakesthemvulnerabletofood

insecurityanddecliningincome.8Withlimitedfiscalspaceandthehighcostsassociatedwithaddressingclimatechange,manyAfricancountriesrelyonexternalfinancingandrequireassistancefromglobalpartners.9Althoughconcessionalfinancing,particularlyintheformofgrants,isthemostsuitableoption,manyAfricannationsendupborrowingtofundclimateaction.

Aloan,whetheronfavourableterms(concessional)ornot(marketrate)isultimatelyadebt-generatingmechanism.AfricancountriesarefindingthemselvesinclimateODAloandebtdespitenotcarryinganyhistoricalresponsibilityfortheclimatecrisis.

Somedevelopingcountriesrecogniseloansforclimateactionaspartoftheirown

nationallydeterminedcontribution10whiletheAfricanGroupofNegotiators(AGN)11arguesthatfinancingthatrequiresreturnpaymentsshouldnotbecountedasclimatefinance:12

“Loansasfinancialinstrumentstogetherwithgreenbonds,arenottobeconsideredasclimatefinance,asbotharetobepaidbackwith

interestratethatishigherthaninterestrateappliedindeveloped

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/4

countries,thustheyarepurerevenuegeneratinginstruments’’Gabon,onbehalfoftheAGN13

Furthermore,theuseofnon-concessional(market-based)loansasclimatefinanceis

contrarytothespiritoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC),wheretheresponsibilityoftransferringresourcesrestswithdeveloped

countries.Forthisreason,wehavenotassessednon-concessionalfinancingtoclimateaction.

Inthisfactsheet,weexplorekeydatapointsthatshowhowODAisbeingusedin

concessionalloansforclimateaction–whichcountriesreceivethemost,andwhether

loansarematchingAfrica’spriorities?WealsolookattrendsinhowtheWorldBank’s

InternationalDevelopmentAssociation(IDA)andChina–amongthebiggestproviders–aredeployingloans.Weconcludewithasectionofkeyrecommendationsforhow

financinginresponsetotheclimatecrisisshouldbeprovidedtoequitablymeetrecipients’needs,andarguethatloansshouldbeconsideredasfiscaleffortonthepartofthe

recipienttowardsitsnationallydeterminedcontribution,ratherthanfiscaleffortonthepartofthedonor.ThisshouldinformhowtheNewCollectiveQuantifiedGoal(NQCG)14on

climatefinanceismeasured.

Aboutthedatainthisfactsheet

Weusethemostrecentlyavailabledataset(dataforcalendaryear2022,publishedinlateDecember2023).Thisfactsheetincludesdataonconcessionalloans(lowornointerestrate)intheformofofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)reportedto

theOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment’sDevelopment

AssistanceCommittee(OECDDAC)andconcessionalloansfromChinatoAfricancountries(allAfricanUnionmembers)–theseareidentifiedusingthesamecriteriaastheOECD’sODAdefinition.DataforthelatterwassourcedfromAidData's

GlobalChineseDevelopmentFinanceDataset,Version3.0.

Climateadaptationandmitigationstatusesarebasedondonor-providedRio

markers,15whereavailable.FordonorsthathavenotscreenedtheirODAfor

climateadaptationandmitigation,acombinationofkeywordsearchandanovelmachine-learningalgorithmwasusedtogenerateclassifications.Youcanreadmoreaboutthismethodologyintheannex.

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/5

Two-thirdsofclimate-

actionODAtoAfrica

comesintheformofloans

.In2022,DACcountriesandmultilateralorganisationsdisbursedUS$8.33billiontoAfricaforclimateactionintheformofconcessionalfinancing–loans,grantsandequityinvestments.

.Ofthis,US$5.4billion(64.8%)cameintheformofdebt-generatingmechanisms–loans.Theseloansareconcessional(i.e.withlowornointerest,and/orwithlongertermstomaturity);however,theyultimatelyhavetobepaidback,contributingto

Africa’sexternallyhelddebt,whichwasUS$1.12trillionin2022.

.Grantsforclimateactionin2022wereUS$2.9billion(34.5%)andtherestUS$58.5million(0.7%)wasprovidedintheformofequityinvestments.

.Thisfocusonloansoccursevenwhenwebreakclimateactiondownintoadaptation,mitigationorboth.Mitigationactivitiesareattractivetotheprivatesector,andso

loansareacommonformoffinancing;adaptation,however,iscarriedoutprimarilythroughpublicinvestmentanddomesticbudget,andsoshouldattractgrants.

Despitetheirlimitedcontributiontotheclimatecrisis,Africancountriesborrowedmoreforclimateactionthantheyreceivedingrants

Figure1:ShareofODAforclimateactioninAfricabytypeofclimateactionandfinancinginstrument,2022

uShareofODAgrantsuShareofEquityinvestmentsuShareofODAloans

Mitigation

Both

Adaptation

0%20%40%60%80%100%

0.9%

32.0%

2.4%

67.1%

36.3

%

61.3%

35.4%

0.1%

64.5%

Source:DevelopmentInitiativesbasedonOECDDACdata.

Notes:‘Equityinvestments’referstodevelopmentinvestmentsbygovernmentsintheequityofprojectsorcompaniesinrecipientcountries.

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/6

Overhalfofclimate-actionODAtoAfricatargets

adaptation

TheAfricanUnion’sClimateChangeandResilientDevelopmentStrategyandActionPlan(2022–2032)reaffirmsthatadaptationandresilience-buildingremainAfrica’stoppriority.16

Slightlymorethanhalf(55.2%)ofODAfromDACdonorsgoesspecificallytoadaption,Africa’stoppriority

Figure2:ShareofODAforclimateactioninAfricabytypeofclimateaction,2022

Both

15.2%

Adaptation55.2%

Mitigation29.6%

Source:DevelopmentInitiativesbasedonOECDDACdata.

.OverhalfofthisconcessionalfinancingforclimateactioninAfricatargetedclimateadaptation–US$4.6billion(55.2%)oftheUS$8.33billiontotal.

.US$2.5billion(29.6%)targetedmitigationandtherest,US$1.3billion(15.2%),

addresseddualobjectivesofbothclimateadaptationandmitigation.Thisbreakdownisaboutthesameevenwhenlookingspecificallyatloans.

.AlthoughthemajorityofODAprioritisesadaptation,most(64.5%)ofthisadaptationfunding,US$3.0billion,comesintheformofloans(asshowninFigure1).

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/7

45.2%ofalladaptation

grantswereconcentratedinjustfivecountries

Bothgrantsandloansforadaptationareconcentratedinahandfulofcountries,includingLDCs

Figure3:ThefivelargestrecipientsofgrantsandconcessionalloansforadaptationinAfrica,2022

Topfivegrantsrecipients0%10%20%

18.0%

1%

8

.

7.7%

7.3%

Ethiopia MalawiMozambiqueEgypt

4.2%

Niger

Kenya Nigeria NigerTanzaniaSenegal

30%

Topfiveconcessionalloanrecipients

0%10%20%30%

16.7

15.6%

11.7%

11.6%

21.8%

%

Source:DevelopmentInitiativesbasedonOECDDACdata.

Notes:Percentagesexcludefundingtomulti-country‘Africa,regional’projects.

.Adaptationisanintegralpartofsustainabledevelopment.Weobserveconcentrationofconcessionalfinancingforadaptationinafewcountries.Niger,anLDC,isoneofthetoprecipientsofbothgrantsandloansforadaptionfromDACdonors.

.FiveAfricancountriestake45.2%oftotalODAgrantsmeantforadaptation.Alargelydifferentgroupoffivetake77.4%ofconcessionalloansforadaptationandall,exceptNiger,aremiddleincome.

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/8

AfricanLDCsgetmost

adaptationODAasloans

33ofthe46LDCs,asclassifiedbytheUN,areinAfrica.Insub-SaharanAfrica,more

thanhalfofcountriesarefacingunsustainabledebtburdens.Generally,thetermsofODAloansfromDACdonorstoLDCshavebecomeincreasinglystringentbetween2015and

2021.Thisperiodhasseenrisinginterestrates,shortermaturityperiodsandareductionintheaveragegrantelementofODAloansextendedtoLDCs.Notably,ithasbeen

observedthattheaverageinterestratesimposedbyEUinstitutionsonLDCsarehighercomparedtothoseappliedtoothermiddle-incomegroups.17

TheParisAgreementurgescountriestotakeintoconsiderationcountry-drivenstrategies:

“theprioritiesandneedsofdevelopingcountryParties,especially

thosethatareparticularlyvulnerabletotheadverseeffectsofclimatechangeandhavesignificantcapacityconstraints,suchastheleast

developedcountriesandsmallislanddevelopingStates,consideringtheneedforpublicandgrant-basedresourcesforadaptation.’’

TheParisAgreement18

OftheUS$8.33billionofODAforclimateactioninAfrica,lessthanhalf(US$4.1billionor49.5%)isprovidedtoLDCs,andhalfofthat($2.1billionor50.8%)comesintheformofloans.Thisproportionishigherwhenlookingatadaptationfinancespecifically.

LDCsreceivedmorethanhalfofadaptationODA(56.9%)fromDACdonorsintheformofloans

Figure4:ShareofODAadaptationfinancingbyfinancinginstrumentinAfricanLDCs,2022

AdaptationODA

grantsforAfrican

LDCs

43.1%

AdaptationODA

loansforAfricanLDCs

56.9%

Source:DevelopmentInitiativesbasedonOECDDACdata.

.56.9%(US$1.6billion)ofODAtargetingclimateadaptationinAfricanLDCscomesintheformofloans.

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/9

IDA,themainfinancerofclimateactioninAfrica,gave83%ofadaptationODAasloans

TheSharmel-SheikhImplementationPlanencouragedmultilateralbanksto:

“defineanewvisionandcommensurateoperationalmodel,channelsandinstrumentsthatarefitforthepurposeofadequatelyaddressingtheglobalclimateemergency,includingdeployingafullsuiteof

instruments,fromgrantstoguaranteesandnon-debtinstruments,

takingintoaccountdebtburdens,andtoaddressriskappetite,withaviewtosubstantiallyincreasingclimatefinance.’’

Sharmel-SheikhImplementationPlan19

In2022,theWorldBank’sInternationalDevelopmentAssociation(IDA)wasthelargest

singleproviderofclimatefinancetoAfricancountries,providingUS$4.45billion.Thistotal

ismorethanhalf(53.4%)ofthatprovidedbyallDACprovidersofclimateactioncombined.

IDAprovidedUS$2.8billioninloansforclimateadaptationinAfrica,accountingfor

83.1%oftheiradaptationtotal

Figure5:DisbursementsfromthefivelargestprovidersofclimateloanstoAfricabyclimateactionandinstrument,2022

US$billions

4

3

2

1

0

IDAFranceGermanyEUADF

Institutions

MitigationloansMitigationgrantsAdaptationloansAdaptationgrants

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/10

Source:DevelopmentInitiatives,basedonOECDDACdata.

Notes:ADF:AfricanDevelopmentFund.

.IDA’sfocusonsupportingadaptationeffortsinAfrica(71%ofitsoverallfunding)

alignstothecontinent’spriority(climateadaptation);however,itsfavouredinstrumentforfinancingadaptationisoverwhelminglyloans(83.1%).

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/11

IDAusedloansmoreoftenforclimate-relatedprojectsthanfornon-climaterelatedprojectsinAfrica

TheIDAnotesthatAfricais“attheheartofitsglobalmissiontoendpovertyonaliveableplanet,representingmorethan70%ofIDA’sglobalcommitments”.20

IDAismorelikelytoprovideloanstoclimate-actionprojectsthannon-climateprojectsinAfrica

Figure6:ShareoffinancinginstrumentsemployedbyIDAforclimateandnon-climateprojectsinAfrica,2022

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

Non-climateClimate

799%

62.7%

.

37.3%

20.1%

IDALoansIDAGrants

Source:DevelopmentInitiativesbasedonOECDDACdata.

.OfthetotalIDAfinance,72.9%(US$11.9billion)isnon-climaterelatedandtherest(27.1%orUS$4.5billion)climate.

.ComparingIDA’sconcessionalfinancingofclimateprojectstonon-climatereveals

thatIDAemploysloansformoreclimateprojects(79.9%oftotaldisbursements)thannon-climateprojects(62.7%).

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/12

83.5%ofIDA’sloansforadaptationinAfricaareconcentratedinfive

countries

Globally,there75countriesareeligibletoreceiveIDAresources,40ofwhicharein

Africa.21,22

JustfiveAfricancountriesaccountedfor83.5%ofIDA’sloansforadaptationin2022

Figure7:FivelargestcountryrecipientsofIDAloansforadaptation,comparedtotherestofAfrica,2022

Kenya

Nigeria

Niger

Tanzania

23.8%

Senegal

R.O.A

0%5%10%15%20%25%

8.9%

1

16.7%

12.6%

11.5%

16.5%

Source:DevelopmentInitiativesbasedonOECDDACdata.

Notes:R.O.A.=therestofAfrica

.While40AfricancountriesareeligibletoreceiveIDAresources,themajorityofIDA’sfinancinggoestojustafewofthem.ThefiveAfricancountriesthatreceivedthe

largestloansfromIDAforclimateadaptionin2022wereKenya(23.8%ofthetotal),Nigeria(18.9%),Niger(16.7%),Tanzania(12.6%)andSenegal(11.5%).Togethertheyaccountfor83.5%.

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/13

.Thereisalsoagreatconcentrationofgrants–wherethefivelargestrecipientstogetheraccountedfor76.5%.TheseareEthiopia(34.5%),Malawi(17.0%),

Mozambique(14.7%),Madagascar(6.1%)andSomalia(5.1%).

.IDA’sassistancetoAfricaforclimatedoesnotnecessarilyalignwithneed:Somalia,DemocraticRepublicofCongo,Chad,SouthSudan,CentralAfricanRepublic,

NigeriaandEthiopia–sevenofthe10countriesintheworldidentifiedasmostatriskofclimatedisaster23–areinAfrica.Only28.1%ofIDA’sadaptationconcessional

financingwenttothesesevenatmostriskcountries,withthemajoritytoNigeria

(15.7%),Ethiopia(8.5%),DRC(2.3%),Somalia(0.9%),SouthSudan(0.4%),Chad(0.2%)andCentralAfricanRepublic(0.1%).

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/14

ChinaisAfrica’sthird-largestproviderof

concessionalclimateloans,basedonourestimates

InourassessmentofconcessionalloansforclimateactioninAfrica,weincludeChinasinceitisthecontinent’slargestbilateraldevelopmentlender.24

Intotal,AfricaowedChinaUS$5.7billionfromconcessionalloansin2022.ThatyearitprovidedUS$275millioninconcessionalclimateloanstoAfrica,makingitthethird-

largestprovidertothecontinent(behindonlytheIDAandFrance).25,26

71.3%ofChineseconcessionalclimateloanstoAfricawereconcentratedinfivecountriesin2022

Figure8:ThefivelargestAfricanrecipientsofChineseloansforclimateaction,2022

Sudan

Zambia

Cameroon

Guinea

Ghana

0%10%20%30%40%

8

8

9.2%

.8%

.7%

13.5%

31.1%

Source:DevelopmentInitiativesbasedonAidData'sGlobalChineseDevelopmentFinanceDataset,Version3.0.

Notes:Calculationexcludes‘Africa,Regional’.

.JustfiveAfricancountriesaccountfor71.3%ofallclimate-targetedloanstothe

continent.Theseare–Sudan(31.1%),Zambia(13.5%),Cameroon(9.2%),Guinea(8.8%)andGhana(8.7%).

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/15

Chineseconcessional

loansforclimatearemoreexpensivethannon-climateloans

In80%ofcases,themeaninterestrateofChineseconcessionalloanstargetingclimateishigherthantheratesitprovidesforotherconcessionalloans

Figure9:Countryaverageinterestratesappliedtoclimateandnon-climateprojectsinAfricabyChina,2022

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

Non-climatetargetedmeaninterestrateClimate-targetedmeaninterestrate

Source:DevelopmentInitiativesbasedonAidData'sGlobalChineseDevelopmentFinanceDataset,Version3.0

Notes:Calculationexcludes‘Africa,Regional’

.WhencomparingtheinterestratesofChina’snon-climate-targetedandclimate-

targetedconcessionalloans,wefindthatin80%ofthecaseswhereadifferenceexists,themeaninterestrateforclimate-targetedloansishigherthanthatfornon-climate-targetedloans.

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/16

.Only13.4%ofDACdonorsdisclosetheirexactinterestrates.Forthe2022climate

loansfromDACdonorsforwhichwedohaveinterestratedata,theaverageratewas

1.3%.ThisisabouthalfapercentagepointlowerthantheaverageChineseclimate

loan(at1.85%),butitisunclearwhetherthesmallsampleofDACloanrateswehavearerepresentativeofallDACloans.OnereasonwhysuchalargeproportionofDACloansaremissinginterestratedataisthatonlybilateraldonorsreportthem.

Multilateraldonors,suchastheIDA,donotreporttheirinterestratestotheOECD.

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/17

Keymessages

Prioritisinggrant-basedfinancing

Public,grant-basedfinancingshouldbeprioritisedoverloansandsignificantlyincreasedinlinewithneed.GrantsshouldbeparticularlyprioritisedforAfricanLDCstofurthertheiradaptationeffortsandavoidburdeningthemfurtherwithdebtforclimateaction,as

emphasisedintheLDCGroupMinisterialDeclaration(2023).27

DevelopedcountriesshouldconsidernettransferoffinancestoclimateactioninAfricainrecognitionofhistoricalresponsibilities.Donorsshouldexplorethepotentialforraising

newandadditionalfundsforclimateaction28inaccordancewiththeKyotoProtocolArt

11.2.a.

RefocusingIDA’ssupportforclimateaction

WhileAfricangovernmentscontinuetocallformoredonorstocontributetothenextroundofIDA’sreplenishment,29ourfindingsshowIDA’sclimatefinancehasan

overwhelmingfocusonloansovergrants,concentratedonafewrecipientcountries.

WhiletheWorldBankisjustthat,abank,thisfocusonloansisaddingadebtburdentotheleastdevelopedAfricancountries.

GiventhatIDAsupportssub-SaharanAfricancountriesthatarevulnerabletoclimate

changebuthaveaweakabilitytocopewithitsnegativeeffects,itssupportforclimate

actionshouldbeprimarilygrant-based,inlinewiththeneedsofthesecountries.Itshouldcoverasmanyeligiblecountriesaspossible,withafocuscountriesthatarelowincomeandatriskofclimatedisaster.

Attributionoffiscaleffort:countingloansasAfrica’scontribution

Theattributionoffiscaleffortofclimateinvestmentsfundedthroughloansneedstobereconsidered.Climateinvestmentsthatultimatelymustberepaidtoalendercan

arguablybeconsideredasnationallydeterminedcontributionsoftheloan-recipient

country.Donorswhoprovideconcessionalloansshouldhavethisfiscaleffortrecognised,butthefullcostoftheloanshouldnotberecordedasthedonor’scontributiontothe

implementationoftheConvention,andthisshouldinformhowtheNewCollectiveQuantifiedGoal(NQCG)onclimatefinanceismeasured

Reformingtheglobalfinancialarchitecture

Theinadequatevolumeofclimatefinance,coupledwithquestionsaboutinstruments,additionalityandimpact,30ultimatelyreflecttheunfairandinequitableglobalfinancialarchitecture.

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/18

Anequitableclimatefinancingapproachrequiresmeaningfulreformoftheglobalfinancial

architecture–whichconsiderswhatisbeingcounted,towhominvestmentsareattributed,andwhichinstrumentsandmodalitiesareappropriate.

ThisisinlinewiththeDecision-/CP.27Sharmel-SheikhImplementationPlan,paragraph37,thatcalledon“theshareholdersofmultilateraldevelopmentbanksandinternational

financialinstitutionstoreformmultilateraldevelopmentbankpracticesandpriorities,alignandscaleupfunding,ensuresimplifiedaccessandmobilizeclimatefinancefromvarioussourcesandencouragesmultilateraldevelopmentbankstodefineanewvisionand

commensurateoperationalmodel,channelsandinstrumentsthatarefitforthepurposeofadequatelyaddressingtheglobalclimateemergency”.31

Enhancingtransparencyforaccountability

Callsforchangesinhowclimatefinanceisprioritisedanddeliveredmustbesupportedbymorerobust,consistentandcomprehensivereportingandinformationonclimate

investments.Thisistheonlywaytomeasurehowdonorbehaviourischanging,ifthesechangesareleadingtoimpact,andoverallprogresstowardssharedclimateobjectives,suchastheNewCollectiveQuantifiedGoal.

DonorreportingonODAloans,forexample,alreadyrequiresreportingoftermsandgrantequivalent(including,forexample,interestrates,paymentstructuresanddates);

however,climatefinancereportedundertheEnhancedTransparencyFramework32

currentlyseeksonlyvoluntaryinformationongrantequivalentandnodetailsoffulltermsonevenavoluntarybasis.33

Greaterconsistencyinreportingbasedonagreedstandardsisneededinordertomonitorhowmuchnewandadditionalclimatefinancingdevelopedcountriesaretransferringto

Africaanddevelopingcountrieselsewhere.34,35

ConcessionalloansforAfrica'sclimatecrisis:Whosefiscaleffort?/19

Annex

Methodologyfordeterminingclimaterelevanceusingmachinelearning

Approach

BeforedataforthisanalysiswasdownloadedfromtheOECDandAidDatawebsites

respectively,amodeltodetermineaproject’srelevancetoclimate,climateadaptation

and/orclimatemitigationwasdeveloped.Anatural-languageprocessingapproachwas

takentoclassifyprojecttitleanddescriptiontextintorelevantcategories.First,the‘bert-base-multilingual-uncased’modelwasselectedbasedonthemodel’sperformanceonthelanguagescommonlycontainedwithintheOECDDAC’sCreditorReportingSystem

(CRS).Anadditional1%ofuniquevocabularyfromtheCRSwasaddedtothemodel

beforefine-tuning.This