2025哈佛大学过度设定目标设置的系统性副作用

GoalsGoneWild:TheSystematicSideEffectsofOver-PrescribingGoalSettingLisaD.OrdóñezMauriceE.SchweitzerAdamD.GalinskyMaxH.Bazerman

LisaD.OrdóñezMauriceE.SchweitzerAdamD.GalinskyMaxH.BazermanGoalsGone GoalsGoneWild:TheSystematicSideEffectsofOver-PrescribingGoalLisaD.EllerCollegeofManagement,UniversityofMauriceE.WhartonSchool,UniversityofAdamD.KelloggSchoolofManagement,NorthwesternMaxH.HarvardBusinessSchool,Harvard

LisaD.AdamD.MaxH.HarvardBusinessSchool,Harvard

GoalsGone GoalsGoneGoalsGoneGoalsettingisoneofthemostreplicatedandinfluentialparadigmsinthemanagementliterature.Hundredsofstudiesconductedinnumerouscountriesandcontextshaveconsistentlydemonstratedthatsettingspecific,challenginggoalscanpowerfullydrivebehaviorandboostperformance.Advocatesofgoalsettinghavehadasubstantialimpactonresearch,managementeducation,andmanagementpractice.Inthisarticle,wearguethatthebeneficialeffectsofgoalsettinghavebeenoverstatedandthatsystematicharmcausedbygoalsettinghasbeenlargelyignored.Weidentifyspecificsideeffectsassociatedwithgoalsetting,includinganarrowfocusthatneglectsnon-goalareas,ariseinunethicalbehavior,distortedriskpreferences,corrosionoforganizationalculture,andreducedintrinsicmotivation.Ratherthandispensinggoalsettingasabenign,over-the-countertreatmentformotivation,managersandscholarsneedtoconceptualizegoalsettingasaprescription-strengthmedicationthatrequirescarefuldosing,considerationofharmfulsideeffects,andclosesupervision.Weofferawarninglabeltoaccompanythepracticeofsettinggoals.

GoalsGoneWild:TheSystematicSideEffectsofOver-PrescribingGoalFordecades,goalsettinghasbeenpromotedasahalcyonpillforimprovingemployeemotivationandperformanceinorganizations.Acrosshundredsofexperiments,dozensoftasks,andthousandsofparticipantsacrossfourcontinents,theresultsareclear(Locke,Latham,Smith,&Wood,1990).Comparedtovague,easygoals(e.g.,“Doyourbest”),specific,challenginggoalsboostperformance.Inareviewoffourdecadesofgoal-settingresearch,LockeandLatham(2006)claim,“Solongasapersoniscommittedtothegoal,hastherequisiteabilitytoattainit,anddoesnothaveconflictinggoals,thereisapositive,linearrelationshipbetweengoaldifficultyandtaskperformance.”Inthisarticle,however,wecontendthatgoalsettinghasbeenover-prescribed.Inparticular,wearguethatgoalsettinghaspowerfulandpredictablesideeffects.Ratherthanbeingofferedasan“over-the-counter”salveforboostingperformance,goalsettingshouldbeprescribedselectively,presentedwithawarninglabel,andcloselymonitored.EmblematicExamplesofGoalsGoneHerearejustafewexamplesofthehazardsofindiscriminategoalsetting.First,considerSears,RoebuckandCo.’sexperiencewithgoalsettingintheearly1990s.Searssetsalesgoalsforitsautorepairstaffof$147/hour.Thisspecific,challenginggoalpromptedstafftooverchargeforworkandtocompleteunnecessaryrepairsonacompanywidebasis(Dishneau,1992).Ultimately,Sears’ChairmanEdwardBrennanacknowledgedthatgoalsettinghadmotivatedSears’employeestodeceivecustomers.Sears’“goalsettingprocessforserviceadviserscreatedanenvironmentwheremistakesdidoccur,”Brennanadmitted(Santoro&Paine,1993).

GoalsGoneWild:TheSystematicSideEffectsofOver-PrescribingGoal实验、数十项任务和数千名参与者中，跨越四大洲，结果清晰（Locke,Latham,和Latham（2006）声称，“只要一个人对目标有承诺，具备实现目标的能力，并且然而，本文我们认为目标设定已被过度推荐。特别是，我们认为目标设定具有强大“”上警告标签，并密切监控。以下是一些任意设定目标危害的例子。首先，考虑一下西尔斯罗巴克公司（Sears,RoebuckandCo.）在20世纪90年代初的目标设定经验。西尔斯为其汽车维修人员设定了每小时147美元的销售目标。这个具体、具有挑战性的目标促使员工超收费用并完成不必要的维修，这在公司范围内普遍存在（Dishneau,1992）。最终，西尔斯董事长GoalsGone Inthelate1990s,specific,challenginggoalsfueledenergy-tradingcompanyEnron’srapidfinancialsuccess.Ackman(2002)comparesEnron’sincentivesystemto“payingasalesmanacommissionbasedonthevolumeofsalesandlettinghimsetthepriceofgoodssold.”EvenduringEnron’sfinaldays,Enronexecutiveswererewardedwithlargebonusesformeetingspecificrevenuegoals.Insum,“Enronexecutivesweremeetingtheirgoals,buttheywerethewronggoals,”accordingtoemployeecompensationexpertSolangeCharas.Byfocusingonrevenueratherthanprofit,Enronexecutivesdrovethecompanyintotheground.Inthelate1960s,theFordMotorCompanywaslosingmarketsharetoforeigncompetitorsthatweresellingsmall,fuel-efficientcars.CEOLeeIacoccaannouncedthespecific,challenginggoalofproducinganewcarthatwouldbe“under2000poundsandunder$2,000”andwouldbeavailableforpurchasein1970.Thisgoal,coupledwithatightdeadline,meantthatmanylevelsofmanagementsignedoffonunperformedsafetycheckstoexpeditethedevelopmentofthecar—theFordPinto.Oneomittedsafetycheckconcernedthefueltank,whichwaslocatedbehindtherealaxleinlessthan10inchesofcrushspace.LawsuitslaterrevealedwhatFordshouldhavecorrectedinitsdesignprocess:thePintocouldigniteuponimpact.InvestigationsrevealedthatafterFordfinallydiscoveredthehazard,executivesremainedcommittedtotheirgoalandinsteadofrepairingthefaultydesign,calculatedthatthecostsoflawsuitsassociatedwithPintofires(whichinvolved53deathsandmanyinjuries)wouldbelessthanthecostoffixingthedesign.Inthiscase,thespecific,challenginggoalsweremet(speedtomarket,fuelefficiency,andcost)attheexpenseofotherimportantfeaturesthatwerenotspecified(safety,ethicalbehavior,andcompanyreputation).Asthesedisasterssuggest,theharmfuleffectsofgoalsettinghavereceivedfartoolittleattentioninthemanagementliterature.Althoughpriorworkhasacknowledged“pitfalls”ofgoal

20世纪90年代末，具体而具有挑战性的目标推动了能源交易公司安然迅速的财务成功。Ackman（2002）将安然的激励机制比作给销售人员按销售额提成，并让他设定销售商品的价格。即使在安然最后的日子里，安然高管因达成特定的收入目标而获得了大额奖金。总的来说安然高管们达到了他们的目标，但却是错误的目标，”在20世纪60年代末，福特汽车公司正失去市场份额，被销售小型、节油汽车的国·艾柯卡宣布了一个具体、具有挑战性的目标：生产一200020001970加上紧迫的截止日期，意味着许多管理层签署了未经执行的安全检查，以加快汽车——福特Pinto的开发。其中一项被省略的安全检查涉及油箱，该油箱位于后轴后方，仅有不到10英寸的挤压空间。后来的诉讼揭示了福特在设计过程中应该纠正的问题：Pinto在标，而不是修复有缺陷的设计，而是计算与Pinto火灾相关的诉讼成本（涉及53人死亡（上市速度、燃油效率和成本）是以牺牲其他未指定的重要特征为代价的（德行为和公司声誉）工作已经承认了陷阱”GoalsGone setting(Latham&Locke,2006),wearguethattheharmfulsideeffectsofgoalsettingarefarmoreseriousandsystematicthanpriorworkhasacknowledged.First,webeginbydescribingthesystematicandpredictablewaysinwhichgoalsettingharmsorganizations.Wedescribehowtheuseofgoalsettingcandegradeemployeeperformance,shiftfocusawayfromimportantbutnon-specifiedgoals,harminterpersonalrelationships,corrodeorganizationalculture,andmotivateriskyandunethicalbehaviors.Wearguethat,inmanysituations,thedamagingeffectsofgoalsettingoutweighitsbenefits.Second,weofferawarninglabeltoguidetheuseofgoalsetting.Weidentifyspecificquestionsmanagersshouldasktoascertainwhethertheharmfuleffectsofgoalsettingoutweighthepotentialbenefits.Third,wecallforfurtherstudyoftheadverseconsequencesofgoalsetting.Giventhewidespreadendorsementanduseofgoalsetting,wearguethattheharmfuleffectsofgoalsettingdeserveadditionalscholarlyandmanagerialattention.HowGoalsGoAdvocatesofgoalsettingarguethatforgoalstobesuccessful,theyshouldbespecificandchallenging.Countlessstudies(seeLocke&Latham,2002,2006)findthatspecific,challenginggoalsmotivateperformancefarbetterthan“doyourbest”exhortations.Accordingtothesefindings,specificgoalsprovideclear,unambiguous,andobjectivemeansforevaluatingemployeeperformance.Specificgoalsfocuspeople’sattention;lackingaspecificgoal,employeeattentionmaybedispersedacrosstoomanypossibleobjectives.Inturn,becausechallenginggoals,or“stretch”goals,createadiscrepancybetweenone’scurrentandexpectedoutput,theymotivategreatereffortandpersistence.

（Latham&Locke，2006年），我们认为目标设定的有害副作用比先前的工作所承认数的研究（参见Locke&Latham，2002年，2006年）发现，具体且具有挑战性的目标比“尽力而为”的号召更能激励绩效。根据这些发现，具体的目标提供了明确、无目标或“拉伸”目标在当前产出和预期产出之间产生了差距，它们激励了更大的努力GoalsGoneGoalsGoneAlthoughspecific,challenginggoalscanproducepositiveresults,wearguethatitisoftenthesesamecharacteristicsofgoalsthatcausethemto“gowild.”WhenGoalsAreTooAsresearchhasshown,goalsfocusattention.Unfortunately,goalscanfocusattentionsonarrowlythatpeopleoverlookotherimportantfeaturesofatask.ConsiderSimonsandChabris'(1999;Neisser,1979)well-knownstudyofinattentionalblindness.Theresearchersaskedparticipantstowatchavideoinwhichtwogroupsofplayerspassbasketballs.Onegroupwearswhiteshirts;theothergroupwearsdarkshirts.Giventhetaskofcountingbasketballpassesamongpeoplewearingonlywhiteshirts,peopleunconsciouslyblockouttheblackshirtedindividuals.Asaresultofthisnarrowfocus,mostparticipantsfailtonoticewhenamanwearingablackgorillasuitsauntersintothemiddleofthescreen,poundshischest,andwalksoffscreen.Intenseconcentrationonthecountingtaskcausespeopletooverlookastrikingelementoftheirvisualworld.Thisfocusingproblemhasbroadapplication(Bazerman&Chugh,2006)anddirectrelevancetogoalsetting.NarrowGoals.Withgoals,peoplenarrowtheirfocus.Thisintensefocuscanblindpeopletoimportantissuesthatappearunrelatedtotheirgoal(asinthecaseofFordemployeeswhooverlookedsafetytestingtorushthePintotomarket).Thetendencytofocustoonarrowlyongoalsiscompoundedwhenmanagerschartthewrongcoursebysettingthewronggoal(e.g.,settingrevenueratherthanprofitgoalsatEnron).Settingappropriategoalsisadifficult,intricateprocess.Supposethatauniversitydepartmentbasestenuredecisionsprimarilyonthenumberofarticlesthatprofessorspublish.Thisgoalwillmotivateprofessorstoaccomplishthenarrowobjectiveofpublishingarticles.Otherimportantobjectives,however,suchasresearchimpact,teaching,andservice,maysuffer.

特征导致了它们失控”。当目标过于具体 以至于人们忽略了任务的其他重要特征。考虑Simons和Chabris（1999；Neisser，1979）关于注意力缺失的著名研究。研究人员要求参与者观看一段视频，视频中两组球个问题有广泛的应用（Bazerman&Chugh，2006）并且与目标设定有直接相关性。忽视与他们的目标看似无关的重要问题（例如，福特员工在匆忙推出Pinto车型时忽略Consistentwiththeclassicnotionthatyougetwhatyoureward(Kerr,1975,1995),goalsettingmaycausepeopletoignoreimportantdimensionsofperformancethatarenotspecifiedbythegoalsettingsystem.StawandBoettger(1990)documentthehazardsofnarrowfocusfosteredbygoalsinacleverstudy.Theyaskedstudentstoproofreadaparagraphthatcontainedbothgrammaticalandblatantcontenterrors.Theparagraphwaspurportedlygoingtobeusedinabrochurepromotingthebusinesscollege.Theauthorsfoundthatindividualsinstructedto“doyourbest”weremorelikelytocorrectbothgrammaticalandcontenterrorsthanwerethosewhoweregivenexplicitgoalstocorrecteithergrammarorcontent.Tenbrunsel,Wade-Benzoni,Messick,andBazerman(2000)makearelatedpoint.Theyarguethatstandards,suchastheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency’sstandardsonpollution,toooftenfocuscomplianceonspecific,measureablestandardsattheexpenseoftheoverallgoalofprotectingtheenvironment.Whenmanagersettargetsforspecificdimensionsofaproblem,theyoftenfailtoanticipatethebroaderresultsoftheirdirectives.Goals“informtheindividualaboutwhatbehaviorisvaluedandappropriate”(Staw&Boettger,1990).Theverypresenceofgoalsmayleademployeestofocusmyopicallyonshort-termgainsandtolosesightofthepotentialdevastatinglong-termeffectsontheorganization.Toomanygoals.Arelatedproblemoccurswhenemployeespursuemultiplegoalsatonetime.Shah,Friedman,andKruglanski(2002)demonstratethatindividualswithmultiplegoalsarepronetoconcentrateononlyonegoal.Relatedresearchsuggeststhatsometypesofgoalsaremorelikelytobeignoredthanothers.Inastockselectiontask,GillilandandLandis(1992)gaveparticipantsbothqualitygoalsandquantitygoals.Whenquantityandqualitygoalswerebothdifficult,participantssacrificedqualitytomeetthequantitygoals.Goalsthatareeasierto

与经典观念一致，即你得到你奖励的（Kerr，1975，1995），目标设定可能导致人们StawBoettger（1990）通过一项巧妙的研究记录了由目标引起的狭隘关注所造成的危害。他们要求学生校对一个既包含语法错误又包含明显内容错误的段落。该段“”MessickBazerman（2000）提出了一个相关观点。他们认为，标准，如美国环保署的污染标准，往往过于关注具体、可衡量的标准，而牺牲了保护环境的整体目标。（Staw&Boettger，1990）。目标目标过多。当员工同时追求多个目标时，会出现相关的问题。ShahFriedmanKruglanski（2002）证明，具有多个目标的人倾向于只关注一个目标。相关研究表明，某些类型的目标更容易被忽视。在股票选择任务中，GillilandLandis（1992）给参与者提供了质量和数量目标。当数量和质量的难度都很大时，参与者为了达到数量目标而牺牲了质量。那些更容易实现的目标achieveandmeasure(suchasquantity)maybegivenmoreattentionthanothergoals(suchasquality)inamulti-goalsituation.InappropriateTimeHorizon.Evenifgoalsaresetontherightattribute,thetimehorizonmaybeinappropriate.Forexample,goalsthatemphasizeimmediateperformance(e.g.,thisquarter’sprofits)promptmanagerstoengageinmyopic,short-termbehaviorthatharmstheorganizationinthelongrun.Cheng,Subramanyam,andZhang(2005)showedthatfirmsthatfrequentlyissuequarterlyearningsreports,comparedtofirmsthatreportearningslessfrequently,tendedtomeetorbeatanalystexpectations,butalsotendedtoinvestlessinresearchanddevelopment.Theefforttomeetshort-termtargetsoccurredattheexpenseoflong-termgrowth.Somecompaniesarelearningfromthesemistakes;CocaColaannouncedin2002thatiswouldceaseissuingquarterlyearningsguidanceandprovidemoreinformationaboutprogressonmeetinglong-termobjectives.Thetimehorizonproblemisrelatedtothenotionthatgoalscanleadpeopletoperceivetheirgoalsasceilingsratherthanfloorsforperformance.JustasthepigeonsintheSkinnerexperimentsdemonstrated“post-pelletpause”(astateofinactivityaftertheirpeckingproducedthedesiredpelletoffood),onceagoalisachievedpeoplerelax,rest,andpause.Forexample,asalesperson,aftermeetinghermonthlysalesquota,mayspendtherestofthemonthplayinggolfratherthanworkingonnewsalesleads.AnexcellentexampleofthisproblemcomesfromastudyofNewYorkCitycabdrivers.Thisstudyanswerstheage-oldquestionofwhyitissohardtogetacabonarainyday(Camerer,Babcock,Loewenstein,&Thaler,1997).Mostpeopleblamedemand:Whenitisraining,morepeoplehailcabsthanwhentheweatherisclear.Butasitturnsout,supplyisanotherimportantculprit.Asadayprogresses,cabsstartdisappearingmorequicklyfromManhattanstreetsonrainydaysthanonsunnydays.Why?Becauseofthe

些公司正在从这些错误中吸取教训；可口可乐公司在2002年宣布将停止发布季度收益指不是底线。正如Skinner实验中的鸽子表现出食丸后暂停（在啄食产生期望的食古老的疑问：为什么在雨天很难打到出租车（Camerer、Babcock、Loewenstein和Thaler，1997）。大多数人将需求归咎于原因：下雨时，叫出租车的人比天气晴朗GoalsGoneGoalsGonespecific,dailygoalsthatmostcabdriversset:agoaltoearndoubletheamountitcoststhemtorentouttheircabsfora12-hourshift.Onrainydays,cabbiesmakemoneymorequicklythanonsunnydays(becausedemandisindeedhigher),hittheirdailygoalsooner,andthentheygohome(theproblemofgoalsasceilings).Thisfindingfliesinthefaceoftheeconomictenetofwageelasticity,whichpredictsthatpeopleshouldworkmorehoursondayswhentheycanearnmoremoneyandlessondayswhentheyearnless.IfNYCtaxidriversusedalongertimehorizon(perhapsweeklyormonthly),kepttrackofindicatorsofincreaseddemand(e.g.,rainorspecialevents),andignoredtheirtypicaldailygoal,theycouldincreasetheiroverallwages,decreasetheoveralltimetheyspendworking,andimprovethewelfareofdrenchedNewYorkers.WhenGoalsAreTooProponentsofgoalsettingclaimthatapositivelinearrelationshipexistsbetweenthedifficultyofagoalandemployeeperformance.Specifically,theyarguethatgoalsshouldbesetatthemostchallenginglevelpossibletoinspireeffort,commitment,andperformance—butnotsochallengingthatemployeesseenopointintrying.Thislogicmakesintuitivesense,yetstretchgoalsalsocauseseriousside-effects:shiftingriskattitudes,promotingunethicalbehavior,andtriggeringthepsychologicalcostsofgoalfailure.Risktaking.Aspriorworkconjectured(Neale&Bazerman,1985;Knight,Durham,&Locke,2001)andrecentworkdemonstrates(Larrick,Heath,&Wu,inpress),goal-settingdistortsriskpreferences.Larricketal.(inpress)demonstratethatpeoplemotivatedbyspecific,challenginggoalsadoptriskierstrategiesandchooseriskiergamblesthandothosewithlesschallengingorvaguegoals.Relatedworkhasfoundthatgoalsharmnegotiationperformancebyincreasingriskybehavior.Negotiatorswithgoalsaremorelikelytoreachaninefficientimpassethanare

他们认为目标应该设定在最具挑战性的水平，以激发努力、承诺和绩效——但不要设定风险承担。如先前的研究所推测（Neale&Bazerman，1985Knight，Durham，&Locke，2001）以及最近的研究所证明（Larrick，Heath，&Wu，待发表），目标设定扭曲了风险偏好。Larrick等人（待发表）证明，受具体、具有挑战GoalsGoneGoalsGonenegotiatorswholackgoals(Neale&Bazerman,1985;Galinsky,Mussweiler,&Medvec,2002).Forexample,Galinskyetal.(2002)foundthatstretchgoalsincreasedthenumberofimpasses,andLarricketal.(inpress)foundthatgoalspromptedparticipantstomakelargerdemandsthatinturndestroyedvalue.Itisalsoquiteeasytoimaginethatinaverydifferentcontext,anegotiatorwhohasobtainedconcessionssufficienttoreachtheirgoal,willsatisficeandaccepttheagreementonthetable,evenifthevaluemaximizingstrategywouldbetocontinuethenegotiationprocess.Clearly,insomedomains,goalsettingcansignificantlyharmperformanceratherthanpromotingbetteroutcomes.Anexcessivefocusongoalsmayhavepromptedtherisk-takingbehaviorthatliesattherootofmanyreal-worlddisasters.ThecollapseofContinentalIllinoisBankprovidesanexamplewithstrikingparallelstothecollapseofEnronandthefinancialcrisisof2008.In1976,Continental’schairmanannouncedthatwithinfiveyears,themagnitudeofthebank’slendingwouldmatchthatofanyotherbank.Toreachthisstretchgoal,thebankshifteditsstrategyfromconservativecorporatefinancingtowardaggressivepursuitofborrowers.Continentalallowedofficerstobuyloansmadebysmallerbanksthathadinvestedheavilyinveryriskyloans.Continentalwouldhavebecometheseventh-largestU.S.bankifitsborrowershadbeenabletorepaytheirloans;instead,followingmassiveloandefaults,thegovernmenthadtobailoutthe

缺乏目标谈判者（Neale&Bazerman，1985；Galinsky，Mussweiler和Medvec，2002）。例如，Galinsky等人（2002）发现，挑战性目标增加了僵局的次数，Larrick等人（待发表）发现，目标促使参与者提出更大的要求，而这些要求反过来又

Inotherdomains,suchasthedesignprocessfortheFordPinto,theperceptualblinders

在其他领域，如福特Pintonarrowandchallenginggoalshavehadfatalconsequences.Kayes(2006)citesthe1996Mt.Everestdisasterinwhicheightclimbersdiedduetothedecisionsofthetwoteamleadersasanexampleof“destructivegoalpursuit.”OnMt.Everest,world-classhigh-altitudeguides,RobHallandScottFischer,identifiedsocloselywiththegoalofreachingthesummitthattheymade

产生了致命的后果。Kayes（2006）引用了1996年珠穆朗玛峰灾难作为“破坏性目标追求”的例子。在珠穆朗玛峰上，世界级的高海¶向导RobHall和ScottFischerGoalsGoneGoalsGoneriskydecisionsthatledtotheirownand6oftheirclients’deaths.Kayesidentifieswarningsignsofleaderswhohavebecomeexcessivelyfixatedongoals.Theseoccurinleaderswhoexpressnarrowlydefinedgoals,associategoalswithdestiny,expressanidealizedfuture,offergoal-drivenjustifications,facepublicexpectations,andattempttoengageinface-savingbehavior.Unethicalbehavior.Anotherseriouswayinwhichgoalsettingcandamageorganizationsisbypromotingunethicalbehavior.AtSears’automotiveunit,employeeschargedcustomersforunnecessaryrepairsinordertomeetspecific,challenginggoals.Inthelate1980s,Miniscribeemployeesshippedbrickstocustomersinsteadofdiskdrivestomeetshippingtargets.Andin1993,BauschandLombemployeesfalsifiedfinancialstatementstomeetearningsgoals.Ineachofthesecases,specific,challenginggoalsmotivatedemployeestoengageinunethicalbehavior.Goalsettinghasbeenpromotedasapowerfulmotivationaltool,butsubstantialevidencedemonstratesthatinadditiontomotivatingconstructiveeffort,goalsettingcaninduceunethicalbehavior.Surprisinglylittleresearchinthegoal-settingliteraturehasexaminedwhatpeoplemightdowhentheyhavetheopportunitytomisrepresenttheirperformanceorcheattoattainagoal.Oneofthefewstudiesthatlookedforadirectlinkbetweengoalsettingandcheatingfoundthatparticipantsweremorelikelytomisrepresenttheirperformancelevelwhentheyhadaspecific,challenginggoalthanwhentheydidnot,especiallywhentheiractualperformancelevelfelljustshortofreachingthegoal(Schweitzer,Ordóñez,&Douma,2004).Goalsettingcanpromotetwodifferenttypesofcheatingbehavior.First,whenmotivatedbyagoal,peoplemaychoosetouseunethicalmethodstoreachit.Forexample,atSears,mechanicstoldcustomersthattheyneededunnecessaryrepairsandthenperformedandchargedthemforthisunneededwork.Second,goalsettingcanmotivatepeopletomisrepresenttheirperformancelevel—inotherwords,toreportthattheymetagoalwheninfacttheyfellshort.For

6（Kayes）确定了那些对目标过度着在希尔斯（Sears）的汽车部门，员工为了达到特定的、具有挑战性的目标，向客户收取不必要的维修费用。在20世纪80年代末，Miniscribe的员工为了达到运输目标，向客户发送砖块而不是磁盘驱动器。1993年，宝视来（BauschandLomb）的员工为们的实际表现水平刚刚达不到目标时（Schweitzer，Ordóñez，&Douma2004） 曲他们的表现水平——换句话说，报告他们达到了目标，而实际上他们没有达到。GoalsGoneGoalsGoneexample,employeesatBauschandLombwhoweredriventoreachsalestargetsreportedsalesthatnevertookplace.Similarly,whenseniormanagementgiveslawyersandconsultantsspecific,challenginggoalsforbillablehours,theymaybillclientsforhourstheyneverworked.Goalsetting,ofcourse,isnottheonlycauseofemployeeunethicalbehavior,butitiscertainlyanimportant,understudiedingredient.Anumberoffactorsserveascatalystsintherelationshipbetweengoalsettingandcheating:laxoversight,financialincentivesformeetingperformancetargets(Jensen,2003;Schweitzeretal.,2004),andorganizationalcultureswithaweakcommitmenttoethics.Theinterplaybetweenorganizationalcultureandgoalsettingisparticularlyimportant.Anethicalorganizationalculturecanreignintheharmfuleffectsofgoalsetting,butatthesametime,theuseofgoalscaninfluenceorganizationalculture.Specifically,theuseofgoalsetting,like“managementbyobjectives,”createsafocusonendsratherthanmeans.Barsky(2007)arguesthatgoalsettingimpedesethicaldecisionmakingbymakingitharderforemployeestorecognizeethicalissuesandeasierforthemtorationalizeunethicalbehavior.Giventhatsmallactionswithinanorganizationcanhavebroadimplicationsfororganizationalculture(Fleming&Zyglidopoulos,2008),wepostulatethataggressivegoalsettingwithinanorganizationwillfosteranorganizationalclimateripeforunethicalbehavior.Thatis,notonlydoesgoalsettingdirectlymotivateunethicalbehavior,butitsintroductionmayalsomotivateunethicalbehaviorindirectlybysubtlyalteringanorganization’sculture.Insum,althoughmanyfactorscontributetounethicalbehavior,thepointcannotbeoverstated:goalsettingmotivatesunethicalbehavior.Dissatisfactionandthepsychologicalconsequencesofgoalfailure.Oneproblemembeddedinstretchgoalsisthepossibilitythatthegoalmaynotbereached.Innegotiations,forexample,challenginggoalscanincreasenegotiationandtaskperformance,butdecrease

绩效目标的财务激励（Jensen，2003；Schweitzer等人，2004），以及缺乏对道目标管理一样，导致了对结果而不是手段的关注。Barsky（2007）阻碍了道德决策。鉴于组织内部的小行动可能对组织文化产生广泛的影响（Fleming&Zyglidopoulos，2008），我们提出，组织内部的激进目标设定将培养一个孕育不道德GoalsGoneGoalsGonesatisfactionwithhigh-qualityoutcomes(Galinskyetal.,2002;Garland,1983).Thesedecreasesinsatisfactioninfluencehowpeopleviewthemselvesandhaveimportantconsequencesforfuturebehavior.MussweilerandStrack(2000)foundthatgivingsomeoneachallenginggoalversusaneasygoalonanattentiontaskoranintelligencetestimprovedperformance,butleftpeoplequestioningtheirconcentrationabilitiesandoverallintelligence.Thesegoal-inducedreductionsinself-efficacycanbehighlydetrimental,becauseperceptionsofself-efficacyareakeypredictoroftaskengagement,commitment,andeffort(Bandura,1977).Goals,Learning,andInordertoadapttoacompetitivelandscape,organizationsneedemployeeswhoareabletolearnandcollaboratewiththeircolleagues.Goalscaninhibitbothlearningandcooperation.Goalsinhibitlearning.Whenindividualsfaceacomplextask,specific,challenginggoalsmayinhibitlearningfromexperienceanddegradeperformancecomparedtoexhortationsto“doyourbest”(Cervone,Jiwani,&R.Wood,1991;Earley,Connolly,&Ekegren,1989;RobertWood,Bandura,&Bailey,1990).Anindividualwhoisnarrowlyfocusedonaperformancegoal,willbelesslikelytotryalternativemethodsthatcouldhelpherlearnhowtoperformatask.Asanexampleofthisphenomenon,LockeandLatham(2002)describeanairtrafficcontrollersimulationinwhichtheperformancegoalinterferedwithlearninginthiscomplexdomain(Kanfer&Ackerman,1989).Overall,thenarrowfocusofspecificgoalscaninspireperformancebutpreventlearning.LockeandLathamrecommendthat“learninggoals”shouldbeusedincomplexsituationsratherthan“performancegoals.”Inpractice,however,managersmayhavetroubledeterminingwhenataskiscomplexenoughtowarrantalearning,ratherthanaperformancegoal.Inmanychangingbusinessenvironments,perhapslearninggoalsshouldbethenorm.Even

对高质量成果的满意度（Galinsky等，2002；Garland，1983）。这些满意度的降低会影响人们对自我的看法，并对未来的行为产生重要影响。Mussweiler和Strack（2000）发现，在注意力任务或智力测试中，给予某人具有挑战性的目标而不是容易测因素（Bandura，1977）。目标、学习和合作1991；Earley，Connolly，&Ekegren，1989；RobertWood，Bandura，&Bailey，1990）。一个专注于绩效目标的个人，将不太可能尝试可能帮助她学习如何完成任务的其他方法。例如，Locke和Latham（2002）描述了一个空中交通管制员模拟，在这个复杂领域，绩效目标干扰了学习（Kanfer&Ackerman，1989）。总的来 Locke和Latham建议，在复杂情况下应使用“学习目标”，而不是“绩效目标”。GoalsGoneGoalsGonewhentasksarecomplexenoughtoclearlywarrantlearninggoals,managersfacethechallengeofidentifyingthespecific,challenginggoallevelsforlearningobjectives.Thegoalofsettingtherightgoalsisitselfachallengingaffair.Goalscreateacultureofcompetition.Organizationsthatrelyheavilyongoalsettingmayerodethefoundationofcooperationthatholdsgroupstogether.Arrow(1973)arguedthatanexclusivefocusonprofitmaximizationcanharmaltruisticandother-regardingbehavioralmotives.Similarly,beingtoofocusedonachievingaspecificgoalmaydecreaseextra-rolebehavior,suchashelpingcoworkers(Wright,George,Farnsworth,&McMahan,1993).Goalsmaypromotecompetitionratherthancooperationandultimatelyloweroverallperformance(Mitchell&Silver,1990).WhenGoalsHarmMotivationAsgoalsettingincreasesextrinsicmotivation,itcanharmintrinsicmotivation–engaginginataskforitsownsake(Mossholder,1980;Rawsthorne&Elliot,1999;Shalley&Oldham,1985).Thisistrueofrewardsingeneral(