产业政策能否恢复美国制造业的领先地位 Will industrial policy restore American manufacturing leadership

hinrichfoundation

JULY2025

advancingsustainableglobaltrade

WillindustrialpolicyrestoreAmericanmanufacturingleadership?

BYSTEWARTPATERSON

SENIORRESEARCHFELLOW,HINRICHFOUNDATION

2

Contents

INTRODUCTION

3

USECONOMICREBALANCING:HOWBIGISTHETASK?

7

OBSTACLESTOSUCCESS

12

THEEVIDENCESOFAR

15

CONCLUSION

17

RESEARCHERBIO:STEWARTPATERSON

18

ENDNOTES

19

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3

Introduction

TherehavebeentwokeydriversbehindtheintensifiedeffortoftheUStore-industrializeitseconomy:economicsandgeopolitics.

TheriseofChinatopre-eminenceinworldmanufacturinghasbecomean

existentialchallengefortheUnitedStates.TariffsinthefirstTrumpadministrationandtheincreasinguseofindustrialpolicysincethenmarkaratchetingupofUSeffortstore-industrializeitseconomy.

Therehavebeentwokeydriversbehindthisintensifiedeffort:economicsand

geopolitics.Ontheeconomicfront,thefallinproductivitygrowthcoincidedwiththedeclineofUSmanufacturingasashareofgrossdomesticproduct(GDP).In

the10yearsto2005,USnon-farmproductivitygrewat3%peryearbutby2020,10-yearrollingproductivitygrowthwasdowntojust1%.Whiletheearlierphaseofglobalization,whichwasalsoassociatedwithadeclineinmanufacturingrelativetoGDP,wasassociatedwithrisingproductivityintheUS,theoppositehasbeentrueinmorerecentyears.

This,whencombinedwithperennialtradedeficitsandthewideningofthedeficitinmanufacturedgoods,hasledsometoconcludethattherehasbeenexcessivede-industrializationintheUS.

Geopolitically,China’sdominanceofmanufacturinghaslefttheUnitedStatesoverlydependentonChinaforcriticalgoods,asituationthatpotentially

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Figure1–Ten-yearrollingUSnon-farmproductivitygrowth(%)

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Source:BBLS,FRED,andauthor’scalculations

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INTRODUCTION

Geopolitically,China’sdominanceofmanufacturinghaslefttheUnitedStatesoverlydependentonChinaforcriticalgoods,asituationthat

potentiallyconstrainsUSfreedomofactionbothdirectlytowardsChinaandmoregenerallyinprotectingitsinterests.

constrainsUSfreedomofactionbothdirectlytowardsChinaandmoregenerallyinprotectingitsinterests.Thisimportdependencyisnotjustlimitedtothemilitary-industrialcomplexbutextendstoproductscriticaltothefunctioningofeverydaylifesuchassmartphonesandpersonalcomputers.

Furthermore,China’sindustrialpolicy-ledeconomicgrowthhasnarrowed

America’stechnologicalleadpotentiallyproducingaself-reinforcingdynamic.

ThereislittleevidencethatChinaisonthecuspoflosingmarketshareinthemanufacturingspacegivenitsdominanceofnewleading-edgeindustries.

Inaddition,China’smanufacturingpre-eminencehasmadeitthelargesttradingpartnerformostcountriesintheworld.Chinahasbecomesocriticaltoglobalsupplychainsthatitsleverageovertheworldhasreachedalevelwhereitcanexertconsiderableinfluencetoachieveitsstrategicgoals.

ThissensethatAmerica’slossofrelativepowerislinkedtoitsde-industrializationhasgivenrisetoadebateabouttherelativemeritsofre-shoring,near-shoring,andfriend-shoringasopposedtothelaissez-faireapproachoftherecentpast

ofsimplybuyingthebestvalueproposition,irrespectiveofthelonger-termgeoeconomicconsequencesorthemannerinwhichthatvalueofferingcameabout.

Awarenessoftheproblemthisde-industrializationpotentiallyposespre-date

bothTrumpandBiden.Forexample,in2012,theObamaadministrationestablishedtheNationalNetworkforManufacturinginnovation(NNMI),sincerenamed

ManufacturingUSA,withaviewtodevelopingpublic-privatepartnershipsto

Figure2一USvs.China:shareofglobalmanufacturingvalueadded(%)

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Source:WorldBank

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INTRODUCTION

5

TheUShasbeguntoimplement

significantindustrialpolicymarking

adramaticchangeindirectionfromthepathadoptedduringtheheightofglobalization.

tacklethechallengesfacingUSmanufacturingandensureUSleadershipinmanufacturingtechnology.

Morerecently,theUShasbeguntoimplementsignificantindustrialpolicymarkingadramaticchangeindirectionfromthepathadoptedduringtheheightof

globalization.TheInfrastructureInvestmentandJobsActof2021;theCHIPSandScienceActof2022,andtheInflationReductionActof2022wereallkeypiecesofindustrialpolicyadvancedbytheBidenadministration.

TheCHIPSActprovidedforaboutUS$50billionofsubsidiesandresearchandtrainingfundingforthesemiconductorindustrytogetherwithaboutUS$170

billionofinvestmentinthepublicsectorresearchanddevelopmentecosystem.Importantlyitalsoprovidedfortaxcreditsforinvestmentinsemiconductorandsemiconductorequipmentmanufacturing.

TheInfrastructureInvestmentandJobsActisfocusedonimprovingphysicalinfrastructure,particularlytransportation,theelectricgrid,andbroadband.

TheheadlineUS$1.2trillionamountstoperhapsaUS$500billionincreaseininfrastructureoverandabovewhatwasalreadyplanned.

ThespendingcomponentoftheInflationReductionActisheavilyfocusedonindustrialdevelopmentincleanenergyindustriessuchasrenewablepower

generationandelectricvehicles.ItalsocontainedprovisionsaimedatensuringsupplychainswereorientatedtowardfriendlycountriesandawayfromChina.

TakentogetherthethreeactscanbethoughtofasrepresentingaseriousefforttokickstartarenaissanceinUSmanufacturing.

TheriseofChinatopre-eminenceinworldmanufacturinghasbecomeanexistentialchallengefortheUS.AratchetingupofUSeffortstore-industrializeitseconomyhasbeenunderwaysinceTrump1.0.

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ThesecondTrumpadministrationis

puttingmoreemphasisonsupplysidereformtoimprovetheefficiencyof

USmanufacturingandtolowerthebarrierstoinvestment.

ThesecondTrumpadministrationisputtingmoreemphasisonsupplysidereformtoimprovetheefficiencyofUSmanufacturingandtolowerthebarriersto

investment.Forexample,TheSmallBusinessAdministration(SBA)haslauncheda“MadeinAmerica”manufacturinginitiativesaimedateasingaccesstofinanceandeliminatingredtapeandbureaucraticprocedures.

Inaddition,thePermittingTechnologyActionPlanaimstomaximizetheuseof

technologytospeedupandcheapentheapprovalprocessforinfrastructure

investment,whichhasbeenakeybarriertogrowingAmerica’smanufacturingandinfrastructurecapabilities.Theoverhauloffederalworkforcetrainingisdesignedtofocusresourcesonskills-basedtrainingtomeetanticipateddemandintradesandmanufacturing.

Thenofcoursetherearethetariffs.Inthecontextofindustrialrenewal,theirroleispurportedtoleveltheglobalplayingfieldandsupportdomesticindustry.ThiswillofcoursecomeatacosttotheUSeconomyintermsofdeadweightlossbutwilllikelyhaveagreaterdistributiveimpactoneconomicwelfarefromconsumerstoproducers.Indoingsotheycouldhelprebalancetheeconomyawayfrom

consumptionandtowardinvestmentwhichisobviouslyrequiredifthecurrentaccountdeficitistobeeliminated.

Thequestionthereforearises:willtheUSapproachtotradeandindustrialpolicyhelpitachieveitsgoalofre-invigoratingUSmanufacturing,breakingitstrade

dependencies,andalleviatingChina’sgriponglobalsupplychains?Orwillan

increaseingovernmentintervention,bothonthetradefrontandindomestic

resourceallocationthroughindustrialpolicy,significantlyreduceprosperityandindoingsofurtherreduceUSinfluenceintheworld?

Inthispaper,weanalyzethesizeofthetaskathand.Justhowsignificantisthereallocationofresourcesrequiredtoreduceimportdependencyandwhatarethecostsandbenefitsofdoingso?Secondly,whatevidenceistherethatthepoliciesinplacetodatearehavingthedesiredimpact?Andfinally,whatobstaclesare

therethatarenotbeingsufficientlyaddressed?

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7

USeconomicrebalancing:Howbigisthetask?

Inmanyways,theUSeconomyhasbecomethemirrorimageofChina,reflectingtheinteractionofthetwoeconomiesintheglobalmarket.

WehavewrittenextensivelyontheneedfortheChineseeconomytoundergoasignificantrebaIancing:

IsChinaseriousaboutconsumption-ledgrowth?

Chinateeterseverclosertoalostdecade

However/inmanyways/theUSeconomyhasbecomethemirrorimageofChina/reflectingtheinteractionofthetwoeconomiesinthegIobaImarket.Ifoneoftheworldstwolargesteconomiesisimbalanced,itfollowsthattheotherprobablyistootogethertheyaccountforover40%oftheworldeconomy.

WhileinChinaconsumptionhasbeensuppressed,theUShasunder-invested.

WhileChinahassavedevenmorethanitsexcessivedomesticinvestmentlevel

requires,theUShasunder-saved,requiringforeigncapitaltomeetevenitssub-optimallevelofinvestment.Inconsequence,theUShasrunperennialcurrent

accountdeficitswhiIeChinahasrunsurpIuses.ChinahasaccumuIatedsignificantnetclaimsontheoutsideworldwhiletheUnitedStateshasbecomethelargestnetdebtor.

Asof2023,Chinasmanufacturingvalue-added,measuredinnominaldollarterms,wasUS$4.7triIIionwhiIstAmerica’swasUS$2.9triIIion.Chinaaccountedfor29%oftheworIdtotaIofUS$16.2triIIion/whiIsttheUnitedStatesaccountedforjust18%.1

Inmanyways/theUSeconomyhasbecomethemirrorimageofChina/reflectingtheinteractionofthetwoeconomiesintheglobalmarket.

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USECONOMICREBALANCING:HOWBIGISTHETASK?

Thus,China’smanufacturingoutputinvaluetermsisabout62%largerthantheUnitedStatesdespitehavinganeconomywhichis36%smaller.

Theundervaluationoftherenminbi,ittradesatabout50%ofitspurchasing

powerparityvaIue/meansthatnominaIdoIIarcomparisonsprobabIysignificantIyunderstateChina’smanufacturingdominancerelativetotheUnitedStates.

AccordingtoUNTradeandDevelopment,forexample,in2023China

manufacturedaImostthreetimesasmanycarsastheUnitedStates:30miIIion

versus10.6million.2Inshipbuilding,Chinacommandsmorethan50%oftheglobalmarketanditssharelookssettogrowgivenitistakingabouttwo-thirdsofnewordersandistheleadingmanufacturerin14outof18vesselcategories.3TheUShasanegligibleshareofglobalcommercialshipbuilding.

Insteel,Chinaproducesmorecrudesteelthantherestoftheworldcombined

withaglobalmarketshareof53%or12timestheproductionintheUnitedStates.TheUnitedStatesproducesjust4%oftheworld’ssteel.4Inaluminum,thestoryissimilarwithChinatakingabout60%marketshareinsmelting.5

FurtherevidenceofChina’smanufacturingdominancecomesfromtradestatistics.In2024,Chinaaccountedfor14.9%ofworldgoodsexports–thelargestshare

butbynomeansoverwheImingIydominant.However/thistotaIsharedisguisesthemanufacturinghegemony.Excludingfoodandfossilfuels,China’ssharejumpsto18.3%ofworIdexports.Ofaround1/200productscIassifiedatthefour-digit

HarmonizedSystemIeveI/Chinahasmorethan50%exportsharein100categoriesandmorethan40%sharein198categories.6

Bywayofcomparison,theUnitedStateshada9%marketshareinglobalexportsin2024.Excludingfuelsandfood,thatsharefallstojust8%.Furthermore,the

UnitedStateshasmorethan50%marketshareinworldexportsinjustsixcategoriesandmorethan40%inonly13categories.7

WhenviewedthroughtheprismoftheUSgoodstradedeficit(whichstandsat

aboutUS$1.2triIIion)/thetasktheTrumpadministrationhassetitseIfbecomes

relativelyclear.Fourbroadsectorsaccountforabout80%oftheoveralltrade

deficit.Theseare:pharmaceuticaIs(HS30);vehicIesotherthanraiIwayortramwayroIIingstock/andpartsandaccessoriesthereof(HS87);eIectricaImachineryand

equipmentandpartsthereof(HS85);andnucIearreactors/boiIers/machineryandmechanicaIappIiances/andpartsthereof(HS84).AIthoughthesesectorsarebroad/theygenerallyincorporaterelativelyhighvalue-addedproductswithstrategic

importance/andAmerica’stradedeficitinthemisjustunderUS$1triIIion.

Threeofthefoursectors(HS87/HS84/andHS85)aIsohappentobethesectors

inwhichChinarunsitslargesttradesurplus.Pharmaceuticalworldexports,on

theotherhand/aredisproportionateIydominatedbyGermany/SwitzerIand/andIreland.Irelandisthefourthlargestexporterofpharmaceuticalsintheworldandisatextbookexampleofindustrialpolicyachievingitsgoals.

IftheTrumpadministration’sobjectiveistore-generateUSmanufacturingtobreaktheIong-runningtradedeficitandcriticaItradedependencies/itisimperativetounderstandtheresourcesthatwillberequiredtoachievethisobjective.

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USECONOMICREBALANCING:HOWBIGISTHETASK?

9

USmanufacturingemployment

thereforeaccountsforabout8%of

totalemploymentwhilemanufacturingcontributesabout10%ofGDP

meaninginitscurrentsizeandform,USmanufacturinghasawellabove-averagerateoflaborproductivitythantheeconomyasawhole.

Ifidleresourcescanbemobilized,thisneednotcomeatthecostofother

economicoutputbut,ifresourcesneedtobedivertedfromothereconomicactivity,therewillbeanopportunitycost.Theefficiencyoftheadditional

manufacturingwilldetermineifthisopportunitycostisgreaterorlessthantheenhancementinmanufacturing.

Intermsofresourcesdeployed,USmanufacturingemployedabout12.7millionpeoplein2024.8Thisisverysimilartothepre-pandemiclevelsofaround12.6

million.Manufacturingvalue-addedintheUSin2024wasUS$2.9trillionmeaningvalue-addedperemployeewasUS$228,000,withaverageemployeeearningsalittleoverUS$100,000peryear.

USmanufacturingemploymentthereforeaccountsforabout8%oftotal

employmentwhilemanufacturingcontributesabout10%ofGDPmeaninginitscurrentsizeandform,USmanufacturinghasawellabove-averagerateoflabor

productivitythantheeconomyasawhole.Perworkervalue-addedeconomy-wideisUS$173,000,whileex-manufacturingitisUS$168,000.9ThisimpliesthatashiftoflabortomanufacturingshouldbeGDP-enhancingiftherelativeproductivitylevelshold.

DirectcomparisonsoflaborproductivityinmanufacturingbetweentheUnitedStatesandChinaaredifficultduetothelackofclearemploymentdatainChina.

AccordingtotheWorldBank,32%ofChinas740millionemployedworkforceisemployedin“industry”,implyinganindustrialworkforceof236million.

Manufacturingandindustryarenotsynonymousbutinotherdata,manufacturingaccountsforthevastmajorityofindustrialemployment.However,manufacturingemploymentin“urbannon-privateunits”isonlyabout36million,accordingtothelaborsurveystatistics,i.e.,alittleover20%oftotal.

Initscurrentsizeandform,USmanufacturinghasawellabove-averagerateoflaborproductivitythantheeconomyasawhole.

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USECONOMICREBALANCING:HOWBIGISTHETASK?

10

Iftheobjectiveofmanufacturing

growthintheUnitedStatesistomatchaggregatemanufacturingoutputto

aggregatemanufacturingproduct

demand,thentheUnitedStateswillneedtogrowmanufacturingvalue-addedbyabout40%orUS$1.2triIIion.

Thestatisticson“industriaIenterprisesoveradesignatedsize”covercompaniesthatemployinaggregateover77millionpeopleofwhomabout60million

areemployedinmanufacturing,soabout78%ofindustrialemploymentisinmanufacturing.

Thesetwodatasets,ifextrapolatedtotheeconomyasawhole,wouldsuggestaround20%oftotalemploymentinChinaisinmanufacturing.A2022reportputthepercentageatanexact18.1%,quotingtheNationalBureauofStatistics(NBS)asasource.10

Ifwetake20%or148millionasanestimateandgiventhatChinese

manufacturingvaIue-addedin2024wasUS$4.7triIIion-thisgivesavaIue-addedperworkerofaboutUS$32/000.SinceChina’sGDPin2023wasUS$17.8triIIionandthetotalemployednumberofworkerswas740million,theeconomy-widevalue-addedperworkerwasjustUS$24/000.Theex-manufacturingvaIue-addedper

workerwouIdbeUS$22/000/makingmanufacturingproductivityabout1.45timestherestoftheeconomy.

AveragewagesinmanufacturinginChina,accordingtotheNBS,amountedtoUS$12/800peryear-about12.5%oftheUSIeveI-whiIevaIue-addedperworkerintheregionof14%oftheUSlevel.Whatthesenumberssuggestisthat,in

aggregate/thecost-benefitadvantageofChinaasamanufacturingdestinationhasreducedsignificantIyovertime/toaIeveIwheretheeconomicsarenoIongeroverlycompellingforitsinvestability.

Twoimportantpointsareworthnoting:firstIy/thereareofcoursemanyotherfactorssuchasscale,industryclusters,andinfrastructurethatarepotentiallyofgreaterimportancethanlaborproductivity.Secondly,Chinasoveralllaborproductivityinmanufacturingwillbedraggeddownbymassiveemploymentinlowervalue-addedindustriesinwhichtheUnitedStateshasnointentionofcompeting,suchastextiles.So,whiletheaggregatenumbersmaysuggestthepIayingfieIdhasIeveIedintermsofIaborcostsandproductivity/theindustry-specificdata-whichisunavaiIabIe-isimportant.

IftheobjectiveofmanufacturinggrowthintheUnitedStatesistomatch

aggregatemanufacturingoutputtoaggregatemanufacturingproductdemand,thentheUnitedStateswillneedtogrowmanufacturingvalue-addedbyabout40%orUS$1.2triIIion.SuchanobjectivedoesnotimpIyautarky/butrather

aggregatebalanceinthemanufacturedgoodstradeposition.

Atexistinglevelsofproductivity,thiswouldrequireanadditional5million

workers,whichrepresentsabout3%ofthecurrentemployedtotalworkforceof160million.Thiswouldbesimilarinabsolutetermstomanufacturingemploymentin2000priortotheChinaShock.

CurrentunemploymentintheUSisrunningat4.2%.U6unemployment,whichcapturesabroaderrangeoflabormarketslack,isrunningat7.2%or11.6millionpeopIe.BoththesemeasuresofunempIoymentarenearhistoricIows.However/itseemssafetoassumethatthereare“idleresources”(aseconomistsputit)intheUSlabormarkettomeetpartofthemanufacturingemploymentrequired,assumingnoskillsgap.

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USECONOMICREBALANCING:HOWBIGISTHETASK?

11

America’simportdependenceis

perhapsthemostproblematicin

sixindustrycategories:machinery;

computerandeIectronicproducts;

eIectricaIappIiancesandcomponents;motorvehicIes;othertransportationequipment;andmedicaIsuppIiesanddevices.

TheproductivityIeveIofaUSworkerisareflectionofthecapitaIstockthatis

employedalongsidethem.ThetotalcapitalstockoftheUnitedStates,atcurrentcost/isUS$89triIIion.OnIyasmaIIproportionofthisisassociatedwithindustry/however.

Theprivatesector’snon-residentiaIcapitaIstockisaboutUS$35triIIion.Thisis

spIitroughIybetweenUS$20triIIionofstructures/US$9triIIionofequipment/andUS$5triIIionofinteIIectuaIproperty.ThebuIkofthisisassociatedwiththeservicessectorthatdominatestheUSeconomy.11

TheUSBureauofEconomicAnalysisproducesdetailedestimatesbyindustry

ofcapitalstock.Therearesixindustrycategoriesthatrepresentareaswhere

America’simportdependenceisperhapsthemostprobIematic:Machinery;

computerandeIectronicproducts;eIectricaIequipment/appIiancesand

components;motorvehicIes;othertransportationequipment;andmedicaIdevicesandsupplies.

ThesesixindustrieshaveacapitaIstockofequipmentvaIuedatUS$582biIIion;structuresatUS$669biIIion;andinteIIectuaIpropertyatUS$657biIIiongivingatotaIcapitaIstockofUS$1.9triIIion.12Theseindustriesrepresentthebulkof

thecapital-intensivemanufacturingindustriesoutsideofthemetalssector.

NewinvestmentofUS$200biIIionayearforfiveyearsontopofdepreciationisthereforerequiredtoincreasetherelevantcapitalstockby50%.Ofcourse,otherinvestmentsaroundtheseindustries,includinginfrastructure,willberequired.

Onpaper,toreturntheUSeconomytoasituationwhereitismanufacturingasimilartotalvalueofgoodstothatwhichitisconsumingrequiresa40%increaseinmanufacturingvaIue-added;areaIIocationofabout3%oftheempIoyed

workforceor5millionpeople,fromeitherexistingemploymentorintotheworkforce/andperhapsaUS$1-1.5triIIionincreaseinthecapitaIstockassociatedwithhighvaIue-addedmanufacturing.Thesearesignificantbarrierstosuccess.

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Obstaclestosuccess

ThreeobstaclestoUSsuccessin

attractingmanufacturingarethetariffregime,skilledlaborshortage,andthecostandtimeofregulatorycompliance.

IftheUSistobesuccessfulinattractingmanufacturingandseeingtheflurry

ofproposedprojectscometofruition,andremainprofitable,therearesome

considerableobstaclestoovercome.Wewouldhighlightthree:thetariffregime;skilledlaborshortage;andthecostandtimeofregulatorycompliance.

Regulationandcompliancecosts

ThegrowthinregulationandtheassociatedcostofcompliancehavebeenasignificantheadwindforUSindustryinthepastdecade.

AccordingtotheNationalAssociationofManufacturers,thecosttomanufacturingbusinessesofcomplyingwithfederalregulationspertainingtohealthandsafety,theenvironment,tax,andhomelandsecurityhasrisentoUS$349billion.This

representsaninflation-adjusted26%risesince2012.OverUS$200billionofthis

costistocomplywithenvironmentalregulations.ThisworksoutatastaggeringUS$29,000perworkerbutbecauseofthefixednatureofmanyofthesecosts,theperworkercostisaroundUS$50,000forsmallercompaniesemployinglessthan50workers.

Forcontext,rememberthattheaveragewageinUSmanufacturingisabout

US$100,000ayearandvalued-addedperworkerisUS$228,000,somorethan12%ofthevaluebeingcreatedbyamanufacturingworkerisbeingeatenupbycompliancecosts,andtheabsolutecostofcomplianceintheUSwouldcover

ThecosttoUSmanufacturingbusinessesofcomplyingwithfederalregulationspertainingtohealthandsafety,theenvironment,tax,andhomelandsecurityhasrisentoUS$349billion.

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OBSTACLESTOSUCCESS

USmanufacturingemploymentistoriseby5million,whichweestimatetobetherequirementforanadditionalUS$1.2trillionofmanufacturingvalue-added,theskillsgapwillonlyworsenunlessdrasticactionistaken.

thecostofemployingtwoworkersinChina.AnotherwayoflookingatitisthatcompliancecostsperworkerintheUSareaboutthesameasvalue-addedperworkerinChina!

Bywayofexample,WilsonBeaverandJamesFeinattheHeritageFoundation

pointoutthattheCleanAirActrequiresthattheEnvironmentalProtection

Agency(EPA)“establishemissionstandardsthatrequirethemaximumdegreeofreductioninemissionsofhazardousairpollutants.”TheEPAthushastheauthoritytodeterminethelevelofreductionthatisnecessaryandcanreviseprevious

emissionsstandards.Thus“CleanAirActregulationskeepexpanding,moving

thegoalpostsforemissionscompliancewhenevercompaniescomecloseto

compliance.Theseincreasingregulationsimposecompliancecostsonlower-tiersuppliersthatdriveuppricesandadverselyaffectsupply-chainefficiency.”13

Suchhighcompliancecostsareclearlyabigbarriertogrowthandneedtobeaddressed,eitherbyregulatorychangeorbycuttingthecostofcompliance.

ImportshaveshieldedtheUSconsumerfromthetruecostoftheregulatory

frameworkthathasbeenputinplaceinthelast10to15years.Iftariffs“work”inthesenseofinducingimportsubstitution,thenthoseregulatorycostswillbecomealltooapparent.

Labo