【英文版】中的能源与能效合作：中国与欧盟排放交易系统比较研究

Differentapproaches,similareffects?

AcomparativestudyoftheChineseand

EuropeanUnionEmissionsTradingSystems

PreparedaspartofthebilateralEnergyPartnershiponbehalfoftheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicAffairsandEnergy

DIFFERENTAPPROACHES,SIMILAREFFECTS?2

Imprint

Commissionedandpublishedby:

DeutscheGesellschaftfürInternationaleZusammenarbeit(GIZ)GmbHRegisteredoffices

BonnandEschborn,Germany

Project:Sino-GermanEnergyTransitionProject(EnTrans)

Projectmanagement:MarkusWypior

TayuanDiplomaticOfficeBuilding2-5,14LiangmaheSouthRd,ChaoyangDistrict100600Beijing,PRChina

Email:markus.wypior@giz.de

Website:

Tel.:+861085275589

PublicationdateJuly2025

Design

Heimrich&HannotGmbH

Text:

TinaBayer,KilianRützel,PascalHader-Weinmann,TheaBarnitzkeGermanEnergyAgency(dena)

GIZisresponsibleforthecontentofthispublication.

Onbehalfofthe

FederalMinistryforEconomicAffairsandEnergy(BMWE)

Energypartners:Implementingorganisations:Incooperationwith:

DIFFERENTAPPROACHES,SIMILAREFFECTS?3

Contents

1Introduction 4

2ThefunctionofEmissionsTradingSystems 5

3ComparativeanalysisoftheEUETSandtheChinesenationalETS 7

3.1AnalysisoftheEUETS 7

3.2AnalysisoftheChinesenationalETS 15

3.3ComparisonoftheEUETSandtheChinesenationalETS 19

4PotentialoptionsforthefuturedevelopmentoftheChinesenationalETS 23

4.1OptionsforthefuturescopeoftheChinesenationalETS 23

4.2OptionsforthefuturedesignoftheChinesenationalETS 23

5Conclusion 25

6ListofAbbreviations 27

7Bibliography 29

DIFFERENTAPPROACHES,SIMILAREFFECTS?4

1Introduction

Everyyear,theWorldMeteorologicalOrganization

globalemissions(WorldBank2024).Thisreflectsthe

(WMO)publishesareportonthestateoftheclimate.

expertconsensusthatsuchpricingmechanisms

Theyear2024surpassed2023asthewarmestonrecord,

representaneffectiveandefficientinstrumentto

withglobalaveragetemperatures1.45°Cabovepre-

achieveclimateprotectiongoals(Stechemesseretal.

industriallevels.Moreover,thepastdecadewasthe

2024).AkeyadvantageofETSsisthattheycangenerate

warmestten-yearperiodsincerecordsbegan.The

anadditionalrevenuestreamfortheimplementing

socio-economicimpactofextremeweatherandclimate

jurisdiction.In2024,theglobalrevenuefromETSs

eventsisimmenseandleadstoeconomicandhuman

reachedalmostEUR65billion

2

(CNY504.75billion).

losses.Foodinsecurityisrising,displacementduetothe

Between2007and2024,theyraisedoverEUR345

climatecrisisisanincreasinglypressingconcernand

billion(CNY2,689.57billion).Halfofthisrevenuewas

vulnerablepeopleinparticulararesufferingfromthe

allocatedtofundclimateandnature-relatedprojects

impactofrisingtemperatures(WMO2025).

(ICAP2025a).

LookingmorecloselyatEurope,theimpactofclimate

AlongsidetheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheRepublic

changeisobvious.Since2020,Europehasdealtwiththe

ofIndia,theEuropeanUnion(EU)andthePeople’s

threewarmestyearsonrecord.Thenegativesocietal

RepublicofChina(hereinafterreferredtoasChina)are

impactsfromextremeheatwaves,largewildfires,

twoofthebiggestemittersofgreenhousegases.Since

floodinganddroughtsareimmense.In2024,335people

bothjurisdictionshaveETSsinplace,acomparisonof

losttheirlivesduetostormsandflooding,withatotal

thetwotradingsystemscanprovidekeyinsightson

of435,000peopleaffectedbysuchevents;anadditional

theirdistinctdesignfeaturesandpotentialoptionsfor

42,000peoplewereaffectedbywildfires.Theresulting

thefuturedevelopmentoftheChinesenationalETS.The

financialdamageisestimatedat13.4billioneuros(EUR)

EUETSistheworld’smostmatureemissionstrading

(104.35billionChineseyuan(CNY))

1

(C3S2025).InAsia,

system,havingbeenintroducedin2005.Sincethen,it

themeantemperaturein2023wasthesecondhighest

hasevolvedthroughdifferentphasesandundergone

onrecordwithtemperaturesinsomeregions–eastern

severaladjustments.ThiscomparisonreferstotheEU

Chinaamongthem–markedlyaboveaverage.The

ETSasitexiststodaywhiletakingintoaccountthatboth

south-westofChinasufferedfromdroughtin2023,

ETSscontinuetoevolve.Itisimportanttobearinmind

withprecipitationlevelsbelownormalalmostevery

thatthefindingsarelimitedbydifferencesinpolicy

month.AcrossAsia,extremeweathereventsledtoover

design,politicalsystemsanddifferentstagesof

2,000fatalitiesin2023,mostlyduetoflooding,with

evolution.TheChinesenationalETSwasimplemented

morethanninemillionpeopledirectlyaffected(WMO

in2021.Severalregionalpilotsthathadbeenoperating

2024a).

inChinasince2013providedexperienceonhowbesttosetupthenationalETS.However,acomparisonwiththe

Thesechangesintheglobalclimate,fromextreme

EUETScanprovidefurtherusefulindicationson

weathereventstorisingglobaltemperatures,have

potentialoptionsforfuturedevelopmentoftheChinese

severeimpactsincludingdeath,displacement,famineandeconomiclosses.Climateprotectionand,

nationalETStoincreaseitsemissionsreductionimpact.

consequently,greenhousegas(GHG)reductionis

Thisreportbeginswithabriefintroductiontothe

thereforeoneofthemostimportantcurrentglobal

functionofemissionstradingsystems.Italsooutlines

tasks.Whilemanydifferentclimateprotection

theclimatedataframeworkwithinwhichtheEUand

measuresarepossible,emissionstradingsystems

ChineseETSsoperate.Next,itanalysespolicy

(ETSs)aregrowinginimportance.Countries,federal

developmentandthedesignfeaturesofbothETSs.

statesandotherjurisdictionsusinganETSnowaccount

Buildingonthisanalysis,itthencomparesthetwo

for58percentofglobalGDP;onethirdoftheworld’s

systems,whichleadstopotentialoptionsforthefuture

populationlivesinlocationswithanETSinplace.In

developmentoftherelativelynewnationalETSinChina.

total,38ETSsareinoperationworldwide,whileanother11areunderdevelopmentandnineareunder

consideration(ICAP2025a).TheseETSsandother

carbonpricingmechanisms,suchascarbontaxesand

carbonoffsetmechanisms,coverabout24percentof

1AllcurrencyconversionsinthispaperarebasedonafixedaverageEUR/CNYexchangerateof7.7875,calculatedfortheyear2024(ECB2025).Thisratehasbeenconsistentlyappliedthroughouttheanalysistoensurecomparability.

2

ThesourcereferstoUSD70billion;theaverageexchangeratein2024wasaroundUSD1.08forEUR1.00(Statista2025).Thisratehasbeenconsistentlyappliedthroughouttheanalysistoensurecomparability.

DIFFERENTAPPROACHES,SIMILAREFFECTS?5

2ThefunctionofEmissionsTradingSystems

AnETSisamarket-basedpolicyinstrumentto

incentiviseemissionreduction.Likeothercarbon

pricinginstruments,italtersthepricesofgoodsand

servicesinaccordancewiththepolluter-paysprinciple(Baranzinietal.2017).ETSstherebyensurethat

producersadjusttheirdecisionsbyinternalising

externalcosts.Incontrasttocarbontaxes,whichsetafixedpriceforemissions,anETScreatesincentivesto

reduceemissionswhereitismostcost-effective(IEA

2020a)and,incaseofacap-and-tradesystem,providescertaintyabouttheemissionlevelsthatareachieved.

ETSscaneitheroperateunderabaseline-and-credit

system,liketheChinesenationalETS,orunderacap-

and-tradesystem(Wiesweg2011).Themostcommon

variantisthecap-and-trade(C&T)system;examples

includetheETSsintheEUandinCalifornia.Inthese

systems,alimit(cap)issetonthetotalamountof

emissionsallowedwithinthesystemorinclearly

definedsectorsoftheeconomy.Thisamountof

emissionsisthentranslatedintopropertyrightsintheformofemissionallowances.TheseallowancesarethenallocatedtotheETSparticipants.Inacap-and-trade

system,theemissionscapisloweredinregularintervalstoensurethegradualreductionofemissionsinlinewiththerespectiveclimatetargets.Allowancesareinitially

allocatedtoemittingentitiesusingoneoftwo

mechanisms:allowancescaneitherbeallocatedfreeofcharge(knownas“grandparenting”)orauctionedoff–withthelatteroptionraisingrevenuefortheregulator(Neuhoff,Martinez,Sato2008).Inthebaseline-and-

creditsystem,thereisnocaponGHGemissions.

Instead,firmsearnemissionreductioncreditswhen

theiremissionsarebelowtheirbaselines,whicharesetbyhistoricalemissionsorperformancestandards.In

bothcases,allowancesandgeneratedcreditscanbesoldonthesecondarymarkettootherentitieswithhigher

marginalabatementcostsorhigheremissionsthantheiroriginalbaseline-determinedfreeallocation.

Therearetwomainwaysforgovernmentstodistributeallowancesfreeofcharge.Thefirstoptionis

grandparenting,wherehistoricalemissionsareusedasthebaseline.Thesecondisbenchmarking,wherethe

shareoffreelyallocatedallowancesisbasedonemissionintensityorefficiencystandards.Benchmarking

providesfreeallowancestofirmsforemissionsthatfallbelowacertainlevel,determinedeitherbyunitof

productoremissionintensity.Benchmarkinglevelscanvaryfordifferentindustriesdependingonthe

methodologyusedandtheaspiredlevelofefficiency.

Thesecondoption,auctioning,allocatesallowances

throughacompetitivebiddingprocess.Theadoptionofauctioningestablishesaprimarymarketfortheinitialdistributionofallowances.Emittingentitiescanthentradeallowanceswitheachotheronthesecondary

market.Auctioninghastheadvantageofgeneratinggovernmentrevenues,whichcanbereinvestedin

climate-relatedprojectsorusedtoprotectvulnerablesectors,companiesandhouseholdsfromthecostsofcarbonpricing(EuropeanCommission2024a;

Narassimhanetal.2018).

MostETSsuseahybridapproachinwhichcovered

entitiesinspecificsectorsreceivesomeoftheir

allowancesforfreebutarerequiredtopurchasethe

remainderviaauctions.Typically,thisbalanceis

adjustedovertime,increasingtheproportionof

allowancesallocatedviaauctioningratherthanthroughfreeallocation(ICAP2024a).

Theparticipatingentitiesareobligatedtodeliverannualemissionreportsasproofoftheircompliance.Entitiesthatemitlessthanthenumberofallowancestheyholdcanselltheirsurplusallowancestootheractorsonthesecondarymarket.Entitieswithlowabatementcostsarethusincentivisedtoreducetheiremissions,whilethosefacinghighercostscancomplybypurchasingadditionalallowancesonthemarket(ICAP2024a;Narassimhanetal.2018).

Bankinghasbeenintroducedasawaytotransfer

allowancesbetweentradingperiodsinordertoincreasetheoverallefficiencyofthesecondarymarket.Bankingallowscompaniestoholdallowancesbeyondthecurrenttradingperiod,thusmakingitpossibletosellthemortomeettheirowncomplianceobligationsatalaterdate.Intheory,thisshouldevenoutmarketpricesovertimeandreducefrictionbetweentradingintervals,leadingtoa

strongerandconsistentscarcitysignalthroughthe

marketprice.Thereversemechanism(borrowing)takesplacewhencompaniesborrowallowancestheyexpecttoreceiveforfreefromfuturetradingperiods.Borrowingprovidesentitieswithflexibilityindeterminingtheir

compliancestrategy.However,byreducingmitigationactionintheshortterm,borrowingcandelaythe

emissionreductionsneededtoachievethe

environmentalobjectivesofanETS.Subsequently,mostETSshaveeitherprohibitedorlimitedborrowing.

Anotheroptiontogenerateefficiencygainsistointroducespatialorsectoralflexibilitymeasures.

Offsettingenablesentitiestocompensatefortheir

emissionsbyinvestinginmitigationprojectsoutsideofthesectorsregulatedthroughtheETS.

DIFFERENTAPPROACHES,SIMILAREFFECTS?6

Whenanentityinvestsinanoffsettingprogramme,itreceivescarboncreditscertifiedoratleast

acknowledgedbythegovernment.Entitiescanthen

tradethesecreditsand–toadefinedextent–usethemtocomplywiththeETSallowanceobligation.

High-integrityoffsettingprojectsareparamountfor

suchflexibilitymechanismstoalignwithenvironmentalandclimateobjectives.

ClimateDataFrameworksintheEUandChina

TheEUandallitsmemberstateshavesignedandratifiedtheParisAgreement(UnitedTreatyCollection2025).Basedonthis,theEUhassetitselfthegoalofbecomingthefirstclimate-neutraleconomyandsocietyby2050(EuropeanCommission2024b).China,liketheEU,hassignedandratifiedtheParisAgreement,therebycommittingtoits

objectives(UnitedTreatyCollection2025).Throughits‘dual-carbongoal’,ChinaaimstopeakCO2(carbondioxide)emissionsbefore2030andachievecarbonneutralityby2060(TheStateCouncil2021).

The27memberstatesoftheEuropeanUnionjointlyrepresenttheworld’sfourth-largestGHGemitterwith3,221.8

MtCO2-eq(carbondioxideequivalents)in2023,accountingfor6.1percentoftheglobaltotal.However,EUemissionsin2023were7.5percentlowerthanin2022(Crippaetal.2024).IntheEU,thetransportsectorisresponsibleforthelargestshareofemissions(24percent),followedbytheenergysector(20percent)andthebuildingssector(14percent).Thetransportsectoristheonlysectortohaverecordedanincreaseinemissionsbetween1990and2022(19

percent).Incontrast,theindustrialandenergysectorsachievedthehighestemissionsreductions,atmorethan50percenteach(Crippaetal.2024).

Astheworld’slargestemitterwith15,944MtCO2-eq(excl.LULUCF)in2023,Chinaaccountsfor30.1percentoftheglobaltotal.In2023,China’semissionsincreasedby5.2percentcomparedto2022.Thepowerindustryremainsthelargestcontributortothecountry’semissionswithashareof48.8percentin2023.Othersectorsalsocontribute

significantlytoChina’semissions,suchasindustrialcombustion(21.7percent)andindustrialprocesses(11per

cent).*Thetransportsectorshowedthelargestincreaseinemissionsbetween1990and2023(1065percent),closelyfollowedbytheenergysector(917percent)andtheprocesssector(650percent).Agricultureistheonlysectorthathasreduceditsemissions,byfourpercentcomparedto1990(Crippaetal.2024).

*Crippaetal.include,forexample,non-metallicminerals,non-ferrousmetals,solventsandotherproductsandchemicalsusedincombustionforindustrialmanufacturingandindustrialprocessemissions.

Figure1:GreenhousegasemissionsinChinaandtheEuropeanUnionfrom1990to2023.OwnfigurebasedonCrippaetal.(2024).

DIFFERENTAPPROACHES,SIMILAREFFECTS?7

3ComparativeanalysisoftheEUETSandtheChinesenationalETS

ThischapteranalysesthedesignofEUETSandtheChinesenationalETSandcomparesthetwosystemsonthebasisofseveralcriteriacharacteristicofETSs,namely:policyandpricedevelopment;coveredemissionsandsectors;capsandallowanceallocation;marketstabilitymechanisms;carbonleakage;monitoring,reportingandverification;andeffectsonemissionsreduction.

3.1AnalysisoftheEUETS

In2005,theEUintroducedtheworld’sfirst

comprehensiveETS.Inrecentyears,theinstrumenthasbeenupdatedseveraltimesinlinewitheconomicrealityandtoensureitisfitforpurpose.Thefollowingsectionsprovideanoverviewofthemostimportantdesign

featuresoftheEUETS.

3.1.1Policyandpricedevelopment

RatificationoftheKyotoProtocol,withitslegally

bindingclimategoals,ledtheEUtoconsider

establishingnewclimatemitigationinstruments,

includingtheEUETS.InitialideasforafutureETS

designweredraftedinaGreenPaperonGHGemissionstradingwithintheEuropeanUnionpublishedin2000

(COM(2000)87final2000).BuildingonthisGreenPaper,theEUETSDirectivewasdrawnupin2003andadoptedin2005,puttinginplacethefirstemissionstrading

systemworldwide.AstheEUETSisamarket-based

instrumenttoreduceGHGemissions,thepriceforan

allowanceissetbytheprincipleofsupplyanddemand.Thesupplyisdeterminedbytheallowancecap,while

demandisdeterminedbytheactualamountofcoveredemissionswithintheEU.Companiesplacebidsto

purchaseEUAllowances(EUAs)eitherontheprimary

market,whereemissionallowancesareauctionedtothemarketparticipants,oronthesecondarymarket,whereparticipantstrademarketspotandderivativecontractsofemissionsallowances.Theauctionclearingprice

representsthepriceatwhichthenumberofbids

matchesorexceedsthenumberofallowancesauctioned(EEX2024).Thepricesofallowancesintheprimaryandthesecondarymarketareverysimilar(Deutsche

Bundesbank2024;DEHSt2024a).PolicydevelopmentoftheEUETSwasdividedintofourtradingphases.

SignificantAccompanyingClimatePoliciesintheEU

AlthougheconomicinstrumentssuchastheEUETS

playavitalroleinclimategovernanceintheEuropeanUnion,theycannotaloneaccountfortheEU’s

emissionsreductiongoals.TheEU’sclimatepolicymixthereforeincludesavarietyofdifferentclimate

mitigationpoliciesaimedatachievingitsclimateobjectives.ThefollowingoutlinesaselectionofEurope’snumerousclimatepolicies.

Fit-for-55

Fitfor55isapackageoflegislationdesignedtoachievethenewtargetofreducingEUGHGemissionsbyat

least55percentby2030.Itincludesnewregulations

fortheEUETS.Itsscopehasbeenextendedtoincludeemissionsfrommaritimetransport,withsystem

allowancesreduced(i.e.capadjusted)morequicklyandfreeallocationofallowancesphasedoutinsome

sectors.Rulesgoverningtheuseofrevenueshavealsobeenadjusted.TheCarbonOffsettingandReduction

SchemeforInternationalAviation(CORSIA)hasbeen

implemented.MoreresourceshavebeenmadeavailablefortheModernisationFundandInnovationFund,whiletheMarketStabilityReservehasbeenrevised.Allof

thesechangesconcernthefourthphaseoftheEUETS;seep.5.

EmissionTradingSystem2

AlongsidethemeasuresrelatedtotheEUETSsetoutintheFitfor55package,anewETShasbeencreatedforbuildings,roadtransportandforcombustiblesand

fuelsforothersectors.TheEmissionTradingSystem2(knownas“EUETS2”)willcommenceoperationin

2027,thoughreportingbeganin2024.FormoreinformationonEUETS2,seeChapter

3.1.8.

DIFFERENTAPPROACHES,SIMILAREFFECTS?8

EffortSharingRegulation

TheEffortSharingRegulationwasadoptedin2018,

settingadditionalnationaltargetsforemissions

reductionsinsectorsnotcoveredbytheEUETS.It

definesbindingtargetsformemberstates’annualGHGemissionsbetween2021and2030forthefollowing

sectors:buildings,agriculture(non-CO2emissions),

wastemanagementandtransport(excludingaviationandinternationalshipping,whichhavebeenaddedtotheEUETS).TheEffortSharingRegulationtargetsanadditionalreductionintheEU’stotalemissionsofupto10percent(Verdeetal.2021).

RenewableEnergyDirective

SimilarlytotheEffortSharingRegulation,the

RenewableEnergyDirectivesetbindingtargetsfor

memberstatesregardingtheshareofrenewablesin

theirfinalenergyconsumption.Thetargetsdiffer

betweenmemberstatesaccordingtotheirGDPper

capita,theirinitialREshareandtheirupscaling

potential.ArevisedversionoftheDirectivewasadoptedin2023,raisingtheEU’sbindingrenewableenergy

targetfor2030toaminimumof42.5percent.

EnergyEfficiencyDirective

TheEnergyEfficiencyDirectivesetsatargetof32.5percentreductioninenergyconsumptionrelativetoa

business-as-usualscenario.

Firstphase(2005–2007)

Duringthefirstphasefrom2005to2007,thefocuswastogainpracticalandadministrativeexperiencewiththenewpolicyinstrumentandtoprepareforthesecond

phase.Freetradingofemissionallowanceswas

establishedacrosstheEU.Duringthisthree-yearphase,theEUETSonlycoveredpowergeneratorsandenergy-intensiveindustries.Inthecaseofnon-compliance,

entitieshadtopayafineofEUR40(CNY311.50)per

tonne.Memberstateshadtodeterminetheirowncap

andallocatetherespectiveemissionallowances,

specifyingtheallocationdecisionsintheirNational

AllocationPlans(NAPs).5percentoftheallowances

wereauctionedwhiletherestwasdistributedforfree

(Verdeetal.2019).Whilethefirsttwoyearswere

markedbymoderateallowancepriceswithanaverage

annualpricebetweenEUR17.30andEUR21.80

(CNY134.72andCNY169.77),theyfelltoalmostzeroin2007(Hintermann2010).Pricefluctuationwasduein

parttoanexcessofallowancesallocatedvia

grandparentingcomparedtorealemissionsasaresultofinsufficientdata,andinpartduetouncertainty

createdthroughpoliticaldebatesaroundwhatpolicy

actiontotake(Hepburnetal.2006).TheCommission

thereforeaskedmemberstatestoreducetheirallowancevolume.Monitoring,reportingandverification(MRV)ofemissionsfromthecoveredentitieswasalso

established.

Secondphase(2008–2012)

Duetolearningsfromthefirstphase,theoverall

allowancecapwasreducedby6.5percentcomparedtothe2005cap.Theemissiondatagatheredduringthe

firstphasehelpedtodeterminehowtoadjustthecaptoactualemissions.Additionally,acrossallcovered

sectors,freeallocationwasreducedto90percent(with10percentauctioned).Theeconomiccrisisin2008ledtoreducedemissionsand,subsequently,tomore

allowancesbeingavailable,whichresultedinlowallowanceprices.

Inthebeginningof2012,theaviationsectorwas

integratedintotheEUETS.Non-compliancebecame

moreexpensiveasthepenaltyincreasedtoEUR100

(CNY778.75)pertonne(EuropeanCommission2024c).

Thirdphase(2013–2020)

Severalmeasuresweretakentofixproblemsthat

developedinthepreviousphases.Insteadofnational

caps,asingleEU-widecaponemissionswasintroduced.Auctioningbecamethedefaultmethodforallowance

allocation(insteadoffreeallocation).Theproportionoffreelyallocatedallowanceswasseverelycutto43per

centbyimplementing100percentauctioningforpowergenerationinstallationsandincreasingtargetsof

auctioningforindustrialinstallationslessexposedtocarbonleakage.

Definition:CarbonLeakage

Carbonleakageisdefinedastherelocationof

greenhousegas-emittingindustriesfromcountries

withstricterclimateprotectionpoliciestoother

countriesinordertocircumventstricterrequirementsforgreenhousegasemissions.FormoreinformationoncarbonleakagemeasuresintheEUETS,see

Chapter

3.1.5.

In2013,20percentoftheallowancesforthose

industrieswereauctioned.By2020,thishadincreasedto70percent.Fortheremainingfreeallowances,the

applicableruleswereharmonisedusinganex-anteGHGperformancebenchmarkingapproach.Severalnew

industriesandGHGswereintegratedintotheEUETS,

includingaluminium,petrochemicals,ammonia,nitricacid,adipicacidandglyoxylicacidproduction,aswellasnitrousoxide(N:O)andperfluorocarbons(PFCs)fromtheproductionofaluminium.Besidestheinclusionof

lleakingCO2fromcarboncapture,thetransportationofthecapturedCO:inpipelinesanditsgeologicalstoragewereincluded(EuropeanUnion2014).Furthermore,theMarketStabilityReserve(MSR,furtherexplainedin

Chapter3.1.4)wasintroducedin2018duetolowprices.

DIFFERENTAPPROACHES,SIMILAREFFECTS?9

Fourthphase(2021–2030)

Inthecurrenttradingphase,theEUETShasbeen

revisedseveraltimesinlinewithmoreambitious

climategoals(seeinfobox“SignificantaccompanyingclimatepoliciesintheEU”,Fitfor55,p.4).Thecaphasbeentightenedandemissionsfrommaritimetransportincludedfrom2024.TheMSRwasadjustedandfree

allocationsreduced.Startingin2026,therewillbeno

furtherfreeallocationintheaviationsector(EuropeanCommission2024d).By2030,100percentofthe

allowancesfornon-CBAM(CarbonBorderAdjustmentMechanism;seeChapter3.1.5forfurtherdetails)

industrieswillbeauctioned,whileCBAMindustrieswillreceiveanincreasinglylimitedfreeallocationuntil2034(BordignonandGamannossi2023).Furthermore,the

possibilityofcarbonoffsetting,whichwaspermittedinphasestwoandthree,endedduetooversupplyand

resultinglowprices,alongwithalimitedimpacton

domesticemissionreduction(Sandberg2012;CarbonMarketWatch2013).By2026,theEUCommissionwillpresentareportonthefeasibilityofintegrating

municipalwasteincinerationfacilitiesintotheEUETS.Theyaresettobeintegratedby2028–iffeasible–andby2030atthelatest(EU2003/87/EC2003).

Pricedevelopment

WhilepricesoccasionallyexceededEUR100

(CNY778.75)inindividualauctions,expertsarguethatthegeneralpricelevelhasremainedtoolow.The

GermanEnvironmentAgencydeterminedthecostsofthedamageinflictedbyonetonneofCO:atEUR180(CNY1401.75)andrecommendsapriceofEUR250

(CNY1946.88)pertonneofCO:-eq(UBA2018,2024).

Pietzckeretal.calculatedthatiftheEUwantstoachieveits55percentemissionsreductiontargetby2030,the

CO:pricewouldneedtobearoundEUR130(CNY1012.4)forthepowerandindustrialsectors(2021).Fortheroadtransport,buildingsandagriculturalsectors(currentlynotincludedintheEUETS),theCO:pricewouldhavetobearoundEUR275(CNY1946.9)pertonne.Road

transportandbuildingswillbecoveredbytheEUETS2startingfrom2027(seeChapter

3.1.8)

;thereare

currentlynoconcreteplanstocovertheemissionsfromagricultureinanETS.PriceforecastsfortheEUETS2rangefromEUR48(CNY373.8)toEUR350

(CYN2725.63)(Fiedleretal.2024).TheInternationalMonetaryFundpointsoutthatCO:pricesneedtobeintheregionofatleastEUR71(CNY552.9)globallyby

2030toachievethegoalsoftheParisAgreementandtocreatecost-effectivenet-zeropathways(Black,ParryandZhunussova2022).

3.1.2Coveredemissions,coveredsectors

TheEUETScurrentlycoversCO