2026年1月全球贸易动态报告

1

Globaleconomicandtradegrowthslows–developing

countries

will

face

headwinds.2

Updatingtherules–WTOreform

at

acrossroads

for

global

trade

in2026.3

Tariffsonthe

rise

–

increased

protectionismmay

trigger

greater

policy

uncertainty.4

Valuechainscontinueto

reconfigure–geopolitics

redraws

trade

and

investment

maps.5

Servicificationoftrade–exportsofservicescontinue

to

grow

faster

than

goods.6

South–Southtradesurge–developingcountries

drive

global

export

growth.7

Sustainable

trade

–environment

will

continue

to

be

part

of

global

trade

initiatives.8

Critical

minerals

-oversupply

and

geopoliticsmay

destabilize

trade

and

global

value

chains.9Feedingthefuture–agriculturaltradewillremainfundamental

to

food

security.10Traderegulationstighten–national

policiesreshape

global

commerce.JANUARY2026Global

tradeupdatePolicyInsightsToptrendsredefiningglobal

trade

in2026KEY

TRENDS©AdobeStockGlobal

economic

and

tradegrowthslows–developingcountrieswillface

headwindsGlobal

growth

remains

sluggish.Global

economic

growth

in2026

will

moderate

tradeprospects,

investmentflows,

and

policy

choices.

UNCTAD

estimates

global

growthwill

remainsubdued

at

2.6

per

cent

in

2025

and

2026,

despite

potential

gains

from

technologies

such

asartificial

intelligence.1

Growth

in

developing

economies

(excluding

China)

is

expected

to

easeslightly

to

4.2

per

cent

in

2026,

down

from

4.3

per

cent

in

2025,

pointing

to

a

volatile

externalenvironment.2Major

economies

will

also

lose

momentum.

The

United

States

growth

is

projected

at1.5percent

in2026,down

from

1.8

per

cent

in2025,while

China—an

essential

trade

and

investmentpartner

for

many

developing

countries—is

expected

to

expand

by

4.6

per

cent

in

2026,

downfrom

5

per

cent

in

2025.

In

Europe,

fiscal

stimulus

in

countries

like

Germany

may

offer

limitedsupport,but

overall

demand

will

remain

modest.3Globaltradein2026isata

criticaljuncture.Geopoliticalconsiderations,economicheadwinds,shiftingsupplychains,digitalbreakthroughs,andsustainabilityimperativesareredefininghowcountriesengageincommerce–withespeciallyprofoundimplicationsfordevelopingnations.Policymakersfaceanurgentchallengetonavigatethiscomplex

landscapewhileensuringtradecontinuestodriveinclusiveandsustainablegrowth.Thisreportexaminestenkeytrendsto

follow

in2026.1

UNCTAD,

TradeandDevelopmentReport

2025,pp.4–5.2

UNCTAD,

TradeandDevelopmentReport

2025,p.2..3

UNCTAD,

TradeandDevelopmentReport

2025,pp.4–5.GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

TREND

1JANUARY

2026©AdobeStock2Slower

growth

affects

trade

through

weaker

export

demand,

tighter

financial

conditions,andgreaterexposuretoshocks.

Commodity-dependent

economies

may

face

heightened

price

volatility,

while

access

to

external

finance

could

become

more

constrained.Globally,

policy

volatility

may

further

dampen

long-term

investment,

complicating

infrastructureand

industrial

financing

for

developing

countries.Theimpactondevelopingcountrieswillbesignificant.

Subdued

global

growth

raisesthestakes

in

developing

countries

by

limiting

investment

and

access

to

finance

forinfrastructureandindustrialization

(figure

1).

Policymakers

will

need

to

adapt

strategies—such

as

strengtheningregional

integration

or

digital

trade—to

counter

global

headwinds

and

build

resilient

developmentplans

toward2026.1050-520042026China15%1050-5Figure

1Adeterioratingpolicyenvironmentinhibitsgrowthacrosstheglobe.Realgrossdomestic

product(GDP)growth,world

and

selected

economies,

percentage,2004–2026

WorldSource:

UNCTAD.TDR2025.

p.5.320042026GlobalSouth

(excludingChina)GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

2004202620042026UnitedStates15%European

UnionJANUARY

2026Updatingtherules–WTO

reform

atacrossroadsfor

global

trade

in

2026The

14th

WTO

Ministerial

Conference

(MC14)

will

take

place

in

Yaoundé,

Cameroon,

againstabackdropofgeopolitical

tensionsand

tradeuncertaintiesdrivenbyunilateral

tariffs,bilateraldeals,andeconomicsecurityconcerns.For

developing

countries,

addressingsystemicchallenges

remains

a

priority,

particularly

reforming

the

dispute

settlement

mechanism

and

restoring

a

fully-functioning

Appellate

Body.These

reforms

are

essentialto

safeguard

market

access

and

ensure

developing

members

caneffectively

uphold

their

rights

within

the

multilateral

trading

system.Preserving

policy

space

and

reinforcing

Special

and

Differential

Treatment

(SDT)

will

also

be

central

concerns.SDT

provisionsarecriticalfor

industrialization,

value

addition,

andstructural

transformation,enabling

developing

countries

to

maximize

the

benefits

of

global

trade.Developing

countries’

interests

span

several

areas.

These

interests

include

agricultureand

fisheries,

with

an

emphasis

on

food

security

and

rural

livelihoods;

electronic

commerce,covering

regulatoryapproachesthatsupportdigital

development

strategies,

cross-border

dataflows,emerging

services

trade

models,and

the

future

of

the

e-commerce

moratorium;

and

thepotentialintegrationoftheplurilateral

Investment

Facilitationfor

DevelopmentAgreement(IFDA)

into

the

WTO

legal

framework,

aimed

at

promoting

foreign

direct

investment

and

facilitatingintegration

into

global

value

chains.Theintersectionof

tradeandclimatepolicy

willremainrelevant.Discussionsonsubsidies

for

sustainable

industrialization

and

eco-labelling

measures

could

affect

developing

countries’trade

competitiveness

and

are

likely

to

feature

in

the

longer-term

WTO

reform

agenda.Deliverables

at

MC14will

shape

the

trajectory

of

WTO

reform

and

global

trade

governance.

Fordeveloping

countries,this

is

a

pivotal

momentto

influence

reformsthat

address

contemporaryeconomicchallengesandopportunitieswhilealsofostering

inclusivegrowth.4TREND

2GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

JANUARY

2026©AdobeStockTariffsonthe

rise

-

increased

protectionism

maytriggergreater

policy

uncertaintyTariff

proliferation

creates

uncertainty.

In

2026,

governments

are

expected

to

continueusing

tariffs

as

protectionist

and

strategic

tools.Their

role

in

regulating

market

access

expandedmarkedly

in

2025,

led

by

the

United

States’

tariff

increases

tied

to

industrial,

geoeconomic,and

geopolitical

objectives.As

a

result,

average

global

tariffs

rose,

with

uneven

effects

acrosssectorsandtradingpartners(figure2a,b).Uncertaintyislikelytopersistin2026asgovernments

pursue

a

variety

of

domestic

policy

objectives

using

tariffs

and

other

trade

policy

instruments,including

industry

support,

intensifying

industrial

policies,

addressing

trade

imbalances,

andadjustments

to

supply-chain

reorganization

and

technological

change

within

existing

and

newtradeagreements.Tariffsshapetradeflows

by

increasing

importcosts,and

evensmall

increases

can

ripple

across

markets

by

weakening

demand,

shifting

sourcing,

and

rerouting

trade.

Frequent

policychanges

amplify

uncertainty,discouraging

investment

and

complicating

planning.

Trade

volumesmayfallnotonlyaftertariffsrise,butalsoasfirmsadjustpreemptivelytoexpectedpolicyshifts.

Avolatile

tariff

environment,therefore,

risks

undermining

global

trade

growth

and

efficiency.Smaller,lessdiversifiedeconomiesareparticularlyexposedtorisingtariffsandpolicy

volatility.

Limited

capacity

to

redirect

exports

or

absorb

higher

costs

can

lead

to

revenuelosses,

fiscal

strain,

and

slower

development.

Tariff

hikes

on

commodities

may

also

threatenlivelihoods

and

food

security.5TREND

3GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

JANUARY

2026©AdobeStock6AutomotiveandTransportChemical

productsElectrical

MachineryIron

and

SteelMachineryOther

base

metalsOther

manufacturingPlasticsand

RubberPrecision

instrumentsTextilesandApparelFigure2a.Tariffsincreaseonglobaltradehasbeensubstantialin2025,especiallyin

manufacturing.Trade-weightedaverageappliedtariffonglobal

tradeAgricultureNatural

ResourcesManufacturingb.Tariffincreasesinglobaltradeinselectedmanufacturingsubsectors6.7%5.7%0.8%

0.8%Source:

UNTradeand

Development(UNCTAD).60%

2468104.7%1.9%GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

Tariff

in

2024

Tariff

in

2025JANUARY

2026Valuechainscontinuetoreconfigure–geopoliticsredraws

tradeand

investment

mapsGlobalvaluechainsareshifting.Recentshocksarereshapingproduction

networksastradetensions

and

the

pandemic

pushed

firms

beyond

cost-driven

offshoring

and

towards

risk-aware

strategies.This

reconfiguration

is

expected

to

continue

in

2026,

driven

by

geopolitical

strains,new

industrial

and

climate

policies,

and

technological

change.

Firms

are

diversifying

suppliers,

“near-shoring”

production

closerto

consumers,

andvertically

integratingto

secure

key

inputs.Advances

in

automation

and

artificial

intelligence

are

also

reducing

labour-cost

advantages,

encouraging

production

relocation.Structuralshiftsarealteringtradepatterns.

Nearlytwo-thirdsofglobaltradeoccurs

withinglobal

value

chains,and

changes

in

their

configuration

are

creating

new

hubs

and

routes.Somehubcountries

-key

locationswherevaluechainactivities

are

concentrated-

and

routesthroughwhich

goods

and

services

move-are

expanding

faster

than

average,while

others

decline(figure3).Althoughsupplierdiversificationcanstrengthenresilienceandthusstabilizetrade,itmayalso

introduce

inefficienciesandweighontradegrowth.Developing

economies

face

both

opportunities

and

risks.

Countries

with

stronginfrastructure,skilled

labour,and

stable

long-term

policies

are

better

positioned

to

attract

investment

as

firms

seek

new

locations.

By

contrast,

peripheral

economies

—especially

thosereliant

on

low-cost

labour

exports

—risk

marginalization

if

production

concentrates

in

a

fewhubs.

Proactive

measures,

including

improved

logistics,

workforce

upgrading,

and

a

strongerinvestment

climate,are

essential

to

remain

integrated

into

global

value

chains.7TREND

4GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

JANUARY

2026©AdobeStock8Source:

UNCTADcalculation

basedon

UNCTADSTATand

nationalstatistics.8UnitedStates

<>

Viet

NamChina

<

>

MexicoChina

<

>

Viet

NamEuropean

Union

<>

United

StatesMexico

<

>

UnitedStatesEuropean

Union

<

>

Viet

NamChina

<

>

European

UnionCanada

<

>

UnitedStatesChina

<

>

UnitedStatesEuropean

Union

<

>

United

KingdomFigure3Uneventradegrowthinglobalvaluechain-relatedbilateralflowsAnnualgrowth

ratesofselected

bilateralflows

(relativetotheglobal

average

in

the

period)

2018–20242024–2025-20%-10%

0%10%20%GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

JANUARY

2026Servicificationoftrade–exports

ofservicescontinueto

growfaster

thangoodsServicesare

poweringglobaltradegrowth.

Over

the

past

decade,

world

services

exportsexpanded

by

about5.3per

cent

annually—more

than

twice

the

pace

of

goods

trade—and

now

account

for

27

per

cent

of

global

trade.

In

2025,

services

export

growth

is

expected

to

reach9

per

cent,

with

momentum

likely

to

continue

in

2026.

This

reflects

growing

servicification,as

services

increasingly

underpin

production

across

sectors.

By

2022,

services

made

up

71per

cent

of

global

intermediate

inputs,

including

sizeable

shares

in

primary

industries

(about

18

per

cent)

and

manufacturing

(about

31

per

cent).4

Access

to

efficient

services

such

asfinance,

logistics,and

information

technology,often

through

imports,

has

become

essential

forcompetitiveness.Digitalization

accelerates

servicification.Advances

in

digitaltechnology

have

made

manyservices

tradable

at

scale.

Digitally

deliverable

services

now

represent

56

per

cent

of

globalservices

exports,having

grown

at

an

average

annual

rate

of

7.1

per

cent

over

the

past

decade.However,

a

pronounced

digital

divide

remains:

in

developed

economies,

about

61

per

centof

services

exports

are

delivered

digitally,

compared

with

just

16

per

cent

in

least

developedcountries

(LDCs).5

At

the

same

time,

new

barriers

are

emerging,

with

the

global

digital

servicestrade

restrictiveness

index

rising

from0.168in2014to0.182

in

2024.6

Figures

4

and

5

illustrateboth

the

rapid

expansion

of

digital

services

trade

and

the

limited

participation

of

LDCs.Digital

services

increasinglyfeatureprominently

in

bilateral

and

regionaltradeagreements,

such

as

for

example,

the

AfCFTA

Digital

Trade

Protocol

with

its

9

Annexes(adoptedin

2025,

going

for

ratification

by

African

countries

in

2026),

recent

bilateral

deals

between

theUnited

States

and

someAsian

countries,

and

ongoing

negotiations

toward

theASEAN

DigitalEconomy

Framework

Agreement

(DEFA).

Looking

ahead,

ministerial

decisions

on

electronic

commerce

and

digital

transactions

at

the

WTO

MC14

may

carry

significant

implications

forglobal

strategies

aimed

at

advancing

servicification

and

integrating

value

chains,

as

well

as

forthe

capacity

of

developing

countries

to

effectively

participate

in

these

activities.TREND

54

Intermediate

inputsdatafromOECDTIVAdatabase.

Accessed

November

2025.5

ExportdatafromUNCTADstat.

Accessed

November

2025.6

The

DigitalServicesTrade

Restrictiveness

Index

datafromthe

OECD

digital

STRI

database.

Accessed

November

2025.GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

JANUARY

2026©AdobeStock910Source:

UNTradeand

Development(UNCTAD)estimates

basedon

UNCTADstatstatistics.Note:Growth

rate

isthecompoundannualgrowth

rate.

Digitallydeliverable

products

include:

insurance

and

financialservices,telecommunications,computerand

informationservices,

intellectual

propertycharges,research-and-developmentservices,trade-related,technical,

managerial,consultancy,engineering,scientific

andarchitecturalservices,audiovisualservices,aswell

as

health

and

education

personal

services,

and

cultural

heritageand

recreationalservices.10Figure4Digitallydeliverableservicesareafast-growingsegmentofglobaltradeAverageannualgrowthofexports,

percentage,2015–2024

Digitally-deliverableservicesOthertypesof

servicesGoods107.1

6.03.62.95.23.3GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

6.73.7Leastdeveloped

countriesDeveloping

economiesDeveloped

economiesJANUARY

2026World4.44.28.43.851120102012201420162018202020222024Source:

UNTradeand

Development(UNCTAD)

basedon

UNCTADstat.Note:

Digitallydeliverable

products

include:

insuranceandfinancialservices,telecommunications,computerand

informationservices,

intellectual

propertycharges,

research-and-developmentservices,trade-related,technical,

managerial,consultancy,engineering,scientificandarchitectural

services,

audiovisual

services,

aswell

as

health

andeducation

personalservices,andcultural

heritageand

recreational

services.11Figure5Digitallydeliverableservicesaccountforonlyasmallshareofservices

exportsinleastdevelopedcountriesExportofdigitallydeliverableservicesas

a

share

oftotal

export

of

services,

percentage,2010–2024

WorldDevelopingeconomiesDevelopedeconomiesLeast

developed

countries

(LDCs)80%GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

706050403020100JANUARY

202612TREND

6South–Southtradesurge–developingcountriesdrive

global

exportgrowthSouth–South

trade

is

emerging

as

a

major

engine

of

global

trade.

Between

1995

and

2025,South–South

merchandise

exports

are

estimated

to

have

soared

from

about$0.5

trillionto

$6.8trillion,far

outpacing

both

South–North

trade

and

overall

world

trade

growth

(figure

6).Today,

57

per

cent

of

developing

country

exports

go

to

other

developing

markets,

up

from

38per

cent

in

1995.This

surge

has

been

fueled

largely

by

Asia’s

regional

value

chains

–

especially

in

East

and

Southeast

Asia

–

where

high-

and

medium-tech

manufacturing

accounts

for

roughly

half

of7

UNCTAD

calculations

based

on

UNCTADStat

data.12GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

South–South

trade.7JANUARY

2026©AdobeStock1995200020052010201520202025Source:

UNCTADcalculations

basedon

UNCTADstatand

UNCTADestimates.Note:

Merchandiseexports.

Do

not

includeservices.South–South

trade

across

regions

is

on

the

rise.

More

than

half

of

Africa’s

exports

now

goto

other

developing

countries

(figure

7),

reflecting

deeper

regional

integration

and

the

growingrole

of

large

emerging

economies

as

import

markets.

Geopolitical

fragmentation

could

furtheraccelerate

this

trend,

as

developing

countries

increasingly

rely

on

each

other

to

offset

weakerdemand

inadvancedeconomies.Figure6South-SouthtradeoutpaceddevelopingcountriesIexportstoNorthand

worldtradegrowthWorld,SouthtoSouth,andSouthto

North

merchandiseexportflows

(1995=100)

WorldSouthtoSouth

Southto

North1

4001

2001

000800600400200GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

JANUARY

2026130Figure

7Southernmarketsbecameaprominentexportdestinationfordeveloping

countriesShareofdevelopingcountries

in

merchandiseexports

by

region(per

cent)

1995202460%Source:

UNCTADcalculations

basedon

UNCTADstat.Note:China

isalsoexcludedas

reporting

country

(exporter)Developing

countries

can

harness

opportunities.Interregional

trade

outside

Asia,

particularly

between

Africa

and

Latin

America,

remains

significantly

underdeveloped

despitestrong

complementarities.

Strengthening

South–South

linkages

could

become

a

key

driver

ofresilience

within

global

trade

networks.88

See/news/unctad16-stronger-south-south-cooperation-trade-and-investment-key-shared-

prosperity14Shareofdevelopingcountries

(excludingChina)

in

merchandiseexports

by

region

(per

cent)60%55.638.324.539.531.523.340.226.3

24.453.227.4Africa

LatinAmericaAsiaand

OceaniaAfrica

LatinAmericaAsiaand

OceaniaGlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

58.742.543.5

34.0Developing

economiesDeveloping

economiesJANUARY

2026402037.34020Sustainabletrade–environment

willcontinueto

be

partof

global

trade

initiativesEnvironmental

agendas

are

moving

into

implementation.

In

2026,

internationalagreements

on

oceans,

biodiversity,fisheries

subsidies,

and

water

resources

are

taking

effect,

with

implicationsfor

embedding

environmental

governance

intotrade

and

economic

planning.As

of9November2025,enhanced

climate

pledges

by113countries

could

cut

global

emissions

by

12%

by

2035

in

comparison

to

2029

levels,

signaling

a

decisive

shift

toward

low-carbongrowth.The

2026

United

Nations

Climate

Change

Conference

(COP31)

will

take

place

from

9to

20

November

in

Antalya,Türkiye.Trade-related

discussions

are

expected

to

focus

onaccelerating

the

energy

transition,

including

financing

renewable

energy,

halting

deforestation,

and

advancing

ajust

and

equitable

shift

away

from

fossil

fuels.

As

carbon-related

regulationsand

industrial

policies

reshape

market

access

and

competitiveness,

the

green

economy

isredefining

trade

flows—driven

by

clean

energy

technologies,

carbon

pricing

mechanisms,

andgrowingdemandforenvironmentalgoodsand

servicesThegreen

economy

is

reshaping

trade.In2026,the

European

Union

Carbon

BorderAdjustment

Mechanism

will

become

fully

operational,

imposing

a

carbon

price

on

selectedimports

and,from2028,on

specific

steel

and

aluminium-intensive

downstream

goods.Applyingto

imports

without

equivalent

carbon

pricing,

including

those

from

LDCs,

may

affect

marketaccess,while

similar

measures

elsewhere

could

further

influence

trade

and

investment

flows.Carbon-related

regulations

and

industrial

policies

are

also

redirecting

trade.

Cleanenergy

technology

markets

could

reach

US$

640

billion

annually

by

2030.9

Trade

in

cleanand

climate-adaptation

technologies

will

drive

environmental

goods

growth

through2030.Environmental

sustainability

is

increasingly

centralto

competitiveness,requiring

inclusive

access

to

green

technologies

and

finance,lower

barriers

for

environmental

goods,and

targeted

technicalassistanceto

build

resilient

productivecapacity.TREND

79

/reports/the-state-of-clean-technology-manufacturing/analysis15GlobaltradeUpdate

Policy

insights

JANUARY

2026©AdobeStockCriticalminerals–Oversupply

and

geopolitics

maydestabilizetradeandglobalvalue

chainsCritical

mineral

markets

enter2026after

a

sharp

price

correction

from

their2021–2022highs.

By

late2025,

prices

of

key

minerals

essential

for

clean

energy

technologies

were

18–39per

cent

below

peak

levels,

despite

notable

short-term

volatility

(figure

11).While

cobalt

pricesrebounded

strongly

in

2025,

this

increase

was

largely

driven

by

temporary

supply

disruptionsand

export

restrictions

inthe

Democratic

Republic

of

Congo,

amplified

by

low

inventories

andprecautionary

restocking,

rather

than

by

sustained

recovery

in

underlying

demand.Overall,

the

price

decline

since

2022

reflects

rapid

supply

expansion,

slower-than-expectedbattery

demand,and

technological

shifts

that

reduce

mineral

intensity.10

These

trends

areexpected

to

continue

in2026.Lower

prices

have

eased

cost

pressures

for

electric

vehicles

and

renewable

energy

producers,but

also

risk

discouraging

new

mining

projects

in2026.

In

2024,

investment

spending

grew

byonly

5

per

cent

compared

to

14

per

cent

in

2023

and

30

per

cent

in

2022.11

Entering

2026,

critical-minerals

investment

remains

constrained,

with

policy-driven

funding

in

the

EuropeanUnion12

and

the

United

States13

partially

offsetting