第6章　感知、认知与情感

EssentialsofNegotiationPart02:CriticalNegotiationSub-processesChapter06:Perception,Cognition,andEmotion©McGraw-HillEducation.Allrightsreserved.Authorizedonlyforinstructoruseintheclassroom.NoreproductionorfurtherdistributionpermittedwithoutthepriorwrittenconsentofMcGraw-HillEducation.ChapterOverviewWebeginbyexamininghowpsychologicalperceptionisrelatedtothe

processofnegotiation,withattentiontoformsofperceptualdistortion.Wethenlookathow

negotiatorsuseinformationtomakedecisionsabouttacticsandstrategy—theprocessofcognition.First,wefocusonframing—thestrategicuseofinformationtodefineandarticulateanegotiatingissueorsituation.Second,we

discusscognitivebiases

ininformationprocessing.

Weexperienceandexpressemotionwhenweinteractwithothersandnegotiatingiscertainlynoexception.Inthefinalsection,wediscusstheroleofmoodsandemotionsinnegotiation—bothascausesofbehaviorandasconsequencesofnegotiatedoutcomes.2PerceptionDefinedPerceptionistheprocessbywhichindividualsconnecttotheirenvironment,byascribingmeaningtomessagesandevents.Perceptionisa“sense-making”processwherepeopleinterprettheirenvironmentsotheycanrespondappropriately.Environmentsaretypicallycomplex,soasperceiverswebecomeselective.3PerceptualDistortionStereotyping.Occurswhenapersonassignsattributestoanothersolelyonthebasisoftheother’ssocialordemographiccategory.Onceformed,stereotypescanbehighlyresistanttochange.Haloeffects.Occurwhenpeoplegeneralizeaboutavarietyofattributesbasedontheknowledgeofoneattributeofanindividual.Canbepositiveornegative.Selectiveperception.Occurswhenperceiverssingleoutsupportinginformationandfiltersoutinformationthatdoesnotconfirmtheirbeliefs.Perpetuatesstereotypesorhaloeffects.Projection.Occurswhenpeopleassigntoothersthecharacteristicsorfeelingsthattheypossessthemselves.Usuallyarisesoutofaneedtoprotectone’sownself-concept.4FramingAframeisasubjectivemechanismallowingpeopletoevaluatesituations,leadingthemtopursueoravoidsubsequentactions.Twoormorepeopleinvolvedinthesamesituationorinacomplexproblemoftenseeitordefineitindifferentways.Theseframescanchangedependingonperspective,ortheycanchangeovertime.Howpartiesframeanissueisareflectionof:Whattheyseeascriticaltotheobjectives.Theiroutcomeexpectationsandpreferences.Whatinformationtheyneedtoarguetheircase.Procedurestheyusetopresenttheircase.Themannerinwhichtheyevaluateoutcomes.Framesareinevitable,occurringwithoutanyrealintentionbythenegotiator.5TypesofFramesSubstantive.Whattheconflictisabout.Outcome.Aparty’spredispositiontoachievingaspecificresultoroutcomefromthenegotiation.Aspiration.Apredispositiontosatisfyingabroadersetofinterestsorneedsinnegotiation.Process.Howthepartieswillgoaboutresolvingtheirdispute.Identity.Howthepartiesdefine“whotheyare.”Characterization.Howthepartiesdefinetheotherparties.Lossorgain.Howthepartiesdefinetheriskorrewardassociatedwithparticularoutcomes.6HowFramesWorkinNegotiationNegotiatorscanusemorethanoneframe.Mismatchesinframesbetweenpartiesaresourcesofconflict.Partiesnegotiatedifferentlydependingontheframe.Specificframesmaybelikelytobeusedwithcertaintypesofissues.Particulartypesofframesmayleadtoparticulartypesofagreements.Partiesarelikelytoassumeaparticularframebecauseofvariousfactors.Differencesinvalues,personality,power,orbackgroundandsocialcontextmayleadpartiestoadoptdifferentframes.7AnotherApproachtoFrames:Interests,Rights,andPowerAninfluentialapproachtoframingdisputessuggeststhatpartiesinconflictuseoneofthreeframes:Interests.Peopleareoftenconcernedaboutwhattheyneed,desire,orwant.Rights.Peoplemayalsobeconcernedaboutwhois“right”—thatis,whohaslegitimacy,whoiscorrect,orwhatisfair.Power.Powerissometimesbasedonwhoisphysicallystronger,butmoreoften,itisaboutimposingothertypesofcosts–economicpressures,expertise,legitimateauthority,andsoon.Thewayapartyframestheproblemwilllikelyinfluencehowtheotherpartyresponds.8TheFrameofanIssueChangesastheNegotiationEvolvesDisputestendtotransformthrough“naming,blaming,andclaiming.”Namingoccurswhenpartiesinadisputelabeloridentifyaproblemandcharacterizewhatitisabout.Blamingoccursnext,asthepartiestrytodeterminewhoorwhatcausedtheproblem.Finally,claimingoccurswhentheindividualwhohastheproblemdecidestoconfront,filecharges,ortakesomeotheractionagainsttheindividualororganizationthatcausedtheproblem.Framesareshapedbythebargainingmix.Arguingstockissues.Arguingthebestpossiblecase.Theymaydefinemajorshiftsandtransitions.

Finally,multipleagendaitems

shapeframes.Criticaltoissuedevelopmentistheprocessofreframing—changestothethrust,tone,andfocusofaconversation.9CognitiveBiases–IrrationalEscalationofCommitmentAn“escalationofcommitment”ismakingdecisionsthatstickwithafailingcourseofaction.Evenwhenthatcommitmentconstitutesirrationalbehavior.Dueinparttobiasesinperceptionandjudgment.Negotiatorsseeksupportiveevidenceandignoredisconfirmingevidence.Initialcommitmentsbecomesetinstone.Adesireforconsistencypreventschangingthem—madeworsebyadesiretosaveface.Fightthebias.Useanadvisertoserveasarealitycheck.Theremaybelessdesiretoescalateifregretisfeltfollowingapreviousescalationsituation.10CognitiveBiases–MythicalFixed-PieBeliefsNegotiatorsmayassumeallnegotiationsinvolveafixedpie.Theymayapproachintegrativenegotiationopportunitiesaszero-sumsituationsorwin-loseexchanges.Negotiatorsfocusingonpersonalgainaremostlikelytocomeundertheinfluenceoffixed-piebeliefs.Whilethosefocusingonvaluesarelesslikelytoseeafixed-pie.Fightthebias.Chapter3providedsomeadvice,herearetwomore.Focusonunderlyinginterestsandyoumayseeyourfixed-pieperceptionismisguided.Andholdnegotiatorsaccountableforthewaytheynegotiate.11CognitiveBiases–IssueFramingandRisk“Prospecttheory”holdsthat:Peoplearemorerisk-aversewhenaproblemisframedasapossiblegain.Andrisk-seekingwhenframedasaloss.Whenrisk-averse,negotiatorsarelikelytoacceptanyoffersimplybecausetheyareafraidoflosing.Incontrast,whenrisk-seeking,negotiatorsmaywaitforabetterofferorfurtherconcessions.Thisprocessisimportantasthesameoffercanelicitmarkedlydifferentcoursesofactiondependingonhowitisframedingain-lossterms.Fightthebias.Awareness.Sufficientinformation.Thoroughanalysis.Realitychecks.Canbedifficulttofightasframesmaybetiedtodeepvaluesortoanchorsthatarehardtodetect.12CognitiveBiases–AnchoringandAdjustmentThesebiasesarerelatedtotheeffectofthestandard(oranchor)againstwhichsubsequentadjustmentsaremadeduringnegotiation.Anchorscanbeatrapasthechoiceofananchormaybebasedonfaultyorincompleteinformationandthereforemisleading.Oncetheanchorisdefined,partiestendtotreatitasabenchmarkbywhichtoadjustotherjudgments.Goals—whetherrealisticornot—canserveasanchorsandmaybepublicorprivate,aswellasconsciousorunconscious.Fightthebias.Thoroughpreparation.Theuseofadevil’sadvocateorrealitycheck.Bothcanhelppreventerrorsofanchoringandadjustment.13CognitiveBiases–AvailabilityofInformationNegotiatorsmustalsobeconcernedwiththepotentialbiascausedbytheavailabilityofinformationorhoweasyinformationistoretrieve.Thisalsoaffectsnegotiationthroughtheuseofestablishedsearchpatternsandovervaluationofinformationresultingfromthosesearches.Fightthebias.Checkeverythingforaccuracy.14CognitiveBiases–TheWinner’sCurseThisreferstothetendencytosettlequicklyonanitemandthensubsequentlyfeeldiscomfortaboutanegotiationwinthatcomestooeasily.Thenegotiatormaysuspecttheotherpartyhasanunseenadvantage;andthinktheycouldhavedonebetter,orthedealisbad.Fightthebias.Thebestremedyforthewinner’scurseistopreventitfromoccurringinthefirstplace.Prepareadequatelytopreventmakinganofferthatisunexpectedlyaccepted.15CognitiveBiases–OverconfidenceOverconfidencehasadouble-edgedeffect:Itcansolidifyanegotiator’ssupportofincorrectorinappropriateoptions,andItcanleadnegotiatorstodiscounttheworthorvalidityofthejudgmentsofothers.Fightthebias.Studyresultsaremixed.So,negotiatorsshouldnotalwayssuppressconfidenceoroptimism.16CognitiveBiases–TheLawofSmallNumbersInnegotiation,thisappliestothewaynegotiatorslearnandextrapolatefromtheirownexperience.Ifexperienceislimited,thetendencyistoprojectthatexperienceontofuturenegotiations.Thismayleadtoaself-fulfillingprophecy.Peoplewhoexpecttobetreatedinadistributivemannerwill:Bemorelikelytoperceivetheotherparty’sbehaviorsasdistributive,andTreattheotherpartyinamoredistributivemanner–whothenmayreciprocate.Fightthebias.Remember,ifyouhavelessexperience,youmayusethatexperienceerroneouslyinthefuture.Stylesandstrategiesthatworkedinthepastmaynotworkinthefuture.Especiallyifthenegotiationsdiffer,whichtheywill.17CognitiveBiases–Self-ServingBiasesPeopleoftenexplainanother’sbehaviorbymakingattributions.Eithertotheperson(internalfactors).Orthesituation(externalfactors).Inexplainingother’sbehavior,weoftenoverestimatetheroleofinternalfactorsandunderestimatetheroleofexternalfactors.Peopleattributetheirownbehaviortosituationalfactorsbutother'stopersonalones.Thisbiasmayalsoinvolvedistortionsintheevaluationofinformation.Thefalse-consensuseffect

meansoverestimatingsupportandconsensusforyourownposition,opinions,orbehaviors.Fightthebias.Negotiatorsmaymakefaultyjudgmentsregardingtacticsoroutcomeprobabilities.Justbeawareofthebias.Usearealitycheck.18CognitiveBiases–EndowmentEffectTheendowmenteffectisthetendencytoovervaluesomethingyouownorbelieveyoupossess.Innegotiation,thiscanleadtoinflatedestimationsofvaluethatinterferewithreachingagooddeal.Negotiatorsarefinewithusingthestatusquoasananchor,makingconcessionsdifficult.Fightthebias.Thisisverydifficulttofightordefendagainst.Useadevil’sadvocatetomakesureyouarenotinitiatingthiseffect.19CognitiveBiases–IgnoringOthers’CognitionsFailuretoconsidertheotherparty’scognitionsallowsnegotiatorstosimplifytheirthinkingaboutotherwisecomplexprocesses.Thismayleadtoadistributivestrategyandcauseafailuretorecognizethecontingentnatureofbothsides’behaviorsandresponses.Incontrast,whennegotiatorsareabletoconsiderthingsfromtheotherparty’sviewpoint(perspectivetaking),Theriskofimpasseisreducedandthechancesforintegrativeoutcomesvialogrollingisenhanced.Fightthebias.Trainingandawarenessmoderatelyreduceeffects.Thiscanonlybeavoidedifyouexplicitlyfocusonforminganaccurateunderstandingoftheother’sinterests,goals,andperspectives.20CognitiveBiases–ReactiveDevaluationThisistheprocessofdevaluingtheotherparty’sconcessionssimplybecausetheotherpartymadethem.Leadsnegotiatorsto:Minimizethemagnitudeofaconcessionmadebyadislikedother.Reducetheirwillingnesstorespondwithaconcessionofequalsize.Seekevenmorefromtheotherpartyonceaconcessionhasbeenmade.Fightthebias.You(oracolleague)shouldmaintainanobjectiveviewoftheprocess.Clarifyeachside’spreferencesonoptionsandconcessionsbeforeanyaremade.Useathirdpartytomediateorfilterconcession-makingprocesses.21ManagingMisperceptionsandCognitiveBiasesMisperceptionsandcognitivebiasestypicallyariseoutofconsciousawarenessasnegotiatorsgatherandprocessinformation.Thefirstlevelofmanagingsuchdistortionsistobeawarethattheycanoccur.Awarenessmaynotbeenough—simplyknowingaboutthemdoeslittletocounteracttheireffects.Beawareoftheexistenceofthesebiases.Understandtheirnegativeeffects.Bepreparedtodiscussthemwhenappropriatewithyourownteamandwithcounterparts.22Mood,Emotion,andNegotiationTheroleofmoodandemotioninnegotiationhasbeenanincreasingbodyoftheoryandresearchduringthelasttwodecades.Thedistinctionbetweenmoodandemotionisbasedonthreecharacteristics:specificity,intensity,andduration.Moodstatesaremorediffuse,lessintense,andmoreenduringthanemotionstates,whichtendtobemoreintenseandtargeted.Emotionsplayimportantrolesatvariousstagesofnegotiation.23ResearchFindingsintheStudyofMood,Emotion,andNegotiationNegotiationscreatebothpositiveandnegativeemotions.Positiveemotionsgenerallyhavepositiveconsequences.Aspectsoftheprocesscanleadtopositiveemotions.Negativeemotionsgenerallyhavenegativeconsequences.Theymayleadtodefiningthesituationascompetitive.Theymayunderminetheabilitytoanalyzethesituationaccurately.Negativeemotionsmayleadpartiestoescalatetheconflict.Negativeemotionsmayleadtoretaliationanddiscourageintegrativeoutcomes.Notallnegativeemotionshavethesameeffect.Negotiatorsmakesmallerdemandsofworriedordisappointedopponents.Butfewerconcessionstoguiltyorregretfulopponents.24TheEffectsofPositiveandNegativeEmotioninNegotiationPositivefeelingsmayhavenegativeconsequences.Negotiatorsin