第2章　分配式谈判的战略、战术及其国际商务情境应用

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Chapter2

StrategyandTacticsofDistributiveBargaining

Overview

Thebasicelementsofadistributivebargainingsituation,alsoreferredtoascompetitiveorwin-losebargaining,willbediscussed.Inadistributivebargainingsituation,thegoalsofonepartyareusuallyinfundamentalanddirectconflictwiththegoalsoftheotherparty.Resourcesarefixedandlimited,andbothpartieswanttomaximizetheirshareoftheresources.Oneimportantstrategyistoguardinformationcarefully–onepartytriestogiveinformationtotheotherpartyonlywhenitprovidesastrategicadvantage.Distributivebargainingisbasicallyacompetitionoverwhoisgoingtogetthemostofalimitedresource.

Therearethreereasonsthateverynegotiatorshouldunderstanddistributivebargaining.First,negotiatorsfacesomeinterdependentsituationsthataredistributive,andtodowellinthosesituationsnegotiatorsneedtounderstandhowtheywork.Second,becausemanypeopleusedistributivebargainingstrategiesandtacticsalmostexclusively,allnegotiatorswillfinditimportanttoknowhowtocountertheireffects.Third,everynegotiationsituationhasthepotentialtorequiredistributivebargainingskillswhenatthe“claiming-value”stage.

Thediscussionofstrategiesandtacticsinthischapterisintendedtohelpnegotiatorsunderstandthedynamicsofdistributivebargainingandtherebyobtainabetterdeal.Athoroughunderstandingoftheseconceptswillallownegotiatorsnotcomfortablewithdistributivebargainingtomanagedistributivesituationsproactively.

LearningObjectives

Understandthebasicelementsofdistributivebargainingincludingthestrategyandtacticsofdistributivebargaining.

Considerthestrategicimpactofpositionstakenduringanegotiationandtheroleofconcessions.

Appreciatetheroleofconcessionsindistributivebargaining.

Identifyhardballtacticsandlearnhowtocounterthem.

ChapterOutline

TheDistributiveBargainingSituation

Thetargetpointisanegotiator’soptimalgoal,orthepointatwhichshe/hewouldliketoconcludenegotiations.

Thetargetisalsosometimesreferredtoasanegotiator’saspiration.

Theresistancepointisanegotiator’sbottomline–thepricebeyondwhichapersonwillnotgo.

Itisalsosometimesreferredtoasareservationprice.

Theaskingpriceistheinitialpricesetbytheseller,orthefirstnumberquotedbytheseller.

Abuyermaycounteranaskingpricewithaninitialoffer–thefirstnumberabuyerwillquotetotheseller.

Therangeofpossiblepricescanbethoughtofasacontinuum–seeFigure2.1.

Bothpartiestoanegotiationshouldestablishtheirstarting,target,andresistancepointsbeforebeginninganegotiation.

Startingpointsareoftenintheopeningstatements.

Thetargetpointisusuallylearnedorinferredasnegotiationsgetunderway.

Negotiatorsgiveupthemarginbetweentheirstartingpointsandtargetpointsastheymakeconcessions.

Theresistancepointisnotknowntotheotherpartyandshouldbekeptsecret.

Negotiators’startingandresistancepointsareusuallyarrangedinreverseorder,withtheresistancepointbeingahighpriceforthebuyerandalowpricefortheseller.SeeFigure2.2.

Thespreadbetweentheresistancepoints,calledthebargainingrange,settlementrange,orzoneofpotentialagreementareveryimportant.

Itistheareawhereactualbargainingtakesplace.

Whenthebuyer’sresistancepointisabovetheseller’s–heisminimallywillingtopaymorethansheisminimallywillingtosellfor–thereisapositivebargainingrange.

Whenthereverseistrue–theseller’sresistancepointisabovethebuyer’sandthebuyerwon’tpaymorethanthesellerwillminimallyaccept–thereisanegativebargainingrange.

Targetpoints,resistancepoints,andinitialoffersallplayanimportantroleindistributivebargaining.

Targetpointsinfluencebothnegotiatoroutcomesandnegotiatorsatisfactionwiththeiroutcomes.

Openingoffersplayanimportantroleininfluencingnegotiationoutcomes.

Resistancepointsplayaveryimportantroleasawarningforthepossiblepresenceofhardballtactics.

Apositivebargainingrangeincreasesthelikelihoodofsettlements.

TheRoleofAlternativestoaNegotiatedAgreement

Negotiatorsalsoneedtoconsiderwhattheywilldoiftheydonotreachagreementwiththeotherparty.Whatistheirbestalternativetoanegotiatedagreement(BATNA)?Whatistheirworstalternativetoanegotiatedagreement(WATNA)?

SeeFigure2.3withalternativesaddedintothepricecontinuumforthecondopurchaseexample.

Alternativesareimportantbecausetheygivenegotiatorsthepowertowalkawayfromanynegotiationwhentheemergingdealisnotverygood.

Anegotiatorwithmanyattractivealternativescansettheirgoalshigherandmakefewerconcessions.

Negotiatorswithnoattractivealternativehavemuchlessbargainingpower.

Goodbargainersidentifytheiralternativesbeforestartingdiscussionandtrytoimprovetheiralternativeswhilenegotiationisunderway.

StrongBATNAscanalsoinfluencehowanegotiationunfolds.

NegotiatorswithstrongerBATNAsaremorelikelytomakethefirstofferandappeartonegotiatebetteroutcomes.

SettlementPoint

Thefundamentalprocessofdistributivebargainingistoreachasettlementwithinapositivebargainingrange.

Theobjectiveofbothpartiesistoobtainasmuchofthebargainingrangeaspossible.

Inotherwords,toreachanagreementasclosetotheotherparty’sresistancepointaspossible.

Bothpartiesindistributivebargainingknowthattheymighthavetosettleforlessthanwhattheywouldprefer(theirtargetpoint),buttheyhopethattheagreementwillbebetterthantheirownresistancepoint.

Foragreementtooccur,bothpartiesmustbelievethatthesettlementisthebestthattheycanget(withinapositivebargainingrange).

DiscoveringtheOtherParty’sResistancePoint

Informationisthelifeforceofnegotiation.

Themoreyoucanlearnabouttheotherparty’starget,resistancepoint,motives,feelingsofconfidence,andsoon,themoreableyouwillbetostrikeafavorablesettlement.SeeBox2.1

Atthesametime,youdonotwanttheotherpartytoknowyourresistancepoint,someofyourtargets,andconfidentialinformationaboutaweakstrategicpositionoranemotionalvulnerability.

Eachsidewantstoobtainandconcealinformation,asaresult,communicationcanbecomecomplex–evolvingintoacodedlanguage.

InfluencingtheOtherParty’sResistancePoint

Centraltoplanningthestrategyandtacticsfordistributivebargainingislocatingtheotherparty’sresistancepointandtherelationshipofthatresistancepointtoyourown.

Theresistancepointisestablishedby:

Thevaluetheotherattachestoaparticularoutcome;

Thecoststheotherattachestodelayordifficultyinnegotiations;

Thecosttheotherattachestohavingthenegotiationsaborted.

Wheninfluencingtheother’sviewpoint,youmustalsodealwiththeotherparty’sunderstandingofyourvalueforaparticularoutcome,thecostsyouattachtodelayordifficultyinnegotiation,andyourcostofhavingthenegotiationaborted.

Therearefourmajorwaystoweakentheotherparty’sresistancepoint.

Reducetheotherparty’sestimateofyourcostofdelayorimpasse.

Increasetheotherparty’sestimateofhisorherowncostofdelayorimpasse.

Reducetheotherparty’sperceptionofthevalueofanissue.

Increasetheotherparty’sperceptionthatyouvalueanissue.

TacticalTasks

Therearefourimportanttacticaltasksforanegotiatortoconsiderinadistributivebargainingsituation:

Assesstheotherparty’starget,resistancepoint,andcostofterminatingnegotiations.

Managetheotherparty’simpressionofthenegotiator’starget,resistancepoint,andcostofterminatingnegotiations.

Modifytheotherparty’sperceptionoftheirowntarget,resistancepoint,andcostofterminatingnegotiations.

Manipulatetheactualcostsofdelayingorterminatingnegotiations.

AssesstheOtherParty’sTarget,ResistancePoint,andCostsofTerminatingNegotiations

Thepurposeistoidentifywhattheotherpartyreallywantstoachieve,aswellashowmuchtheyarewillingtopay.

Thenegotiatorcanpursuetwogeneralroutestoachievethistask:

Obtaininformationindirectlyaboutthebackgroundfactorsbehindanissueor

Obtaininformationdirectlyfromtheotherpartyabouttheirtargetandresistancepoints.

SeeBox2.2foradviceongatheringinformationfornegotiation.

IndirectAssessment

Indirectassessmentmeansdeterminingwhatinformationanindividuallikelyusedtosettargetandresistancepointsandhowheorsheinterpretedthisinformation.

Forexample,inlabornegotiations,managementmayinferwhetherornotaunioniswillingtostrikebyhowhardtheunionbargainsorbythesizeofitsstrikefund.

Theuniondecideswhetherornotthecompanycanaffordastrikebasedonthesizeofinventories,marketconditionsforthecompany’sproduct,andthepercentageofworkerswhoaremembersoftheunion.

DirectAssessment

Inbargaining,theotherpartydoesnotusuallyrevealaccurateandpreciseinformationabouttheirtargets,resistancepoints,andexpectations.

Sometimes,whenpushedtothelimit,theotherpartywillprovideaccurateinformation.

Ifcompanyexecutivesbelieveawagesettlementaboveacertainpointwilldrivethecompanyoutofbusiness,theymaychoosetostatethatlimitveryclearly.

Mostofthetime,theotherpartyisnotsoforthcomingandmethodsofobtainingdirectinformationarecomplex.

Inlabornegotiations,companieshavebeenknowntorecruitinformersorbugunionmeetingrooms.

Unionshavehadtheirmemberscollectpapersfromexecutives’wastebaskets.

ManagetheOtherParty’sImpressionsofYourTarget,ResistancePoint,andCostofTerminatingNegotiations

Animportanttaskfornegotiatorsisto:

Controltheinformationsenttotheotherpartyaboutyourtargetandresistancepoints

Whileguidinghimorhertoformapreferredimpressionofthem.

Negotiatorsneedtoscreeninformationabouttheirownpositionsandtorepresentthemastheywouldliketheothertobelieve.

Screeningactivitiesaremoreimportantatthebeginningofnegotiation

Anddirectactionismoreusefullateron.

ScreeningActivities

Thesimplestwaytoscreenapositionistosayanddoaslittleaspossible.

Silenceisgoldenwhenansweringquestions

Instead,usewordstoasktheothernegotiatorquestions.

Concealmentisthemostgeneralscreeningactivity.

Whennegotiationsareconductedthrougharepresentative,calculatedincompetencemaybeausefulapproach.

Constituentsdonotgivethenegotiatingagentallthenecessaryinformation,makingitimpossibleforthenegotiatortoleakinformation.

Duringteamnegotiation,channelingallcommunicationthroughateamspokespersonreducesthechanceofinadvertentlyrevealinginformation.

Stillanotherscreeningactivityistopresentagreatmanyitemsfornegotiation,onlyafewofwhicharetrulyimportanttothenegotiator.

DirectActiontoAlterImpressions

Negotiatorscantakemanyactionstopresentfactsthatwilldirectlyenhancetheirpositionormakeitappearstrongertotheotherparty.

Oneofthemostobviousmethodsisselectivepresentation–negotiatorsrevealonlythefactsnecessarytosupporttheircase.

Anotherapproachistoexplainorinterpretknownfactstopresentalogicalargumentthatshowsthecostsorriskstooneselfiftheotherparty’sproposalsareimplemented.

Negotiatorsshouldjustifytheirpositionsanddesiredoutcomesinordertoinfluencetheotherparty’simpressions.

Aslongastheotherpartyunderstandshowyouseethings,thenhisorherthinkingislikelytobeinfluenced.

Displayingemotionalreactiontofacts,proposals,andpossibleoutcomesisanotherformofdirectactionnegotiatorscantaketoprovideinformationaboutwhatisimportanttothem.

Takingdirectactiontoalteranother’simpressionsraisesseveralpotentialhazards.

Itisonethingtoselectandpresentfactsemphasizingorde-emphasizingtheirimportanceaccurately,butanotherthingtofabricateandlie.

Theformerisexpectedandunderstoodindistributivebargaining,thelatter,isresentedandattackedifdiscovered.

Soethicalconsiderationsareaconcern.

Problemsarisewhentrivialitemsareintroducedasdistractionsorminorissuesaremagnifiedinimportance.

Theotherpersonmaybecomeawareofthismaneuverandconcedeontheminorpoints,gainingarighttodemandequallygenerousconcessionsonthecentralpoints.

ModifytheOtherParty’sPerceptionsofHisorHerTarget,ResistancePoint,andCostofTerminatingNegotiations

Anegotiatorcanaltertheotherparty’simpressionsofhisorherownobjectivesbymakingoutcomesappearlessattractiveorbymakingthecostofobtainingthemappearhigher.

Thenegotiatormayalsotrytomakedemandsandpositionsappearmoreattractiveorlessunattractivetotheotherparty.

Thereareseveralapproachestomodifyingtheotherparty’sperceptions.

Oneapproachistointerpretfortheotherpartywhattheoutcomesofhisorherproposalwillreallybe.

ManipulatetheActualCostsofDelayingorTerminatingNegotiations

Extendingnegotiationsbeyondadeadlinecanbecostly.

Alargemajorityofagreementsindistributivebargainingarereachedwhenthedeadlineisnear.

Timepressureinnegotiationappearstoreducenegotiatordemands.

Andwhenanegotiatorrepresentsaconstituency,timepressureappearstoreducethelikelihoodofreachinganagreement.

Manipulatingadeadlineorfailingtoagreebyaparticulardeadlinecanbeapowerfultoolinthehandsofthepersonwhodoesnotfacedeadlinepressure.

Theultimateweaponinnegotiationistothreatentoterminatenegotiations,denyingbothpartiesthepossibilityofasettlement.

Therearethreewaystomanipulatethecostsofdelayinnegotiation:

Plandisruptiveaction

Formanalliancewithoutsiders

Manipulatetheschedulingofnegotiations

DisruptiveAction

Onewaytoencouragesettlementistoincreasethecostsofnotreachinganegotiatedagreementthroughdisruptiveaction.

Publicpicketingofabusiness,boycottingaproductorcompany,andlockingnegotiatorsinaroomuntiltheyreachagreementareallformsofdisruptiveactionthatincreasethecoststonegotiatorsfornotsettlingandtherebybringthembacktothebargainingtable.

Suchtacticscanwork,buttheymayalsoproduceangerandescalatetheconflict.

AlliancewithOutsiders

Anotherwaytoincreasethecostsofdelayorterminationofnegotiationsistoinvolveotherpartieswhocansomehowinfluencetheoutcomeintheprocess.

Forexample,individualsdissatisfiedwithabusinessorgovernmentagencycanformtaskforces,politicalactiongroups,andprotestorganizationstobringgreatercollectivepressureonthetarget.

ScheduleManipulation

Negotiationschedulescanbeusedtoincreasetimepressureonnegotiators.

Businesspeoplegoingoverseastonegotiatemayfindthatnegotiationsbeginsoonaftertheirplanelands,

Orthehostmaysqueezenegotiationsinatthelastminutetoelicitconcessions.

Theopportunitiestoincreaseoralterthetimingofnegotiationvarywidely.

Thetacticisanoptionthatcanbothenhanceyourownpositionandprotectyoufromtheotherparty’sactions.

PositionsTakenDuringNegotiation

OpeningOffers

Whileknowledgeabouttheotherpartyhelpsnegotiatorssettheiropeningoffers,itdoesnottellthemexactlywhattodo.

Makingthefirstofferisadvantageousasitcananchoranegotiation.

Higherinitialoffershaveastrongeffectonnegotiationoutcomes.

Negotiatorscandampenthe“first-offereffect”byconcentratingontheirowntargetandfocusingontheothernegotiator’sresistancepoint.

Thefundamentalquestioniswhethertheopeningoffershouldbeexaggeratedormodest.

Exaggeratinganopeningofferisadvantageousbecause:

Itgivesthenegotiatorroomformovementtherebygivinghimorhertimetolearnabouttheotherparty’spriorities;

Maycreateanimpressionintheotherparty’smindthat:

Thereisalongwaytogobeforeareasonablesettlementwillbeachieved;

Agreaternumberofconcessionswillhavetobemadetofindacommonzoneofpotentialagreement(ZOPA);

Theothermayhaveincorrectlyestimatedhisorherownresistancepoint.

Twodisadvantagestoexaggeratinganofferinclude:

Potentialrejectionbytheotherparty,haltingnegotiationsprematurely;

Theperceptionofa“tough”attitudecanharmalong-termrelationship.

OpeningStance

Aseconddecisionnegotiatorsshouldmakeattheoutsetofdistributivebargainingconcernsthestance,orattitude,toadoptduringthenegotiation.

Competitiveormoderate?

Belligerencemaybemetwithbelligerencefromtheotherparty.

Negotiatorstendtomatchdistributivetacticsfromtheotherpartywiththeirowndistributivetactics,especiallyappropriatetactics.

Tocommunicateeffectively,anegotiatorshouldtrytosendaconsistentmessagethroughboththeopeningofferandopeningstance.

Whenthemessagesareinconflict,theotherpartywillfindthemconfusingtointerpretandanswer.

Timingalsoplaysapart,asshowninBox2.3.

InitialConcessions

Anopeningofferisusuallymetwithacounteroffer,andthesetwooffersdefinetheinitialbargainingrange.

Afterthefirstroundofoffers,whatmovementorconcessionsaretobemade?

Itisnotanoptiontoescalateone’sopeningoffer–thatis,tosetanofferfurtherawayfromtheotherparty’stargetpointthanone’sfirstoffer.

Ifconcessionsaretobemade,howlargeshouldtheybe?

Thefirstconcessionconveysamessage,frequentlyasymbolicone,totheotherpartyabouthowyouwillproceed.

Openingoffers,openingstances,andinitialconcessionsareelementsatthebeginningofanegotiationthatpartiescanusetocommunicatehowtheyintendtonegotiate.

Negotiatorswhotakeahardlineduringnegotiationsachievebettereconomicoutcomes,butatacostofbeingperceivednegativelybytheotherparty.

Thereareseveralgoodreasonsforadoptingaflexibleposition.

First,whentakingdifferentstancesthroughoutthenegotiation,youcanlearnabouttheotherparty’stargetsandperceivedpossibilitiesbyobservinghowtheyrespondtodifferentproposals.

Second,flexibilitykeepsthenegotiationsproceeding–themoreflexibleyouseem,themoretheotherpartywillbelieveasettlementispossible.

RoleofConcessions

Concessionsarecentraltonegotiation–withoutthem,negotiationwouldnotexist.

Peopleenternegotiationsexpectingconcessions.

Immediateconcessionsareperceivedlessvaluablethangradual,delayedconcessions.

SeeBox2.4forguidelinesonhowtomakeconcessions.

Researchsuggeststhatmorestraightforwardnegotiatorsandthosewithgreaterconcernfortheotherpartymakemoreconcessionsduringnegotiation.

Negotiatorsgenerallyresentatake-it-or-leave-itapproach.

Thereisampledatatoshowthatpartiesfeelbetteraboutasettlementwhenthenegotiationinvolvedaprogressionofconcessionsthanwhenitdidn’t.

Concessionsimplyrecognitionoftheother’spositionanditslegitimacy.

Intangiblefactorsofstatusandrecognitionmaybeasimportantasthetangibleissues.

Notreciprocatingaconcessionmaysendapowerfulmessageaboutfirmnessandleavestheconcessionmakeropentofeelingtheiresteemhasbeendamaged.

Areciprocalconcessioncannotbehaphazard.

Itmustbeonthesameitemoroneofsimilarweightandcomparablemagnitude.

Makingadditionalconcessionswhennonearereceivedimpliesweakness.

Negotiatorsmaynotacceptinadequatereciprocalconcessions.

Toencouragefurtherconcessions,negotiatorsmaylinktheirconcessionstoapriorconcessionmadebytheother.

Packagingconcessionscanleadtobetteroutcomesthanmakingconcessionssinglyonindividualissues.

PatternofConcessionMaking

Thepatternofconcessionsanegotiatormakescontainsvaluableinformation,butitisnotalwayseasytointerpret.

Whensuccessiveconcessionsgetsmaller,themessageisthattheconcessionmaker’spositionisgettingfirmerandtheresistancepointisbeingapproached.

Notethataconcessionlateinnegotiationsmayalsoindicatethatthereislittleroomlefttomove.

Thepatternofconcessionmakingisalsoimportant.

Figure2.4showsthepatternofconcessionsmadebytwonegotiators.

Mariomakesthreeconcessions,eachworth$4perunit,foratotalof$12.

Georgemakesfourconcessions,worth$4,$3,$2,and$1perunit,foratotalof$10.

BothsaytheyhaveconcededalltheycanbutGeorgeismorelikelytobebelievedashispatternofconcessionssignalthereisnothinglefttoconcede.

Marioislesslikelytobebelievedashisthreeequalconcessionssignalthereisplentymoretoconcede,eventhoughhehasalreadyconcededmorethanGeorge.

Itisimportanttosignaltotheotherpartywithbothactionsandwordsthattheconcessionsarealmostover.

FinalOffers

Eventually,anegotiatorwantstoconveythemessagethatthereisnofurtherroomformovement–thatthepresentofferisthefinalone.Butsometimesasimplestatementof“ThisallIcando”doesnotsufficeandanegotiatormayuseconcessionstoconveythepoint.

Asimpleabsenceoffurtherconcessionsconveysthemessage,buttheotherpartymayfeelthepatternofconcessionsisbeingviolated.

Onewaytoaccomplishthisistomakethelastconcessionmoresubstantial.

Largeenoughtobedramaticyetnotsolargeitcreatessuspicionthatthenegotiatorhasbeenholdingback.

Aconcessionmayalsobepersonalizedtotheotherpartysignalingthisisthelastconcessionthenegotiatorwillmake–“Iwenttomybossandgotaspecialdealjustforyou.”

ClosingtheDeal

Thenextchallengeforanegotiatoristoclosetheagreement.Negotiatorscancallonseveraltacticswhenclosingadeal.Choosingthebesttacticisamatterofartasmuchasscience.

ProvideAlternatives

Ratherthanmakingasinglefinaloffer,providetwoorthreealternativepackagesfortheotherpartythatareroughlyequalinvalue.

Thistechniquecanbeusedwhenataskforcehastwodistinct,defensiblepossiblesolutions–theycanprovideadescriptionofthecostsandbenefitsofeach.

AssumetheClose

Salespeopleuseanassume-the-closetechniquefrequently.

Afterageneraldiscussionabouttheneedsandpositionsofthebuyer,thenactasifthedecisiontopurchasesomethinghasalreadybeenmade.

SplittheDifference

Splittingthedifferenceisperhapsthemostpopularclosingtactic.

Thenegotiatorwillsummarizethenegotiationandsuggestthat,becausethingsaresoclose,“whydon’twejustsplitthedifference?”

Thistacticassumesthepartiesstartedwithfairopeningoffers.

Anegotiatorusinganexaggeratedopeningofferandthensuggestingasplit-the-differencecloseisusingahardballtactic.

ExplodingOffers

Anexplodingoffercontainsanextremelytightdeadlineinordertopressuretheotherpartytoagreequickly–anextremeversionofmanipulatingnegotiatingschedules.

Thepurposeofanexplodingofferistoconvincetheotherpartytoacceptthesettlementandtostopconsideringoutcomes.

Peoplemayfeeluncomfortableaboutreceivingexplodingoffersastheyfeelasifthey’reunderunfairpressure.

Explodingoffersappeartoworkbestfororganizationswithresourcestomakeattractiveoffersearlyinordertopreventtheotherpartyfromcontinuingtosearchforapotentiallybetteroffer.

Sweeteners

Anotherclosingtacticistosaveaspecialconcessionfortheclose.

“I’llgiveyouXifyouagreetothedeal.”

Tousethetacticeffectively,negotiatorsneedtoincludethesweetenerintheirnegotiationplansortheymayconcedetoomuchduringtheclose.

HardballTactics

Wenowturntoadiscussionofhardballtacticsinnegotiation.

Hardballtacticsworkbestagainstpoorlypreparednegotiators.

Theycanalsobackfire.

Manyfindthetacticsoffensiveandout-of-bounds.

Theyaredifficulttoenactandeachinvolvesriskforthepersonusingit.

Itisimportanttounderstandhardballtacticsandhowtheyworksoyoucanrecognizeifhardballtacticsareusedagainstyou.

DealingwithTypicalHardballTactics

Anegotiatordealingwithhardballtacticshasseveralchoicesabouthowtorespond.

Agoodstrategicresponserequiresthenegotiatoridentifythetacticquicklyandunderstandwhatitisandhowitworks.

Howbesttorespondtoatacticdependsonyourgoalsandthebroadercontextofthenegotiation.

Therearefourmainoptionsnegotiatorshaveforrespondingtotypicalhardballtactics.

DiscussThem

Labelthetacticandindicatethatyouknowwhattheotherpartyisdoingandoffertonegotiatethenegotiationprocessitselfbeforecontinuing.

Proposeashifttolessaggressivemethods.

Separatethepeoplefromtheproblem–thenbehardontheproblem,softonthepeople.

IgnoreThem

Ignoringahardballtacticcanbeverypowerful–thetacticstakealotofenergytoenactproperly.

Notrespondingtoathreatisoftenthebestwayofdealingwithone.

RespondinKind

Althoughthisresponsecanresultinchaos,producehardfeelings,andbecounterproductive,itisnotanoptionyoushoulddismiss.

Maybethemostusefulwhendealingwithanotherpartywhoistestingyourresolveorasaresponsetoexaggeratedpositions.

Co-opttheOtherParty

Ifanegotiatorisknowntouseaggressivehardballtactics,trytobefriendthembeforetheyusethetacticsonyou.

Itismoredifficulttoattackafriendthananenemy.

TypicalHardballTactics

Wenowdiscusssomeofthemorefrequentlydescribedhardballtacticsandtheirweaknesses–SeeTable2.1.

GoodCop/BadCop

Althoughthegoodcop/badcoptacticcanbetransparent,itoftenleadstoconcessionsandnegotiatedagreements.

Thetactichasmanyweaknesses.

Relativelytransparent,especiallywithrepeateduse.

Easilycounteredbytheotherpartywhomaycallyououtonthetactic.

Difficulttoenact–requiresalotofenergytowardmakingthetacticwork.

Itmayalienatetheotherparty.

Negotiatorsmaygetinvolvedinthegameandfailtoconcentrateontheirgoals.

Lowball/Highball

Negotiatorsstartwitharidiculouslylow(orhigh)openingoffertheyknowtheywillneverachieve.

Thetheoryisthattheextremeofferwillcausetheotherpartytoreevaluatetheirownopeningofferandmoveclosetoorbeyond