第6章　感知、认知与情感

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Chapter6

Perception,Cognition,andEmotion

Overview

Aworkingknowledgeofhowhumansperceivetheworldaroundthem,processinformation,andexperienceemotionsisimportanttounderstandingwhypeoplebehavethewaytheydoduringnegotiations.

Webeginthechapterbyexamininghowpsychologicalperceptionisrelatedtotheprocessofnegotiation,withparticularattentiontoformsofperceptualdistortionthatcancauseproblemsofunderstandingandmeaningmakingfornegotiators.Wethenlookathownegotiatorsuseinformationtomakedecisionsabouttacticsandstrategy—theprocessofcognition.Ourdiscussionherepursuestwoangles.First,wefocusonframing—thestrategicuseofinformationtodefineandarticulateanegotiatingissueorsituation.Second,wediscussthevariouskindsofsystematicerrors,orcognitivebiases,ininformationprocessingthatnegotiatorsarepronetomakeandthatmaycompromisenegotiatorperformance.Thissectionwillalsoconsiderhownegotiatorscanmanagemisperceptionsandcognitivebiasesinordertomaximizestrategicadvantageandminimizetheiradverseeffects.

Socialencountersare,however,morethanjustoccasionsforperceptionandcognition.Weexperienceandexpressemotionwhenweinteractwithothersandnegotiatingiscertainlynoexception.Inthefinalmajorsectionofthischapter,wediscusstheroleofmoodsandemotionsinnegotiation—bothascausesofbehaviorandasconsequencesofnegotiatedoutcomes.

LearningObjectives

Examinetheimportantroleplayedbyperceptions,cognitions,andemotionsinnegotiation.

Explorehowperceptionscanbecomedistortedandleadtobiasesinnegotiationandjudgment.

Considerthewaysthatcognitioninnegotiationcanbeaffectedbybiasesandframingprocesses.

Understandtherolethatemotionsandmoodplayinshapingnegotiationprocessesandoutcomes.

Gainadviceonhowtomanageperception,cognition,andemotionsinnegotiationsituations.

Perception

PerceptionDefined

Perceptionistheprocessbywhichindividualsconnecttotheirenvironment,byascribingmeaningtomessagesandevents.

Thisprocessisstronglyinfluencedbytheperceiver’scurrentstateofmind,roleandcomprehensionofearliercommunications.

Perceptionisa“sense-making”processwherepeopleinterprettheirenvironmentsotheycanrespondappropriately.SeeFigure6.1:ThePerceptualProcess,reproducedbelow.

Stimulus Attention Recognition Translation Behavior

Perception

Environmentsaretypicallycomplex,soasperceiverswebecomeselective.

Thisselectiveperceptionoccursthroughanumberofperceptual“shortcuts,”unfortunately,theyoftenresultattheexpenseofaccuracy.

PerceptualDistortion

Aperceiver’sownneeds,desires,motivationandpersonalexperiencesmaycreateapredispositionabouttheotherparty.

Thiscanleadtobiasesanderrorsinperceptionandsubsequentcommunication.

Here,wediscussfourmajorperceptualerrors:stereotyping,haloeffects,selectiveperception,andprojection.

Stereotypingandhaloeffectsareexamplesofperceptualdistortionbygeneralization:smallamountsofinformationareusedtodrawlargeconclusionsaboutindividuals.

Selectiveperceptionandprojectionareformsofdistortioninvolvinganticipatingcertainattributesandqualitiesinanotherperson—theperceiverfiltersanddistortsinformationtoarriveatapredictableandconsistentviewofanotherperson.

Stereotyping

Stereotypingiscommonandoccurswhenoneindividualassignsattributestoanothersolelyonthebasisoftheother’smembershipinaparticularsocialordemographiccategory.

Anindividualisassignedtoagroupbasedononepieceofperceptualinformation(theindividualisyoungorold)

Thentheyassignabroadrangeofothercharacteristicsofthegrouptothisperson(“oldpeopleareconservative;thispersonisoldandthereforeconservative”)or(youngpeoplearedisrespectful;thispersonisyoungandthereforedisrespectful”)

Onceformed,stereotypescanbehighlyresistanttochange—encouragesgroupmemberstouse“we”and“they”whilemakingcomparisonsbetweenthem.

Commonlyusedduringconflictsinvolvingvalues,ideologies,anddirectcompetitionforresources.

Haloeffects

Haloeffectsoccurwhenpeoplegeneralizeaboutavarietyofattributesbasedontheknowledgeofoneattributeofanindividual—asmilingpersonisjudgedmorehonestthanafrowningorscowlingperson,thoughthereisnoconsistentrelationshipbetweensmilingandhonesty.

Haloeffectscanbepositiveornegative.

Researchshowshaloeffectsaremostlikelytooccurinperception

Wherethereisverylittleexperiencewithapersonalongsomedimension

Whentheotherpersoniswellknown,and

Whenthequalitieshavestrongmoralimplications

Haloeffectsandstereotypesarecommonhazardsinnegotiation.

Selectiveperception

Selectiveperceptionoccurswhentheperceiversinglesoutcertaininformationthatsupportsorreinforcesapriorbeliefandfiltersoutinformationthatdoesnotconfirmthatbelief.

Selectiveperceptionperpetuatesstereotypesorhaloeffects.

Afterquickjudgment,apersonmayfilteroutevidencedisconfirmingthatjudgment.

Thenegotiator’sownbiasesmayaffecthowtheotherparty’sbehaviorisperceivedandinterpreted.

Projection

Projectionoccurswhenpeopleassigntoothersthecharacteristicsorfeelingsthattheypossessthemselves.

Projectionusuallyarisesoutofaneedtoprotectone’sownself-concept—toseeoneselfasconsistentandgood.

Negotiatorsmayassumetheotherpartywillrespondinthesamemannertheywouldifpositionswerereversed.

Projectionmayleadanegotiatortooverestimatehowmuchtheotherpartyknowsabouttheirpreferencesordesires.

Framing

Akeyissueinperceptionandnegotiationisframing.

Aframeisthesubjectivemechanismthroughwhichpeopleevaluateandmakesenseoutofsituations,leadingthemtopursueoravoidsubsequentactions.

Framesdefineaperson,anevent,oraprocessandseparateitfromthecomplexworldaroundit.

Theimportanceofframingstemsfromthefactthattwoormorepeoplewhoareinvolvedinthesamesituationorinacomplexproblemoftenseeitordefineitindifferentways.

Becausepeoplehavedifferentbackgrounds,experiences,expectations,andneeds,theyframepeople,events,andprocessesdifferently.

Theseframescanchangedependingonperspective,ortheycanchangeovertime.

Aquarterbackisa“hero”whenthrowingatouchdownbuta“loser”withaninterception.

Framesareimportantinnegotiationasdisputesareoftenopentodifferentinterpretations.

Framesemergeandconvergeasthepartiestalkabouttheirpreferencesandpriorities;theyallowthepartiestobegintodevelopacommondefinitionoftheissuesandaprocessforresolvingthem.

Howpartiesframeanddefineanegotiatingissueorproblemisareflectionof

Whattheydefineascriticaltothenegotiatingobjectives

Whattheirexpectationsandpreferencesareforcertainpossibleoutcomes

Whatinformationtheyseekandusetoarguetheircase

Theprocedurestheyusetotrytopresenttheircase,and

Themannerinwhichtheyevaluatetheoutcomesactuallyachieved

Framesareinevitable—wecannotavoidframing,anditoccurswithoutanyrealintentionbythenegotiator.

Framescanbeshapedbythetypeofinformationchosenorthesettingandcontextinwhichtheinformationispresented.

TypesofFrames

Substantive—whattheconflictisabout

Partiestakingasubstantiveframehaveaparticulardispositionaboutthekeyissueorconcernintheconflict.

Outcome—aparty’spredispositiontoachievingaspecificresultoroutcomefromthenegotiation.

Thedominantframemaybetofocusallstrategy,tactics,andcommunicationtowardgettingthatoutcome.

Partieswithastrongoutcomeframethatemphasizesself-interestanddownplaysconcernfortheotherpartyaremorelikelytoengageprimarilyindistributivenegotiations.

Aspiration—apredispositiontowardsatisfyingabroadersetofinterestsorneedsinnegotiation.

Ratherthanfocusingonaspecificoutcome,thenegotiatortriestoensuretheirownbasicinterests,needs,andconcernsaremet.

Partieswithastrongaspirationframearemorelikelytoengageinintegrativenegotiation.

Process—howthepartieswillgoaboutresolvingtheirdispute.

Negotiatorswithastrongprocessframearelessconcernedwithspecificissuesandmoreconcernedabouthowthedeliberationswillproceed,orhowthedisputeshouldbemanaged.

Whenthemajorconcernsarelargelyproceduralratherthansubstantive,processframeswillbestrong.

Identity—howthepartiesdefine“whotheyare.”

Maybegender,religion,ethnicorigin,placeofbirth,currentresidence,etc.

Characterization—howthepartiesdefinetheotherparties.

Canbeshapedbyexperiencewiththeotherparty,byinformationabouttheotherparty’shistoryorreputation,orbythewaytheotherpartycomesacrossearlyinthenegotiation.

Inconflict,identityframes(ofself)tendtobepositive;characterizationframes(ofothers)tendtobenegative.

Lossorgain—howthepartiesdefinetheriskorrewardassociatedwithparticularoutcomes.

Abuyerinasalesnegotiationcanviewthetransactioninlossterms(themonetarycostofthepurchase)oringainterms(thevalueoftheitem).

HowFramesWorkinNegotiation

Itisdifficulttoknowwhatframeapartyisusingunlessthepartytellsyouorunlessyoumakeinferencesfromtheparty’sbehavior.

Framesofthosewhohearorinterpretcommunicationmaycreatebiasesoftheirown.

Herearesomeinsightsdrawnfromstudiesofframingeffects:

Negotiatorscanusemorethanoneframe.

Alanddeveloperdiscussingaproposedgolfcoursethatwillfillinawetlandcanspeakabout:

Thegolfcourse—thesubstantiveissue

Theirpreferencesforhowthelandshouldbefilledin—anoutcomeframe

Howmuchinputneighborsandenvironmentalgroupsshouldhaveindeterminingwhathappenstothatwetland—aproceduralframe

Andwhetherheviewsthesegroupsfavorablyorunfavorably—acharacterizationframe

Mismatchesinframesbetweenpartiesaresourcesofconflict.

Mismatchescauseambiguity,whichmaycreatemisunderstanding,leadtoconflictescalationandevenstalemate

Oroneorbothpartiesmayreframetheconflictintoframesmorecompatible

Forhighlypolarizeddisputes,mutualreframingmayrequireathirdparty

Partiesnegotiatedifferentlydependingontheframe.

Forexample,whenpartiesframeanegotiationinemotionalterms,theytendtobemorehighlyinvolvedandbehavecompetitively,leadingtoimpasse

Specificframesmaybelikelytobeusedwithcertaintypesofissues.

Partiesdiscussingsalarymaybelikelytouseoutcomeframes,whilepartiesdiscussingrelationshipissuesmayusecharacterizationframes.

Particulartypesofframesmayleadtoparticulartypesofagreements.

Forexample,partiesstrivingforintegrativeagreementswillbenefitfromusingaspirationframesanddiscussingalargenumberofissues

Incontrast,partieswhouseoutcomeornegativecharacterizationframesmaybelikelytoholdnegativeviewsoftheotherpartyandastrongpreferenceforspecificoutcomes,whichmayleadtointensifiedconflictanddistributiveoutcomes—ornotagreementatall.

Partiesarelikelytoassumeaparticularframebecauseofvariousfactors.

Differencesinvalues,personality,power,orbackgroundandsocialcontextmayleadpartiestoadoptdifferentframes.

Asanexample,seeBox6.1onChinesenegotiationframes

AnotherApproachtoFrames:Interests,Rights,andPower

Aninfluentialapproachtoframingdisputessuggeststhatpartiesinconflictuseoneofthreeframes:

Interests

Peopleareoftenconcernedaboutwhattheyneed,desire,orwant.

Peopletalkabouttheir“positions,”butoftenwhatisatstakeistheirunderlyinginterests.

Rights

Peoplemayalsobeconcernedaboutwhois“right”—thatis,whohaslegitimacy,whoiscorrect,orwhatisfair.

Disputesoverrightsaresometimesreferredtoformalorinformalarbitratorstodecidewhosestandardsorrightsaremoreappropriate.

Power

Negotiationsresolvedbypoweraresometimesbasedonwhoisphysicallystrongerorisabletocoercetheother,butmoreoften,itisaboutimposingothertypesofcosts–economicpressures,expertise,legitimateauthority,andsoon.

Differentframesarelikelytoleadtoverydifferentdiscussionsbetweenparties.

Thewayapartyapproachestheproblemwilllikelyinfluencehowtheotherpartyresponds.

Theexampleinthetextisofastudentfeelingtheywereoverchargedforcarrepairsandtheirresponsewithineachofthethreeframes.

TheFrameofanIssueChangesastheNegotiationEvolves

Aclassicstudyoflegaldisputessuggestedthatdisputestendtotransformthroughaprocessof“naming,blaming,andclaiming.”

Namingoccurswhenpartiesinadisputelabeloridentifyaproblemandcharacterizewhatitisabout.

Blamingoccursnext,asthepartiestrytodeterminewhoorwhatcausedtheproblem.

Finally,claimingoccurswhentheindividualwhohastheproblemdecidestoconfront,filecharges,ortakesomeotheractionagainsttheindividualororganizationthatcausedtheproblem.

Framesareshapedbyconversationsabouttheissuesinthebargainingmix.

Severalfactorscanaffecthowconversationsandframesareshaped:

Negotiatorstendtoargueforstockissues,orconcernsthatareraisedeverytimethepartiesnegotiate.

Wageissuesorworkingconditionsmayalwaysbediscussedinalabornegotiation—theunionalwaysraisesthem,andmanagementisready.

Eachpartyattemptstomakethebestpossiblecaseforhisorherpreferredpositionorperspective.

Itisnotuncommonforbothsidesto“talkpasteachother”atthestartofnegotiations—eachtryingtocontroltheconversationwithacertainframe.

Eventually,argumentsandframesbegintoshift.

Inamore“macro”sense,framesmayalsodefinemajorshiftsandtransitionsintheoverallnegotiation.

Diplomaticnegotiationsuseatwo-stageprocesscalled“formula/detail”whichhasthreestages:

Diagnosis—thepartiesrecognizetheneedforchange,reviewhistory,andpreparepositions.

Formula—thepartiesattempttodevelopasharedperceptionoftheconflict,includingcommonterms,referents,andfairnesscriteria.

Detail—thepartiesworkoutoperationaldetailsconsistentwiththebasicformula.

Finally,multipleagendaitemsoperatetoshapeissuedevelopment.

Whensecondaryconcernsarebroughtintothenegotiationtheycantransformtheconversationabouttheprimaryissues.

Criticaltoissuedevelopmentistheprocessofreframing—changestothethrust,tone,andfocusofaconversationasthepartiesengageinit.

Reframingisadynamicprocessandmayoccurmanytimesinaconversation.

Reframingcanoccurasonepartyusesmetaphors,analogies,orspecificcasestoillustrateapoint,leadingtheothertoredefinethesituation.

Reframingmaybedoneintentionallyoritmayemergefromtheconversation—eitherwayanewwaytoapproachtheproblemisoftenproposed.

SectionSummary

Framingisaboutfocusing,shaping,andorganizingtheworldaroundus.Remember:

Framesshapewhatthepartiesdefineasthekeyissuesandhowtheytalkaboutthem.

Bothpartieshaveframes.

Framesarecontrollable,atleasttosomedegree.

Conversationstransformframesinwaysnegotiatorsmaynotbeabletopredictbutmaybeabletomanage.

Certainframesaremorelikelythanotherstoleadtocertaintypesofprocessesandoutcomes.

CognitiveBiasesinNegotiation

Sofar,wehaveexaminedhowinformationisperceived,filtered,distorted,andframed.Nowweexaminehownegotiatorsuseinformationtomakedecisionsduringnegotiation.

Negotiatorsmakesystematicerrorswhenprocessinginformation—labeledcognitivebiases,andthefollowingsectiondiscussesadozensuchbiases.

Table6.1summarizesthebiasesanddefinitions.

IrrationalEscalationofCommitment

An“escalationofcommitment”isthetendencyforanindividualtomakedecisionsthatstickwithafailingcourseofaction.

Negotiatorssometimesremaincommittedtoacourseofactionevenwhenthatcommitmentconstitutesirrationalbehaviorontheirpart.

Escalationofcommitmentisdueinparttobiasesinindividualperceptionandjudgment—negotiatorsseeksupportiveevidenceandignoredisconfirmingevidence.

Initialcommitmentsbecomesetinstoneandadesireforconsistencypreventschangingthem—madeworsebyadesiretosaveface.

Onewaytocombatthisistohaveanadviserserveasarealitycheckpointtowarnnegotiatorswhobegintobehaveirrationally.

Theremaybelessdesiretoescalateifregretisfeltfollowingapreviousescalationsituation.

MythicalFixed-PieBeliefs

Manynegotiatorsassumethatallnegotiationsinvolveafixedpieandapproachintegrativenegotiationopportunitiesaszero-sumsituationsorwin-loseexchanges.

Negotiatorsfocusingonpersonalgainaremostlikelytocomeundertheinfluenceoffixed-piebeliefswhilethosefocusingonvaluesarelesslikelytoseeafixed-pie.

Chapter3providedadviceonminimizingthisfixed-piebeliefthroughproceduresforinventingoptions—wementiontwoadditionalapproachesnow.

First,byfocusingonunderlyinginterestsratherthanmerelyontheissuesbeingnegotiated,negotiatorsaremorelikelytoseetheirfixed-pieperceptionismisguided.

Second,fixed-pieperceptionscanbediminishedbyholdingnegotiatorsaccountableforthewaytheynegotiate.

AnchoringandAdjustment

Cognitivebiasesinanchoringandadjustmentarerelatedtotheeffectofthestandard(oranchor)againstwhichsubsequentadjustmentsaremadeduringnegotiation.

Anchorscanbeatrapforthenegotiatorasthechoiceofananchormaybebasedonfaultyorincompleteinformationandthereforemisleadinginandofitself.

Oncetheanchorisdefined,partiestendtotreatitasareal,validbenchmarkbywhichtoadjustotherjudgments,suchasthesizeofoneside’sopeningoffer.

Goals—whetherrealisticornot—canserveasanchorsandmaybepublicorprivate,aswellasconsciousorunconscious.

Thoroughpreparation,alongwiththeuseofadevil’sadvocateorrealitycheck,canhelppreventerrorsofanchoringandadjustment.

IssueFramingandRisk

Asdiscussedearlier,aframeisaperspectiveorpointofviewthatpeopleusewhentheygatherinformationandsolveproblems.

Forinstance,peoplerespondquitedifferentlywhentheyarenegotiatingto“gain”somethingthanwhennegotiatingto“notlose”something.

“Prospecttheory”holdsthatpeoplearemorerisk-aversewhenaproblemisframedasapossiblegain,andrisk-seekingwhenframedasaloss.

Whennegotiatorsarerisk-averse,theyaremorelikelytoacceptanyviableoffersimplybecausetheyareafraidoflosing.

Incontrast,whennegotiatorsarerisk-seeking,theyareapttowaitforabetterofferorforfurtherconcessions.

Thispositive/negativeframingprocessisimportantasthesameoffercanelicitmarkedlydifferentcoursesofactiondependingonhowitisframedingain-lossterms.

Remedies—awarenessofthebias,sufficientinformation,thoroughanalysis,andrealitychecks—butcanbedifficulttoachieveasframesareoftentiedtodeeplyheldvaluesandbeliefsortootheranchorsthatarehardtodetect.

AvailabilityofInformation

Negotiatorsmustalsobeconcernedwiththepotentialbiascausedbytheavailabilityofinformationorhoweasyinformationistoretrieve—checkforaccuracy.

Theavailabilityofinformationalsoaffectsnegotiationthroughtheuseofestablishedsearchpatternsandovervaluationofinformationresultingfromthosesearches.

TheWinner’sCurse

Thewinner’scursereferstothetendencyofnegotiators,particularlyinanauctionsetting,tosettlequicklyonanitemandthensubsequentlyfeeldiscomfortaboutanegotiationwinthatcomestooeasily.

Thenegotiatormaysuspecttheotherpartyknowstoomuchorhasinsightintoanunseenadvantage;andthinktheycouldhavedonebetter,orthedealisbad.

Thebestremedyforthewinner’scurseistopreventitfromoccurringinthefirstplacebypreparingadequatelytopreventmakinganofferthatisunexpectedlyaccepted.

Overconfidence

Overconfidenceisthetendencyofnegotiatorstobelievethattheirabilitytobecorrectoraccurateisgreaterthanisactuallytrue—andhasadouble-edgedeffect:

Itcansolidifythedegreetowhichnegotiatorssupportpositionsoroptionsthatareincorrectorinappropriate,and

Itcanleadnegotiatorstodiscounttheworthorvalidityofthejudgmentsofothers,ineffectshuttingdownotherpartiesassourcesofinformation,interests,andoptionsnecessaryforasuccessfulintegrativenegotiation.

Studyresultsaremixed,sonegotiatorsshouldnotalwayssuppressconfidenceoroptimism.

TheLawofSmallNumbers

Indecisiontheory,thelawofsmallnumbersreferstothetendencytodrawconclusionsfromsmallsamplesizes.

Innegotiation,thelawofsmallnumbersappliestothewaynegotiatorslearnandextrapolatefromtheirownexperience.

Ifexperienceislimitedintimeorscope,thetendencyistoextrapolatepriorexperienceontofuturenegotiations—suchas,allnegotiationsaredistributive.

Thistendencymayleadtoaself-fulfillingprophecy–peoplewhoexpecttobetreatedinadistributivemannerwill:

Bemorelikelytoperceivetheotherparty’sbehaviorsasdistributive,and

Treattheotherpartyinamoredistributivemanner.

Likelybereciprocatedwiththesamedistributivetreatmentbytheotherparty.

Toprevent,justrememberthelessexperience,thegreaterthepossibilitythatpastlessonswillbeerroneouslyusedinthefuture.

Stylesandstrategiesthatworkedinthepastmaynotworkinthefuture,especiallyifthenegotiationsdiffer,whichtheywill.

Self-ServingBiases

Peopleoftenexplainanotherperson’sbehaviorbymakingattributions,eithertotheperson(internalfactors:ability,mood,effort)orthesituation(externalfactors:task,otherpeople,fate).

Inexplainingother’sbehavior,thetendencyistooverestimatetheroleofpersonalorinternalfactorsandunderestimatetheroleofsituationalorexternalfactors.

Perceptualbiasesareoftenexacerbatedbytheactor-observereffectinwhichpeopletendtoattributetheirownbehaviortosituationalfactorsbutattributeother'sbehaviorstopersonalfactors.

Perceptualerrorofaself-servingnaturemayalsoinvolvedistortionsintheevaluationofinformation.

Forinstance,thefalse-consensuseffectisatendencytooverestimatethedegreeofsupportandconsensusthatexistsforone’sownposition,opinions,orbehaviors.

Wealsotendtoassumeourpersonalbeliefsoropinionsarebasedoncredibleinformation,whileopposingbeliefsarebasedonmisinformation.

Negotiatorssubjecttothisbiasmaymakefaultyjudgmentsregardingtacticsoroutcomeprobabilities.

EndowmentEffect

Theendowmenteffectisthetendencytoovervaluesomethingyouownorbelieveyoupossess.

Innegotiation,theendowmenteffectcanleadtoinflatedestimationsofvaluethatinterferewithreachingagooddeal.

Negotiatorsarefinewithusingthestatusquoasananchor,makingconcessionsdifficult.

IgnoringOthers’Cognitions

Failuretoconsidertheotherparty’scognitionsallowsnegotiatorstosimplifytheirthinkingaboutotherwisecomplexprocesses;

Thisusuallyleadstoamoredistributivestrategyandcausesafailuretorecognizethecontingentnatureofbothsides’behaviorsandresponses.

Incontrast,whennegotiatorsareabletoconsiderthingsfromtheotherparty’sviewpoint(acognitivecapacityknownas“perspectivetaking”),

Theriskofimpasseisreducedandthechancesforintegrativeoutcomesvialogrollingisenhanced.

Researchsuggeststhisisaresultofmakingacomplextaskofdecisionmakingunderconditionsofriskanduncertaintymoremanageable.

Trainingandawarenessreducetheeffectsmodestly.

Thisdeep-seateddrivetoignoretheothers’cognitionscanbeavoidedonlyifnegotiatorsexplicitlyfocusonputtingintheeffortneededtoformanaccurateunderstandingoftheotherparty’sinterests,goals,andperspectives.

ReactiveDevaluation

Reactivedevaluationistheprocessofdevaluingtheotherparty’sconcessionssimplybecausetheotherpartymadethem—leadsnegotiatorsto:

Minimizethemagnitudeofaconcessionmadebyadislikedother;

Toreducetheirwillingnesstorespondwithaconcessionofequalsize;or

Toseekevenmorefromtheotherpartyonceaconcessionhasbeenmade.

Reactivedevaluationmaybeminimizedby

Maintaininganobjectiveviewoftheprocess,

Assigningacolleaguetodothistask,

Clarifyingeachside’spreferencesonoptionsandconcessionsbeforeanyaremade,

Usingathirdpartytomediateorfilterconcession-makingprocesses.

IV. ManagingMisperceptionsandCognitiveBiasesinNegotiation

Misperceptionsandcognitivebiasestypicallyariseoutofconsciousawarenessasnegotiatorsgatherandprocessinformation.

Thefirstlevelofmanagingsuchdistortionsistobeawarethattheycanoccur.

Awarenessmaynotbeenough—simplyknowingaboutthemdoeslittletocounteracttheireffects.

Moreresearchisneededtoprovideeffectiveadvice,butuntilthen:

Beawareoftheexistenceofthesebiases,

Understandtheirnegativeeffects,and

Bepreparedtodiscussthemwhenappropriatewithyourownteamandwithcounterparts.

Mood,Emotion,andNegotiation

Historically,researchportraysnegotiatorsasrationalbeingswhoseemcalculating,calm,andincontrol,butthisoverlookstherolesplayedbyemotionsinthenegotiatingprocess.

Theroleofmoodandemotioninnegotiationhasbeenanincreasingbodyoftheoryandresearchduringthelasttwodecades.

Thedistinctionbetweenmoodandemotionisbasedonthreecharacteristics:

specificity,intensity,andduration

Moodstatesaremorediffuse,lessintense,andmoreenduringthanemotionstates,whichtendtobemoreintenseanddirectedatmorespecifictargets.

Emotionsplayimportantrolesatvariousstagesofnegotiation.

Thefollowingareselectedresearchfindingsinthestudyofmood,emotion,andnegotiation.

NegotiationsCreateBothPositiveandNegativeEmotions

Acognitiveassessmentofa“goodoutcome”leadspartiestofeelhappyandsatisfied.

Somenegativeemotionstendtobebasedindejectionwhileothersarebasedinagitation.

Dejection-relatedemotionsresultf