2026国防科技前沿：欧洲领先之道研究报告 The Defense Technology Frontier How Europe Could Lead

TheDefense

TechnologyFrontier

HowEuropeCouldLead

February2026

ByNikolausLang,PhilippeLavigne,GregMallory,RamiRaih,JonaLampert,andDavidZuluagaMartínez

BCG

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Introduction

Governmentsaroundtheworldare

reassessingtheirstrategicdefense

capabilities.Manyofthesecountries,

particularlyinEurope,areplayingcatch-

upafterdecadesofunderinvestmentin

defenseandarefocusingonstrengtheningtheirabilitytomeetimmediatenational

securityneeds:closingcapabilitygaps,rebuildingstockpiles,andfortifying

existingsystemsagainstcyberthreats.

Suchefortsareessentialbutincomplete.Newand

emergingdefensetechnologies—acrossAI,autonomous

systems,space,biotechnology,quantumtechnologies,andmore—arechangingtheverynatureofconlictand

alteringthefuturedefinitionofmilitaryadvantage.Itis

crucialthatpolicymakersconsiderthesestrategicinterestsintandem.

Europe—specifically,theUKandallcountriesthatare

membersofbothNATOandtheEU—facesunique

challengesinnavigatingthisnewgeostrategicterrain.Theregionisanestablishedhubofworld-classtalentwith

strongresearchcapacity.Butouranalysisofroughly250millionresearchpublications,90millionpatentfamily

records,andmultipleinvestmenttrends,showsthat

Europestrugglestoconvertitsresearchpotentialinto

deployabledefenseproducts.Thedisconnectbetween

potentialandapplicationisdueinlargeparttothelackofconsistentdemandfromdomesticmilitaryendusers.

Suchdemand,however,ispoisedtogrow.ManyEuropeancountriesaimtomorethandoubletheirdefensespendingto5%ofGDPannuallyby2035(with3.5%takingtheformofcoredefensespending).Butwhatshouldthatinvestmentlooklike,nowandintheyearstocome?Tohelpanswer

thatquestion,wehavefocusedourstudyonthedefense

techfrontier—identifyingthehighest-impactnew

technologiesonthebasisofinsightsfromapanelofmorethan50seniordefenseexpertsinEurope,theUS,and

otheralliedcountries.WealsoassessedEurope’srelativepositionacrossthesekeytechnologies—toproposeapathfornationalleadersandpolicymakerstofollowin

prioritizinginvestments.

THEDEFENSETECHNOLOGYFRONTIER:HOWEUROPECOULDLEAD3

WhatIstheDefenseTechFrontier?

Often,policyleadersmustmakestrategicsecurity

decisionswithintheconstraintsoflimitedresources.To

prioritizeanddeploynationalresourcesefectivelyand

maximizetheirdefensecapabilities,theseleadersshouldaimtoidentifythreekeythings:

•Thetechnologiesmostlikelytoshapethefutureofwarfare

•Howrapidlythosetechnologiesareevolving

•Thepointatwhichthosetechnologieswillhaveanimpactonthebattlefieldatscale

Toidentifythehighest-impactdefensetechnologiesofthefuture,weconvenedapanelofseniorBCGdefense

experts.WeusedNATO’snineemerginganddisruptive

technology(EDT)areasasastartingpointfortheanalysis,rangingfromAItobiotechandhypersonicsystems.

(See

theappendix,“NATO’sNineEDTs.”)

Fromaninitial

groupof60applications,weidentified19thatcouldhavethegreatestpotentialstrategicimpactacrossthreetimehorizons.

(SeeExhibit1andExhibit2.)

Foreachofthesetechnologies,thecurrentlevelof

developmentisanimportantfactor,buttherateatwhichtheyareprogressingisequallyimportant.Accordingtothedefenseexpertswesurveyed,AI-poweredapplications—

suchassensorsandefectorsthatautonomouslydetect,

classify,andrespondtothreatsinrealtime,and

intelligenceanalysisanddecisionsupportsystemsthat

processvastamountsofdatatosupportfasterdecision

making—areevolvingespeciallyquicklyatthemoment.Bycontrast,humanaugmentationsystems,whichenhance

soldierresilienceandprotection,areprogressingmoreslowlythanmostotherapplicationsinthegroupof19.

Diferencesintherateofprogressacrosstechnology

applicationsareimportantbecausetheydeterminehowmuchrunwaycountriesarelikelytohavefordevelopinghomegrownsolutions.Sincenotallcountrieshavethesameresources,objectives,andsecurityneeds,it’s

importanttobaseregion-specificassessmentsoftheseglobaltrendsonhoweachregionispositionedto

compete,cooperate,orshapetheemergingdefense-technologylandscape.

EXHIBIT1

High-ImpactFrontierDefenseTechnologyApplications

ShortlisteddefensetechapplicationsforeachEDT

AI-empowered

sensorsandeffectors

Quantumkeydistribution

AIintelligenceanalysis

anddecisionsupportsystems

Quantumsensing

Human-machineteamingsystems

QuantumAIandlarge-scalequantumcomputing

Autonomousunmannedaerial,ground,andmaritimesystems

Highlyautonomousswarms

andintegratedcombatnetworks

Advancedbiologicalagents

Advancedsoldiercapabilityandsurvivabilityaugmentationsystems

Advancedanti-satellitesystems

Next-generationspace-basedcommunicationsystems

Advancedglobalstrikesystemsandhypersonicmissiledefense

Metamaterials

Advanceddirectedenergyweapons

Compactfield-deployableenergysources

6Gandadvancednetworking

Unifiedmultidomainnetworks

Adhocmeshcommunicationsandself-healing,securenetworks

NATOEDTareas

Artificialintelligence

Quantumtechnologies

Autonomoussystems

Biotechnologyandhumanenhancementtechnologies

Space

(c)Hypersonicsystems

Novelmaterials

andmanufacturing

Energyandpropulsion

Next-generation

communicationnetworks

Sources:NATO;BCGanalysis.

Note:EDT=emerginganddisruptivetechnologies.

4BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|BCGHENDERSONINSTITUTE

Europetrailsothermajormilitarypowersindevelopingemerging

defensetechnologies,butithasnotyetbeenleftbehind.

6BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|BCGHENDERSONINSTITUTE

EXHIBIT2

DefenseTechnologyApplicationsAreLikelytoMatureatDiferentPointsinTime

Relativeimpact

High

AIintelligenceanalysisanddecisionsupportsystems

Highlyautonomousswarmsandintegratedcombatnetworks

QuantumAIandlarge-scalequantum

AI-empoweredsensorsandeffectors

Advancedbiologicalagents

computing

Autonomousunmannedaerial,

Human-machineteamingsystems

Unifiedmultidomainnetworks

ground,andmaritimesystems

Quantumsensing

Advancedanti-satellitesystems

Adhocmeshcommunicationsandself-healing,securenetworks

Quantumkeydistribution

Metamaterials

Compactfield-deployableenergy

Next-generationspace-based

6Gandadvancednetworking

sources

communicationsystems

Advancedglobalstrikesystemsandhypersonicmissiledefense

Advanceddirectedenergyweapons

Advancedsoldiercapabilityand

survivabilityaugmentationsystems

Low

~40applicationsdeprioritized

Currentandimminent

(0–5years)

Middleterm(5–15years)

Longterm(15+years)

Source:BCGanalysis.

Note:“Impact”referstothedegreetowhichthetechnologycanshapeoutcomesonthebattlefield.“Timehorizon”referstothetimeframeinwhichthis

technologywillmostlikelyreachmaturity(thatis,besufficientlyadvancedtohaverealat-scalebattlefieldimpact).AtechnologythatisjustbeingworkedonorisintheprototypeorR&Dstageisnotcountedtowardmaturity,nordothetimehorizonsconsideracountry’scapacitytointegratethetechnologyintoitsarmedforces.

Europe’sSignificant

Research-to-DevelopmentGap

Europecurrentlytrailsothermajormilitarypowersin

developingtheseemergingdefensetechnologies,buttheregionhasnotyetbeenleftbehind.Thedefenseexperts

weconsultedconsistentlyrankEuropethirdgloballyacrossthe18ofthe19high-impactapplications—theone

exceptionbeingsoldiercapabilityandsurvivabilityaugmentationsystems,whereitrankssecond.

ResearchstrengthinEuropeisparticularlystrong,

accordingtoouranalysisofsome250millionresearch

publicationsintheOpenAlexdatabase.Overthepast

decade,Europehasaccountedformoreofthetop10%ofmosthighlycitedpapersacrosssixofthenineNATOEDT

areasthananyotherregion.

(SeeExhibit3.)

Europehasasizableleadinhigh-qualityresearchinAI,quantum

technologies,space,energyandpropulsion,and

biotechnologyandhumanenhancementtechnologies.

Butforscientificresearchtoleadtobreakthroughs,itmustbedeveloped,typicallyintopatentedproducts—andthisiswhereouranalysisrevealsaproblematicrecurringpatternforEurope.Theregion’sstrongfundamentalresearch

capabilitiestendtoyieldonlylimitedcommercial

development.Evenininstanceswheredemandexistsfor

sophisticatedtechnologiesthatEuropeiswellplacedto

develop,theregionhasfailedtokeeppace.Forexample,

Europeranksfifthgloballyinglobalstrikesystemsand

hypersonicmissiledefenseapplications,eventhoughsomeofitstopdefensecompanieshavecollaboratedfordecadesontheseweapons.

EXHIBIT3

THEDEFENSETECHNOLOGYFRONTIER:HOWEUROPECOULDLEAD7

EuropeLeadsinFoundationalResearchinSixofNATO’sNineEmergingandDisruptiveDefenseTechnologyAreas

ArtificialintelligenceQuantumtechnologiesAutonomoussystems

Biotechnologyandhumanenhancementtechnologies

Space

Hypersonicsystems

Novelmaterialsandmanufacturing

Energyandpropulsion

Next-generationcommunicationnetworks

Europe

Averageshareofthetop10%ofmostcitedacademicpublicationsperdomain,2015–2025(%)

34

21

24

21

37

19

19

24

30

18

32

20

40

17

20

23

39

24

14

23

21

18

40

21

21

43

24

13

16

39

25

20

30

26

30

13

USChinaOtherNATOEDTsinwhichEuropeisleading

Sources:OpenAlex;BCGanalysis.

Note:Thisexhibitshowsonlycountriesorregionsthatareamongthetop20globaldefensespendersandreachatleastashareof10%ofthetop10%ofpublicationsfrom2015to2025.Countriesareassignedonthebasisofthenationalityoftheinstitutionthattheauthorsareaffiliatedwith.Ifthereare

multipleordifferentaffiliations,thepublicationiscountedforeachinstitutionsIhomecountry.“Europe”encompassestheUKandallcountriesthatareinboththeEUandNATO.EDT=emerginganddisruptivetechnologies.Becauseofrounding,notallbarsegmenttotalsaddupto100%.

Ourcomparativeanalysisofpatentdatarevealsthat

Europe’sshareofhigh-qualitypatentsisconsistentlylowerthanitsshareofleadingscientificpublications.Wefound

thisunderperformanceacrossallnineNATOEDTs,

includingtheonesinwhichEuropeanresearchisstrongest.IntheUS,bycontrast,theoppositeistrue:thecountry

consistentlyhasahighershareofhigh-qualitypatentsthanoftopscientificpublications.

(SeeExhibit4.)

ChallengestoCommercialization

Theunderlyingcauseofthisasymmetryisnosecret.

MultiplereportsbytheEuropeanCommission,the

OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment,andtheEuropeanInvestmentBank,allpointtoacommonculprit:weakpathwaystocommercialization.Insufficient

incentivesandsupportforresearcherstopursuepatents,limitedindustrydemandforfrontiertechnologies,and

fragmentedmarketsandintellectualpropertyregimeswithinEuropeallhinderefortstoscalenascent

innovationsintomarket-readytechnologies.

Europe’slaggingdevelopmentperformanceisalsoevidentinitsdefensestartupecosystem.TherearetwiceasmanydefensestartupsintheUSasinEurope,andthesehave

benefitedfrom8.5timestheventurecapitalinvestment

overthepastdecade—althoughthatratiohasfallento7.5timessinceRussia’sinvasionofUkraine.

(SeeExhibit5.)

Thissuggeststhat,onaverage,Europeancompanies

workingtodevelopnoveldefensetechapplicationshave

considerablysmallervaluationsthantheirUScounterparts.

Similarly,intermsoftransatlanticM&Aactivity,three

timesasmuchcapitalhaslowedfromtheUStoEurope

overthepastdecadethanhaslowedfromEuropetotheUS—asignthatEurope'sdefenseecosystemisdeficientinscale,capitalization,andcommercialmaturity.

8BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|BCGHENDERSONINSTITUTE

EXHIBIT4

EuropeTrailstheUSinTranslatingFundamentalResearchintoPatents

Shareofhigh-qualitypatents(%)1

60

Greaterfocus

onexploitation

2

4

50

3

1

5

40

6

9

30

8

2

54

7

20

3

86

10

7

1

Greaterfocusonexploration

9

0102030405060

Shareofhigh-qualityscientificpublications(%)2

1Artificialintelligence4

Biotechnologyandhumanenhancementtechnologies

7

Novelmaterials

andmanufacturing

2Quantumtechnologies5

Space

8

Energyandpropulsion

3Autonomoussystems6

Hypersonicsystems

●US●Europe

9

Next-generation

communicationnetworks

Sources:OpenAlex;LexisNexisPatentSight+;BCGanalysis.

Note:“Europe”encompassestheUKandallcountriesthatareinboththeEUandNATO.Thecountriesandregionsincludedintheassessmentwere

Australia,Brazil,Canada,Europe,India,Israel,Japan,Russia,SouthKorea,Turkey,Ukraine,andtheUS.

1AssessmentsoftechnologicalqualityarebasedonTechnologyRelevance,atrademarkedtoolcreatedbyLexisNexisPatentSight+thatmeasuresapatent’squalityonthebasisofitsrateofforwardcitationsinotherpatentapplications.Patentsaregroupedbyscoreasfollows:0–0.5=low;0.5–2=moderate;

2–5=high;over5=exceptional.

2Percentagesreflectthecountry’sorregion’sshareofthetop10%mostcitedpublications.

THEDEFENSETECHNOLOGYFRONTIER:HOWEUROPECOULDLEAD9

EXHIBIT5

TheDefenseTechStartupEcosysteminEuropeIsSmallerandLessWellFundedThantheOneintheUS

Venturecapitalinvestment,2015–2025($billions)

~8.5x

69

8

EuropeUS

Activedefensetechstartups,2015–2025(totalnumber)

~2x

1,176

597

EuropeUS

Sources:Pitchbook;BCGanalysis.

Note:NumbersshownconsiderventurecapitalinvestmentandnumberofactivestartupswithinthenineNATOEDTs.“Europe”encompassestheUKandallcountriesthatareinboththeEUandNATO.EDT=emerginganddisruptivetechnologies.

TheseinvestmenttrendsindicatethatprivateinvestmentandcommercialactivityinEuropeareinsufficientto

translateitsworld-classresearchcapacityintoefective,

scalable,andafordabledefensetechproducts.Indeed,

BCG'sVitalityIndex

—whichmeasurescompanies'

growthpotentialalongthedimensionsofstrategy,people,technology,andculture—findsthatjustoneoftheten

mostvitaldefensecompaniesintheworldisEuropean,theGermanaerospacecompanyHensoldt.Oftheothers,eightarebasedintheUSandoneinTurkey.

Still,defensestartupactivityinEuropeshowsencouragingsignsofrevival.TheMunich-baseddefensecompany

Helsing,foundedin2021,combinesdeepAIexpertisewithindustrialscaleandexcelsatintegratingAIintoexisting

platforms.Backedbyover€1.3billioninfunding—

includinga€600millionroundin2025ledbyPrima

MateriaandSaab—HelsinghasemergedasoneofthemostprominentEuropeandefensetechstartupsinthe

market.OtherEuropeandefensestartupsarepositioningthemselvestobecomeleadersaswell.

Foundedin2018andbasedinOttobrunn,Germany,Isar

AerospacedevelopssovereignEuropeanlaunchcapabilitiesforgovernmentanddefensepayloads—supportthatis

criticaltosecuringtheaccesstospaceneededtodeployawiderangeofmoderndefensetechnologies.TheDutch

companyDeltaQuad,foundedin2012,isdevelopinglong-enduranceintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR)dronesandtacticalfixed-wingverticaltake-ofandlandingdronesforEuropeandefensecustomers.Portugal-basedTekevergotitsstartin2001andbloomedintoa

unicornin2025bydevelopingunmannedaerialsystemsformaritimesurveillance,borderprotection,anddefense-

gradeISRmissions.ThegrowthofDeltaQuadandTekever,inparticular,relectsEurope’sgrowingstrengthin

autonomoussystemsandoperationalintelligence.

OurresearchshowsthatEurope’sdefenseheavyweightsaremakingastrategicplayforthefuture,too.Infact,thetoptenEuropeandefensecompaniesbyrevenuearenowactive,onaverage,innearlytwo-thirdsofthe19high-

impactdefensetechapplications.AlthoughmanyoftheseapplicationsremainattheearlyR&Dstages,the

companiesarecontributingsignificantlytobuildinga

technologicallyadvanceddefenseecosysteminEurope.

AFragmentedDefenseEcosystem

Attractingprivateinvestmenttohelpdevelopfrontier

defensetechnologieswillultimatelydependonstableandpredictabledemandfromEuropeanmilitaries.Inour

survey,abouttwo-thirdsofWesterndefenseexpertsagreedthatEuropeanadoptionofmilitarydefensetechnologywasweakacrossallEDTcategories.Butthechallengegoes

beyondsimplyraisingspendinglevels.Europe’sdefensemarketishighlyfragmented,whichsapsthecontinent’spotentialdemandpull.

DespitetheEU’sencouragementoflargeswathsof

politicalandeconomicintegration,pocketsof

fragmentationremain.Acrossthe27-nationbloc,memberstatesdevotesome80%ofdefenseprocurementand

approximately90%ofresearchandtechnologyspendingonapurelynationalbasis.Theresultisamashupof

systemsandstrategies,duplicatedprogramswithsmallproductionruns,andlimitedinteroperability.

10BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUP|BCGHENDERSONINSTITUTE

ThereareaboutfourtimesasmanydiferentmajorweaponssystemsinoperationacrossEuropeasintheUS.Theresultisanecosystemofmanyrelativelysmallfirmsthatserve

fragmentedhomemarketsandstruggletoachieve

economiesofscale,attractlong-termprivatecapital,and

investenoughtoturnEurope’sstrongresearchbaseinto

globallycompetitive,production-readydefensetechnologies.

Europeanpolicymakershavestartedtoaddressthese

issues,launchinginitiativessuchastheEUDefence

IndustryReinforcementThroughCommonProcurement

Act,ashort-terminstrumentthatallocated€310millionin2024and2025(lessthan1%ofoverallprocurement

spendingin2025)tosubsidizejointprocurements.The

EuropeanDefenseIndustrialStrategy(EDIS)aimsto

furtherencourageharmonizationbysettingacollaborativeprocurementtargetof40%fordefenseequipmentby2030,morethandoublingthe2021level(18%).

Thesewelcomeefortsarejustastart.Europeanmilitary

spendingonresearchandtechnology(R&T)—including

activitiessuchasbasicresearch,appliedresearch,and

advancedtechnologydevelopment—hasgrowninrecent

years,reachingapproximately1.7%oftotalpublicdefensespending,whichisclosetotheEU’s2%targetandis

similartotheUSbudgetforR&T.Nevertheless,only10%oftheEU’sR&Tspendinghappenscollaboratively.

InthebroadercategoryofR&Dspending—whichincludesthingslikeproductprototypedevelopmentand

demonstrations—thepublicinvestmentgapbetweenthe

USandtheEUwidensconsiderably.EUcountriesspendonaverageabout4%oftheirdefensebudgetsonR&D

comparedtothe17%orsothattheUSspendsonresearch,development,test,andevaluation,afairlycomparablesetofactivities.Intheprivatesector,thesituationisnearly

reversed,asthetoptenEuropeandefensecompaniesby

revenuespendonaverageroughly7.5%oftheirrevenueonR&D,comparedtoabout4.5%fortheirUSpeers.(A

substantialportionofR&Dspendingoccursindual-use

technologiesresearch,whichcannotefectivelybe

subdividedintomilitaryandnonmilitarycomponentsto

provideanadditionaldatapointforUS-Europe

comparison.)Thisdiscrepancyrelectsthefragmentation

ofweaponsystemsinEurope,aswellaslowerlevelsof

governmentco-funding,whichresultsinprivatecompanieshavingtomakeupfortheshortfallinpublicfunding.WhenitcomestoR&Dspending,EuropeangovernmentstypicallypartnerlesswiththeprivatesectorthantheUS

DepartmentofWardoes.

(SeeExhibit6.)

EXHIBIT6

TheUSMaintainsaSizableR&DAdvantageoverEurope,PrimarilyDrivenbyPublicR&DSpending

PublicR&Tspendingasapercentageofoveralldefensebudget,2025(%)1

~1.2x

1.72.0

EuropeUS

PublicR&Dspendingasapercentageofoveralldefensebudget,2025(%)2

~4x

17

4

EuropeUS

PrivateR&Dspendingasa

percentageofrevenue,2025(%)3

~0.6x

8

5

EuropeUS

Sources:USDepartmentofWar;EuropeanDefenceAgency;S&PCapitalIQ;BCGanalysis.

Note:R&D=researchanddevelopment;R&T=researchandtechnology.

1ForEurope,weusedtheR&TfiguresasreportedbytheEuropeanDefenceAgency;fortheUS,weusedtheDepartmentofWar’sbudgetactivities

categorizedas“basicresearch,””appliedresearch,”and“advancedtechnologydevelopment”tocalculatetheR&Tfigure.

2ForEurope,weusedtheR&DfiguresasreportedbytheEuropeanDefenceAgency;fortheUS,weusedtheDepartmentofWar’sresearch,development,test,andevaluationnumbers,whichtheEuropeanDefenceAgencyconsiderstobecomparabletoitsR&Dfigures.

3WeusedS&PCapitalIQR&DspendingandrevenuedataforthetenlargestEuropeanandUSdefensecompaniesbyrevenuetoconstructtheaverageprivateR&Dspendingfigure.

THEDEFENSETECHNOLOGYFRONTIER:HOWEUROPECOULDLEAD11

StreamliningProcurement

AsEuropeplacesbetsonstrategictechnologies,

procurementsystemsthatfosterinnovativeandscalable

solutionswillimproveperformance.

PriorBCGresearch

hasshownthatdemandcanexerttherightpull:shorteningprocurementcyclestobettermatchthepaceoftechnologydevelopment,raisingstartups'risktolerancetoaccess

governmentcontracts,andpromotinglonger-term

contractsthatsupportcapacity-buildinginvestmentbydefensecompanies.

Suchefortscouldhelpshakethestasisthatcurrently

afflictsEuropeandefensestartupsintheformofrisk-

aversetrials,lengthyqualifications,anddifficultintegrationintomultinationalnetworks.Alloftheseconstraintsmakeitdifficultfortechnologypilotstodevelopintospeedy,

scalable,andafordabledeployment.

Hereagain,Europe’srenewedsenseofdefenseurgency

hasyieldedpromisingearly-stageinitiatives.EDISandtheEuropeanDefenceIndustryProgrammeexplicitlyseekto

pushjointorders,prioritizeEuropeansystems,and

acceleratecapacityramp-up;andtheReArmEurope

initiativeaimstoprovidelarge-scalefinancingtotransformthesepolicyambitionsintoactualindustrialinvestment

andmultiyearjointprocurement.

Theultimatesuccessoftheseprograms,however,dependsontheabilityofindividualcountriestopooldemandand

alignregulatoryrequirements.NATOandEUofficialswarnthatthereislittlemarginforerror:ifnewruleshardeninto

marketbarriersorifcountriesspreadtheirprocurementfundstoothinly,costswillriseanddeliverycouldlag,

underminingefortstoimproveadoption.

ChartingaPathForward

ThegoalforEuropeshouldnotbetoleadonallfrontier

defensetechapplications.Theregion’sresourcesare

limited,thecapabilitygapsinlegacysystemsaretoogreat,andtheneedtobridgethemistoourgent.Policymakers

willneedtoolstohelpthemdecidewheretoplace

strategicbets—toleadwhereEuropecan,tocatchupwhereitmust,andtorelyonpartnersandallieswheredoingsoismostpractical.

Tohelpleadersmakethosedecisions,wegroupedour19high-impactdefensetechapplicationsbythespeedat

whicheachtechnologyisevolvingaswellasbythedegreetowhichEuropeiseitherclosingthegapwithorfalling

fartherbehindthegloballeaders.Onthebasisofthisanalysis,weidentifiedfourdistinctcategories,eachofwhichcallsforadiferentiatedstrategicposturefromEurope

(seeExhibit7)

:

•Partnertoclosethegap.

•Doubledowntolead.

•Shapestandardstobuildinluence.

•Monitorandinvesttocreateoptionality.

EXHIBIT7

APrioritizationFrameworkforNavigatingFrontierDefenseTechnologyInvestments

Higher

Defensetechapplication’s speedofevolution

Lower

PartnertoclosethegapDoubledowntolead

AIintelligenceanalysisanddecisionsupportsystems

Autonomousunmannedaerial,ground,andmaritimesystems

AI-empoweredsensorsandeffectors

Advancedglobalstrikesystemsandhypersonicmissiledefense

Advancedanti-satellitesystems

QuantumAIandlarge-scalequantumcomputing

Highlyautonomousswarmsandintegratedcombatnetworks

Advanceddirectedenergyweapons

Compactfield-deployableenergysources

Metamaterials

Advancedbiologicalagents

Monitorandinvesttocreateoptionality

Human-machineteamingsystems

Unifiedmultidomainnetworks

Next-generationspace-basedcommunicationsystems

Adhocmeshcommunicationsandself-healing,securenetworks

6Gandadvancednetworking

Quantumsensing