【IMF】弹性和可持续性安排的催化作用-2026.3

TheCatalyticImpactofResilienceand

SustainabilityFacilityArrangements

Y.Diallo,P.Escalante,L.Kaltani,T.Kapan,F.Langowski,and

D.Nyberg

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchin

progressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedto

elicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.

TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersare

thoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarily

representtheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.

2026

MAR

AT

N

★★

A

R

©2026InternationalMonetaryFundWP/26/38

IMFWorkingPaper

FinanceDepartment

TheCatalyticImpactofResilienceandSustainabilityFacilityArrangements

PreparedbyY.Diallo,P.Escalante,L.Kaltani,T.Kapan,F.LangowskiandD.Nyberg*

AuthorizedfordistributionbyDaliaHakura

March2026

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicit

commentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseofthe

author(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.

ABSTRACT:TheResilienceandSustainabilityFacility(RSF),whichwasaddedtotheIMF’slendingtoolkitin2022,providesaffordablelonger-termfinancingtosupportcountriesundertakingmacrocriticalreformsto

reduceriskstoprospectiveBoPstabilityemanatingfromextremeweathereventsandpandemics.Thispaper

drawsearlylessonsfromRSFarrangementsbyexploringwhethertheyhavebeenabletomeetoneoftheir

coreobjectives,namelycatalyzingfinancingfromothersources.Amultiprongedapproachisusedconsistingofasurveyofcountryteams,aneconometricstudy,andanalysisofnon-traditionaldata.AccordingtoasurveyofIMFcountryteamsmostcountrieswithRSFarrangementsreceivedclimatefinance,mainlyfromsynergieswithpublicsources.TheeconometricanalysisshowsthatapprovalofanRSFisassociatedwithincreasedMDB

climatefinanceandOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)inlow-incomecountries,thusstrengtheningthe

RSF’slinktoBoPstability.Non-traditionaldatadrawingfromnewsmediaandlabormarketdevelopmentspointtopotentialhigherfinancinginthefuture.

JELClassificationNumbers:

C50,O16,Q48,Q54

Keywords:

IMF-supportedprograms,catalyticfinance,econometricanalysis,entropybalancing,non-traditionaldata.

Author’sE-MailAddress:

ydiallo2@;pescalante@;

lkaltani@;

tkapan@;flangowski@;

dnyberg@

*TheauthorswouldliketothankSerkanArslanalp,DaliaHakura,PapaN’Diaye,ChristianMumssen,PrasadAnanthakrishnan,SamuelPienknagura,GerdSchwartz,andCarloSdralevichforguidanceandsuggestions;JingHanandNanJiangforexcellentresearchassistance;andVeraLochanandAmyMirandaforeditorialsupport.TheauthorsalsothankparticipantsofaFund-wideseminarfortheirusefulsuggestions.

IMFWORKINGPAPERS

TheCatalyticImpactofResilienceandSustainabilityFacility

Arrangements

PreparedbyY.Diallo,P.Escalante,L.Kaltani,T.Kapan,F.Langowski,andD.Nyberg

IMFWORKINGPAPERSTheCatalyticImpactofResilienceandSustainabilityFacilityArrangements

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND2

Contents

Glossary 3

ExecutiveSummary 5

Context 6

CountryTeamSurveyResults 8

EconometricApproach 21

Non-TraditionalData 32

Conclusions 34

AnnexI.AdditionalCharts 36

References 48

IMFWORKINGPAPERSTheCatalyticImpactofResilienceandSustainabilityFacilityArrangements

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND3

Glossary

BoP

BalanceofPayments

CD

CapacityDevelopment

CF

CreditFacility

CPD

ClimatePolicyDiagnostic

C-PIMA

ClimatePublicInvestmentManagementAssessment

EIB

EuropeanInvestmentBank

EMDEs

EmergingMarketandDevelopingEconomies

EMs

EmergingMarkets

FCL

FlexibleCreditLine

FCS

FragileandConflicted-affectedState(s)

FDI

ForeignDirectInvestment

GCF

GreenClimateFund

GRA

GeneralResourcesAccount

LICs

Low-IncomeCountries

MDBs

MultilateralDevelopmentBanks

MFIs

MultilateralFinancialInstitutions

NDC

NationallyDeterminedContribution

ND-GAIN

NotreDameGlobalAdaptationInitiative

ODA

OfficialDevelopmentAssistance

PEFA

PublicExpenditureFinancialAccountability

PFM

PublicFinancialManagement

PIM

PublicInvestmentManagement

PLL

PrecautionaryLiquidityLine

PPF

ProjectPreparationFacility

PPP

Public-PrivatePartnership

PRGT

PovertyReductionandGrowthTrust

PSM

PropensityScoreMatching

RM

ReformMeasure

RSF

ResilienceandSustainabilityFacility

RST

ResilienceandSustainabilityTrust

SBA

Stand-ByArrangement

SDS

SmallDevelopingState(s)

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND4

TATechnicalAssistance

UCTUpperCreditTranche

UNFCCCUnitedNationsFrameworkConventionforClimateChange

IMFWORKINGPAPERSTheCatalyticImpactofResilienceandSustainabilityFacilityArrangements

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND5

ExecutiveSummary

TheResilienceandSustainabilityTrust(RST)wasapprovedbytheIMF’sExecutiveBoardinApril2022and

becameoperationalinOctober2022.RSTlendingthroughRSFarrangementsprovidesaffordablelonger-term

financingtosupportcountriesundertakingmacrocriticalreformstoreduceriskstotheirprospectiveBoPstability

emanatingfromextremeweathereventsandpandemics

.1

OnecoreobjectiveofanRSFarrangementistoshapetheconditionswhichunlockadditionalfinancingfrommultilateraldevelopmentbanks(MDBs),bilateraldonors,andprivateinvestors.ThispaperusesamultiprongedapproachtodrawearlylessonsontheextenttowhichRSF

arrangementscatalyzefinancethrough:(i)anIMFcountryteamsurvey;(ii)aneconometricstudy;and(iii)an

analysisofnon-traditionaldata.Thiscomplementaryapproachisintendedtoovercomesomeofthechallenges

relatedtothestilllimitedperiodofRSToperationsanddifficultiesidentifyingcausality,whilealsopointingtoareasforfutureresearchasalargernumberofRSFarrangementscometocompletion.Drawingontheseanalytical

approaches,thepaperoffersearlyevidenceofthelinkbetweenRSFarrangementsandotherfinance,thusstrenghteningtheRSF’slinktoBoPstability.

AccordingtoasurveyofIMFcountryteams,countrieswithRSFarrangementsreceivedamedianvalueof

climatefinanceofaround0.5percentofGDPbetween2023-2024withthemajoritybeingfrompublicsources.

Thesurveyindicatesthatcountriesthatheldaclimatefinanceroundtable,convenedbytheIMF,received

slightlyhighermedianclimatefinance,comparedtothosethatdidnot.Thesurveyalsopointstotheneedtoidentifyinvestableprojects(includingpublicprivatepartnerships),improvedataprovision,andstrengthentheenablingframeworks,suchastheregulatoryandlegalframeworks,tofosterprivateandofficialfinance.

Technicalassistance(TA)fromdevelopmentpartnersandmacrostructuralreformsundertheaccompanyinguppercredittranche(UCT)-qualityIMF-supportedprogramcanplayanimportantroleinaddressingthese

gaps.

TheeconometricstudyfindsthatcountrieswithanRSFarrangementreceivedhigherclimatefinancefromMDBscomparedtonon-RSFprogramcountries.TheseresultsholdwhenconsideringdifferentsubsamplesofPovertyReductionandGrowthTrust(PRGT)andGeneralResourceAccount(GRA)countries.PRGT-eligiblecountrieswithRSFarrangementsalsoreceivedhigherOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)commitments.

Analysisofnon-traditionaldataallowsforidentifyingpossibleearlyimplementationeffectsthatmaynotyetbereflectedinconventionalmetricsbutthatcouldbeleadindicatorsofadditionalclimatefinancinginthefuture.Specifically,thereseemstohavebeenincreasedmediacoverageofclimatefinance-relatedtopicsfollowingapprovalsofRSF

arrangements.LabormarketindicatorsshowanassociationbetweenRSFarrangementsandgreenjobcreation.

Takentogether,theaboveapproachespointtoearlyfindingsofapotentialenablingenvironmentcreatedinthecontextofRSFarrangementsinreducingcountries’riskstoprospectiveBoPstability.WhileRSFarrangementsappeartohavebeenassociatedmainlywithofficialfinance,increasedprivatesectorparticipationiscriticalto

meetsignificantlonger-termclimateinvestmentneeds.Inthiscontext,enhancingtheenablinginvestment

environmentrelatedtodataandmonitoring,developingnewfinancialinstruments,regulation,andbankable

projects,possiblysupportedbyTA,iscriticaltoscalingupprivatesectorfinance.Buildingonthisearly

assessment,thepaperpointstoseveralfuturedirectionsofresearchonceadditionaldataareavailableandasmoreRSFarrangementscometocompletion.

1See2022

ProposaltoEstablishaResilienceandSustainabilityTrust

and2024

InterimReviewoftheResilienceandSustainability

TrustandReviewofAdequacyofResources.

IMFWORKINGPAPERSTheCatalyticImpactofResilienceandSustainabilityFacilityArrangements

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND6

Context

Figure1.GlobalClimateFinance,PublicandPrivate

GlobalClimateFinance,2018-2023InUSDbn

2000

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

201820192020202120222023

Source:ClimatePolicyInitiative(2025).

Source:ClimatePolicyInitiative,

GlobalLandscapeofClimateFinance2025-CPI

Inrecentyears,globalclimatefinance

(bothprivateandpublic)hasgrown

significantly.Annualflowsmorethan

doubledbetween2018and2023,drivenbyincreasedinvestmentsinsectorslikeelectricvehiclesandrenewableenergy(seeFigure1).Thisgrowthhasbeen

supportedbyinternationalagreementssuchastheParisAgreement,theriseofblendedfinancemechanisms,and

greaterprivatesectorengagementin

climate-relatedinvestments.However,despitethisprogress,availableclimatefinanceremainswellbelowtheneedsofdevelopingcountriesestimatedatuptoUSD7trillioncumulativelyuntil2030bytheUnitedNationsFramework

ConventiononClimateChange

(UNFCCC)StandingCommitteeonFinance

.2

Privateclimatefinanceisalsoonanincreasingtrend,butitsvolumeislaggingbehindofficialfinance

.3

Emergingmarketsanddevelopingeconomies(EMDEs)inparticularfinditchallengingtoattractprivateclimatefinanceduetostructuralissuessuchasunattractiverisk-returnprofiles,theeaseofdoingbusiness,investors’fiscalsustainabilityconcernsandlackofinvestableprojects(Chenetal.,forthcoming).

TheRSTwasestablishedin2022toprovidepolicysupportandlonger-termfinancingtohelpmembercountriesenhanceeconomicresilienceandsustainabilityandreduceriskstocountries’prospectiveBoPstability,

emanatingfromextremeweathereventsandpandemics.TheIMF’sExecutiveBoardapprovedthe

establishmentoftheRSTinApril2022,andtheRSTbecameoperationalinOctober2022.TheRST

complementstheFund’sexistinglendingtoolkitbyprovidinglonger-term,affordablefinancingtomemberstohelpthemaddresslonger-termstructuralchallenges,includingfromclimate-inducedshocksandpandemic

preparedness.Asofend-November2025,26RSFarrangementshadbeenapproved(seeFigure2),spanningabroadgroupofmembercountries–PRGT-eligible,FragileandConflict-afflictedStates(FCS),Small

DevelopingStates(SDS)aswellasmiddle-incomecountrieswhicharenotPRGT-eligible(Figure3)

.4

2SeeUNFCCCStandingCommitteeonFinance:

Newcollectivequantifiedgoalonclimatefinance.

3Privateclimatefinancereferstofundingfromnon-governmentalsources—suchasbanks,institutionalinvestors,corporations,andfoundations—intendedtosupportprojects,programs,orinitiativesthatmitigategreenhousegasemissionsand/orenhanceclimateresilience,andwhichcanbemeasuredortrackedaccordingtorecognizedcriteria.SeeIMF(2023)foradiscussionofprivate

financeflows.

4RSFarrangementsapprovedafterend-November2024arenotincludedintheanalysisofthispaper.

IMFWORKINGPAPERSTheCatalyticImpactofResilienceandSustainabilityFacilityArrangements

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND7

Figure2.RSFEligibilityandApproved

Arrangements

Figure3.RSFCountryGroups

AsofNovember2025

AsofNovember2025

5

Note:UnderlinedRSFarrangementswereapprovedafterNovember

2024andarenotincludedintheanalysisofthispaper.

AspartoftheRST’sgoalofsupportingprospectiveBoPstability–definedasthebalanceofacountry’sinflowsandoutflowsofinternationalmonetarytransactionsduringaspecifiedperiod–andreducingmacro-critical

risks,RSFarrangementsareintendedtohelpcatalyzepublicandprivatefinance.Thefinancingprovidedby

RSFarrangementsisrelativelysmallcomparedtocountries’investmentneedsforeligiblestructural

challenges.CatalyzingfinancingisthereforeessentialtosupportprospectiveBoPstability,andRSFoperationsandreformscancontributetothisobjective.However,giventheshorthistoryoftheTrust,studyingthelinkagebetweentheRSFandsynergieswithotherfinancingandidentifyinganycausalrelationshipischallenging.

First,thenumberofRSFarrangements,andespeciallythenumberofcompletedones,islimitedandthepost-RSFperiodisrelativelyshort,soworkingwithannualdataposeschallenges,especiallygivenlagsinofficial

datareporting.Second,thereislimitedcross-countrydataonclimatefinanceflowsingeneral,andavailable

dataisoftennotdirectlycomparableduetodifferencesindefinitions,divergentreportingstandards,andgapsincoverage

.6

Thisappliesinparticulartoprivateflows,whichareoftennotlabelledexplicitly(Chenetal.,

forthcoming).Third,RSFarrangementsmayonlyhaveadelayedcatalyticimpactonclimatefinanceviathe

staggeredreformsthattheyhelpimplementandtheassociatedfinancingtheyprovideandcanthereforetaketimetohaveanimpact.Withintheseconstraints,thispaperfollowsamultiprongedapproachtoidentifyany

earlyinsightsonotherfinancingandother‘enablers’thatcanfacilitateclimatefinancinginthefuture.First,thepaperusesasurveyofIMFteamsworkingoncountrieswithRSFarrangements.Second,aneconometric

analysisexplorestheassociationbetweenRSFarrangementsandvarioustypesoffinancialflows.Third,thepaperusesnon-traditionaldatathatdonotsufferfromthesamedelaysasofficialdataandwhichcanpointtootherenablingeffectsofRSFarrangements.

5Countriesareclassifiedaccordingtothe2024StaffGuidancenoteontheIMF’sengagementwithsmalldevelopingstates(SDS)

andasfragileandconflict-affected(FCS)accordingtotheFY25list

(/en/-

/media/files/publications/pp/2023/english/ppea2023010-s003.pdf

).

6SeeJachniketal(2019)foradiscussionofeffortsintrackingclimatefinanceflows.SeealsoGemayeletal(2025)onclimatefinancechallengesinSub-SaharanAfrica.

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND8

CountryTeamSurveyResults

InOctober2024asurveywassharedwithIMFteamsworkingoncountriesthatatthetimehadanongoing,orcompleted,RSFarrangement.Theobjectivewastoassessthearrangement’sactualandpotentialimpactonclimatefinancebothfromprivateandpublicsources,aswellastoidentifystructuralimpedimentsandareasofopportunityforfutureclimatefinancing

.7

Thesurveyresultsprovidedescriptive,stylizedfactsintendedtoofferinitialinsightsintothepotentialcatalyticroleofRSFarrangements.Tothebestofourknowledge,thisisthe

mostcomprehensivesurveyconductedtodatewhichaddstoourknowledgebaseontheexperienceof

membercountriesinIMFclimatepolicylending.Itsfindings,however,donotimplycausalrelationshipsduetotheinherentselectionbiasoffocusingexclusivelyoncountrieswithRSFarrangements,andtheymayalsobeinfluencedbyconcurrentbroaderreformefforts,pre-existingpolicymomentum,anddataavailability

.8

Thefirstpartofthesurveyfocusedoninformationontheamountofpublicandprivateclimatefinancethat

countriesreceivedfollowingtheapprovaloftheRSFarrangement,bothcommittedanddisbursed.Inthis

context,anadditionalquestioninquiredabouttheeffectivenessoftheclimatefinanceroundtables,organizedbyIMFstaffattherequestoftheauthorities,incatalyzingclimatefinance

.9

Thesurveyalsoaskedaboutthetypesoffinanceinstrumentsthathavebeendevelopedorwereunderconsideration,suchasgreenbonds,

climateinsuranceschemes,etc.tofacilitatetheflowofclimatefinance.Thesecondpartofthesurveyfocusedonthemainimpedimentsthatmaybeholdingbackadditionalclimateinvestments,suchasclimate-related

regulation,data,andavailabilityofinvestableprojects

.10

All20teamsworkingoncountrieswithRSF

arrangementsapprovedbytheIMF’sExecutiveBoardatthetimeofsurveyroll-outprovidedresponses

.11

RSFandtheFlowofClimateFinance

Basedonthecountryteamsurvey,countrieswithactiveRSFarrangementsreceivedmedianclimatefinanceof0.5percentofGDPbetween2023-2024,withnotablevariationbetweencountries(seeAnnexTableA.12for

climatefinancebycountry).Thesefiguresincludedatafromall20countriesinthesurvey,ofwhich15providedquantified(non-zero)answers.Thesurveyalsoaskedforreportedfigurestobebrokendownbybroad

categoriesofpublicandprivateclimatefinance,wherethepublicfinancecategoryincludesmultilateral

developmentbanks,multilateralfinancialinstitutions(MFIs)andbilateraldonors.ThesurveyresultsindicatethatmostclimatefinancetoRSFcountrieswasfrompublicsources,whilethelimitedavailabledatasuggests

7Foraglossaryanddefinitionsofclimatefinanceindicators,pleasesee:Glossary

MacroeconomicClimateIndicatorsDashboard.

8Thesurveyresultsonlyallowcomparisonsbetweenthe20RSFcountriesforthepost-RSFperiod.Assuch,theyaresubjecttotheselectionbiasofcountrieshavingbeenapprovedforanRSFwhichmaybecorrelatedwithfactorssuchaspre-existingclimate

reforms,institutionalstrengthorotherdonor-supportedprograms.Theeconometricanalysis,whichfollowsthissection,attemptstoaddresstheselimitations.

9Seealso“CatalyzingFinancingforClimateResilience”byPrasadandKapan(forthcoming).

10The13-questionsurveyisstructuredasfollows:(i)atablewithabreakdownofannualclimatefinancecommitmentsand

disbursements;(ii)sevenqualitativeyes/noquestionsonclimatefinanceinstruments,publicprivatepartnerships,climatefinanceroundtables,coordinationandmonitoring,CDandTA;(iii)fourqualitativequestionswithsubjectiveratingsrelatedtothecatalyticpotentialofRSFreformmeasures,thepotentialimpactofRSFfeaturesinattractingofficialorprivateclimatefinance,impedimentstomobilizingclimatefinance;andfinally(iv)anopen-endedspaceforrecordingadditionalcommentsorclarificationstosurvey

responses.

11TheIMFExecutiveBoardhasapprovedsixRSFarrangementssincethesurveyrollout(Boardapprovaldateinbrackets):

PapuaNewGuinea(December2024);DemocraticRepublicofCongo(January2025);Egypt(March2025);Pakistan(May2025);theGambia(June2025);andJordan(June2025).Thesearenotincludedintheanalysisofthispaper.

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND9

thattheshareofprivateclimatefinanceissmall.Theresponsesshowthat

MDBscommittedaround¾ofthetotalfunding,bilateralinstitutionscommitted22percent,whiletheprivatesector

sharesofarwaslimitedwithlessthanonepercentofthetotalfinancing

received(seeFigure4)

.12

Theresultsfromthecountryteam

surveycomplementexistingdataon

overallclimatefinance.Sourcesof

climatefinancehavedifferentdefinitionsandtimecoverage,sonumbersarenotdirectlycomparable,buttheyarestill

informativeabouttrends.Figure5

suggeststhatclimatefinanceprovided

byMDBstoRST-eligiblecountrieshas

beenonanupwardtrendsince2015

(consistentwithinstitutionalclimate

financecommitments),withanoverall

medianof0.8percentofGDPin2023

.13

ItalsoshowsthatcountrieswithRSF

arrangementsreceivedhigherclimate

financeflowsrelativetothosewithout

evenbeforetheintroductionoftheRSF,whichmaybeduetocountry

characteristicssuchascapacityand

willingnesstoimplementclimate

reforms.Intheeconometricanalysis

thatfollowsbelowweformallyanalyzewhethertheapparentfasterincreaseinMDBclimatefinanceisduetotheRSFarrangementwhilecorrectingfor

potentialselectionbiasdueto

differenceswithinthegroupofRST-eligiblecountries.

Figure4.SourcesofAdditionalClimateFinanceduring

anRSFArrangement

(SurveyQuestion:Climate-budgetsupportandotherfinancing.

Pleasecompletethetablebelowwiththeamountofclimate

financingfromdifferentsourcesthatyourcountryhasreceivedor

willreceivefollowingtheapprovaloftheRSFprogram.)

Figure5.MDBClimateFinance

Source:2023JointReportonMultilateralDevelopmentBanks’ClimateFinance.

12Notethatthesenumberslikelyunderestimatetotalfinancingreceivedsincethesurveyonlyprovidespartialinformation.Countryteamsandauthoritiestypicallydonothaveasystematicwayofmonitoringallclimateinvestmentsinacountry,especially

investmentsfromtheprivatesector.

13TheclimatefinancefromMDBsreferstototalclimatefinancereceivedbyRST-eligiblecountriesupto2023,withdatasorted

basedonwhethercountrieshadanongoing,orcompleted,RSFatthetimeofsurveyrollout.ThedataarenotdirectlycomparabletothecountryteamsurveywhichasksaboutclimatefinancedirectlyrelatedtotheRSF.

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND10

InthecontextofRSFarrangements,climatefinance

roundtableshavebeenheldinhalfoftheRSFcountriestofacilitateandcoordinateclimatefinance.Whilethe

roundtablesarenotpartoftheofficialRSFarrangement,theIMFhelpednationalauthoritiesin10RSFcountries

14

toconvenetheseroundtablesinclosepartnershipwith

majorstakeholders,includingtheWorldBankandregionalMDBs.Theseroundtablesserveasaunifyingumbrellafordiscussionandcollaborationamongpolicymakers,

internationalorganizations,andtheprivatesector.The

goaloftheroundtablesistounderstandthemainbarrierstoclimatefinancethatthecountryisfacingandidentify

solutions,includingthroughRSF-complementarypolicyactions,capacitydevelopment(CD),andprogrammaticapproachesforcrowdinginadditionalfinancingfortheauthorities’climateagenda.

ThesurveyresultsshowthatRSFcountrieswhichheld

climatefinanceroundtablesreceivedrelativelymore

financingcomparedtootherRSFcountries.Intheperiod2023-24,countrieswithclimatefinanceroundtablesand

anactiveRSFreceivedmedianclimatefinance

commitmentsequivalentto0.6percentofGDP,comparedtoamedianamountof0.5percentofGDPforcountries

withoutsuchroundtables(seeFigure6)

15

.

Figure6.ClimateFinanceRoundtables

Anessentialfeatureoftheroundtablesforsupportingclimatefinancehasbeentheirroleinenhancing

coordinationamongvariousstakeholderstoachievescale.WiththesubstantialclimatefinancingneedsofEMDEsexceedingthecapacityofanysingleinstitution,coordinationamonggovernments,international

financialinstitutions,anddevelopmentpartnersiscriticaltomobilizingclimatefinanceattheneededscale.

Additionally,asdiscussedbelow,lackoftargetedclimatepoliciesandanenablingenvironmentforclimateinvestmentswerecitedasmajorimpedimentstoclimatefinancebymostcountryteamsinthesurvey.

Governmentactionacrossmultiplefronts—includinglegal,regulatory,andinstitutional—isneededtoaddresstheseimpediments,whichrequiresacoordinatedeffortfromvariousgovernmentagencies.Climatefinance

roundtableshavebeeninstrumentalinbringingtogetherbothgovernmentandexternalstakeholders,helpingthemtobettercoordinatetheirefforts.Finally,thelackofapipelineofbankableclimateprojectsisthemost

frequentlycitedimpedimenttoscalingupclimatefinanceinthesurvey.Almostallroundtablestodatehave

alsoidentifiedprojectpipelinesasamajorconstraint.Throughthecollaborationfollowingtheseroundtables,countryauthoritiesareworkingwithdevelopmentpartnerstoestablishProjectPreparationFacilities(PPFs)todevelopapipelineofclimateprojects.ThesePPFslaythegroundworkfordevelopingclimateprojects,whichprovideopportunitiesfordevelopmentpartnerstoscaleuptheirsupport(seealsoPrasadandKapan

(forthcoming)).Asexpressedinseveraljointpressreleases,partnershaveincreasedtheirfinancialsupport

14Asofend-2024.

15CaboVerdeisexcludedfromthechartasanoutlier.Asasmallislandcountry,exceptionallylargefinancing(Euro300million)resultedintheequivalentamountof