高盛-美国通胀面临的来自伊朗战争的风险-The Risks to US Inflation from the War with Iran-20260323

Eco

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ntsi:c/s/wse.vaaruhelist

23March2026|5:22PMCDT

USECONOMICSANALYST

TheRiskstoUSInfiationfromtheWarwithIran

JessicaRindels

+1(972)368-1516|

nOurcommoditiesstrategistsnowexpectBrentoilpricestoaverage$105in

jessica.rindels@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

Marchand$115inAprilbeforefallingto$80in2026Q4,refiectingtheir

expectationthatfiowsofoilthroughtheStraitofHormuzwillremainverylowfor6weeks.TheyestimatethatBrentwouldlikelyapproachorexceedits2008

recordbeforemoderatingto$100in2026Q4inanadversescenariowherefiowsaredisruptedfor10weeksorto$115in2026Q4inaseverelyadversescenariowherefiowsaredisruptedfor10weeksandinfrastructuredamagecausesa

persistenthittoproduction.Moreseveredisruptionsfromthewarimplya

slightlyhigherbaselineinfiationpathandmateriallygreaterupsiderisk,inpartbecausetheyincreasetheriskofproductshortagesandupwardpressureoninfiationexpectations.

nMostoftheimpactofthewaronUSinfiationwillcomefromhigheroilprices.

Ourruleofthumbisthata10%increaseinoilpricesraisesheadlinePCEinfiationby0.2ppandcoreinfiationby0.04pp,withmuchoftheimpactcomingthroughtransportationservices.Ourcommoditypricepassthroughmodelsuggeststhattheboostfromenergypriceincreasesinourbaselineforecasttoyear-over-yearcorePCEinfiationwillpeakaround0.35ppattheendoftheyear.

nThewarhasalsoraisedpricesofotherGulfexportsincludingchemicalandmetalproductssuchasaluminumandnitrogenfertilizer.Weexpecthigherfertilizer

coststoboostfoodpricesbyabout1.5%thisyear,worth0.1pponheadline

infiation,butexpectonlyamodestimpactoncoreinfiationbecausetheUS

producesmanyoftheseproductsdomesticallyandcansourcethemfrom

elsewhereifnecessary.IfUSimportsoftheseproductsfromtheGulfwerecuto仟entirelyandtheirpricesdoubled,weestimatetheboosttocorePCEwouldbe

roughly0.3pp.

nWealsoconsiderpotentialsecond-rounde仟ectsthroughinfiationexpectations.Whilesomemeasuresofexpectationscanbesensitivetoenergyprices,overthepast40yearsevenmajoroilpriceshocksdidnothavelong-lastinge仟ectson

infiationexpectations.Ourmodelofthefeedbackloopbetweenrealized

infiationandinfiationexpectationssuggestsonlymodestfurtherupward

pressurethroughthischannelinourbaselinescenario.Allowingforthe

possibilitythatinfiationexpectationsmightbelessanchoredintheaftermathofthepandemicinfiationsurge,weestimatethatthesesecond-rounde仟ectswouldprovidea0.1ppboosttoinfiationbyend-2026underourbaselinescenarioand

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html

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inalyst

a0.4ppboostunderourseverelyadversescenario.

nWehaveraisedourDecember2026headlinePCEinfiationforecastbyanother0.2ppto3.1%.Thiswouldbe3.6%(withapeakof4.6%thisspring)inouradversescenarioor4.0%(withapeakof4.9%)inourseverelyadversescenarioforoilprices.WehavealsoraisedourDecember2026corePCEinfiationforecastbyanother0.1ppto

2.5%.Inourstrategists’adverseandseverelyadversescenariosforoilprices,wewouldexpectcorePCEinfiationof2.6%inDecember2026.

nWehavealsoloweredour2026GDPgrowthforecastbyanother0.1pp(ontopofourearlier0.3ppdownwardrevision)to2.1%onaQ4/Q4basisor2.4%ona

full-yearbasis.OurQ4/Q4forecastwouldfallto1.9%inouradversescenarioforoilpricesor1.8%inourseverelyadversescenario.Refiectingthegreaterdownsiderisk,wehavealsobumpedupour12-monthrecessionprobabilitybyanother5ppto

30%.

nWecontinuetoexpecttwomore25bpratecutsinSeptemberandDecemberthis

year,inpartbecauseweforecastalargerincreaseintheunemploymentrateto4.6%thantheFOMCexpects.WhiletheriskthattheFedcouldinsteadremainonholdallyearhasrisensomewhat,ourprobability-weightedFedforecastremains

meaningfullymoredovishthanmarketpricing.

23March20262

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23March20263

TheRiskstoUSInfiationfromtheWarwithIran

Ourcommoditiesstrategistsnow

expect

Brentoilpricestoaverage$105inMarchand$115inAprilbeforefallingto$80in2026Q4,refiectingtheirexpectationthatfiowsofoilthroughtheStraitofHormuzwillremainverylowfor6weeks.Theyestimatethat

Brentwouldpeakat$140inanadversescenariowherefiowsaredisruptedfor10weeksandat$160inaseverelyadversescenariowherefiowsaredisruptedfor10weeksandinfrastructuredamagecausesapersistenthittoproduction.

Moreseveredisruptionsfromthewarimplyaslightlyhigherbaselineinfiationpathandmateriallygreaterupsiderisk,inpartbecausetheyincreasetheriskofproduct

shortagesandupwardpressureoninfiationexpectations.

Exhibit1:OurOilStrategistsNowExpectOilPricestoAverage$105inMarchand$115in

AprilBeforeFallingto$80in2026Q4;TheyContinuetoSeeMoreSevereUpsideRiskstoTheirForecast

DollarsperbarrelBrentCrudeOilMonthlyAverageClosingPriceDollarsperbarrel

160160

Adverse:10Weeks(NoProductionScarring)

140Baseline:6WeeksofVeryLowFlowsThroughthe140StraitofHormuz

120120

100100

8080

6060

4040

20212022202320242025202620272028

SeverelyAdverse:10Weeks(ProductionScarring)

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,EIA

PassthroughofHigherOilandOtherCommodityPricestoInfiation

MostoftheimpactofthewaronUSinfiationwillcomefromhigheroilprices.Ourruleofthumbisthata10%increaseinoilpricesraisesheadlinePCEinfiationby0.2ppandcoreinfiationby0.04pp.Muchoftheimpactofhigheroilpricesoncoreinfiationcomesthroughtransportationservices—weestimatethata10%increaseinoilpricesraises

transportationservicesprices0.15-0.20pp(Exhibit2).

23March20264

Exhibit2:HigherOilPricesBoostTransportationServices,Sanitation,andAccommodationPricestheMost

TransportSvcs.

Water,Sanitation

Accommodations

RecreationSvcs.

OtherSvcs.

FoodSvcs.

MedicalSvcs.

Housing

FinancialSvcs.

Nondur.Goods

AutoParts

OtherDurGoods

Furnishings

Appliances

NewVehicles

SportingEquip.

Rec.Vehicles

Electronics

Clothing

Jewelry,Watches

CorePCE

Percentagepoints

Percentagepoints

OilPriceson

byComponent

ImpactofPCEPrices

10%IncreaseinOver4Quarters,

0.200.150.100.05

0.00

0.200.150.100.05

0.00

ServicesGoods

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Ourcommoditypricepassthroughmodelsuggeststhattheboostfromenergyprice

increasesinourbaselineforecasttoyear-over-yearcorePCEinfiationwillpeakat

around0.35ppin2026Q4.Underouradverseandseverelyadversescenarios,theboostfromenergypricestocorePCEinfiationwouldpeakaround0.5pp.

Exhibit3:WeEstimateThattheBoostfromCommodityPriceIncreasestoYear-Over-YearCorePCEInfiationWillPeakAround0.35ppin2026Q4inOurBaselineScenario

PercentagepointsEstimatedImpactofCommodityPrices

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

1.000.750.500.25

0.00

onYoYCorePCEInflationLumber

Agriculture/Livestock

PreciousMetal

IndustrialMetal

Energy

Total,SeverelyAdverseScenarioTotal,AdverseScenario

Total,GSBaseline

Percentagepoints

1.000.750.500.25

0.00

-0.25-0.25

20202021202220232024202520262027

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Thewarhasalso

raisedpricesofotherGulfexports

includingchemicalandmetal

productssuchasnitrogenfertilizerandaluminum(leftpanelofExhibit4).Weexpect

higherfertilizercosts,whichaccountforroughlyone-thirdofinputcostsforcertain

cropslikecorn,toboostfoodpricesbyabout1.5%thisyear,worth0.1pponheadlineinfiation.Weexpecttheboosttofoodpricestobegininmid-summerbecausefarmershave

alreadyapplied

mostofthefertilizerneededaheadofthespringplantingseasonandwillthushavelimitedexposuretohigherglobalpricesuntiltheybuyfertilizerforfall

23March20265

application.

Exhibit4:TheWarHasRaisedPricesofNon-OilGulfExports,IncludingFertilizersandAluminum;WeHaveBoostedOurForecastforPCEFoodInfiation,RefiectingtheSharpIncreaseinFertilizerPrices

Helium

Nitrogen

Fertilizer

Methanol

Sulfur

Polyethelyne

Ammonia

Aluminum

5PCEFoodInflation5

NewForecast

4Pre-WarForecast4

33

22

11

00Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25Jan-26Jul-26Jan-27

Percentchange,yearagoPercentchange,yearago

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

PercentReportedPriceIncreasesPercent

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

100

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,DepartmentofLabor,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

WeexpectshortagesandhigherpricesofGulfexportsofthesechemicalsandmetalstohaveonlyamodestimpactoncoreinfiationbecausetheirweightincoreproduction

costsislowerandtheUSproducesmanyoftheseproductsdomesticallyandcansourcethemfromelsewhereifnecessary.

Weestimatetheimpactoncoreinfiationfromdisruptionstomarketsfortheseproductsthroughtwochannels:ascarcitye仟ect,whichcapturestheinfiationarye仟ectofa

shortfallinUSproductionofotherproductsfromareductioninimportsfromGulf

countries,andaninputcoste仟ect,whichcapturestheinfiationaryimpactfromhigherglobalpricesfortheseproducts.Fortheformer,weestimatetheshareofacommodity’scostaccountedforbyimportsoftheproductsshowninExhibit4fromGulfcountriestoestimatethehittoUSproductionfromareductionintheseimportsandtranslatethe

shortageintoapricee仟ectbyassumingpriceelasticitiesof-1onaverage.Forthelatter,wemodifyourcommoditypricepassthroughframeworktoincorporatethesechemicalsandmetalproducts.

WeestimatethatthepriceincreasesfortheseproductsthathaveoccurredsofarwouldprovideaboosttocorePCEofroughly0.05pp.InamoderateriskscenarioinwhichUSimportsoftheseproductsfromGulfcountriesarereducedby30%andpricesrise

somewhatfurtherfromtheircurrentelevatedlevels,weestimateaboosttocorePCEofroughly0.1pp,with0.01ppcomingfromthehittoUSproductionandtherestcomingfromhigherinputcosts(leftpanelofExhibit5).InasevereriskscenarioinwhichUS

importsoftheseproductsfromGulfcountrieswerecuto仟entirelyandthepricesoftheseproductsdoubled,weestimateaboosttocorePCEofroughly0.3pp(rightpanelofExhibit5).

23March20266

Exhibit5:AModerateDisruptiontoAvailabilityandPricesofCertainChemicals,Metals,andFertilizersfromGulf

CountriesWouldBoostCorePCEbyRoughly0.1pp;ASevereDisruptionWhereTheseImportsfromGulfCountriesAreCutOffandPricesDoubleWouldBoostCorePCEbyRoughly0.3pp

Nondur.Goods

MedicalSvcs.

NewVehicles

Housing

OtherSvcs.

FoodSvcs.

Furnishings

Rec.Vehicles

RecreationSvcs.

OtherDurGoods

TransportSvcs.

Other

CorePCE

Nondur.Goods

MedicalSvcs.

NewVehicles

Housing

OtherSvcs.

FoodSvcs.

Furnishings

Rec.Vehicles

RecreationSvcs.

OtherDurGoods

TransportSvcs.

Other

CorePCE

0.5ContributiontotheBoosttoCorePCEfromSupplyDisruptionsandPriceIncreasesforSelectedChemicals,

Metals,andFertilizers*,byComponent0.4InputCostEffect-SevereDisruption***

ScarcityEffect-SevereDisruption***0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

PercentagepointsPercentagepoints

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

ContributiontotheBoosttoCorePCEfromSupply

DisruptionsandPriceIncreasesforSelectedChemicals,

Metals,andFertilizers*,byComponent

InputCostEffect-ModerateDisruption**ScarcityEffect-ModerateDisruption**

0.250.200.150.100.05

0.00

0.250.200.150.100.05

0.00

PercentagepointsPercentagepoints

*Includeshelium,sulfur,methanol,ammonia,nitrogen,aluminum,andallfertilizers.

**ModeratedisruptionassumesUSimportsofproductslistedabovefromGulfcountriesarereducedby30%andpricesincreaseasfollowsrelativetotheirpre-warlevels:fertilizerpricesincreaseby80%,otherchemicalspricesincreaseby60%,andaluminumpricesincreaseby30%.

***SeveredisruptionassumesUSimportsofproductslistedabovefromGulfcountriesarereducedby99%andpricesincreaseby100%fromtheirpre-warlevels.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

PotentialSecond-RoundE仟ectsThroughInfiationExpectations

Wealsoconsiderpotentialsecond-rounde仟ectsthroughinfiationexpectations.Whilesomemeasuresofexpectationscanbesensitivetoenergyprices,overthepast40yearsevenmajoroilpriceshockswherepricesroseby50%or100%didnothavelong-lastinge仟ectsoninfiationexpectations(exhibit6).Andwiththelabormarketnownotably

softerthanin2021and2022,thepotentialforameaningfulboostfromsecond-rounde仟ectsshouldbemorelimited.

Exhibit6:OverthePast40Years,EvenMajorOilPriceShocksDidNotLeaveLong-LastingEffectsonConsumerInfiationExpectations

EvolutionofLong-TermConsumerInflation

ExpectationsFollowinganOilPriceShockWhereOil

PricesIncreasedatLeastX%Within3Months

100%50%

-10123456789101112131415161718

MonthsSinceShock

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5

Index,percentagepoints(monthpriortoshock=0)

Index,percentagepoints(monthpriortoshock=0)

EvolutionofShort-TermConsumerInflation

ExpectationsFollowinganOilPriceShockWhereOil

PricesIncreasedatLeastX%Within3Months

100%50%

-10123456789101112131415161718

MonthsSinceShock

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5

Index,percentagepoints(monthpriortoshock=0)

Index,percentagepoints(monthpriortoshock=0)

Note:BasedonUniversityofMichiganmeasures.Weexcludemonthsthatoverlapwithanotheroilpriceshockwhereoilpricesincreasedbyatleast30%within3months.Weincludetwoepisodeswhereoilpricesincreasedbyatleast100%:September1990andJune2020.Weincludethreeepisodeswhereoilpricesincreasedbyatleast50%:September1990,June2020,andMarch2022.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,UniversityofMichigan

23March20267

Weupdateour

model

thatestimatesthefeedbackloopbetweenrealizedinfiationandinfiationexpectations.Underourbaselinescenario,ourmodelsuggestsonlymodest

furtherupwardpressurethroughthischannel(bluedashedlinesinExhibit7).Evenintheseverelyadversescenario,ourmodelimpliesthatrealizedinfiationwouldgetonlya

modestfurtherboostfromthefeedbackloopwithinfiationexpectations(reddashedlinesinExhibit7).

Mightinfiationexpectationsbelessanchoredintheaftermathofthepandemicinfiationsurge?Ifweadjustourmodeltoallowforthatpossibilitybymakinginfiation

expectationstwiceassensitivetorealizedinfiationasusual,weestimatethat

second-rounde仟ectsofinfiationexpectationswouldprovidea0.1ppboosttorealizedinfiationbyend-2026underourbaselinescenarioforoilpricesanda0.4ppboostunderourseverelyadversescenario.

Exhibit7:OurModelPredictsOnlyaSmallAdditionalEffectfromtheFeedbackLoopBetweenRealizedInfiationandInfiationExpectations,UnlessOilPricesSpikeMoreSharplyandInfiationExpectationsProveLessAnchoredintheAftermathofthePandemicInfiationSurge

PercentPercent

3.753.75

BaselineAdverseSeverelyAdverse

3.503.50

3.253.25

3.003.00

2.752.75

2.502.50

2.252.25

19972001200520092013201720212025

Long-TermInflationExpectations

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

19972001200520092013201720212025

Percentchange,ar8

SeverelyAdverse

Percentchange,ar8

Baseline

CoreInflationAdverse

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

5

4

3

2

1

19972001200520092013201720212025

BaselineAdverseSeverelyAdverse

Short-TermInflationExpectations

5

4

3

2

1

Percent6

Percent6

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,UniversityofMichigan,DepartmentofLabor

Accountingforourstrategists’updatedoilpriceforecasts,thelikelyboosttofoodpricesfromhigherfertilizercosts,modestpassthroughofhigherpricesforotherat-risk

commoditiestothecore,andthemodestpotentialimpactofhigherinfiation

expectations,wehaveraisedourDecember2026headlinePCEinfiationforecastbyanother0.2ppto3.1%.Thiswouldbe3.6%(withapeakof4.6%thisspring)inour

adversescenarioor4.0%(withapeakof4.9%)inourseverelyadversescenarioforoilprices.

WehavealsoraisedourDecember2026corePCEinfiationforecastbyanother0.1ppto2.5%.Inourstrategists’adverseandseverelyadversescenariosforoilprices,wewouldexpectcorePCEinfiationof2.6%inDecember2026.

23March20268

Exhibit8:WeNowExpectDecember2026HeadlinePCEInfiationof3.1%,1ppAboveOurPre-WarForecast;BothHeadlineandCorePCECouldPeakHigherinaMoreSevereRiskScenario

goPercentchange,yearagoCorePCE

55

44

33

22

GSForecast

11

Percentchange,yearago5

Actual

SeverelyAdverseScenarioAdverseScenario

NewForecast

Pre-WarForecast

4

3

2

1

5

4

3

2

1

Percentchange,yearagoHeadlinePCEPercentchange,yeara

Actual

----AdverseScenario

-SeverelyAdverseScenario

--Pre-WarForecast

----NewForecast

GSForecast

Oct-25Jan-26Apr-26Jul-26Oct-26Jan-27Apr-27Jul-27Oct-27Oct-25Jan-26Apr-26Jul-26Oct-26Jan-27Apr-27Jul-27Oct-27

Note:Baselineassumesoilpricesaverage$105inMarchand$115inAprilbeforedecliningto$80by2026Q4.Adversescenarioassumesoilpricesaverage$110inMarchand$140inAprilbeforedecliningto$100by2026Q4.Severelyadversescenarioassumesoilpricesaverage$115inMarchand$160inAprilbeforedecliningto$115by2026Q4.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Exhibit9:WeHaveRaisedOurHeadlinePCEForecastbyNearly1ppSincetheStartoftheWar,MostlyRefiectingHigherEnergyPrices

PercentagepointsContributiontoChangeinGSForecastforPercentagepoints

1.2December2026HeadlinePCEInflation1.2

SincetheStartoftheIranWar

1.01.0

0.80.8

0.60.6

0.40.4

0.20.2

0.00.0

EnergyFoodCoreHeadline

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

OtherAdjustmentstoOurEconomicForecaststoRefiectHigherOilPrices

Inadditiontothechangestoourinfiationforecastsshownabove,wehavealsomade

modestfurtheradjustmentstoourothereconomicforecaststorefiectourcommoditiesstrategists’higheroilpriceforecast.Thesechangescomeontopofthe

revisions

thatwemadeonMarch11thatalreadytookonboardanearlierincreaseinouroilprice

forecast.

Weareloweringour2026GDPgrowthbyanother0.1pp(ontopofourearlier0.3pp

23March20269

downwardrevision)to2.1%onaQ4/Q4basisor2.4%onafull-yearbasis.Ourforecastwouldfallto1.9%Q4/Q4inouradversescenarioforoilpricesand1.8%inourseverelyadversescenario.Refiectingthegreaterdownsiderisk,wehavealsobumpedupour

12-monthrecessionprobabilitybyanother5ppto30%.

Exhibit10:WeHaveLoweredOur2026Q4/Q4GDPGrowthForecastbyAnother0.1pp(on

TopofOurEarlier0.3ppDownwardRevision)to2.1%toRefiectOurHigherOilPriceForecast

PercentPercent

4.04.0Baseline

3.5AdverseOilScenario3.5SeverelyAdverseOilScenario

3.0PotentialGDPGrowth3.02.52.52.02.01.5