花旗-中东经济：重新思考海合会石油美元体系-Middle East Economics Rethinking the GCC Petrodollar Architecture-20260427

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MiddleEastEconomics

IlkerDomacAC

+971-4509-9588

ilker.domac@

GultekinIsiklarAC

+90-212-319-4915

gultekin.isiklar@

RethinkingtheGCCPetrodollarArchitecture

CITI'STAKE

DevelopmentsintheMiddleEastanduncertaintyovertheregion’spost-conflictgeopoliticalriskpremiumhaverenewedinterestinpetrodollardynamics.Muchofthecurrentdiscussiondrawsontheanalyticalframeworkinheritedfromthe1970sandreaffirmedduringthe2003-2014oilcycle.Thisnoteexamines,fromaGCCperspective,whetherthatframeworkstillfitsthearchitecturethroughwhichtheregionaccumulatesanddeploysitsoilrevenuestoday.WedocumentstructuralshiftsintherecyclingofoilproceedsandinthecompositionofGulfexternalwealth.WethenempiricallyinvestigatewhetherthisstructuralchangeisvisibleinthedataonGulfUSTreasuryholdingsanddeveloptheimplicationsforregionalfiscalpostureandsovereignwealthdeployment.Drawingonthisanalysis,wealsodiscusswhatthepost-2024architectureimpliesforthepetrodollardiscussionitself.

SeeAppendixA-1forAnalystCertification,ImportantDisclosuresandResearchAnalystAffiliations.

2

MiddleEastEconomics

27April2026CitiResearch

Overview

TheMiddleEastconflictandtheresultingeffectiveclosureoftheStraitof

Hormuzhaveproducedanoilpriceshockwithanunusualfeature.Thepricegaincomesalongsideavolumelossformostoftheregionthatwouldnormallybeits

principalbeneficiary.As

wehavenotedpreviously

,onlySaudiArabiaandtheUAE,

withtheirbypasspipelinestotheRedSeaandtoFujairah,retainmeaningful

capacitytoexportattheelevatedprice,whereastheotherGulfproducersare

largelysidelined.Thisbackdrop,togetherwiththeuncertaintyovertheregion’s

post-conflictgeopoliticalriskpremium,hasrevivedinterestinthepetrodollar

discussion.

1

Theframeworkbeingapplied,however,islargelytheoneinherited

fromthe1970sandfromthe2003–2014oilcycle.Inourview,theGulfitselfhas

evolvedinwaysthatthisframeworknolongeradequatelycaptures.

Threedevelopmentssince2014havechangedthearchitecturethroughwhich

theregionaccumulatesanddeploysitsoilrevenues.TheGulfsurplusatanygivenoilpriceissmallerthanitusedtobe,withSaudiArabiaindeficitat$70Brent.Theprincipalcounterpartyintheglobaloilmarket,theUnitedStates,hascrossedoverfrombeingthelargestnetimportertoasustainednetexporter,reversingthe

demand-sidelegofthehistoricalrecyclingchannel.Andtheinstitutionallocusof

externalassetaccumulationhasshiftedfromcentralbankreservemanagersto

sovereignwealthfundswithdifferentmandates,timehorizonsandasset

preferences.Eachoftheseiswelldocumentedinisolation;thepetrodollar

discussionhasnotyetcaughtupwiththeircombinedimplication.

ThisnoteapproachesthepetrodollarquestionfromaGCCperspective.We

documentthestructuralchangeintheregionalbalanceofpayments,the

institutionalshiftfromreservestosovereignwealthfundsandtheresulting

transformationinthecompositionofGulfexternalwealth.Wethenempirically

investigatewhetherthisstructuralchangeisvisibleinthedataonGulfUSTreasuryholdings—anexercisethatformsthecenterpieceofthenote.

Section1setsoutthethreeconditionsthatsupportedthehistoricalchannelandshowswhyeachhasweakened.Section2presentstheempiricalevidence.

Section3placestheGulfadjustmentinthebroadercontextofglobalsurplus

generation.Section4turnstotheimplicationsforregionalfiscalposture,sovereignwealthfunddeploymentandtheanalyticalreadingoftheGulfexternalbalance

sheet.Section5concludeswithasynthesisoftheanalysisandaperspectiveon

whatthepost-2014architecturemeansforthepetrodollardiscussion.

TheHistoricalChannelandItsTransformation

Inourview,threeconditionshadtoholdforthehistoricalpetrodollarchanneltooperateasconventionallyunderstood.

2

TheGulfhadtorunasizeablecurrent

accountsurplus.Theprincipalcounterpartyintheglobaloilmarket—theUnited

Statesasthelargestnetimporter—hadtohaveanexternalfinancingrequirement

1See,forinstance,“

IranWarRattlesGulfPetrodollarFoundations

,”Reuters(March25,2026)andSetser,B.W.,“

Petrodollars:MythsandReality

,”CFR(14April,2026).Thepresentnotediffersin

vantagepoint:wheremostoftherecentliteraturehasbeenwrittenfromaUSbalanceofpaymentsperspective,ourfocusistosetoutwhathaschangedintheGulfitselfandwhatthepresent

architectureimpliesforhowtheregionintermediatesitsoilproceedsgoingforward.

2Thepetrodollarconceptissometimesframedaroundtheconditionsthatsustainthedollar’sroleinoilmarkets—USoildemand,dollarinvoicingofoilandtheGulf-Washingtonsecurityrelationship.Thisnoteaddressesacomplimentaryaspect:thechannelthroughwhichGulfoilrevenuesarerecycledintodollarassets.

MiddleEastEconomics

27April2026CitiResearch

3

amplifiedbyoilimports.AndGulfauthoritieshadtobedisposedtoholdtheir

accumulatedsurplusesinreserve-typedollarinstruments,mostlyUSTreasuries

andAgencysecuritiesdeployedthroughregionalcentralbanks.Allthreeconditionsheldduringthe1973–85episodeandagainduringthe2003–2014cycle.Inour

view,eachhasweakenedsince2014andthecombinedshiftisstructuralratherthancyclical.

Takethefirstcondition,thesizeofthesurplus.SaudiArabiaaccumulateda

currentaccountsurplusofmorethanUS$1trillionover2005–2015.In2024and2025,withBrentaveraginginthe$70s,theKingdomranoutrightcurrentaccountdeficits,financingitsdevelopmentprogramsthroughdomesticassetdrawdownsanddollarbondissuanceratherthanthroughexternalaccumulation.The

aggregateGCCsurplusstoodataroundUS$120bnin2025,wellbelowthelevelsseeninthepreviouscycleatcomparableoilprices,withSaudideficitsoffsetting

modestsurpluseselsewhereintheregion(Figure1).Thefiscalbalancehas

deterioratedstructurallyoverthesameperiod:theGCCgeneralgovernment

balancemovedfromfrequentsurplusesthrough2014,ofteninthehighsingle

digitsandlowdoubledigitsasashareofGDPduringthe2003–2014cycle,toa

morevariablepatternofsmallsurplusesanddeficitssince2015,withmaterial

negativereadingsin2015–2016and2020(Figure15).Thebreakintheregional

fiscalposturepre-datesthepresentshockand,inourview,isunlikelytounwindinthenearterm.

Figure1.GCCCurrentAccountBalancesandOilPrices

-1000

2000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024

BHKWOMQASAAEOilprices(RHS)

US$/barrel

120

100

80

60

40

20

US$bn

500

400

300

200

100

0

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics

Figure2.GCCIssuanceandOilPrices

2000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024

GCCissuance(%ofGDP,LHS)Oilprices(US$,inverted)

US$/barrel

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

%ofGDP

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,Bloomberg

Thefinancingsideofthisfiscalshiftisvisibledirectlyinregionalbondissuance

(Figure2).Duringthe2003-14cycle,withsurplusesaccumulating,GCCsovereignandquasi-sovereignUSdollarissuancewasasmallshareofregionalGDP—therewaslittlereasontoborrowexternallywhentheregionwasaccumulatingdollars.Since2014,thepatternhasreversed.Issuancehasrunbetween4%and8%of

GDP,withpeaksin2020and2024atoilpricesthatduringthepreviouscyclewouldhaveproducedreserveaccumulationratherthanexternalborrowing.

Thesecondcondition,USabsorptioncapacity,hasbeentransformed.Whenthepetrodollarconceptwasdevelopedandrefined,theUSranalargeexternaldeficitthatwasamplifiedbyoilimports,withnetoilimportspeakingatcloseto13mb/dinthemid-2000s(Figures3-4).USTreasuryissuanceintothisdeficitwasthe

naturalcounterpartyforaccumulatedGulfsurpluses,givingthechannelitsself-

stabilizingcharacter.Thepictureisnowmarkedlydifferent.TheUnitedStates

crossedovertonetexporterstatusinpetroleumproductsandcrudein2019–2020,hasremainedthere,andisnowthelargestoilproducerintheworld.Theswingof

around15mbdrelativetothemid-2000speakisoneofthelargerstructuralshifts

4

intheglobaloilmarketinthepost-warperiod.Higheroilprices,whichusedto

widentheUSexternaldeficitandpullGulfreservestowardUSTreasurymarkets,

nownarrowthedeficitinstead.ThereductioninUSabsorptioncapacityis

independentofanychangeinGulfinstitutionalbehavior.Itisafeatureoftheglobaloilmarketitself,anditconditionstheenvironmentinwhichtheGulfnowdeploysitsexternalassets.

Fig3GCCdUSShfGlblCdOilPdtin

ure.an

aresooaruerouco

%

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

199019931996199920022005200820112014201720202023

GCCUSA

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics

Figure4.USNetImportsofOilandPetroleumProducts

mb/d

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

199019972004201120182025

USNetImportsofCrudeOilandPetroleumProducts

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics

ThethirdconditionconcernswhereintheGulfinstitutionallandscapethe

surplusactuallyendsup.Inbothearlierepisodes,ameaningfulsharesatonthe

balancesheetsofGulfmonetaryauthoritiesandwasdeployedintoUSTreasuries,Agencysecuritiesandtheinternationalbankingsystem.Thathaschanged:the

marginalGulfsurplusisnowintermediatedthroughsovereignwealthfundsratherthancentralbankreservemanagers—thePublicInvestmentFundinSaudiArabia,Mubadala,ADQandtheAbuDhabiInvestmentAuthorityinAbuDhabi,theQatarInvestmentAuthorityandtheKuwaitInvestmentAuthoritybeingtheprincipal

vehicles.TheclearestexpressionoftheshiftisthedivergencebetweenGulfcurrentaccountflowsandGulfcentralbankreserves.Through2003–2014,thetwoseriestrackedclosely.From2014,theyhavedecoupled:thecumulativeGCCcurrent

accountsurplussince1990hasgrownfromaroundUS$2.5trillionatend-2014toaroundUS$3.5trillionatend-2024,butcentralbankreserveshavestagnatedindollartermsanddeclinedasashareofGCCGDP.Thesurplushasnotdisappeared.Itisbeingintermediatedthroughdifferentchannels.

Figure5.GCCCurrentAccountBalanceandReserves

US$bn

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

-50

-100

198019841988199219962000200420082012201620202024

GCCCABGCCReserves(RHS)

US$bn

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics

5

TheSWFcomplexontheothersideofthisdivergencehasgrowntoascalethatdwarfsthecentralbankbalancesheets.AggregateAUMatthemajorGCCSWFsexceedUS$4.5trillion,withADIA,KIAandPIFeachmanagingclosetoorabove

US$1trillionindividually(Figure6).SetagainstaggregatecentralbankreservesofaroundUS$830bn,theSWFcomplexisnowseveraltimeslargerthanthereservemanagementcomplex;thegapwasmuchnarrowertwodecadesago.

Korniyenko

andXin(2025)

(IMF,Sep-2025),usingdeal-leveldata,documentaprogressive

reorientationofsovereignwealthfunddeploymenttowardequity,privateassets

anddirectstrategicinvestmentfromthemid-2010s.

Evidence

(gccbusinesswatch,1-Oct-2024)pointstoaconsistentstory:themajorGCCSWFscollectively

deployedaroundUS$55bninthefirst9monthsof2024,mostlyintoequity,

privateequityanddirecttransactionsratherthanfixedincome.Thestocknumbersarelargeintheirownright.Accordingtothe

EWNdatabase

,Gulfexternalwealth

hasexpandedfromaroundUS$500bnin1995toaboveUS$7trillionby2024,withportfolioequitythelargestsinglecomponentoftheexpansion(Figure7).

Figure6.KeyGCCSWFsbyAssetsunderManagement

US$bn

OmanInvestmentAuthority

DubaiInvestmentFund EmiratesInvestmentAuthorityAbuDhabiDev.HoldingCompany MubadalaInvestmentCompany InvestmentCorporationofDubaiQatarInvestmentAuthority

PublicInvestmentFundKuwaitInvestmentAuthority

AbuDhabiInvestmentAuthority

020040060080010001200

KeySWFsinGCC

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,SWFI

Figure7.TheCompositionofGCCTotalForeignAssets

US$tn

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

PortfolioEquityAssets

PortfolioDebtAssets

FXReservesMinusGold

199519971999200120032005200720092011201320152017201920212023

FDI

OtherInvAssetsTFA(US$trn)

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.

Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics,TheEWNdatabase,BrookingsInstitution

ToestablishthatthisisaGulf-specificstructuralpatternratherthanaglobal

trendtheregionisparticipatingin,webenchmarktheGCCagainsta

representativeEMpeergroup.WeusethemedianacrossChile,Hungary,India,

SouthKorea,thePhilippines,Poland,ThailandandTurkey(Figure8).TheGulfis

dramaticallyover-weightinportfolioequity,withtheGCCsharefluctuatinginthe25–40%rangeandreachingover40%by2024,againstanEMmedianthathas

stayedinthelowsingledigits.TheGulfhasrotatedoutofreservesmore

aggressivelythanthepeergroup,withtheGCCsharefallingfromapeakofaround25%inthemid-2000stoaround10%by2024,againstanEMmedianthathas

fallenmoregraduallyfromaround50%toaround30%.AndtheGulfhasnot

followedtheEMtemplateofbuildingoutwardFDIasasubstituteforreserves:theEMmedianFDIsharehasrisenfromabout4%in1994toaround30%by2024,

whiletheGCCsharehasplateauedataround10%.Thesubstituteforreservesin

theGulfhasbeenportfolioequityratherthandirectinvestment,consistentwith

thedeploymentpatternsatPIF,ADIA,KIAandQIA.TheGulf’sexternalbalance

sheetisstructurallydistinctfromtheEMpeergroup—equity-heavy,reserves-lightandFDI-modest.Forward-lookinganalysisofregionalexternalbalancesshould

takethisastheoperatingrealityofthepost-2014system.

TheGulfsurplusissmaller,theinstitutionsintermediatingithavedifferentassetpreferencesandtheglobaloilmarket’sprincipalcounterpartyhasstructurally

changed.Theresultisarecyclingarchitecturethatbearsonlyapartialresemblancetotheonethatoperatedthrough2014.Thevolumeofflowhasnotcollapsed;whathaschangedistheinstitutionalvehiclethroughwhichitisnowmanaged.Whether

6

thecombinedshiftislargeenoughtoshowupinthebenchmarkindicatorofthehistoricalchannel—GulfUSTreasuryholdingsasashareofUSpublicdebt—isthequestionweturntonext.

Figure8.TotalForeignAssetsandExternalInvestments:GCCversusEM

%(c)FDIAssets(%ofTFA)

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

1995199820012004200720102013201620192022GCC:FDI(%ofTFA)EM:FDI(%ofTFA)

PEA(%ofTFA)

FDI(%ofTFA)

PDA(%ofTFA)

OIN(%ofTFA)

FXRMG(%ofTFA)

19951999200320072011201520192023

%(a)GCC'sExternalInvestments(%ofTFA)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

%(b)PortfolioEquityAssets(%ofTFA)

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

1995199820012004200720102013201620192022GCC:PEA(%ofTFA)EM:PEA(%ofTFA)

%(d)FXReservesMinusGold(%ofTFA)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1995199820012004200720102013201620192022GCC:FXRMG(%ofTFA)EM:FXRMG(%ofTFA)

%(f)OtherInvestmentAssets(%ofTFA)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1995199820012004200720102013201620192022GCC:OIN(%ofTFA)EM:OIN(%ofTFA)

%(e)PortfolioDebtAssets(%ofTFA)

25

20

15

10

5

0

1995199820012004200720102013201620192022GCC:PDA(%ofTFA)EM:PDA(%ofTFA)

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.

TFA:TotalforeignAssets,PEA:Portfolioequityassets,PDA:Portfoliodebtassets,FXRMG:FXreservesminusgoldandOIN:Otherinvestmentassets.

Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics,TheEWNdatabase,BrookingsInstitution

EmpiricalEvidence

Ifthethreeconditionshaveweakenedtogether,theconsequenceshouldshowupinthebenchmarkindicatorofthehistoricalchannel:GulfUSTreasury

holdingsasashareofUSpublicdebt.PlottingtheGCCshareagainstoilprices

makesapparenttothepost-2019breakapparenttotheeye(Figure9).The

empiricalexercisethatfollowsquantifiesthemagnitudeofthatbreakandtests

whetheritisrobusttoconfoundingfactorsandalternativespecifications.We

constructanannualseriesfortheGCCshareoffederaldebtheldbythepublicfrom1990,modelitshistoricalrelationshipwithoilpricesover1990–2019andthenaskwhethertherelationshipholdswhenprojectedforwardto2020–2024.

AscanbeseenfromFigure9,therelationshipwastightfromtheearly1990s

through2019.Themid-1990s,withoilinthe$15–20range,sawtheGulfshareat0.4–0.7%.The2003–2008surgetookituproughlythreefold,toapeakabove2%in2008.Thehigh-oilregimeof2011–2014sustaineditinthe1.4–1.8%range.Theco-movementbetweenoilandtheGulfshareisvisibletotheeyeandconsistentwiththeoperationofthehistoricalchannel.

MiddleEastEconomics

27April2026CitiResearch

7

Figure9GCCUSTreasuryHoldingsandOilPrices

US$/barrel12010080604020

0

2018

Oilprices(US$,RHS)

.

%

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

1990

19972004

GCCUSTholdings(%ofUSpublicdebt)

2011

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics

Weestimatethehistoricalrelationshipusingaparsimoniousautoregressive

specification.TheshareoftheGCCholdingsinUSdebtheldbypublicismodelledasafunctionofitsownone-yearlag,thelogoftheannualaverageBrentpriceandadummyfor2008–2009tocontrolfortherapidexpansionofUSdebtissuance

duringtheacutephaseoftheglobalfinancialcrisis.Specifically,weconsiderthefollowingmodel:

GCCSTt=c+ρ·GCCSt_₁+β·ln(Oilt)+φ·DGFCt+ut

whereGCCSTdenotestheGCCshareoffederaldebtheldbythepublic,OilistheannualaverageBrentpriceindollarsperbarrel3andDGFCequalsonein2008–2009andzerootherwise.TheestimationresultsarepresentedinFigure10.

Figure10.EstimationResultsfortheGCCshareofUSPublicDebt(1991–2019)

Coefficient

Std.Error

t-Statistic

Constant-0.680.21-3.18

GCCSTt-10.470.114.17

log(OILt)0.350.084.52

DUMGFC0.280.151.82

Otherstatictics

Adj.R-squared=0.86

F-statistic=58.9Breusch-Godfrey=F-stat0.75(p=0.39)

#ofobservations=29Jarque-Bera=0.66

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics

3Wepreferthelogspecificationforatleasttworeasons.First,Brenthasrangedacrossroughlyanorderofmagnitudeoverthesample(fromaround$15toabove$130)andlogshandlethisrangenaturallywithoutgivingdisproportionateweighttohigh-priceobservations.Second,alog

specificationimpliesthatproportionalchangesinoildriveproportionalchangesintheGCCshare,whichfitsthehistoricaldatamoretightlythanthelevelsalternative.

8

Allcoefficientscarrytheexpectedsigns.Theconstantandthelaggeddependentvariablearesignificantatthe1%level,withtheAR(1)coefficientof0.47indicatingmoderatepersistenceinGulfTreasuryholdingsasashareofUSpublicdebt.Theoilcoefficientof0.35issignificantatthe1%level,confirmingthatasustained

increaseinthelogBrentpricetranslatedreliablyintoahigherGulfshare.TheGFCdummycarriestheexpectedpositivesignandissignificantat10%;weretainit

becausethe2008–2009expansionofUSissuanceisadocumentedfeatureofthesamplethattheequationshouldaccountfor.Thefitisstrongandresidualsshownoevidenceofserialcorrelation.Theimpliedlong-runsensitivity,β/(1−ρ),is

around0.66ppperunitlogchangeinoil,inlinewiththehistoricalrangeof

variationintheGulfshareacrosstheoilcycle.Wethenprojecttheequation

forwarddynamicallyto2020–2024usingtheobservedpathofBrent.Thedynamicprojectionfeedsthepredictedlagforwardthrougheachyear,whichisthe

appropriatetestofwhethertherelationshipcontinuestoholdratherthanaskingonlywhetherone-period-aheaderrorsaresmall.ForecastresultsarepresentedinFigure11.

Figure11.Out-of-sampleforecastresults,2020–2024

Observed(%)

Predicted(%)

Std.error

Gap(pp)Dollargap(US$bn)USpublicdebt(US$tn)

2020

1.051.390.200.347421.7

2021

0.971.460.220.4911423.2

2022

0.991.620.240.6315524.6

2023

0.991.620.240.6417227.0

2024

1.041.620.240.5816728.9

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics

Inourview,the2022observationisthemostinformativesingleyear.WithBrentaveragingcloseto$100ontheRussia-Ukraineshockandconditionalonthe

previousyear’sobservedshare,theequationpredictsaGulfshareofaround1.62%;theobservedsharewasapproximately0.99%,agapof0.63pp.Translatingeach

year’sgapintodollars(gapinpercentagepointsmultipliedbyfederaldebtheldbythepublic),givesannualshortfallsrisingfromroughlyUS$74bnin2020toroughlyUS$167bnin2024.Theyear-by-yeardeviationsarelarge,consistentlynegative

andwidenthroughtheforecastwindow,pointingtoastructuralbreakinthe

relationshipratherthantransientnoise.Theformaldiagnosticsalsosupportthisconjecture.Fourofthefiveforecastyears(2021through2024)rejectconsistencywiththehistoricalrelationshipatthe5%threshold,with2022and2023rejectingatthe1%level.TheTheilbiasproportionofabout0.96,withnegligiblevariance

andcovariancecomponents,indicatesthaterrorsaresystematicandone-

directionalratherthanrandom.Ourempiricalresultsarealsorobustacross

alternativespecifications—oilinlevelsratherthanlogs,varyingtheGFCdummy

specificationsandaftercontrollingforthe10-yearUSTreasuryyieldandaggregateGCCoilproductiongrowth.

9

Figure12.GCCUSTHoldings(%ofUSdebt):Actual,FittedandForecast

%

199019931996199920022005200820112014201720202023

ActualFittedForecast+/-2SE

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Fcst

©2026CitigroupInc.NoredistributionwithoutCitigroup’swrittenpermission.Source:CitiResearch,HaverAnalytics

ThesameshiftcanbetracedthroughthecompositionofGCCexternalwealth.

AsashareofGCCtotalforeignassets(TFA),USTreasuryholdingshavedeclinedmeaningfullyfromtheir2008peak.WithintheGulf’sdebt-assetportfolio(PDA)specifically,however,USTreasuriesremainasubstantials