经济学（微观）（英文版原书第7版）课件 第16章　定价策略

EconomicsSeventhEditionChapter16PricingStrategyCopyright©2019,2017,2015PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReserved.ChapterOutline16.1

PricingStrategy,theLawofOnePrice,andArbitrage16.2

PriceDiscrimination:ChargingDifferentPricesfortheSameProduct16.3

OtherPricingStrategiesPrice,orPrices?Untilnow,wehaveassumedthatfirmschargeasinglepricefortheirproducts.Isthismodelgoodenough?Wewillask:Whenisitpossibleforafirmtochargedifferentpricesforthesameproduct?Whywouldafirmwanttochargedifferentprices?Wouldsuchapracticeincreaseordecreaseefficiency?Whatotherpricingstrategiesmakesenseforfirmstouse?16.1PricingStrategy,theLawofOnePrice,andArbitrageDefinethelawofonepriceandexplaintheroleofarbitrage.Supposethattwoidenticalproductssoldfordifferentprices.Example:AnAppleiPadmightsellfor$499instoresinAtlantaandfor$429instoresinSanFrancisco.Whatdoyouthinkwouldhappen?AnentrepreneurwouldstartbuyingiPadsinSanFrancisco,shippingthemtoAtlanta,andsellingthemfor$499(oralittleless).Thispracticeofbuyingaproductinonemarketandresellingitinamarketwithahigherpriceisknownasarbitrage.ArbitrageandtheLawofOnePriceIfthisarbitragecanoccur,whatwillhappentopricesinAtlanta(wherethepriceiscurrently$499)andSanFrancisco(wherethepriceiscurrently$429)?ThesupplyofiPadsinAtlantawillrise,decreasingthepriceinAtlanta.ThesupplyofiPadsinSanFranciscowillfall,increasingthepriceinSanFrancisco.IfitwerecompletelyfreetotransportiPadsfromSanFranciscotoAtlanta,thepricewouldconvergetobeingexactlythesameineachlocation;thisisthe“lawofoneprice”.TheLawofOnePriceandTransactionCostsTherearetransactioncostsfortransportingtheiPadsfromSanFranciscotoAtlanta.Transactioncosts:Thecostsintimeandotherresourcesthatpartiesincurintheprocessofagreeingtoandcarryingoutanexchangeofgoodsorservices.Weonlyexpectthelawofonepricetoholdperfectlywhentransactioncostsarezero.Canonlyapplyifresaleispossible.Example:Resellinghaircuts;sothelawofonepricewillnotapplytohaircuts.Table16.1WhichInternetRetailerWouldYouBuyFrom?(1of2)Sometimesfirmsappeartobesellingthesameproductatdifferentprices,violatingtheruleofoneprice.Example:Thesameblu-raydiscmaysellfordifferentpricesondifferentwebsites.Butisthesamemovieondifferentwebsitesreallythesameproduct?Considerthetablebelow:Product:StarWars:TheLastJediBlu-rayDiscblankblankCompanyPriceWhatdoesthissiteofferyou?A$22.96Fastdeliverytoyourhome.Securepackaging.Easypaymenttoyourcreditcardusingasecuremethodthatkeepsyourcreditcardnumbersafefromcomputerhackers.22.96Fastdeliverytoyourhome.Securepackaging.Easypaymenttoyourcreditcardusingasecuremethodthatkeepsyourcreditcardnumbersafefromcomputerhackers.WaitForeverForYourO21.50LowpriceJustStartedinBusinessLastW20.25LowpriceTable16.1WhichInternetRetailerWouldYouBuyFrom?(2of2)Somepeoplemightbewillingtotakeariskonthelastsite,inordertosaveacoupleofdollars.ButmanywouldbuyfromAorWinstead;herethe“product”mightrefernotonlytothephysicaldisc,buttrustingthecompanytodeliveritontime,nottoresellyourcreditcardinformation,etc.Product:StarWars:TheLastJediBlu-rayDiscblankblankCompanyPriceWhatdoesthissiteofferyou?A$22.96Fastdeliverytoyourhome.Securepackaging.Easypaymenttoyourcreditcardusingasecuremethodthatkeepsyourcreditcardnumbersafefromcomputerhackers.22.96Fastdeliverytoyourhome.Securepackaging.Easypaymenttoyourcreditcardusingasecuremethodthatkeepsyourcreditcardnumbersafefromcomputerhackers.WaitForeverForYourO21.50LowpriceJustStartedinBusinessLastW20.25Lowprice16.2PriceDiscrimination:ChargingDifferentPricesfortheSameProductExplainhowafirmcanincreaseitsprofitsthroughpricediscrimination.Supposeyougowithyourfamilytoseeamovie:Asastudent,youwillprobablygeta“studentdiscount.”Yourgrandparentsmightgeta“seniordiscount.”Yourparentswillprobablyhavetopayfullprice.Themovietheaterwillchargethesedifferentprices,eventhoughitcoststhemtheexactsameamounttoshowthemovietoeachoneofyou.Thisisanexampleofpricediscrimination:chargingdifferentpricestodifferentcustomersforthesameproductwhenthepricedifferencesarenotduetodifferencesincost.Discrimination?Isn’tThatIllegal?Discriminationonthebasisofarbitrarycharacteristics,suchasraceorgender,isgenerallyillegalundercivilrightslaws.Pricediscriminationisperformed,however,onthebasisofwillingnessandabilitytopayandassuchisgenerallylegal.Example:Studentsandtheelderlytendtobepoorerthanadultsofworkingage,sotheirwillingnesstopayforamovietickettendstobelower.Therearesomegrayareas.Carinsurancecompaniestypicallychargelowerpricestowomenthantomen,becausemenhavemoreaccidentsthanwomen.Butwhatifacarcompanydeterminedthatoneracetendedtohavemoreaccidentsthananother?WhenIsPriceDiscriminationPossible?Pricediscriminationispossiblewhen:Firmspossessmarketpower.Otherwise,thefirmisaprice-taker.Identifiablegroupsofconsumershavedifferentwillingnesstopayfortheproduct.Ifthefirmcannotidentifydifferentgroups,itcannotexpecttochargethosegroupsdifferentprices.Arbitrageoftheproductisnotpossible.Eitherbecauseresellingtheproductisnotlogicallypossible(aneducation,forexample)orbecausethetransactioncostsinvolvedmakeresaleimpractical.ApplytheConcept:MilitaryDiscountsattheHomeDepotHomeDepotisahomeandgardensupplystore.Itoffersa10percentdiscounttomilitarypersonnel,reservists,andtotheirfamilies.HomeDepotcertainlyhassomemarketpowerandcanidentifymilitarypersonnelusingtheirmilitaryidentificationcards.Butdoesn’tarbitrageseempossible?Somepossiblereasonswhythisprogramdoesn’tgetabused:A10percentdiscountisrelativelysmall.Peoplemightconsideritimmoraltoabusethediscount.Transactioncosts(theinconvenienceofhavingsomeoneelsebuygoodsforyou)arehigh.Canyouthinkofothers?GroupsofConsumerswithDifferentWillingnesstoPayIffirmscanpracticepricediscrimination,whowilltheychargeahigherpriceto?GroupswithahigherdemandThesepeoplearewillingtopaymore,andfirmswillprofitbychargingthemmore.GroupswithalowerpriceelasticityofdemandThesepeoplearelesssensitivetoprice;raisingthepriceonthemwillresultinfewerofthemceasingtousetheproduct.Figure16.1PriceDiscriminationbyaMovieTheaterDemandformoviesishigherintheeveningthantheafternoon.Intheafternoon,theprofit-maximizingpriceforatickettoanafternoonshowingis$8.50,usingMC=MR.Whendemandishigherintheevening,theprofit-maximizingpriceishigher.YieldManagementYieldmanagementisthepracticeofcontinuallyadjustingpricestotakeintoaccountfluctuationsindemandinordertomaximizeprofit.Example:Airlinesadjustpricesofflightsdependingonhowfulltheflightis,andwhattheyanticipatedemandfortheflightwillbebeforedeparture.Yieldmanagementisasophisticatedformofpricediscriminationthatreliesongatheringandunderstandingdataaboutyourcustomersandtheirbehavior.Airlines:theKingsofPriceDiscriminationAirlinesdividetheircustomersintotwomaincategories:businesstravelersandleisuretravelers.Businesstravelersaregenerallylesssensitivetoprice,soprofit-maximizationsuggestschargingthemmore.Butnoonewouldvolunteertheinformationthattheywereabusinesstraveler,ifitmeanttheywouldpaymore.Instead,airlinesseektoinferthisinformation,from:Howfarinadvanceyouarebookingtheticket,andHowlongyouwillstay.Figure16.233customersand27differentpricesThefigureillustratespricediscriminationonaUnitedAirlinesflightfromChicagotoLosAngeles.Noticethatpeoplewhoboughtticketsmorethan14daysinadvancegenerallypaidlowerprices.Buttherearesomeexceptions,suggestingyieldmanagementbytheairline.ApplytheConcept:BigDataandtheRiseofDynamicPricingDynamicpricingreflectstheideathatpricesarecontinuallyadjustedasnewdatabecomeavailable.Unsurprisingly,airlineshaveembraceddynamicpricing.Butotherfirmshavealso;forexample,theIndianapolisZoovariesitspricebetween$8and$30,“basedonadvancesalesandexpecteddemand.”Similarly,onlineretailerslikeAarewell-knownforgatheringandusinguserdata.PerfectPriceDiscriminationPerfectorfirst-degreepricediscriminationreferstochargingeveryconsumerapriceexactlyequaltotheirwillingnesstopayforaproduct.Inthiscase,everyconsumerwouldbuytheproduct,butconsumersurpluswouldbezero:thefirmwouldextractallsurplusfromthemarket.Perfectpricediscriminationisprobablyimpossibleinpractice;butitcanillustrateasurprisingresult:pricediscriminationmightincreaseeconomicefficiency.Figure16.3PerfectPriceDiscrimination

(1of2)Inthispanel,themonopolistcannotprice-discriminate.Asusual,themonopolistchoosesthequantitywhereMC=MR.ManyconsumerswhoarewillingtopaymorethanMCmissout;thisisadeadweightloss.Figure16.3PerfectPriceDiscrimination(2of2)Nowweallowthemonopolisttoperfectlypricediscriminate.Itsellstoeveryconsumerwithawillingnesstopaygreaterthanthemarginalcost;thismaximizesprofit.Thenthemonopolistwillselltheefficientquantity!ResultsofPriceDiscriminationWeknowthatpricediscriminationincreasesprofitsforfirms(otherwisetheywouldn’tdoit).Butitalsodecreasesconsumersurplus.Overall,canwesaythatpricediscriminationincreaseseconomicefficiency(i.e.decreasesdeadweightloss)?Unfortunately,notalways—theresultsofpricediscriminationonoverallwelfareareambiguous.Figure16.4PriceDiscriminationacrossTimeAlessobviouswayinwhichfirmspricediscriminateisacrosstime.Forexample,bookpublishersoftensellahardcoverversion,andsomemonthslater,releaseamuchcheaper,paperbackversion.Theproductioncostissimilar.Thepublishersimplywantstodeterminewhoisahugefanandcan’twaittoreadthebook,andhenceiswillingtopaymore;thesepeoplewillgetchargedmore.CanPriceDiscriminationBeIllegal?In1936,CongresspassedtheRobinson-PatmanAct,anantitrustlawthat:outlawedpricediscriminationthatreducedcompetitioncontainedlanguagethatcouldbeinterpretedasmakingillegalallpricediscriminationInthe1960s,theFederalTradeCommissiontestedthescopeofthislaw,suingBordenInc.forsellingevaporatedmilkunderitsownbrand,andunderastorebrand,fortwodifferentprices.Thecourtsruledthatsuchpricediscriminationincreasedratherthanreducedcompetitionandhavegenerallyfollowedthispatterninsubsequentyears.16.3OtherPricingStrategiesExplainhowsomefirmsincreasetheirprofitsbyusingoddpricing,cost-pluspricing,andtwo-parttariffs.Manyfirmsuseoddpricing:charging$4.95insteadof$5.00,or$199insteadof$200.Why?Thestrongestreasonforthecontinuationofoddpricingistheapparentpsychologicaleffectthatithasonconsumers.Researchershavetestedthisbyestimatingdemandcurvesforitemsstatistically,thensurveyingpeopletofindouthowmuchtheywouldbuyifthepricewere,say,$9.99insteadof$10.00.Thispricedifferenceshouldresultinaverysmallincreaseinquantitydemanded.Buttheactualincreaseinquantitydemandedisgenerallymuchlargerthanexpected.Cost-PlusPricingManyfirmsusecost-pluspricing:pricinganitemequaltosomefixedpercentageaboveaveragetotalcost.Intheory,thisapproachisincorrect:profitmaximizationrequirespricingwhereMC=MR.Inpractice,cost-pluspricingcomesclosetoachievingprofit-maximizationintwosituations:WhenmarginalcostandaveragecostareroughlyequalWhenafirmhasdifficultyestimatingitsdemandcurveParticularlyinthelattercase,cost-pluspricingcanbeusefulifthefirmcanidentifywhichproductsarelikelytohavemoreorlesspriceelasticdemandandadjustthemarkupaccordingly.ApplytheConcept:Cost-PlusPricinginthePublishingIndustry(1of2)Cost-pluspricingiscommoninthepublishingindustry,whereitisoftendifficulttoassigncosts(labor,etc.)toparticularbooks.Acommonapproachistomultiplythephysicalcostofproductionby7or8toarriveatthefinalpriceofthebook.Thecostsontherightareforabookexpectedtosell5000copies;averagecostperbookis$4.50.PlantCostsBlank

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Typesetting$3,500Blank

Otherplantcosts2,000ManufacturingCosts

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Printing$5,750BlankPaper6,250BlankBinding5,000TotalProductionCost

BlankBlankBlankBlank$22,500ApplytheConcept:Cost-PlusPricinginthePublishingIndustry(2of2)7timesthisgives$31.50;thebookwouldlikelysellforaroundthisprice.Thepublisherwouldreceiveabout60percentofthis……andtheamountabovetheaveragecostwouldbeusedtopayforsalaries,marketing,royalties,warehousing…andprofit.PlantCostsBlank

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Typesetting$3,500Blank

Otherplantcosts2,000ManufacturingCosts

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Printing$5,750BlankPaper6,250BlankBinding5,000TotalProductionCost

BlankBlankBlankBlank$22,500Two-PartTariffsAnotherpricingstrategythatafirmcanuseisatwo-parttariff:asituationinwhichconsumerspayoneprice(ortariff)fortherighttobuyasmuchofarelatedgoodastheywantatasecondprice.Memberships,likeatSam’sCluboryourlocaltennisclub,oftenworkthisway.Phonecompaniesalsousethisapproach,withamonthlychargeplusafee(orperhapsnone)foradditionalminutes.Whywouldcompaniesusesuchapricingstrategy?Wewillinvestigateby