摩根士丹利-石油手册：中东产量恢复速度有多快？-The Oil Manual：How Fast Can Middle East Production Return-20260601

Morganstanley

June1,202603:50AMGMT

RESEARCHGLoBALlDEA

TheOilManual

HowFastCanMiddleEastProductionReturn?

Weadjustourmodellingassumptionsforre-openingofthe

Straitaswellasthepathofproductionrecovery.Ourbasecasecallsforatight3Qwithfurtherinventorydrawsahead.Brent

pricesmayhavefallenbutwesticktoour2Q/3QBrentforecastsandraiseour4Q/1Qestimatesmodestly.

KeyTakeaways

WemoveourmodellingassumptionforinflectioninStraitofHormuzoilexportstolateJuly,fromend-Maybefore

Inaddition,wefine-tuneourestimateforproductionrecoverypost-Hormuzopeningslightly,from70%recoveryover3months,to75%recoverover4months

TheircombinedeffectisaBrentmarketthatremainsbroadlyastightin3Qasitwasin2Qwithfurtherinventorydrawsahead

LargeUSoilexportsandlowimportsintoChinahaveshieldedtherestoftheoilmarket,butwhetherthiscanlastthroughout3Qisuncertain

Inflation-adjusted,Brenthasfallentoits20-yearmedian,pricinginacleanandnear-termrecovery;fromhere,however,risksappearsskewedtotheupside

Exhibit1:Ininflation-adjustedterms,thecurrentBrentpricesitspreciselyatthe50thpercentileofthepricedistributionoverthelast20years-themost-commonpricedespitethemost-unusualsupplydisruption

MoRGANSTANLEy&Co.INTERNATioNALpLc+MartijnRats,CFA

EquityAnalystandCommoditiesStrategist

Martijn.Rats@

+44207425-6618

CharlotteFirkins

CommoditiesStrategist

Charlotte.Firkins@

+44207425-3866

AmyGower(AmySergeant),CFACommoditiesStrategist

Amy.Gower1@

+44207677-6937

Exhibit2:WereviseourBrentpriceforecastsfor4Qand1Q27modestlyhigher

Previousresearch:

•TheOilManual:SPRTracker:HowMuchHasBeenReleased?What'sNext?(28May2026)

•TheOilManual:WhyisthePriceofOilNotHigher?(11May2026)

•TheOilManual:USGasoline:TightBalance;FairValueForNow(4May2026)

•TheOilManual:Schrodinger'sStrait(27Apr2026)

•TheOilManual:HormuzClosure–SixWeeksIn:WhereDoWeStand?(13Apr2026)

•TheOilManual:'Paper'vs'Physical'Oil-AShortPrimer(7Apr2026)

•TheOilManual:StraitofHormuz-PhysicalAirPocketArrivingNow(30Mar2026)

•TheOilManual:StraitofHormuz:AirPocket(16Mar2026)

MorganStanleydoesandseekstodobusinesswith

companiescoveredinMorganStanleyResearch.Asaresult,investorsshouldbeawarethatthefirmmayhaveaconflictofinterestthatcouldaffecttheobjectivityofMorganStanley

Research.InvestorsshouldconsiderMorganStanley

Researchasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.

Foranalystcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,refertotheDisclosureSection,locatedattheendofthisreport.

+=Analystsemployedbynon-U.S.affiliatesarenotregisteredwithFINRA,maynotbeassociatedpersonsofthememberandmaynotbesubjecttoFINRArestrictionson

communicationswithasubjectcompany,publicappearancesandtradingsecuritiesheldbyaresearchanalystaccount.

2

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALlDEA

•TheOilManual:IranScenarios-Updated(2Mar2026)

•TheOilManual:IranScenarios(23Feb2026)

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLobALIdEA

HowFastCanMiddleEastProductionRecover?

Thepuzzle,again

Inrecentdays,thefront-monthBrentfuturehasfallentoabout$92abarrel.Themostintriguingfeatureofthatnumberishowunremarkableitis.AdjustthepasttwentyyearsofBrentpricesforinflation,andtoday'slevelsitsexactlyatthe50thpercentileofthedistribution—

i.e.today

'spriceisthehistoricmedian.

Itisneitheranexaggerationnorhyperbolethatthecurrentsupplyshockisthelargestinhistory,andyet,ithasproducedapricethatis,statistically,themostordinaryofthelasttwodecades.Itisbarelyabovethe~$80'mode'ofthishistoricaldistribution(i.e.thepricethat,inrealterms,hasoccurredmostfrequently)towardwhichweeventuallyexpect

pricestoconvergeoncethedisruptionhascleared.

Whenwelastwrote,inWhyisthePriceofOilNotHigher?(11May),wesetoutwhypriceshadrisenfarlessthanthescaleoftheshockimplied:themarketenteredtheconflictwithsubstantialbuffers,ithaspersistentlyexpectedanimminentreopeningoftheStrait,andtheUS'shighexportsandChina'slowimportshaveshieldedtherestoftheoilmarket.

Threeweekson,thequestionhas,ifanything,sharpened—becausethepricehasnotrisen.Ithasfallen,from~$104atthetimeofourlastnoteto~$92today.

Moretellingthanthelevelistheshapeofthecurve,andhowmuchfurtherithas

flattenedsincewepublishedon11May.Thefront-weekBrentCFD—theclearestreadonpromptphysicaltightness—hasmorethanhalvedoverthosethreeweeks,from$5.7/bblto$2.6,whiletheM1–M2spreadhasfallenfrom$3.8/bbltounder$1.Inotherwords,

sinceourlastnotethemarkethasnotmerelyremainedsanguineaboutaresolution—ithasgrownmoreso,increasinglypricingacleanandnear-termreturnofsupplyacrossthewholecurve.

Fromcurrentlevels,wethinkthatistoooptimistic.WepreviouslymodelledtheStraittore-openfromend-Mayonwards,butmovethisassumptiontolateJune.Ontopofthat,weallowforanotherfewweeksformineclearing,confidencebuildingandotherissues,puttingthemomentwhereexportsstarttoinflecthigheronlybylateJuly.Asaresult,thetightnessaheadislikelydeeperandmoredrawn-outthanweinitiallyexpected,andalsothanthecurveimplies.Onthattimeframe,themechanismsbywhichtheoilmarkethasabsorbedthesupplyshockmaybecomechallenged.

OnthatbasisweareholdingourforecastsforDatedBrentat$100in3Qbutmake

modestupwardsrevisionsfor4Q(from$90to$95)and1Q27(from$80to$85),still

expectingconvergenceto$80thereafter.Withspotat$92,anunchangednear-term

forecastisitselfaconstructivecall:wecannotforecasttheprecisedateoftheHormuzre-openingeither,butfromhere,riskstooilpriceshaveapositiveskew,inourview.

Theremainderofthisnotesetsoutthecase.WeexplainwhywenowexpecttheStraittoreopenlaterthanthemarketassumes;whytheproductionrecoverywillbeslowand

backloaded,andtherationaleforourrecoverypath;thebuffersthathaveabsorbedtheshockandwhytheyarenowfraying.

MoRGANSTANLEyREsEARcH3

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALIDEA

4

Exhibit5:ThenumberofdailytankertransitsviatheStraitremainsafractionsofitshistoriclevel

Exhibit3:CrudeoilproductionfromtheMiddleEastremainsunderpressure...

Exhibit4:….andthesameisthecaseforexportsfromtheregion

Delayingourassumptionforre-openingoftheStrait

InourpreviousworkweassumedtheStraitofHormuzwouldremaineffectivelyclosedthroughend-May,withflowsbeginningtorecoverfromaround1June.Wearepushingthatassumptionback:wenowexpectexportstobeginrecoveringmeaningfullyonlyfromthesecondhalfofJuly.

Throughoutthisconflicttherecoveryhasconsistentlybeen"weeksaway",butthose

weekshave—equallyconsistently—failedtoarrive.Anearly-Aprilceasefire

announcement,themid-Aprilpeace-talkheadlinesandthe4Mayescortproposaleach,atthemomentofrelease,madeanimminentreopeninglookplausible;eachproved

premature.

Thelasttwoweekshaveshownthesamedynamic:on25MaynewswiresdescribedadealtoreopentheStraitas"largelynegotiated",andBrentfellabout4%;however,within24hoursUSforceshadstruckIranianmissilesitesandWashingtonandTehranwerereported"stillapart";by28MaytheWhiteHousementioneda"possible"—butunsigned—deal;andby29Maytheagreementwasagain"elusive".Overthesametwoweeksfront-monthBrenttradedfrom$112to$96,backto$100,anddownbelow$92.

Thedelayinourmodellingassumptionfrom'endMay'to'lateJuly'splitsintwoparts:first,werecognisethatatthetimeofwritingthereisnoagreementorMOUyetbetweentheUSandIranonpeacenegotiations.Howmuchlongerthistakesisuncertainbutfor

modellingpurposesweassumeafewmoreweeks.Second,weallowanotherfewweeksformineclearingandcommercialconfidenceamongstshipownerstorebuild.Thatputsameaningfulpick-upinflowsonlyfromthesecondhalfofJuly.However,wewouldstressthatthisisthecentralcaseofanadmittedlywidedistribution.

Afteranagreement,severalbottlenecksandobstaclesneedtobeovercome

DatafromRystadEnergysuggeststhatroughly11mb/dofGulfcruderemainsoffline—closetohalftheregion'spre-conflictoutput.Acrucialpoint,however,isthatnearlyallofthisisbecausestoragefacilitieshavefilledup,notdestroyedcapacity.Thelossesare

concentratedinSaudiArabia(~3.8mb/d),Iraq(~2.9)andKuwait(~1.9),withtheUAE(~1.2),Iran(~0.8)andQatar(~0.6)makinguptherest,accordingtoRystad.Restartingthisproductionisnotnecessarilydifficult,butitdoestaketime.Wehighlightthefollowing

bottlenecks:

MoRGANSTANLEyREsEARcH5

Exhibit6:Inaslowtrickly,nearly30%ofthepeakcrudevolumethatwason

tankerswest-of-Hormuzhassailedoutbynow

Exhibit7:Onournewassumption,thecumulativesupplylossvsaflatpre-

conflictproductionwouldbe2.6bnbblin2026

1.Security,insuranceandmineclearing:ThefirsthurdletoovercomeisforshipownersandinsuranceproviderstoregainconfidencethattheStraitisgenuinelysafetonavigateagain.Initself,theannouncementofaceasefireextensionisnotnecessarilysufficientforthat.Themarketneedsevidencethatattacks,tolling,orinterdictionswillnotresume.Aspartofthis,theareaneedstobeclearedfromseamines.Aslongasseaminesare

believedtobeinplaceinthetraditionalshippinglanes,thecapacityoftheStraitismuchreduced,evenifit'stechnically'open'.Thetimeittakesfortheareatobeclearedfor

minesisuncertainbutlikelyintheorderofweekstoseveralmonths.

2.Tankerbacklogandvesselmisallocation:Then,tankersareinthewrongplace.Overthelastfewmonths,idleshipsthatcouldn'tfindworkinthearea,ballastedtotheUS

Gulf,WestAfrica,Brazil,etc,oftencreatinganoversupplythere.Onits1Q26earningscall,Aramco'sCEOcalledthis"thebiggestissue",addingthat"eveninthemostoptimistic

scenario,theenergyandcommoditysupplychainswillneedseveralmonthstoreturnto

theirpre-conflicttraffic,asvesselsrerouteoravoidbeingidle".Thereareanumberof

'empties'parkedjustoutsidetheGulf,sosomeinitialcargoescouldmovequickly.

However,afullandsustainedrestorationoftankerflowsprobablyalsoneedsanumberofmonths.

3.Storage/ullageinsidetheGulf:Oilfieldscannotrestartaslongasexportstorageisfull.Thisisespeciallyimportantforcountrieswithoutmeaningfulexportcapacityviapipelines,suchasIraqandKuwait,whoseseaborneexportshavepracticallyfallentozerobynow.

Forthose,thenumberofemptytankerstransitingintotheGulfiscriticaltotherestartofoilproduction.

4.Fieldrestarts:Thedifficultyofrestartingfieldsdependsonthelengthoftheclosure.Rystadestimatesroughly10,000ofthe~36,000wellsthatwereactivebeforethe

closureacrossthesixGulfproducersarecurrentlyoffline.Thenumberthatstrugglestoreturnscaleswithshut-induration,theyargue:about2,800wellsfacerestartconstraintsafteratwo-monthshut-in,~4,100afterfourmonthsandmorethan5,000aftersix,

accordingtoRystad.OurownH2-Julyreopeningassumptionimpliesashut-inofroughly4½–5months,whichwouldputtherelevantnumberofwellstoward4,000–5,000wells.Theissueisthatwithinjectionhalted,reservoirpressureoftenbleedsaway;wellbores

cool,precipitatingwaxandasphaltenesthatplugtubing;corrosionandartificial-liftfailures(ESPmotors,gas-liftvalves)setinafterextendedidle;andflowlinesmustbecleaned,integrity-testedandphasedbackintoservice.

Theseeffectsarelargelyreversible,buttheycosttimeandmoney,andrecoveryislikelytobeunevenacrossfields.Conventional,natural-drivefieldsrestartwithlittlemorethanwellboreclean-up,butsomeofthemanaged-pressuregiantsthatdependoncontinuouswaterorgasinjection(e.g.Kuwait'sBurganaswellasthelargeoffshorefieldsofQatar,theUAEandSaudiArabia)mustrebuildpressuresupportbeforeratesrecover;and

mature,high-water-cutsystems(e.g.Iraq'sRumailaaswellassomeIranianfields)arethemostintervention-intensiveandmaybeleftshutinselectively.Onarecentearningscall,Halliburtonwarnedthat"thelongerthingsareshutin,themorecomplextheyaretobringbackon."

5.Damagedinfrastructure:Physicaldamagetoinfrastructureisconcentrated

downstreaminrefiningaswellasexport/storageterminals,notcrudeoilproduction.AccordingtoRystaddata,15refinerieswerestruckwithaggregatecapacityof4.3mb/d.

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLobALIDEA

6

Ofthistotal,~2.5mb/disstilldisrupted.Repairingthislikelytakes2–3quarters,implyingfullnormalisationby1Q2027attheearliest.Thisisanobstacletotherecoveryofrefinedproductexports—still5mb/dofthepre-conflict20mb/dexportsviatheStraitof

Hormuz—althoughitshouldnotholdbackthecrudeexports/productionrecovery.

6.Oilfieldservice,crewsandrigs:Restartingrequirespeopleandkit.OFScompaniesdemobilizedstaff,suspendedtravelandreroutedlogisticsduringtheconflict.Bringingbackcrewsandequipmenttakestime.ExpatshavelargelywithdrawnfromKuwaitandlraq,whichleanmostheavilyoninternationalprovidersfordrilling,completionsandartificiallift.

Exhibit8:

Updatedproductionforecastsshowscontinueddeficit

Giventhesebottlenecks,wemodelatwo-speedrecovery:weestimatethatproductionwillreboundquickerinSaudiArabiaandtheUAE,buttakelongerinlraq,Kuwaitand

Qatar.Themajorityofproductioncancomebackwithinseveralmonths—weestimate75%oflostsupplytobebackwithin4monthsafterflowsviatheStraitresume.Onourestimates,thatwouldbebyNovember.Thereafter,therecoverylikelyslows,withtheremaining25%takinguntilwellinto2027.

Thistightensournear-termbalancessignificantly.OurpreviousassumptionhadexportflowsviatheStraitresumingfromlateMay/earlyJuneonwards.Onthatbasis,ourgloballiquidsbalanceshowedanimpliedbalanceof-0.3mb/dduring3Q2026.Onournew

assumptions,wenowestimateadeficitof-4.5mb/din3Q.

lfcorrect,thismayhaveimportantconsequences.lnapreviousOilManual,weaddressedthequestionwhyoilpricesarenothighergiventhesupplyshockhasbeensosevere.lnsummary,wehighlightedfourreasons:

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALIDEA

MoRGANSTANLEyREsEARcH7

1.Theoilmarkethadlargebuffersatthestartoftheconflict:Theoilmarketwasinsurplus,inventorieswereelevatedandoil-on-waterwaselevated

2.Re-openingoftheStraithasbeen'aroundthecorner'atanymoment:The

front-monthBrentfuturehedgesexposuretothepriceofoildeliveredthemonth-after-next,i.e.oilthatisdelivered,onaverage,8weeksintothefuture.Atany

pointinthelastthreemonths,itseemedlikelythattheStraitwouldbeopenin8weeks.

3.AverylargeincreaseinUSnetoilexports:Acrosscrudeoilandrefinedproducts,seabornenetexportsfromtheUShaveincreasedfrom~5to~9mb/d,

significantlyhelpedbyareleasefromstrategicreserves.

4.AnunusuallylargedeclineinnetoilimportsintoChina:Seabornenetoil

importsintoChinahavefallenfrom~13mb/dthistimelastyear,tojust~7.5mb/doverthelast30days.

Exhibit9:NetseaborneoilexportsfromtheUSarestilltrendinghigher...

Exhibit10:...whilstnetseaborneimportsintoChinaarestilldeclining

Exhibit11:Oncurrenttrends丿theglobalSPRreleasefallssharplyinJuly

Inthebest-casescenario,oilexportsviatheStraitresumesoon,sayinthenextfew

weeks,andtheproductionrecoveryintheregionisrapid,quickerthanweoutlinedabove.Inthatcase,thecallonUSexportscandisappearandChinacanreverttoitsusuallevelofimports,andtheoilmarketwouldstillgraduallyloosen.Themost-commoninflation-

adjustedoilpriceofthelast20yearsis$80/b,whichwewouldseeasananchorintheoilmarket.Inthisscenario,DatedBrentcouldrevertbacktothispricerelativelyswiftly.

However,ifourbasecaseassumptionsplayout,thebalanceinthemarketlooksdifferent:

•First,inourrecentnoteonglobalSPRs,wehighlightedthatoncurrentschedules,SPRreleasesaresettodeclinefrom~2.5mb/dinApril-to-Junetojust~0.7mb/dinJulyandAugust.IftheStraitisnotre-openedbythetimeofthis'SPRcliff',the

marketwouldlikelytightenmeaningfully.

•Second,oilinventoriesintheUShavebeenfallingsignificantly.Bothdieseland

gasolineinventoriesarealreadywellbelow5-yearseasonallows,andoncurrenttrajectory,arelikelytotestminimumoperationalrequirementslaterthissummer.Atsomepoint,USexportsofcrudeandrefinedproductmayneedtofalltobettersupplythedomesticmarket.However,thatwouldsubsequentlytightenoil

marketselsewhere.IfthispointisreachedbeforeflowsviaHormuzhaverestartedmeaningfully,theBrentmarketwouldtightenagainaswell.

8

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLobaLIdEa

Exhibit12:USgasolineinventoriesareunusuallylowandfallingrapidly...

Exhibit13:...andthesameisthecaseforUSdistillateinventories

Third,Chinahaslocked-inanunusuallylowamountofcrudeinrecentmonths.ThiscanbeseeninExhibit14whichshowscumulativecrudeoilpurchasedealsthat

Chinesecompanieshaveclosed,plottedbydeliverymonth(outsideterm

agreements,

i.e.spot

dealsonly).Asshown,dealsfordeliveryinJuneandJulyarestillunusuallylow,andevenAugustisofftoaslowstart.Bynow,thisimpliesfiveconsecutivemonthsoflowimports(i.e.Apr–Aug),andwiththat,likelysustainedinventorydraws.However,thereisameaningfulprobability,inourview,that

ChinesecrudebuyersmayreturntomarketfortheSeptember-deliverycycleinordertosteminventorydeclines.BuyingforSeptemberdeliverytypicallystartsinmid/lateJune.IftheStraitopenssoon,thiscanhappenwithouttighteningthe

market.However,ifthatprospectcontinuestoslip,thistooprovidesanupsiderisk.

Exhibit14:SpotcrudesupplydealsintoChinahavebeenrunningatunusuallylow

levelsforAprilandMaydelivery,andarealsostillverylowforJun-Aug.However,after5months,theprobabilityisbuildingthatChinesebuyersreturntothemarketforthe

September-deliveryperiod,forwhichbuyingbeginsinmid-lateJune.

Asmentionedatthestartofthisnote,thefront-monthBrentfuturehasalreadyfallen

backtoitsmedianinflation-adjustedpriceofthelast20years.Bynow,itappearstopriceinarapid-and-smoothreopeningoftheStrait.Thatmayhappen—theseeventsarehard

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALlDEA

toforecast.However,theoperationalandlogisticalbottlenecksstillonlyimplyagradualresumptionofproduction,suggestingtheoilmarketwillremainindeficitforseveral

monthstocome.Overthatperiod,themechanismsbywhichthemarkethasabsorbedthecurrentshockmaynotsustain.

MoRGANSTANLEyREsEARcH9

After3Q,wemodelthemarkettoreturntobalancein4Qandstillamodestsurplusin2027,albeitwithstructurallylowerinventories.Thiscombinationlikelypreventsa'blowout'inpricesbutshouldneverthelessbesufficienttodriveBrentfutureshigheragainfromhere.Withthat,westicktoourcurrentBrentforecastfor2Qand3Q,andadd

modestlytoour4Qand1Q27forecast—seeExhibit2.

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALlDEA

Supply/demandbalance

Exhibit15:

10

Change

20251Q262Q263Q264Q2620261Q272Q273Q274Q272027

'25-26

'26-27

-1.2

-0.3

-0.9

0.5

0.3

-0.1

0.3

-0.9

-0.8

-5.9

-5.1

2.2

2.3

0.2

2.1

1.8

0.3

0.1

1.5

0.5

0.0

6.0

6.0

-2.4

-2.8

3.6

-0.8

1.3

-0.2

0.2

-0.1

0.2

-0.6

1.3

-1.2

0.6

Change

'25-26

'26-27

-1.7

-0.1

-1.6

-0.1

0.3

0.3

-0.0

-6.3

-5.9

-0.4

2.6

-0.0

2.6

-0.1

1.3

0.3

1.0

6.1

6.0

0.1

-4.2

4.9

Totaloilliquids

Demand

OECD

Non-OECD

Non-OPECsupply

UnitedStatesC+CFSUC+C

Other

OPECNGLsandcondensate

OPECcrude

Impliedbalance

Misctobal

CallonOPECcrude

29.6

2.4

-1.2

27.4

-0.4-

-0.9

104.9

45.9

59.0

72.2

13.6

10.3

48.3

5.5

27.2

104.6

45.7

59.0

71.7

13.6

10.0

48.1

5.2

27.7

101.0

44.7

56.3

72.0

14.0

10.0

48.0

3.7

19.6

25.4

105.5

45.8

59.7

73.6

14.0

10.3

49.3

5.1

26.8

103.8

45.9

57.9

73.3

13.9

10.3

49.1

4.7

21.2

4.5

1.8-

26.8

0.0

0.0

25.8

104.9

45.3

59.6

73.9

14.1

10.3

49.6

5.2

25.8

23.7

-2.7

1.0

103.7

45.5

58.2

72.7

13.9

10.2

48.6

4.7

26.4

105.3

45.5

59.8

74.2

14.2

10.2

49.8

5.2

25.9

107.5

46.1

61.3

75.1

14.2

10.2

50.7

5.2

27.2

106.6

46.2

60.4

74.6

14.1

10.2

50.3

5.2

26.8

29.7

3.3

-1.4

106.1

45.8

60.3

74.5

14.2

10.2

50.1

5.2

26.4

5.8-

3.3

28.929.630.130.4

3.13.83.23.2

-1.3-1.5-1.3-1.3

Observedstockchange

1.2

-

1.3

-

2.4

-

2.8

-

0.0

-

1.6

1.8

2.2

1.9

1.9

2.0

ofwhich:

SPR(IEAmembers)China

Othernon-OECD

CommercialOECD

Oil-on-water

Crude+condensateonly

0.0

0.3

0.1

0.1

0.6

-

-

-

0.1

0.6

0.2

0.1

1.9

-

-

-

2.0

0.0

-

0.2

0.6

-

-

1.0

-

-

1.8

-

-

-

-

-

0.0

-

-

-

-

0.8

0.1

0.1

0.4

0.6

0.5

0.3

0.3

0.7

-

0.5

0.3

0.3

1.1

-

0.5

0.3

0.3

0.8

-

0.5

0.3

0.3

0.8

-

0.5

0.3

0.3

0.9

-

2025

1Q26

2Q26

3Q26

4Q26

2026

1Q27

2Q27

3Q27

4Q27

2027

Runs

84.2

83.4

78.6

83.3

84.4

82.4

84.8

84.6

85.4

85.2

85.0

WestofSuez

43.3

42.8

42.9

43.9

43.1

43.2

42.8

43.0

43.8

43.1

43.2

EastofSuez

40.9

40.6

35.7

39.3

41.3

39.2

42.1

41.6

41.7

42.1

41.9

Directuse

0.9

0.7

0.9

0.9

0.6

0.8

0.6

0.8

0.9

0.6

0.7

Non-OPECC+Csupply

54.6

54.5

54.5

55.1

55.6

54.9

56.1

56.0

56.2

56.7

56.2

UnitedStates

13.6

13.6

14.0

13.9

14.0

13.9

14.1

14.2

14.1

14.2

14.2

Other

41.1

40.9

40.5

41.2

41.6

41.0

42.0

41.8

42.0

42.5

42.1

OPEC

31.6

29.2

20.9

22.8

28.5

25.4

30.6

31.4

31.8

32.1

31.5

Crude

29.6

27.4

19.6

21.2

26.8

23.7

28.9

29.6

30.1

30.4

29.7

Condensate

2.0

1.8

1.3

1.6

1.7

1.6

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.7

Impliedstockchange

1.2

-

0.5

-

4.2

-

6.2

-

0.8

-

2.9

1.3

2.0

1.6

3.0

2.0

DatedBrentforecasts

Base

69.1

75.7

110

100

95

95

85

80

80

80

81

Bull

69.1

75.7

150

150

150

150

150

150

150

150

150

Bear

69.1

75.7

80

75

70

80

65

65

65

65

66

WTI

Base

64.7

71.4

102

94

90

90

80

75

75

75

76

Bull

64.7

71.4

145

145

145

145

145

145

145

145

145

Bear

64.7

71.4

76

71

66

76

61

61

61

61

62

Source:Argus,IEA,EIA/DOE,Vortexa,S&PGlobalEnergy,Petro-Logistics,RystadEnergy,MorganStanleyResearch

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALlDEA

Keymarketindicators

Exhibit16:

MoRGANSTANLEyREsEARcH11

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALlDEA

Prices

Exhibit17:Exhibit18:

12

Exhibit19:

Exhibit20:

Exhibit21:

Exhibit22:

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALlDEA

Exhibit23:Exhibit24:

MoRGANSTANLEyREsEARcH13

Exhibit25:

Exhibit27:

Exhibit26:

Exhibit28:

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALIDEA

14

Differentials

Exhibit29:

Exhibit30:

Exhibit31:

Exhibit32:

Exhibit33:

Exhibit34:

MoRGANSTANLEyREsEARcH15

CrudeQuality

Exhibit35:

Exhibit36:

Exhibit37:

Exhibit38:

Theanalysesabovearebasedonadailyregressionofthepriceof95seabornecrudes

against1)theirAPIgravity,2)theirsulphurcontent,3)adummyvariableindicating

whetherthecrude'soriginisEastorWestofSuez,and4)anotherdummyvariable

indicatingwhetherthegradeisfromRussianoriginornot.Thechartsaboveshowhowthesensitivityofthese95crudepricestoeachofthesevariableshaschangedovertime.

16

RefiningMargins

Exhibit39:

Exhibit40:

Exhibit41:

Exhibit42:

Exhibit43:

Exhibit44:

Morganstanley

RESEARCH

GLoBALlDEA

ProductCrackSpreads

Exhibit45:

MoRGANSTANLEyREsEARcH