管理经济学（第14版） 课件 第1章　管理者、利润与市场

Chapter01Managers,Profits,andMarketsMANAGERIALECONOMICSFoundationsofBusinessAnalysisandStrategyFourteenthEditionCHRISTOPHERR.THOMAS©McGrawHillLLC.Allrightsreserved.NoreproductionordistributionwithoutthepriorwrittenconsentofMcGrawHillLLC.LearningOutcomes1.1 Understandwhymanagerialeconomicsreliesonmicroeconomicsandindustrialorganizationtoanalyzebusinesspracticesanddesignbusinessstrategies.1.2 Explainthedifferencebetweeneconomicandaccountingprofitandrelateeconomicprofittothevalueofthefirm.1.3 Describehowseparationofownershipandmanagementcanleadtoaprincipal–agentproblemwhengoalsofownersandmanagersarenotaligned,andmonitoringmanagersiscostlyorimpossibleforowners.1.4 Explainthedifferencebetweenprice-takingandprice-settingfirmsanddiscussthecharacteristicsofthefourmarketstructures.1.5 Discusstheprimaryopportunitiesandthreatspresentedbytheglobalizationofmarketsinbusiness.2ManagerialEconomicsandTheoryManagerialeconomicsappliesmicroeconomictheorytobusinessproblems.Howtouseeconomicanalysistomakedecisionstoachievethefirm’sgoalofprofitmaximization.Economictheoryhelpsmanagersunderstandreal-worldbusinessproblems.Usessimplifyingassumptionstoturncomplexityintorelativesimplicity.3MicroeconomicsMicroeconomicsStudyofbehaviorofindividualconsumers,businessfirms,andmarketsthatcontributestoourunderstandingofbusinesspracticesandtactics.BusinesspracticesortacticsRoutinebusinessdecisionsmanagersmustmaketoearnthegreatestprofitunderprevailingmarketconditions.Usingmarginalanalysis,microeconomicsprovidesthefoundationforunderstandingeverydaybusinessdecisions.4IndustrialOrganizationandStrategicDecisionsIndustrialorganizationSpecializedbranchofmicroeconomicsfocusingonbehaviorandstructureoffirmsandindustries.Providesfoundationforunderstandingstrategicdecisionsthroughapplicationofgametheory.StrategicdecisionsBusinessactionstakentoaltermarketconditionsandbehaviorofrivalsinwaysthatincreaseand/orprotectthestrategicfirm’sprofit.Whilecommonbusinesspracticesarenecessaryforthegoalofprofitmaximization,strategicdecisionsaregenerallyoptimalactionsmanagerscantakeascircumstancespermit.5Figure1.1:EconomicForcesThatPromoteLong-RunProfitabilityAccessthetextalternativeforslideimages.6EconomicCostofResourcesOpportunitycostWhatfirmownersmustgiveuptouseresourcestoproducegoodsandservices.Market-suppliedresourcesOwnedbyothersandhired,rented,orleasedinresourcemarkets.Owner-suppliedresourcesOwnedandusedbythefirm.7TotalEconomicCostTotaleconomiccostSumofopportunitycostsofallresourcesusedbyafirmtoproducegoodsorservices.ExplicitcostsMonetaryopportunitycostsofusingmarket-suppliedresources.ImplicitcostsNonmonetaryopportunitycostsofusingowner-suppliedresources.8ThreeTypesofImplicitCostsOpportunitycostofcashprovidedtoafirmbyitsowners,knownasequitycapital(fundsprovidedtobusinessesbytheowners).Opportunitycostofusinglandorcapitalownedbythefirm.Opportunitycostofowner’stimespentmanagingorworkingforthefirminsomeothercapacity.9Figure1.2:EconomicCostofUsingResourcesAccessthetextalternativeforslideimages.10EconomicProfitVersusAccountingProfitEconomicprofit=Totalrevenue−Totaleconomiccost=Totalrevenue−Explicitcosts−ImplicitcostsAccountingprofit=Totalrevenue−ExplicitcostsAccountingprofitdoesnotsubtractimplicitcostsfromtotalrevenue.Firmownersmustcoverthecostsofallresourcesusedbythefirm,sotheobjectiveistomaximizeeconomicprofit.11MaximizingtheValueofaFirm1ValueofafirmPriceforwhichitcanbesold.Equaltothepresentvalueofexpectedfutureprofits.RiskpremiumAnincreaseinthediscountratetocompensateinvestorsforuncertaintyaboutfutureprofits.Thelargertherisk,thehighertheriskpremium,andthelowerthefirm’svalue.12MaximizingtheValueofaFirm2Maximizefirm’svaluebymaximizingprofitineachtimeperiod.Costandrevenueconditionsmustbeindependentacrosstimeperiods.Valueofafirm=13SomeCommonMistakesManagersMakeNeverincreaseoutputsimplytoreduceaveragecosts.Pursuitofmarketshareusuallyreducesprofit.Focusingonprofitmarginwon’tmaximizetotalprofit.Maximizingtotalrevenuereducesprofit.Cost-pluspricingformulasdon’tproduceprofit-maximizingprices.14Principal–AgentRelationshipRelationshipformedwhenabusinessowner(theprincipal)entersanagreementwithanexecutivemanager(theagent)whosejobistoformulateandimplementtacticalandstrategicbusinessdecisionsthatwillfurthertheobjectivesofthebusinessowner(theprincipal).Aprincipal–agentproblemarisesbetweenafirm’sownerandmanagerwhentwoconditionsaremet:Theobjectivesoftheownerandmanagerarenotaligned.Theownerfindsiteithertoocostlyorimpossibleinthecaseofmoralhazardtoperfectlymonitorthemanagertoblockallmanagementdecisionsthatmightbeharmfultotheownerofthebusiness.15SeparationofOwnershipandControlPrincipal–agentproblemAmanagertakesanactionormakesadecisionthatadvancestheinterestsofthemanagerbutreducesthevalueofthefirm.CompletecontractAnemploymentcontractthatprotectsownersfromeverypossibledeviationbymanagersfromvalue-maximizingdecisions.HiddenactionsActionsordecisionstakenbymanagersthatcannotbeobservedbyownersforanyfeasibleamountofmonitoringeffort.MoralhazardAsituationinwhichmanagerstakehiddenactionsthatharmtheownersofthefirmbutfurthertheinterestsofthemanagers.16CorporateControlMechanismsInternalcontrolmechanismsRequiremanagerstoholdstipulatedamountoffirm’sequity.Increasepercentageofoutsidersservingonboardofdirectors.Financecorporateinvestmentswithdebtinsteadofequity.ExternalmechanismCorporatetakeovers.17Price-TakersVersusPrice-SettersPrice-takingfirmCannotsetpriceofitsproduct.Priceisdeterminedstrictlybymarketforcesofdemandandsupply.Price-settingfirmCansetpriceofitsproduct.Hasadegreeofmarketpower,whichistheabilitytoraisepricewithoutlosingallsales.18WhatIsaMarket?Amarketisanyarrangementthroughwhichbuyersandsellersexchangeanythingofvalue.Marketsreducetransactioncosts,

whicharethecostsofmakingatransactionhappen,otherthanthepriceofthegoodorserviceitself.19MarketStructuresMarketcharacteristicsthatdeterminetheeconomicenvironmentinwhichafirmoperates.Numberandsizeoffirmsinthemarket.Degreeofproductdifferentiationamongcompetingfirms.Likelihoodofnewfirmsenteringmarketwhenincumbentfirmsareearningeconomicprofits.20PerfectCompetitionLargenumberofrelativelysmallfirms.Undifferentiatedproduct.Price-takerswithnomarketpower.Nobarrierstoentry.Anyeconomicprofitearnedwillvanishasnewfirmsenter.21MonopolySinglefirm.Producesproductwithnoclosesubstitutes.Protectedbyabarriertoentry.Allowsthemonopolisttoraiseitspricewithoutconcernthateconomicprofitswillattractnewfirms.22MonopolisticCompetitionLargenumberofrelativelysmallfirms.Differentiatedproductsgivethemonopolisticcompetitorsomedegreeofmarketpower.Price-setters.Nobarrierstoentry.Ensuresanyeconomicprofitswilleventuallybebidawaybynewentrants.23OligopolyFewfirmsproduceallormostofmarketoutput.Profitsareinterdependent.Actionstakenbyanyonefirmwillaffectsalesandprofitsoftheotherfirms.24GlobalizationofMarketsEconomicintegrationofmarketslocatedinnationsaroundtheworld.Providesopportunitytosellmoregoodsandservicestoforeignbuyers.Presentsthreatofincreasedcompetitionfromforeignproducers.25Summary1Managerialeconomicsappliesconcepts/theoriesfrommicroeconomicsandindustrialorganization.Marginalanalysisprovidesthefoundationforeverydaybusinesspracticesortactics.Opportunitycostofusinganyresourceiswhatthefirmownersmustgiveuptousetheresource.Unlikeeconomicprofit,accountingprofitdoesnotsubtractimplicit(opportunity)costsfromtotalrevenue.Withtheseparationofownershipandmanagement,aprincipal–agentproblemcanarisebecauseownerscannotbecertainthatmanagersaremakingdecisionstomaximizethevalueofthefirm.26Summary2Globalizationrepresentstheeconomicintegrationofmarketslocatedinnationsaroundtheworld.Forprice-takingfirms,priceisdeterminedsolelybymarketforcesofsupplyanddemand,whileprice-settershavesomedegreeofmarketpowertosetprice.27EndofMainContent©McGrawHillLLC.Allrightsreserved.NoreproductionordistributionwithoutthepriorwrittenconsentofMcGrawHillLLC.AccessibilityContent:TextAlternativesforImages29Figure1.1:EconomicForcesThatPromoteLong-RunProfitability-TextAlternat