越南经济更新2026年5月：持续改革应对不确定性（英）

VietNamEconomicUpdate

SustainingReforms,NavigatingUncertainty

⃞2026InternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheworldBank1818HstreetNW

washingtonDC20433

Telephone:202-473-1000

Internet:www.worldbank.org

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coverphoto:colgaGavrilova/shutterstock

ACRONYMS

ASEANAssociationofsoutheastAsianNations

CPIConsumerpriceIndex

EAPEastAsiaandpacific

EMDEEmergingMarketandDevelopingEconomy

HOSEHochiMinhstockExchange

IEAInternationalEnergyAgency

IMFInternationalMonetaryFund

MOFMinistryofFinance

NSONationalstatisticsoffice

ODAOfficialDevelopmentAssistance

pwlpurchasingManagersIndex

SBVStateBankofvietNam

SOEState-ownedenterprise

VBMAVietNamBondMarketAssociation

VNDVietNamDong

yoyyear-0ver-year

YTDYear-to-date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ThiseditionofthevietNamEconomicupdatewaspreparedbyateamcomprisingTehminas.khan(LeadEconomist),sachaDray(Economist),ThummHaThiNguyen(Analyst)andkeomanivonephimmahasay(seniorEconomist).

ThereportbenefitedfromcontributionsbyvietQUOCTrieu(seniorFinancialsectorspecialist),TrangMinhTa(consultant)andpaulAndrescorralRodas(seniorpovertyEconomist).valuablecommentsfromHabibRab(practiceManager,FiscalpolicyandGrowth,worldBank)aregratefullyacknowledged.

TheteamisgratefulforoverallguidancefromMariamJ.sherman(DivisionDirectorforvietNam,cambodia,andLaopDR),LalitaM.Moorty(RegionalDirectorforprosperity,EastAsiaandpacific)andMarcoHernandez(practiceManager,Fiscalpolicy

andGrowth,EastAsiaandpacific).

wearegratefultoAnhThiQuynhLe(ExternalAffairsofficer)andDuongT.Tran(seniorExternalAffairsofficer)fordeliveredcommunicationssupport.

TheteamwouldliketothankHoaThiThanhNguyen(programAssistant)forexcellentsupportduringthepreparationofthisreport,includingduringthetypesettinganddesignstages.simonDroughtandseanLothropprovidededitorialservices.

1Executivesummary

2A.GlobalDevelopments

2Theglobalandregionalbackdrop

4TheMiddleEastshock

5B.RecentEconomicDevelopments

6Realsector,activityandsentiment

12Externalbalancesandbuffers

13prices

14Monetarypolicyandfinancialsector

19publicfinances

21C.0utlook,Risksandpolicypriorities

21outlookandrisks

23policychallengesandpriorities

FIGURES

Figure1.Globaloilsupplydeclinesinmajoroilcrisis.2

Figure2.Globalenergyprices

Figure3.Effectivetariffratesanditsincrements.3

Figure4.GrowthinEApvsrestoftheworld.…3

Figure5.Growthofelectronicsexportsandothers 3

Figure6.privateinvestmentasshareofGDP……3

Figure7.ImpactchannelsoftheMiddleEastconflict.......4

Figure8.RealGDpgrowthrate

Figure9.contributiontogrowth,byexpenditure.…6

Figure10.Realinvestmentgrowth.6

Figure11.Tradegrowth6

Figure12.ExportsofAl-relatedgoods7Figure13.ManufacturingsectorasshareofGDP.7Figure14.Growthratebyeconomicactivity…7Figure15.Internationalvisitors7Figure16.purchasingmanagerindices(PMls)8Figure17.ManufacturingpMIinputandoutputprices8Figure18.privateconsumption8Figure19.Retailsalesandaveragemonthlyincome8Figure20.FDIcommitments&disbursementsbysector…9Figure21.NewlyregisteredcapitalbycountryFigure22.Exportgrowthbyfirmownershipoffirm10Figure23.AverageustariffratebyproductFigure24.Firmentryandexit……10Figure25.capitalandemploymentofnewfirms10FigureB1.1.productivitygapoffirms11Figure26.Balanceofpayments

Figure27.currentaccount

Figure28.Financialaccount12

Figure29.Tradebalanceandgrowthbysector…13

Figure30.Exchangerate(VND/us$)…13

Figure31.Foreignreserves.13

Figure32.contributiontocpI…14

Figure33.Domesticfuelprices(VND/liter)..…14

Figure34.CPIbreakdownforApril-26 .14

Figure35.creditanddepositgrowth14Figure36.Fundingstructure15

Figure37.Interestrates15

Figure38.credit-tommGDP

Figure39.capitaladequacyratio..….15Figure40.openmarketoperations.16Figure41.Nonmmperformingloansratio….16Figure42.Loan-lossreservesratio.…16FigureB2.1.Breakdownofrealestateloans17Figure43.Equitypriceindex…18Figure44.Netforeignbuying(selling)…18Figure45.Bondissuances.…18

Figure46.capitalmarket

Figure47.Fiscalbalance.…19Figure48.publicinvestment19Figure49.Taxrevenue…19Figure50.Governmentbondsinvestorprofile..…20Figure51.Governmentbondyield20Figure52.keypolicyrecommendations

TABLES

Table1.MajorEApcountriesbyexposure,vulnerability,andpolicyspace

Table2.keyFDIprojectsinQ1mm269

Table3.selectedeconomicindicators,vietNam2024-

BOXES

BOX1.Thedualeconomyastructuralimbalance

BOX2.creditexpansion,realestateandthehousingparadox…17BOX3.TheMiddleEastoilshock:impactsandpolicyresponsesforvietNam22

FOREWORD

TheeconomiclandscapefacingvietNamhasshiftedmarkedlyinrecentyears.AmoreuncertainglobaltradeenvironmentandheightenedgeopoliticaltensionshavetestedtheresilienceofvietNam'sexport-orientedgrowthmodel.Atthesametime,climaterisks,rapidtechnologicalchange,demographictransition,andrisinginfrastructureneedsarereshapingthefoundationsoflong-termdevelopment.Thesedevelopmentsrequirepolicymakerstocontinuetoimprovemacroeconomicmanagementintheshort-termandacceleratestructuralreformsthatcansustainhighgrowth,strengthenresilience,andsupportvietNam’sambitiontobecomeahigh-incomeeconomy.

Tohighlightthekeyopportunitiesandchallengesfacingtheeconomy,andtostimulatediscussionamongpolicymakers,theprivatesector,developmentpartners,andotherstakeholders,theworldBankGroupproducesthevietNamEconomicupdate,abiannualreportassessingrecenteconomicdevelopments,theoutlook,andselectedpolicypriorities.Thiseditionreviewsrecentglobalanddomesticmacroeconomictrends,examinesboththenear-termandmedium-termprospectsforvietNam.

Theupdatedescribesaneconomythathasshownnotableresilience,supportedbystrongexternaldemand,continuedforeigndirectinvestment,andacceleratedpublicinvestment.whilemanufacturingandexportscontinuetoanchorgrowth,theeconomy’sabilitytoretainmorevaluedomestically,deepenlinkagesbetweenforeign-investedanddomesticfirms,andraiseproductivitywillbecriticalforsustainingmomentumoverthemediumterm.

Theoutlookremainspositive,butrisksareelevatedinthenearterm,mainlyfromexternalsources.Domestically,highcreditintensityandrealestatemmrelatedfinancialexposuresrequirecontinuedvigilance.Recentpublicadministration,financeandinvestmentmanagementandcapitalmarketreformsprovideanimportantopportunitytoraisetheeconomyslongtermgrowthrate.Arguably,themostimportantpolicychallengeistoimplement,financeandsustainthewide-rangingreformagendanowunderway,manageandreducerisksbothexternalanddomestic-andstrengthenthedomesticprivatesector.

MARIAMJ.SHERMAN

DivisionDirectorforvietNam,cambodiaandLaopDR,TheworldBank

ExecutiveSummary

VietNamentered2026inthestrongestpositionofanyeconomyinASEAN.Despiteglobaltradeheadwinds,grossdomesticproduct(GDP)growthacceleratedto8percentin2025—thefastestinASEAN—withmomentumcarryingthroughto2026,buoyedbysurgingexportsandinvestment,aresilientdomesticeconomyandsweepingreformagendaamidstthelargestadministrativerationalizationandreorganizationsincetheĐổiMớireforms.Since2025,theauthoritieshaveenactedmorethan86lawsand300decreesthroughtoApril2026tostreamlinebureaucracyandregulatoryimpedimentstoprivatesector-ledgrowth,andtomodernizetax,customs,judiciary,digital,andcorporateinsolvencysystems.Havingestablisheditselfasaglobaltradeandmanufacturinghub,VietNamisnowactivelyopeningitscapitalmarketstodomesticandforeigninvestors.

However,theMiddleEastconflicthasexposedstructuralweaknessesinVietNam’sgrowthmodel.Inscaleandscope,theoilshocklinkedtotheMiddleEastconflictsinceMarch2026isthelargestindecades.Separately,theglobaltradeenvironmentremainsuncertain.Together,thesepressureshavebroughtrenewedfocustolonger-standingfeaturesofVietNam'sgrowthmodel:thewideninggapbetweenforeigndomesticinvestment(FDI)anddomesticfirms,amismatchbetweenstrongtradeandweakdomesticretentionofforeignexchangecontributingtothinexternalbuffersandpersistentexchangeratepressure,andoneofthehighestcorporateleverageratiosamongmajorEastAsianeconomies,alongsideliquiditystrainsinthebankingsector.

Althoughglobalheadwindswilltemperthepaceofgrowth,theoutlookfor2026remainssolid.Growthisexpectedtomoderatein2026toastillhigh6.8percent,astheMiddleEastoilshockweighsonglobaldemandanddomesticactivity.Onthedomesticside,aninvestment-ledfiscalexpansionisexpectedtosupportprivatesectoractivityandconsumption.Withpublicdebtatonly34percentofGDP(2025),thereismeaningfulfiscalspacetoincreasespendingandabsorbshocks.Withhigherglobal

energypricesexpectedtopersistthroughtheyear,inflationisprojectedtoaveragejustover4percentin2026.Themedium-termoutlookisanchoredbyafar-reachingcapitalmarketandstructuralreformagendaalongsideaUS$320billionpublicinfrastructureinvestmentplan.

Near-termrisksaretiltedtothedownside,butmorebalancedinthemediumterm.Near-termrisksincludehighsensitivitytoexternaldemand,givenveryhightradeopenness.AcuteshockssuchasaprolongedorworseningglobaloilsupplydisruptioncoulddepressglobaldemandforVietNam’sexportsandspilloverintothedomesticeconomy.Inthemediumterm,stronger-than-expectedreformimplementationandinfrastructuredelivery,deepercapitalmarkets,andcontinuedsupply-chaindiversificationcouldsubstantiallyboostproductivityandsupportmoreresilientgrowth.Ontheotherhand,poorlymanagedorunevenlyexecutedreformsandunproductiveinvestmentscouldincreaserisksofamiddle-incometrap,stallingthegrowthofthemiddle-classevenastheworkforceages.

Theglobaloilshocksharpenstheurgencyofreforms.VietNam'sreformagendaissteeringintherightdirection,buttranslatingitintoresults—ensuringinvestmentsareproductive,financingisadequate,andimplementationkeepspacewithambition—willrequiresustainedeffortagainstanuncertainexternalbackdrop.Donewell,however,thismomentopensagenuineopportunitytobuildavirtuouscycleofrisinginvestorconfidence,privateinvestment,growth,andresilience.Thisdemandsafundamentalshiftinthegrowthmodel—fromfactoraccumulationandbank-ledfinancetowardproductivity-drivengrowth,deepercapitalmarkets,andhigher-qualityFDIwithstrongerdomesticspillovers.ThisshiftisalsoVietNam'sclearestpathtomoreandbetterjobs,astrongerdomesticprivateeconomy,andentryintotheranksofhigh-incomecountries.

●

A.GlobalDevelopment

Theglobalandregionalbackdrop

Globalgrowthremainedresilientin2025...

Globaleconomicconditionsin2025provedmoreresilientthananticipated.DespiteheadwindsfromhigherU.S.tariffs,afront-loadingoftradeactivity,AI-driveninvestment,supplychainreconfiguration,limitedtariffpass-through,andeasingfinancialconditionsinthesecondhalfoftheyearprovidedasupportivebackdrop,whileinflationcontinuedmoderating,allowingformoreaccommodativemonetaryconditionsacrossmanyeconomies.Asaresult,thepost-pandemicreboundover2021–25markedthestrongestrecoveryfromaglobalrecessioninmorethansixdecades.

...butactivityisexpectedtomoderateduetotheMiddleEastconflict

However,geopoliticaltensionsandconflictintheMiddleEasthaveincreaseduncertainty.TheMiddleEastoilshockhadresultedinalossof13mbdbymid-April(Figure1),withglobalenergypricesupmorethan50percentyoyinend-April(Figure2).EastAsiaisamongthemostexposedregionsduetodependenceonoilimportsfromtheGulfregion.Theshockismulti-layered,impactingnearlyaboutafifthoftheworld'sLiquefiedNaturalGas(LNG)supply,andthetransitofsignificantvolumesoffertilizers,aluminum,petrochemicalsandcriticalindustrialrawmaterialssuchasheliumandsulfur,andraisingtankerandshippingcosts.Damagetoenergyinfrastructuremeansthatthedisruptionhasmovedbeyondlogisticstoproduction,withuncertaintyaroundwhenfullproductioncanberestored.

Theglobaltradeenvironmentremainsuncertain.DespitetheFebruary2026SupremeCourtrulingonInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct(IEEPA)tariffs,U.S.exportdutiesremainabove2024levels,withformer"reciprocal"measuresreplacedbyaprovisional10percentglobaltariffunderSection122throughJuly2026(Figure3).Section232cases,meanwhile,sustainhightariffsonsteel,aluminum,copper,andvariousmanufacturedgoods.InMarch2026,theU.S.TradeRepresentative(USTR)initiatedtwomajorSection301investigationsfocusedon60economiesand16tradingpartners,includingVietNam.

Globaloilsupplydeclinesinmajoroilcrisis

source:IEAreportsandworldBankstaffcalculations.Note:mb/d=millionbarrelsperday

Globalenergyprices(Average,Brent,andDubaicrudeoilprices)

source:worldBankGroupcommodityprices.

Globalactivityandjobcreationareexpectedtosoftenin2026.Todate,high-frequencyindicatorspointtocontinuedresilienceinglobalactivity,supportedbystilleasymonetaryandfiscalpolicyinadvancedandemergingmarketeconomies,andasAI-drivencapexandadoptiondriveinvestmentspendingandproductivity.UnderthebaselineassumptionthatthemostacutedisruptionsendsoonandshippingthroughtheStraitofHormuzgraduallyreturnstowardprewarlevelsbylate2026,Brentoilpricesareforecasttoaverage$86perbarrelin2026,upsharplyfrom$69in2025.Overall,commoditypricesareprojectedtoriseby16percentthisyear,whileenergypricesareexpectedtoincreaseby24percent,reachingtheirhighestlevelsince2022.Thesupplyshocksbroughtaboutbytheconflictarebroad.Fertilizerpricesareprojectedtosoar,whilepricesoffoodcommoditiesandmanymetalsarealsoexpectedtoincrease.Asaresultglobalgrowthisexpectedtoslowin2026beforerecoveringin2027-28.Riskstotheseprojectionsarefirmlytiltedtotheupside.IfdisruptionsintheMiddleEastprovemoreextensivethanassumed,Brentpricescouldaverageashighas$115perbarrelin2026.

GrowthinEastAsiaissettoslowin2026…

GrowthindevelopingEastAsiaandPacific(EAP),althoughabovetheglobalaverage,islikelytoslowfrom5.0percentin2025to4.2percentin2026and4.4percentin2027(Figure4).ThistrendislargelydrivenbyChina'sdeceleratingeconomy-growthisexpectedtodeclineto4.2percentin2026asdomesticdemandremainssubdued(amidsoftlaborandhousingmarkets).FortheremainderofEAP,growthislikelytoslowfrom4.9to4.1percentin2026,withasubsequentreboundto5.0percentin2027asgeopoliticaltensionsease.Notwithstandingasurgeintheregion’sexports(Figure5),privateinvestments’shareofGDPremainsbelowpre-pandemicbaselinesinASEANeconomies(Figure6)partlybecauseofelevatedeconomicpolicyuncertainty,bothdomesticallyandglobally.

Effectivetariffratesanditsincrements

source:EApupdate,April2026.

GrowthinEAPvsrestoftheworld

source:EAPEconomicupdate,April2026.

Growthofelectronicsexportsandothers

PrivateinvestmentasshareofGDP

●

TheMiddleEastoilshock

Exposure,vulnerability,andpolicyspacetorespondvariesacrosscountries

TheoilshockaffectseconomiesinEAPthroughseveraltransmissionchannels(Figure7).First,higherglobaloilpriceswouldraisecrudeandfuelimportbillsandtranslateintoanincreaseindomesticfuelprice.Second,higherenergypumppriceswouldfeeddirectlyintotransportcostsandindirectlyintofoodprices,logistics,constructionmaterials,andothergoodsandservices,creatingsecond-roundinflation.Third,firmsintransport,manufacturing,agriculture,andconstructionwouldfacehigherinputcosts,whichcouldsqueezeprofitmargins,delayinvestment,orbepassedontoconsumers.Fourth,alargeroilimportbillwouldincreasedemandforforeigncurrency,addingpressureonthecurrentaccount,theexchangerate,andforeignreserves.Fifth,higherinflationandexchangeratepressurewouldlimitroomformonetaryeasingandcouldkeepliquidityconditionstighter,affectingcreditandinvestment.Finally,higherfuelandfoodpriceswouldreducehouseholdpurchasingpower,whileuncertaintyoverenergypricesandshippingdisruptionscouldweakenbusinesssentiment.Overall,theoilshockwouldactasanegativesupplyshock,raisinginflationandexternalpressureswhiledampeningconsumption,investment,andgrowthinthenearterm.

Capacitytorespondishigherinnetenergyexporters,andthosewithlargerbuffersandlowinflation(Table1).MajorimporterslikeMongolia,LaoPDR,andThailand—whereoilandgasimportsrepresent5to13percentofGDP—facethegreatestburden,ashigherenergypricescompresshouseholdpurchasingpowerandraiseindustrialinputcosts,whilenetexporterssuchasMalaysiastandtobenefitfromimprovedtermsoftrade.Capacitytorespondisconstrainedincountrieswithhighgovernmentdebtandlimitedfiscalspace(LaoPDR,China(atthelocallevel),andThailand)versusthosewithlowerdebt(VietNam)orgreatercapacitytoabsorbtheshockthroughstrategicreserves,domesticrefiningcapacity,orcommodityexportrevenuesthatprovideanaturalhedge.SeveralofthelargerdevelopingEAPeconomiesfallshortoftheIEA’s90-daystrategicpetroleumreservebenchmark.Cambodia,Indonesia,andVietNamholdonlyonetotwomonthsofcoverage,whereasChinaandThailandalignmorecloselytothestandard.

Policymakersareconfrontingthechallengeofdealingwiththetwinthreatsofinflationandgrowthdeceleration.Thisismostevidentinthecaseofmonetarypolicy.Centralbankswithwell-anchoredinflationexpectationsandlowinflationcanaffordtoaccommodateenergysupplyshocks,iftemporary—butasevereorsustainedpriceincreaseorcurrencypressuremaywarranttightermonetarypolicythatweighsondomesticrealactivity.

ImpactchannelsoftheMiddleEastconflict

source:worldBankillustration.

LaopDR

MongoliaThailandcambodiaphilippinesMyanmar

china

vietNamIndonesiaMalaysia

Table1.MajorEAPcountriesbyexposure,vulnerability,andpolicyspace

Exposurevulnerabilitypolicyspace

oil&gasnetimportsExternalfinancingneeds(%ofGDP,2024)(%ofGDP,2025)

Inflationrate

(Feb2026orlatest)

Foreignreserves

(monthsofimports,

2025)

Generalgovernmentgrossdebt

(%ofGDP,2025)

Fiscalbalance

(%ofGDP,2025)

6.2

3

6.4

1.5

1.3

3

2.4

3

2

4

1.4

5.5

2

g42

4.8

6

5

-2.9

-3.8

source:EAPEconomicupdate,April2026

B.RecentEconomicDevelopments

VietNamcarriedthestronggrowthandreformmomentumfrom2025into2026,supportedbyrobustexports,resilientservices,strongFDI,andasurgeinpublicinvestment,alongsidemajoradministrativeandinstitutionalrestructuringtoimprovepublicsectoreffectivenessandservicedelivery,andpublicinvestmentprogramstoaddresslogisticsandtradebottlenecksandboostmedium-termgrowth.

However,theexternalenvironmenthasbecomechallengingin2026duetotheMiddleEastoilshock.FuelsubsidiesduringMarchhelpedbuffermoreactivityandlimitthepass-throughtoenergyprices.Butbusinesssentimentisweakeningalongsideexportorders,andsupply-sidepricepressuresarebuilding.FDIfirmshadweatheredlastyearstrade-shocksrelativelywell,andVietNamisalsoemergingasamajorsupplierofAI-relatedelectronicsandhardware.However,domesticfirmsexportinglowervalue-addedmanufacturinggoodshadbeenharderhit,withthisweaknesspersistingintoQ1-26.CorporateleverageisthehighestamongASEAN,andcreditisincreasinglyconcentratedintherealestatesector.Withsaverssearchingforhigher-yieldingassetsoutsidethebankingsector,bankliquiditystrainshaveemerged.CurrencypressureshavealsoincreasedasaresultofatradedeficitinQ1-26,thestrengtheningoftheUSdollar,andhigheroilimportcosts.

Themonetarypolicystancehasbecomemorerestrictive,andthecentralbankhasmandatedtheadoptionofBaselIII—alignedcapitalandriskgovernancestandardsby2030.Fiscalpolicyhasbecomemoreexpansive,withplanstoinvestUS$320billionininfrastructureoverthenextfiveyears,financedthroughincreasedborrowing,includingfromconcessionalresourcesanddomesticrevenuemobilization.Majorstructuralreformsarealsounderway,whichshouldboostprivateinvestmentandparticipationininfrastructureinvestments.

●

Realsector,activityandsentiment

Stronginitialconditionsentering2026…

VietNam’seconomyhascontinuedtooutperformregionalpeers,supportedbyrobustexternalanddomesticdemand(Figure8).Growthacceleratedto8percentin2025from7.1percentin2024(Figure9).MomentumwassustainedintoQ1-26,with7.8percentyoyexpansion—thehighestin9years—andwasbroad-based,underpinnedbyrobustmanufacturingexportsandFDI,higherpublicinvestmentandhouseholdconsumption,andresilientservices.Onthedomesticside,investmentrose8percentin2025,reflectingstepped-upeffortstodisburseinthefinalyearofthe2021-25publicinvestmentplan,includingthroughstreamlinedprojectapprovalanddisbursementprocesses,aswellasasurgeinFDIasregionalvaluechainsdiversified(Figure10).

Nettradeisamodest,butgrowing,dragongrowth

Exportsroseby16percentin2025(Figure11),reachingarecordUS$475billion(93percentofGDP),ledbya28percentsurgeinhigh-techandelectronicsshipmentstotheUS(valuedatUS$153billion)thatwerefront-loadedinanticipationofUStariffs,andhelpedbyastructuralup-swinginglobalAIinfrastructurespendingthathaspropelledAI-relatedtradeacrossEastAsia,includingVietNam.Amidstrongdemandforintermediateinputsthatfeedexport-orientedproductionandmanufacturing,importsroseby17percent,sothatnetexportsmadeanegativecontributiontoGDPgrowth(0.76percentagepoints),forthesecondyearinarow.

FIGURE8

RealGDPgrowthrate

source:HaverAnalytics.

Contributiontogrowth,byexpenditure

source:NsoandworldBankcalculations.

Realinvestmentgrowth

source:NsoandworldBankcalculations.

FIGURE11

Tradegrowth

source:NsoandworldB