美联储-标准在邮件中：信用卡供应指标比较 The Standards Are in the Mail Comparing Credit Card Supply Indicators

FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries

FederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.

ISSN1936-2854(Print)

ISSN2767-3898(Online)

TheStandardsAreintheMail:ComparingCreditCardSupply

Indicators

JohnC.Driscoll,BenjaminS.Kay,GengLi,andCindyM.Vojtech

2026-048

Pleasecitethispaperas:

Driscoll,JohnC.,BenjaminS.Kay,GengLi,andCindyM.Vojtech(2026).“TheStandardsAreintheMail:ComparingCreditCardSupplyIndicators,”FinanceandEconomicsDis-cussionSeries2026-048.Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,

/10.17016/FEDS.2026.048

.

NOTE:Sta优workingpapersintheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(FEDS)arepreliminarymaterialscirculatedtostimulatediscussionandcriticalcomment.Theanalysisandconclusionssetfortharethoseoftheauthorsanddonotindicateconcurrencebyothermembersoftheresearchsta优ortheBoardofGovernors.ReferencesinpublicationstotheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(otherthanacknowledgement)shouldbeclearedwiththeauthor(s)toprotectthetentativecharacterofthesepapers.

1

TheStandardsAreintheMail:ComparingCreditCardSupplyIndicators

ByJoHNC.DRⅠscoLLANDBENjAmⅠNS.KAyANDGENGLⅠANDCⅠNDyM.VojTEcH∗

May22,2026

Weprovidethefirstlender-levelanalysislinkingtwoindependently

constructedcreditsupplymeasures:theFederalReserve’sSenior

LoanOfficerOpinionSurvey(SLOOS)andcreditcardmailoffers

fromMintelComperemedia.Usingamatchedpanelof73banks

from2000to2019,wefindthatquarterlymailvolumegrowth

was18percentlowerwhenbanksreportedtighteningcreditcard

lendingstandards,arelationshiprobusttoincludingcreditdemand

indicators.Inaddition,SLOOSresponsesoncreditlimitsand

interestratespreadsarealsocorrelatedwiththesetermsobserved

inmailoffers.Ourfindingsvalidatebothmeasuresasinformative

creditsupplyindicators.

JELclassification:G21;G28;E51.

Keywords:Creditavailability;creditstandards;offerrates.

I.Introduction

Creditplaysanessentialroleinfinancialmarketsandtheeconomymorebroadly.Tightorscarcecreditsupplymayhinderhouseholdspendingandbusinessinvestment,diminishingeconomicgrowth.Conversely,easyorexcessivecreditsupplymayfuelover-borrowingandleveraging,leadingtocreditqualitydeteriorationandassetbubbles.However,measuringchangesincreditsupplyischallengingbecausethepriceandquantityofborrowingreflectschangesinbothcreditsupplyanddemand.Thesemeasurementchallenges,alongwiththethemulti-dimensionalnatureofcreditterms(

Geanakoplos

,

2009

),havecomplicatedthesearchforaninformative,practical,andconsistentindicatorofcreditsupply.

Twodatasourcesofferpromiseinaddressingthismeasurementchallenge.First,theFederalReserve’sSeniorLoanOfficerOpinionSurveyonBankLendingPractices(hereafter,SLOOS)providesasurvey-basedmeasure:itasksloanofficersdirectlyaboutchangesinloanunderwritingpolicies,terms,andperceiveddemandformajorloancategoriesattheirbanks,withofficersusing

∗AllauthorsareattheFederalReserveBoard.Driscoll:

john.c.driscoll@

,Kay:

benjamin.s.kay@

,Geng:

geng.li@

,andVojtech:

cindy.m.vojtech@

.TheviewsexpressedheresolelyreflectthoseoftheauthorsandnotnecessarilythoseoftheFederalReserveBoard,theFederalReserveSystemasawhole,norofanyoneelseassociatedwiththeFederalReserveSystem.WethankHajaSannoh,HannahFarkas,andHannahCaseforsuperbresearchassistance.WethankourBoardcolleaguesforseveralusefulconversationsanddatasupport,especiallyJoseBerrospide,FeliciaIonescu,andRebeccaZarutskie.

2

theirjudgmenttoprovideaunivariatemeasurethatencompassesandweightsallchangesinloanunderwritingandterms.Secondandinthecreditcardmarketspecifically,anaction-basedmeasurehasemerged:mailoffervolumeprovidesaquantifiablemetricofcreditsupplythatbanksfullycontrol.

Han,Keys,andLi

(

2018

)showthataggregatecreditcardoffermailvolumeintheMintelComperemediatracksaggregateSLOOSmeasuresofcardlendingstandardsclosely.

Thispaperexamineswhetherbanks’wordsmatchtheiractionsincreditmarkets.Atthelenderlevel,wecombineSLOOSsurveyresponseswithobservedcreditcardmailoffersfromMintelComperemediaandask:whenloanofficersreporttighteninglendingstandards,dotheirbanksactuallysendfewercreditcardofferswithtighterterms?Andwheneasing,dotheymailoutmoreofferswithlooserterms?Morespecifically,wequantifythisrelationship:byhowmuchdoesmailvolumedeclinewhenabankreportstighteningstandards?MatchingSLOOSandMintelComperemediadatafor73banksfrom2000:Q1to2019:Q4,weestimatethemagnitudeoftheassociationbetweenreportedpolicychangesandobservedchangesinoffervolumeandterms,controllingforbankfixedeffects,timeeffects,andcrucially,creditdemandchanges.Beyondquantifyingtheserelationships,ouranalysisprovidesmutualvalidation:consistencybetweenthesetwoindependentlyconstructedmeasures—onebasedonself-reportedpolicies,theotheronobservedactions—reinforcesthenotionthatbothmetricscapturegenuinecreditsupplydynamicsratherthannoiseordemand-sidefactors.

Whilethispaperfocusesonbanksandcreditcards,theanalysishasbroaderimplications.Creditcardsarethedominantformofunsecuredconsumerborrowing($1.3trillionoutstanding),

1

andcommercialbanksholdover90percentofcreditcardloans.

2

Recentresearchdemonstratesthatconsumercreditfluctuationsareamajordeterminantofrealeconomicoutcomeslikeemploymentdynamics(

Herkenhoff

,

2019

).Thecreditcardmarketthusprovidesanideallaboratorytoassesstheconsistencyoftwoindependentlyconstructedcreditsupplyindicatorstoexplorebankcreditsupplydynamics.

Banksacquirecreditcardcustomersthroughfourprimarychannels:internet,directmail,telemarketing,anddirectselling.

Steffes,Murthi,andRao

(

2011

)findthatinternetanddirectmailcampaignsgeneratemoreprofitablecustomers,suggestingthatmailsolicitationscloselyreflect

1FederalReserveBoard,theG.19StatisticalReleaseofConsumerCredit

2FederalReserve,FRY-9C,“ConsolidatedFinancialStatementsforHoldingCompanies.”

3

banks’creditstandards.Becausebanksfullycontrolthevolumeandtermsofmailedoffers,theseoffersprovideacleanercreditsupplymeasurethanequilibriumoutcomeslikenewcreditcardoriginations,whicharecontaminatedbydemandfactors.

OurfirstcontributionestablishesconsistencybetweenSLOOS-reportedlendingstandardchangesandobservedchangesincreditcardmailoffersatthelenderlevel.PriorresearchfindsthatSLOOS-reportedchangesinlendingstandardspredictsubsequentmovementsinbankingvariablesandmacroeconomicoutcomes(

Lown,Morgan,andRohatgi

,

2000

;

LownandMorgan

,

2006

;

Cunningham

,

2006

;

Bassett,Chosak,Driscoll,andZakrajsek

,

2014

;

Haltenhof,JungLee,andStebunovs

,

2014

;

Vojtech,Kay,andDriscoll

,

2020

).

Hanetal.

(

2018

)showthataggregatemailvolumetracksSLOOSresponsesclosely.Ourpaperisthefirsttostudythisrelationshipatthelenderlevel,exploitingthelongitudinalstructureofbothdatasetstocharacterizetherelationshipbetweenthesecreditsupplymeasures,therebyprovidingmutualvalidationoftheirinformationtrackingcreditsupplychanges.

OursecondcontributionextendstheanalysisbeyondmailvolumetoexaminehowSLOOSindicatorsregardingspecificcreditcardtermscorrelatewithobservedtermsinmailoffers.Theseterm-specificindicators—changesincreditlimitsandinterestratespreads—arenotperfectlycorrelatedwithlendingstandardchanges,aswedocument.Byexaminingbothstandardsandterms,weprovideacomprehensiveassessmentofhowsurvey-basedcreditsupplymeasuresrelatetoobservedlenderbehavior.

Ourprimaryempiricalapproachregressesquarterlymailvolumegrowthonbanks’reportedchangesinlendingstandards(tightening,easing,ornochange),controllingforbankandtimefixedeffects(bothyearandquarter-of-year).Crucially,wecontrolforSLOOScreditdemandchangesbasedonindividualbanksurveyresponsestoisolatemailofferchangesfromfeedbackeffectsattributabletodemandconditions.Thisspecificationtestswhetherreportedtightening(easing)ofstandardsisassociatedwithlower(higher)mailvolumegrowth,holdingconstantcreditdemand. Wecomplementthisbank-levelanalysiswithborrower-levelandoffer-levelregressions.Attheborrowerlevel,weestimatealinearprobabilitymodelwherethedependentvariableindicateswhetheraborrowerreceivedanofferfromaparticularlenderinagivenquarter,regressedonthatlender’sreportedlendingstandardchangesandtheborrower’screditscorebucket(prime,near-prime,orsubprime).Attheofferlevel,weregressobservedcreditterms—minimumcreditlimitsandregularpurchaseinterestrates(the“go-to”rate)—onlenders’SLOOSresponsesregarding

4

changesinthosespecificterms.ThesecomplementaryapproachesexaminetheSLOOS-MintelComperemediarelationshipfrommultipleangles,strengtheningourinferenceabouttheconsistencyofthesecreditsupplymeasures.

Wefindastrong,economicallymeaningfulrelationshipbetweenreportedlendingstandardsandobservedmailvolume.Quarterlymailvolumegrowthis18percentagepointslowerwhenbanksreporttighteningcreditcardlendingstandards,relativetoquarterswithnochange—amarginexceedingonequarterofthesamplestandarddeviation.Thisrelationshipisrobusttoincludingbank-reportedcreditdemandchanges,whosecoefficientsarenumericallysmallandstatisticallyinsignificant,corroboratingthatmailvolumeandSLOOSlendingstandardsarecreditsupplymeasureslargelyinsulatedfromcreditdemandvariations.Thismailvolumetolendingstandardsassociationisasymmetric.Wefindnosignificantcorrelationbetweenmailvolumegrowthandeasingofcreditcardlendingstandards.Banks’reportedeasingdoesnottranslateintohighermailvolumegrowthinoursampleperiod.

Borrower-levelanalysiscorroboratesourbank-levelfindings.Tighteningoflendingstandardsisassociatedwithanappreciablylowerlikelihoodofreceivinganofferfromthatparticularlender,controllingfortheborrower’screditscore.Thecoefficientonlendertightening(-0.704,standarderror0.420)iscomparabletothecoefficientsonthenear-primeandsubprimeindicators(-0.603and-0.955,respectively),indicatingthatreportedtighteningmeaningfullydecreasesthelikelihoodofreceivinganoffer.Bycontrast,easingshowsnosuchassociation,consistentwiththeasymmetricpatterninmailvolumegrowth.

Turningtocreditterms,SLOOSresponsesoncreditcardtermscorrelatewithobservedtermsinMintelComperemediaoffers.Creditlimitsinoffersextendedbybankstightening(easing)creditlimitsare9percentlower(11percenthigher)thanthosefrombanksreportingnochanges.Thisrelationshipislargelysymmetric:bothtighteningandeasingtranslateintoobservablebehavior.Similarly,interestratesinoffersfrombanksreportingwideningratespreadsare33basispointshigherthanthosefrombanksreportingnochanges.Yet,narrowingspreadsdoesnotpredictlowerofferedrates,resemblinganasymmetrysimilartothatobservedforlendingstandardsandmailvolume.

Severalrobustnesschecksconfirmourresults.First,restrictingthesampletolenderspresentinthedataformorethan20quartersleavesbaselineestimatesrobustand,ifanything,stronger.Second,

5

restrictingtolenderswithaveragequarterlymailvolumeabove500,000offersyieldsconsistentresults.Third,wefindlittlesystematicdifferenceintherelationshipbetweenlendingstandardchangesandmailvolumegrowthacrossthecreditscoredistribution,thoughwenotesuggestiveevidenceofstrongereffectsforsubprimeborrowersduringeasingepisodes.Fourth,weexaminewhethertherelationshipshiftedaroundtheCreditCardAccountabilityResponsibilityandDisclosure(CARD)ActandfindthattherelationshipbetweenstandardtighteningandlowermailvolumegrowthwassubduedbeforetheCARDActbutbecamesizeableandstatisticallysignificantafterward.

Theremainderofthepaperproceedsasfollows.Section

II

describestheSLOOSandMintelComperemediadataandexplainshowwematchthemtocreatealender-levelpanel.Section

III

presentsourmainresults:therelationshipbetweenlendingstandardsandmailvolumegrowth,howterm-specificSLOOSresponsesrelatetoobservedofferterms,andborrower-levelevidenceonthelikelihoodofreceivingoffers.Section

IV

concludesanddiscussesimplicationsformeasuringcreditsupplyinothermarkets.

II.DataDescription

Wetakedatafromtwoprincipalsources:(1)theFederalReserve’sSLOOSonchangesinloanunderwritingstandards,terms,anddemand(2)andtheMintelComperemediadataofcreditcardoffers.Inthissection,wedescribethesesources,howwematchthem,andprovidesummarystatistics.

A.SeniorLoanOfficerOpinionSurvey

UNDERwRⅠTⅠNGSTANDARDsANDDEmAND

TheFederalReserve’sSLOOShaspolledbanksaboutchangesintheirlendingstandardsformajorcategoriesofloanstohouseholdsandbusinessesaswellasaboutchangesindemandforthoseloancategoriessincetheearly1990s.Thesurveyisconducted(usuallyquarterly)bytheFederalReserveBoard;and,forthemajorityofoursample,nearly60U.S.commercialbanksparticipateineachsurvey.

3

Weusedatathrough2019:Q4,beforetheonsetofthepandemic.Thesurveypanelofdomesticbanksspansall12FederalReserveDistricts,whilebalancingtheneedtokeepitheavily

3Whilethesurveyhasbeenconductedsince1966,astable,consistentsetofquestionshaveonlybeenaskedsince1990.Upto24U.S.branchesandagenciesofforeignbanksalsoparticipateinthesurvey,thoughtheydonotanswerquestionsaboutcreditcardloans,assuchloansaregenerallynotalargepartoftheirbusiness.Thesurveyisvoluntary,butbanksinvitedtoparticipateinthesurveyalmostalwaysagreetodoso.In2012,thedomesticpanelwasexpandedtoallowupto80banks.Formoreinformationonthesurvey,

see/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey

.

6

weightedtowardlargebanks.Surveyrespondentsholdabout70percentofallassetsatdomesticallycharteredbankinginstitutions.

Theprimarycauseofsampleattritionistheacquisitionofarespondentbankbyanotherbankthatalreadyparticipatesinthesurvey.Thus,non-responseselectionbiasintherespondentsislikelytobelimited.Banksareaskedtoreportwhethertheyhavechangedtheirstandardsduringthesurveyperiod(i.e.,overthepreviousthreemonths)onthefollowingsevencategoriesofcoreloans:commercialandindustrial(business),commercialrealestate,residentialmortgagestopurchasehomes,homeequitylinesofcredit,creditcards,auto,andconsumerloansotherthancreditcardsorautoloans.

Thequestionaboutchangesincreditcardstandardsis,“Overthepastthreemonths,howhaveyourbank’screditstandardsforapprovingapplicationsfromindividualsforcreditcardloanschanged?”Similarly,thequestionaboutchangesindemandis,“Apartfromnormalseasonalvariation,howhasdemandforcreditcardloanschanged?”Banksareaskedtoanswerbothquestionsusingafive-pointscale.Inthecaseofstandardsquestions,thescaleis:1=“easedconsiderably”;2=“easedsomewhat”;3=“aboutunchanged”;4=“tightenedsomewhat”;and5=“tightenedconsiderably.”Fordemandquestions,“eased”and“tightened”arereplacedwith“strengthened”and“weakened,”respectively.

4

Ithasbeenhistoricallyrarethatbankscharacterizetheirchangesinstandardsordemandashavingchanged“considerably.”Assuch,weuseavariablethattakesavalueof-1whenabankreportsthatstandardshaveeasedconsiderablyorsomewhat,0ifstandardsarereportedasunchanged,and1ifabankreportsthattheyhavetightenedconsiderablyorsomewhat.Asimilarvariableisconstructedfordemand.

5

Thetoppaneloffigure

1

plotschangesincreditcardloanunderwritingstandardsoverthesampleperiod.Thepositivebluebarsshowthepercentageofrespondentsreportingtheyhavetightenedstandards,andthenegativeredbarsthefractionreportingthattheyhaveeasedstandards.Duringthe2008–09recession(shaded),morethanhalfofthebanksreportedtighteningstandardsinmultiplequarters,andnoneeased.Thepost-recessionperiodwasmarkedbyeasingforthefirstfiveyears.

4Thequestiononcreditcard-specificdemandchangeswasintroducedintheearly2010s.Beforethat,theSLOOSaskedamoregeneralquestionondemandchangesofconsumerloans.

5Inthefulltestingpanelof1,030bank-quarterobservations,banksreportconsiderabletighteningonce,considerableeasing7times,considerablestrengthening8times,andconsiderableweakening10times,atotaloffewerthan3percent.

7

Becausethesemeasuresarequalitativeandtheirinterpretationcanvaryacrossbanksandovertime,thebarheightsdonotnecessarilyreflecttheactualmagnitudeoftighteningoreasing.Thedataalsoindicateperiods—suchasfrom2016through2019—whenasizableshareofbanksreportedbothtighteningandeasingstandardssimultaneously.Moreover,banksmaybesomewhatreluctanttoreporteasing:onaverage,theproportionofbanksreportingatighteningislargerthantheproportionreportinganeasing.Someofthisiseffectivelyaformofmeasurementerror,attenuatingourresultsrelativetotheirtruerelationships,andsomeofthiscanbemanagedbyusingfirmleveldatatocalculatetherelationshipbetweenstandardsandmeasuresofcreditavailability.

TERms

TheSLOOSasksquestionsoncreditcardtermsandconditions,usingasimilarformattothequestionsonunderwritingstandardsanddemand.Specifically,itaskshow,overthepastthreemonths,bankshavechanged:creditlimits;spreadsofinterestrateschargedonoutstandingbalancesoverthebank’scostoffunds;theminimumpercentofoutstandingbalancesrequiredtoberepaideachmonth;theminimumrequiredcreditscore;andtheextenttowhichloansaregrantedtosomecustomersthatdonotmeetcreditscoringthresholds.

Ofthesefivequestions,thelasttwooverlapcloselywiththequestionsonunderwritingstandards,andwedonotconsiderthemfurther.MinimumrequiredpaymentsarenotrecordedintheMintelComperemediaoffersdata.Accordingly,ouranalysisoncredittermswillfocusonthepriceofcreditandcreditlimitoffered.

ThebottomtwopanelsofFigure

1

plottheresponsestochangesintermsforspreadsandcreditlimits.Here,tighteningreferstoincreasedspreadsordecreasedlimits,respectively.Incontrasttothestandardsquestion,thetermsresponsesbyagivenbankoftenhavereportedeasingandtighteninginthesamequarter.Thesesituationscanbeseeninthefigureinquarterswherethereareredandbluebarsatthesametime.

B.MintelComperemedia

OurdatasourceforcreditcardoffersisMintelComperemedia’sproprietarysurveyofU.S.consumers,andoursamplebegins2000:Q1.Eachmonth,MintelComperemediarandomlyselectsabout4,000consumersfromapoolofonemillionconsumersthatthefirmacquiredfromalargesurveyserviceprovider.Onaverage,about2,500consumerspermonthchoosetoparticipatein

8

FⅠGuRE1.SLOOSDATAFoRCREDⅠTCARDs

ReportedChangesinStandardsForCreditCards

EasingTightening

PercentQuarterly

200320052007200920112013201520172019

100

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-80

-100

ReportedChangesinSpreadsForCreditCards

EasingTightening

100

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-80

-100

Percent

Quarterly

200320052007200920112013201520172019

ReportedChangesinLimitsForCreditCards

EasingTightening

100

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-80

-100

Percent

Quarterly

200320052007200920112013201520172019

Source:SLOOS

9

thesurvey.Eachparticipantsendstheircommercialmailfromcertaintrackedsectors,includingcreditcardoffers,toMintelComperemediaweekly.Ifconsumerswishtorespondtoacreditcardoffer,theyareinstructedtodetachtheresponseportionandforwardMintelComperemediatheremainderoftheoffermaterials.Consumersareofferedprizerafflesasaparticipatingincentive.

MintelComperemediarecordsinformationontheforwardedmailoffers.Thisallowsustostudynotonlywhetheraconsumerreceivesanycreditcardoffers,butalsotermsofthecontractsoffered.Forexample,thedataincludeinformationaboutthepriceofcredit—theso-called“go-to”interestrate,whichistheregularnon-promotionalinterestrateforoutstandingbalances.Thevastmajorityofthemailofferscollectedinthesurveyarepersonalcreditcardoffers,asthepersonalcreditcardindustryexhibitslargerelianceondirectmailforcustomeracquisition.

Inadditiontothesurveyoncreditcardoffers,MintelComperemediaconductsaseparatesurveyonparticipatingconsumerstocollecttheirdemographicandsocioeconomicinformation.Thisinformationisusedtocalculatepost-stratificationweightsthatfacilitatestheestimationofaggregatemailvolumeatthenationallevel.Auniquefeatureofthesedataisthat,from2007,surveyparticipants’VantageScore2.0creditscorewasmergedinfromTransUnion,oneofthemajorcreditreportingagencies,foreachofferrecipient.

6

C.MatchingandSummaryStatistics

MintelComperemediaprovidesthenameofeachfinancialinstitutionmakinganoffer.Becausewewishtoexaminetheimpactofchangesinbanklendingstandards,weconfineouranalysistothoseinstitutionsinMintelComperemediathatareassociatedwithcommercialbanksontheSLOOSpanel.

7

Wehand-matchtheMintelComperemedialendernametoitsunique,contemporaneousidentifier,theRSSDID,andusethisRSSDIDtomergewiththeSLOOSdata.

Themergedpaneldatasetcontains73uniquebankswithabout19banksonaverageineachquarter.Table

1

describesthedistributionofSLOOSresponsesatthelender×quarterlevel.Asshownincolumn1ofthetoppanel,80percentoftheresponsesinoursampleindicatedunchangedcreditcardlendingstandards,with12and8percentreportingtighteningandeasingstandardsduringthepreviousthreemonths,respectively.Thedistributionofcreditlimitstandardsislargely

6Thedataweuseremovedallpersonalidentifiableinformation(PII).

7TheSLOOSpanelconsistsofcommercialbanks,andgiventhelimitedsample,commercialbanksinthesamebankholdingcompany(BHCs)areavoidedinthesampleselectionprocess,withtheassumptionthatlendingstandardsareroughlyconsistentacrosssubsidiarieswithinthesameBHC.

10

similar.Incontrast,only4percentofthesampleindicatedwideningcreditcardinterestratespreadsand10percentindicatingnarrowingthespreads.

TABLE1—SLOOSCREDⅠTCARDLENDⅠNGANDTERmsSTANDARDs

Percent

(1)

Lendingstandard

(2)

Creditlimits

(3)

Interestratespreads

Tightening(widening)

11.8

11.8

4.2

Unchanged

80.2

79.1

85.4

Easing(narrowing)

8.0

9.2

10.4

N

1,457

1,442

1,442

CreditlimitstandardTightening

UnchangedEasing

Lendingstandards

Tightening

Unchanged

Easing

60.2

36.3

3.5

5.1

87.3

7.6

6.8

59.8

33.3

Spreadsstandard

Lendingstandards

Tightening

Unchanged

Easing

Widening

32.8

7.0

11.1

Unchanged

64.9

88.9

80.3

Narrowing

2.3

4.1

8.6

Source:SLOOSandauthors’calculations.

Note:Theupperpanelshowsthedistributionofbanks’responsestoSLOOSquestionson

changesinlendingstandardsandtermsofcredit.Themiddleandlowpanelsshowhowlending

standardchangesarerelatedtotermsofcreditchanges.

Themiddleandlowerpanelsofthetableshowthecorrelationsbetweenlendingstandardandtermstandards(eachcolumnaddsupto100percent).Thematricesarefarfromdiagonal,indicatingless-than-perfectcorrelations.Forexample,amongthebanksreportedtighteninglendingstandards,only33percentalsoreportedwideninginterestratespreads.Amongthebanksreportedeasinglendingstandards,themajorityreportednochangeincreditlimit,whereas7percentreportedtighteningcreditlimits.

Table

2

summarizesmainMintelComperemediavariables.Atthelenderlevel,theaveragemailvolumegrowthbetweentwoquartersisabout18percent.

8

Theaverageofferedminimumcredit

8Thequarterlymailvolumegrowthatthelenderlevelisvolatileandhasasignificantnumberofoutliersthatdonotnecessarilyreflectunderlyingchangesincreditcardmailofering.Wetrimthesampleatthetopandbottom5percentofthemailvolumegrowthdistributiontolimittheefectofoutliers.

11

limitisabove$1,400andtheaverageofferedregularpurchase“go-to”rateisabout14percent.

TABLE2—MⅠNTELCompEREmEDⅠAMAⅠLVoLumEGRowTHANDOFFERTERms

∆%Mail

(1)

volume(percent)

(2)

Creditlimit($)

(3)

Interestrate(percent)

Mean

17.9

1,445

14.0

Standarddeviation

68.5

1,638

4.6

Source:MintelComperemediaandauthors’calculations.

Note:Creditlimitreferstotheminimumcreditlimitincreditcardofers.Interestratereferstotheregularpurchaseinterestrate,whichisalsoreferredtoasthe“go-to”rate.

III.Results

A.LendingStandards

Wefirstanalyzewhetherbanklenders’reportedlendingstandardchangesarecorrelatedwiththemailvolumegrowthofcreditcardoffersextendedbythesamebank.Inthesimplestspecificationbelow,

(1)∆%mailvolumej,t=α+β1Tightenj,t+β2Easej,t+ϕj+θt+ϵj,t,

wherepercentchangeinmailvolume,∆%mailvolumej,t,inquartertisregressedonbankj’sreportedchangeinitslendingstandard,Tightenj,tandEasej,t.ϕjisbankfixedeffects,andθtistimefixedeffects.Tohelpcontrolforpotentialseasonalityandaggregate