中国能源转型：2026年全球经验教训

WhattheWorld

CanLearnfrom

China’s

EnergyTransitionBy

Maurice

Berns,

RinaSu,

Patrick

Herhold,Christophe

Brognaux,

MattSundberg,Vincent

Chin,Chris

Yu,and

Eden

Cottee-JonesAugust2026Understandingtheseapparentcontradictionsisessentialfor

identifyingwhichaspectsof

thecountry’senergytransitionoffer

lessons

for

other

countries

and

which

are

shaped

byChina’suniquecircumstances.Bytakinganempiricalviewacrosssustainability,energysecurity,affordability,and

broader

economic

outcomes,weidentify

where

China’s

approach

has

been

successful,wheredifficult

tradeoffs

emerge,and

which

elements

can

be

adoptedby

other

countries.Our

analysis

identified

the

five

mostimportantdriversof

thetransition:intensemarketcompetition,stronginnovationandcommercialization,accelerated

project

delivery,strategic

fiscal

support,andlong-term

policy

predictability.Importantly,manyof

theseleversareavailableto

governmentseverywhere.Whilemarketeconomiesmustemploydifferentinstitutionsandprocesses,theypossess

manyof

thesamepolicy

levers.The

challenge

for

governments

is

to

createdurablepolicyframeworksthatprovidestrategicdirectionbeyond

electoral

cycles

while

using

public

policy

and

financingto

reducethecostof

aonce-in-a-generationinvestmentinenergyinfrastructure.Noothercountryhasexpandedrenewablegenerationasquickly,invested

as

heavily

in

energy

transition

supply

chains,or

played

as

significant

a

role

in

reducing

the

global

cost

oflow-carbonenergytechnologies.Giventhe

paceof

China’senergy

transition,there

is

much

that

other

countries

can

learnfromitsexperience.Yet

assessments

of

China’s

energy

transition

are

often

polarized,

emphasizingeitheritsextraordinaryachievementsoritsshortcomings.Thispolarizationisn’tsurprisinggiventhedata:•Overthe

pasttwo

decades,

China

has

reduced

itsemissions

intensity

by50%,yet

the

country’s

rapideconomicgrowth

meansit

nowaccountsforapproximately

30%of

global

emissions.•China

installed

more

than

1,300GW

of

renewable

powercapacity

over

the

past

five

years,but

thermal

coal

stillaccounts

for

more

than

half

of

its

energy

supply.China’s

progressintheglobalenergytransition

has

attractedintenseinterestfrompolicymakersandbusiness

leaders.WHATTHEWORLDCAN

LEARN

FROMCHINA’S

ENERGYTRANSITION30.60.40.20.040.053.2World0.615.51.00.61.3Brazil20242.04.4Indiaxx0.40.61.41.30.41.1IndonesiaBubblesizeand

number=Absoluteemissions(MtCO₂e)4.63.2EU0.70.4UKEXHIBIT1ChinaHasReducedItsEmissionsIntensitybyHalf,But

Still

Accountsfor30%of

theWorld’sAbsoluteEmissionsGreenhouse

absolute

emissions

and

emission

intensity,

ranked

by2024intensity

from

high

to

lowEmissionintensity:KgCO₂e

per$1,000

GDP1.07.30.8Toassessthetransition,weevaluatedChina’sperformanceacross

sustainability,energy

security,affordability,and

broader

economic

outcomes.SustainabilityBetween2004and2024—a

period

of

extraordinarily

rapideconomic

expansion—China

reduced

its

emission

intensity

by50%.

However,total

greenhouse

gas

emissions

have

continuedtoincreaseand

nowaccountfor

roughly30%of

globalemissions.(See

Exhibit1.)

Partof

thisreflectstherelocationof

manufacturing

from

developed

economies

into

China,withemissionseffectivelyembeddedinproductsconsumedelsewhere.

Nevertheless,thecompositionof

China’sdomesticenergy

mix

remains

a

factor.Windandsolargeneration

have

beendeployedinChinaatscale,with1,300GW

installed

in

the

last

five

years.

In2025alone,China

installed430GW

of

wind

and

solar

capacity—more

than

the

total

installed

wind

and

solar

capacity

of

anyother

country.Atthesametime,the

useof

thermalcoalcontinuestoexpandinabsoluteterms,withapproximately180

GW

added

overthe

pastfiveyears.(See

Exhibit2.)Althoughcoal’sshare

of

China’senergysystemisexpectedtodeclineovertime

as

renewablescontinuetoexpand,itwill

remainasignificantcomponentof

thecountry’senergysystemforthe

foreseeablefuture.China’sEnergyTransitionDashboardSources:

European

Union;

International

EnergyAgency;

BCGanalysis.Note:CO2e=carbondioxide

equivalent.4BOSTONCONSULTING

GROUPNigeriaAustraliaJapanChina20045.97.1USSources:

International

EnergyAgency;

BCGanalysis.Energy

SecurityAlthoughChinapossessessubstantialdomesticcoalreserves—estimated

at

around220billion

metric

tons

in2023—it

remains

dependent

on

imported

oil

and

natural

gas.China

has

sought

to

improve

energy

security

by

diversifying

itscrude

oil

imports;yet

in2025,more

than

half

of

importsoriginatedfrom

justfourcountries.To

reduce

dependence

on

imported

fossil

fuels,China’selectrification

rate

has

doubled

since

2004,

reachingapproximately29%in2024,and

is

expected

to

surpass

leadingdeveloped

economies

in

the

near

future.Atthesametime,China’sdependenceonenergyimports

hasincreased

from

approximately6%of

primary

energy

supply

in

2004to

around24%in

2024.Some

increase

is

inevitable

foran

economy

that

has

expanded

as

rapidly

as

China’s,

butevenafteraccountingforeconomicgrowth,thisincrease

in

importdependence

hasexceededthatofmanyotherindustrialeconomies.AffordabilityRetailelectricitypricesinChinahave

remainedstableordeclined

over

the

past

decade,even

as

the

country

hasundertakensubstantialinvestmentingridinfrastructure.Industrial

electricity

prices

have

fallen

by

approximately24%inlocal

currency

terms

over

this

period,whereas

many

otherindustrialeconomieshaveexperiencedsignificantincreases.EconomicOutcomesChineseexportsof

energytransitiontechnologieshaveexpanded

dramatically,reaching

approximately$147

billionaftergrowingatacompoundannual

rateof

around

18%overthe

past

decade.

Major

export

markets

include

both

theEuropean

Union

and

ASEAN

economies.Thisprogressreflectstheinteractionofmultiplereinforcingfactors

that

have

evolved

over

more

than

two

decades.Someare

foundational,including

the

country’s

manufacturing

base,skilled

workforce,and

abundant

wind

and

solar

resources.Others

are

deliberate

policy

choices

that

have

shapedinvestmentincentivesandindustrialdevelopment.FiveFactorsHave

Catalyzed

China’sEnergyTransitionOur

analysis

identified

five

key

drivers

of

China’s

energytransition.(See

Exhibit3.)

Together,

they

have

created

anecosystem

that

supports

rapid

deployment,continuous

cost

reduction,andindustrialcompetitiveness.174+5%60%6865%EXHIBIT2CoalAccountsfor60%ofChina’sEnergySupplyChina’stotalenergysupply(exajoules),

2004–2024

Coaland

products+4%

Oil

andgas+6%

Solarandwind+43%

Nuclear+12%

Hydropower+7%

Others–1%20042009201420192024200150100500WHATTHEWORLDCAN

LEARN

FROMCHINA’S

ENERGYTRANSITION52004–2024

CAGRSource:

BCGanalysis.Factor1:

Intense

CompetitionChina

deliberately

engineered

strong

competition

in

selectedparts

of

the

value

chain

to

support

emerging

industries

bycreatingdensemanufacturingecosystemsthatacceleratedinnovation,commercialization,andcostreduction.

InShenzhen,for

example,

BYD

and

other

energy

transitiontechnology

companies

are

co-located

with

leading

universityresearchinstitutions,including

Peking

University’sGreenEnergy

Research

and

Development

Center.In

China,

local

governments

play

an

important

role

incompeting

to

secure

central

government

funding

for

industrialdevelopment.Over

the

past

decade,this

dynamic

hasencouragedthe

rapidemergenceofnewcompaniesdevelopingenergy

transition

technologies.

In

many

regions,

numerousfirmshaveenteredsimilarmarketssimultaneously,creatingan

exceptionallycompetitivecommercialenvironment.Thiscompetitionhasdrivencontinuousimprovementsinproductivity,acceleratedcostreductions,andstrengthened

exportcompetitiveness.With

ample

fiscal

support

and

local

governments

unwilling

togiveuptheirnewlyestablished

manufacturing

bases,unprofitable

firms

continue

to

be

subsidized,driving

prices

down

even

further.

In

some

cases,this

means

loss-makingcompaniesthatmightotherwisehaveexitedthe

marketcontinuetoreceiveassistance.Whilethissituationcancreatesignificantchallengesforlocaleconomies

when

companies

eventually

fail,the

benefits

for

thebroader

energy

transition

are

considerable.Capacity

growsrapidly,costs

fall

dramatically,and

companies

look

to

expandintooverseasmarkets.Factor

2:

InnovationandCommercializationIn

the

early

stages

of

industrial

development,China

focusedlargely

on

manufacturing

technologies

developed

elsewhere.Increasingly,

however,thecountry

has

becomea

leading

sourceof

innovationitself.IntensecompetitionLocalgovernmentscompetedforcapital,givingriseto

hundredsoftechnologyfirms.Costsfellandexportssurged.InnovationandcommercializationChinaevolvedfromfast-followertoinventor,andquicklytranslatedR&Dinto

products.AcceleratedprojectdeliveryProjectsreachthegrid2xto5xfasterthroughparallelpermittingandsimultaneousinvestmentingenerationandthegrid.SavvyfiscalsupportManufacturingsubsidies

precededdeploymentsupport.Loweredthecostcurveandscaleddeployment.Long-term

policypredictabilityTwodecadesofconsistentdirectionviaFive-Year

Plans.Gaveinvestorsconfidenceinalong-paybacksector.FiveLeversUnderpinChina’sEnergyTransition—AndMost

AreTransferableScale,wherever

possiblePursuetargetedindustrialscalingopportunities,exploregeographicalexpansion,andcreatelargerand

moreintegrateddomesticmarkets.Translateinnovationinto

manufacturingInvestinfoundationalresearchandconvertresearchintocommercialopportunities.Rethinkthegovernment’s

roleTreatthetransitionasalong-termnationalinfrastructureprogram,strengthenlong-termpolicyclarity,andusepublicfinancesstrategicallytoimproveaffordability.PrioritiesforothercountriesLeversChina

hasdeployed6BOSTONCONSULTING

GROUPEXHIBIT

3Factor3:AcceleratedProject

DeliveryChina’s

permitting

and

grid

connection

systems

have

beendesigned

with

rapid

deployment

as

a

central

objective.Theperiod

between

final

investment

decision

and

grid

connection

for

major

renewable

energy

projects

in

China

is

typically

two

tofivetimesfasterthancomparableprojectsinthe

UnitedStatesand

Europe.

Rather

than

relying

on

sequential

reviews

bymultiplegovernmentagencies,permittingprocessesare

oftencoordinatedinparallel,withstandardizedinterconnectionstudiesreducingadministrativedelaysand

uncertainty.

Insome

cases,

permitting

decisions

have

reportedly

beencompleted

within18days.

Faster

permitting

also

has

a

clearbusiness

case.

Longer

development

cycles

for

Europeanrenewable

projects

can

reduce

investor

internal

rates

of

returnbyanestimated4to5

percentage

points

relativetocomparable

projects

in

China.Project

delivery

has

also

benefited

from

extensive

upfrontinvestmentintransmissionanddistributioninfrastructure.Verticalintegrationacrosselementsof

theelectricitysystem

hasfurthershortenedprojecttimelinesbysimplifyingcoordination

between

generation,transmission,and

gridconnection.(See

Exhibit5.)China

awards

more

than3.6million

science,

technology,engineering,andmathematics(STEM)degreesannually,which

is

more

than

the

United

States,

India,and

Japan

combined.

Ona

per

capita

basis,China’s

2,500

STEM

graduates

per

millionpeopleis

broadlycomparablewith

leadingeconomies.This

deep

pool

of

scientific

and

engineering

talent

has

beenaccompanied

by

a

rapid

expansion

of

China’s

research

andinnovationcapabilities.Academicpublicationsrelatingtoenergy

transition

technologies

produced

by

Chineseuniversitieshavegrownsubstantiallyoverthepasttwodecades,and

China

has

demonstrated

an

increasing

ability

to

convertthisresearchintocommercialoutcomes.(See

Exhibit4.)Between2000and2024,China

accountedfor

approximately57%of

cumulative

global

energy

transition

patent

filings.Chinesefirmsare

now

producingglobally

recognizedtechnologicalinnovations,exemplifiedby

JinkoSolarsettingsuccessive

world

records

for

solar

cell

conversion

efficiency.What’smore,China’sinnovationmodel

places

particularemphasisoncommercialapplication.Closelinks

between

researchinstitutions,manufacturers,andindustrialclusters

haveenabled

newtechnologiesto

move

rapidlyfromlaboratories

into

large-scale

production.ElectromobilitySmartgrids

FuelcellsEnergyefficiencyEnergyefficiencyFuelcellsSmart

grids

ElectromobilityBiofuelsWind

energyPhotovoltaicsSolarthermalBatteriesHydropower304050

6070

80%

patents(China+

US

=

100%)10090807060504030201000

1020EXHIBIT4ChinaLeadsinScientificPublicationsandPatentsAcrosstheTop

10

EnergyTransitionTechnologies1Batteries2Electromobility3Photovoltaics4

Windenergy5Fuelcells6Biofuels7

Solarthermal8Energyefficiency9

Smartgrids10

HydropowerSources:

IRENA;Scopus;

BCGanalysis.Note:

Dataiscumulativefrom2000–2024.

Patentdatafrom

International

Renewable

EnergyAgency(IRENA).Article

publicationdata

basedon

Scopus

database,including

all

publicationarticles,excluding

reviews,with

relevant

keywordsof

certaintechnologiesintitle,abstract,or

keywords.Top10technologies

ranked

by

patentsWindenergy

Photovoltaics%

articles(China+

US

=

100%)WHATTHEWORLDCAN

LEARN

FROMCHINA’S

ENERGYTRANSITION7HydropowerBatteries●

ChinaSolarthermal

USBiofuelsOvertime,investmentincreasinglyshiftedtowardstransmissionanddistributioninfrastructure—thegridinvestments

required

to

support

growing

demand

andintegrationofrenewable

power.Onlyafterstrengthening

bothmanufacturingcapacityandsupportinginfrastructuredidChinasignificantlyexpanddeploymentincentives,suchasfeed-in

tariffs.(See

Exhibit6.)Looking

ahead,the

country

has

announced

plans

to

investapproximately

RMB5trillioningridinfrastructurebetween2026and2030throughacombinationofpublicand

privateinvestment,

representing

roughly

an85%increase

comparedwiththe

previousfive-year

period.Factor5:

Long-termPolicy

PredictabilityPerhaps

the

defining

characteristic

of

China’s

approach

hasbeen

the

consistency

of

long-term

policy

direction.

For

morethan

two

decades,successive

Five-Year

Plans

have

identifiedtheenergytransitionasanationalstrategic

priority.Asfarback

as2010,China’s

Twelfth

Five-Year

Plan

established

atarget

to

increase

the

share

of

non-fossil

fuels

in

primaryenergy

consumption

to11.4%.

Its

industrial

policy

focused

notonly

on

building

domestic

manufacturing

but

also

securing

keyupstreaminputs,suchascriticalmineralsandothermaterials.Factor4:Savvy

Fiscal

SupportWhile

many

governments

have

relied

on

fiscal

incentives

tostimulate

demand,China

invested

early

and

heavily

across

the

supplysideof

theenergytransition.Thisreflectedtheirviewthatenergyinfrastructureisavitalnationalassetthatcan

strengthencompetitivenessandstimulateeconomicdevelopment

for

decades.While

it’s

true

that

China’s

state-owned

energy

companieshave

been

able

to

invest

in

projects

with

relatively

modestfinancial

returns,and

state-owned

banks

have

offeredfinancingonhighlyfavorableterms,theseinstitutionalcharacteristicsalonedonotfullyexplainChina’ssuccess.Between2008and2010,

manufacturers

of

the

first50megawatt-level

wind

turbines

received

subsidies

of

RMB600per

kilowatt.

Between2011and2020,

approximately

RMB

100billion

in

central

government

funding

was

directed

towardsChina’sdomesticelectricvehicleindustry.Asmanufacturingcapability

strengthened,China

established

a

leading

globalpositionacrossnumerouscomponentsof

theenergytransitionvalue

chain.ChinaCompletesProjectsBeforeComparableUSorEU

Projects

CompletePermittingProject

developmenttimefrominitiationto

on-grid,

utility-scale

solar

and

onshore-wind,

2024

Projectapproval

Construction

On-grid

processSources:

BCG

projectexperience(China);

Lawrence

Berkeley

National

Laboratoryand

resourcesforthefuture(US);Solar

Power

Europe

and

International

EnergyAgency

(EU);

BCGanalysis.1The

EU’s

Renewable

Energy

Directive(RED

III)targetis2to3years,

butactual

permittingtimescanstillexceed

6yearsin

some

cases.US

4一6years3–5

6–12~1years

months

yearEU

4一8

years8

BOSTONCONSULTINGGROUPEXHIBIT51一2

years3–6months6–12

months3–5months1–2months3–6

years11–2

yearsChinaThispolicystabilityhas

reduced

uncertaintyfor

businessesmaking

investments

that

require

large

upfront

capital

and

longpayback

periods.

Investors

have

been

able

to

commit

capitalwith

greater

confidence

that

the

broader

policy

environmentwould

continue

to

support

long-term

returns.(See

Exhibit7.)This

does

not

mean

that

China’s

policy

environment

has

beenstatic.

Policyadjustmentshaveoccurred.

Forexample,centralgovernment

subsidies

through

feed-in

tariffs

for

new

utility-scaleanddistributedsolarphotovoltaicprojects

andwindprojects

ended

in2021.

Nevertheless,these

changes

havegenerally

occurred

within

a

broader

strategic

framework

thathasremainedremarkablyconsistentovertime.Tradeoffs

of

the

TransitionWhile

the

speed

ofChina’s

energy

transition

is

notable,it

hasnot

been

achieved

without

tradeoffs.These

experiencesprovide

valuable

lessons

for

policymakers

seeking

to

accelerate

their

own

transitions

while

avoiding

unintended

consequences.Chinahaslargelysucceededinfinancingthetransitionwithout

significantlyincreasingelectricitypricesforconsumers.However,someof

thesecosts

haveinstead

beenabsorbed

bypublic

institutions

and

state-owned

grid

operators,effectively

shifting

a

portion

of

the

financial

burden

to

the

broader

publicsector

through

taxation

and

public

finance.Competitionbetweenprovincialgovernmentstoattractinvestmentandpreservelocal

manufacturing

has,insomesectors,contributedtoduplicateinvestment,excesscapacity,

andcutthroatcompetitionthatleavesmanycompanieswithpersistently

low

profitability.

Between2017and

2024,

asgovernmentinvestmentinelectricvehiclesaccelerated,profitabilityinChina’sautomotiveindustryfellbyapproximatelyone-third,while

capacity

utilization

declined

and

supplierpayment

delays

increased.China’s

two

largest

grid

operatorsgenerated

an

average

return

on

equity

of

just2%

between

2020and2024,asopposedtothe4%to

15%typicallyearned

bymajor

USand

Europeanutilities.

Manycompaniesremaindependenton

publicsupport,exposing

localgovernmentstodebt

risks

with

knock-on

impacts

to

employment.

Gridinvestments

GenerationinvestmentsSources:China

ElectricityCouncil;Companyfinancial

report;

BCGanalysis.Note:Totalinvestmentcompleted,including

both

publicand

privateinvestment.TheState-ownedAssetsSupervisionandAdministrationCommission

of

the

State

Council

(SASAC)isaninstitutiondirectlyundertheStateCouncilof

Chinathat

acts

asthestate’sownerfor

centrally

administered

state-owned

enterprises.ChinaInvestedintheGridFirst,EnablingLater

Generation

Growth

ThroughState-OwnedEnterprisesChina’s

total

investment

in

electricity

grid

andpowergeneration(RMB

billions)1,20002013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025Phase1:2013–2019Grid

LeadsTotalinvestment:

RMB5,750billion60%for

gridPhase2:2019–2025GenerationCatch-upTotalinvestment:RMB9,110billion60%for

generation1,000800600400200WHATTHEWORLDCAN

LEARN

FROMCHINA’S

ENERGYTRANSITION9EXHIBIT

613th

Five-Year

Plan“Toincreasenon-fossilfuelsinprimaryenergyconsumptionto15%in

2020”The

rapid

paceof

deployment

hasalso

producedenvironmentalandsocialimpacts.China’spermittingsystemhas

demonstrated

that

renewable

energy

projects

can

beapproved

and

constructed

quickly,but

this

raises

questionsaboutwhethersufficientconsiderationisconsistentlygiventowiderenvironmentalandsocialimpacts.The

rapid

build-outof

windandsolarcapacity

has

ledto

higherlevelsofrenewableenergycurtailment,asgridinfrastructureand

electricity

demand

have

struggled

to

keep

pace

with

thegrowth

in

generation.China’s

solar

curtailment

rate

increased

from

approximately3%in2021to

around7%in

2025,whilewind

curtailment

rose

from2%to6%over

the

same

period.Taken

together,these

side

effects

provide

important

contextfor

China’s

achievements.The

country’s

experience

offerslessons

notonlyinwhatcan

beachievedthrough

rapiddeployment,but

also

in

how

policymakers

and

businesses

cananticipate

and

manage

the

challenges

that

accompany

it.TransferringChina’sLeversto

OtherSociopoliticalContextsChina’sexperienceinevitablyreflectsfeaturesof

itsownpoliticalandinstitutionalsystem.Acentrallyplannedeconomy,state-ownedfinancialinstitutions,andprovincialgovernments

directly

accountable

to

central

government

createconditionsthatcannotsimplybereplicatedelsewhere.However,many

of

the

most

effective

elements

of

China’sapproach

are

not

unique

to

its

political

system.

Rather,theyreflect

policy

choices

that

could

be

adapted,albeit

differently,within

market-based

economies.Three

priorities

stand

out

forgovernments

and

policymakers

seeking

to

accelerate

their

ownenergytransitions.2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

ChinainvestmentsUSinvestmentsSources:

BloombergNEF;

BCGanalysis.Note:

Includes

mainenergytransitionindustries,suchassolar,wind,storage,

hydrogen,CCUS,and

EV.

Investmenttypesinclude

green

tech

deployment,investmentsinthe

greenenergysupplychain,equityinvestmentsand

public

marketfundingingreentechcompanies,

and

debtissuance

specificallyfor

energytransition

purposes.TheConsistencyofChina’sFive-YearPlansHasReinforcedInvestor

ConfidenceinGreenEnergyAnnual

total

investment

in

green

energy($US

billions)1,000800600400200012th

Five-Year

Plan“Toincreasenon-fossilfuelsinprimaryenergyconsumptionto11.4%in2015”