mckinsey -赋能人工智能：过度建设的风险究竟有多现实 Powering AI How real is the risk of overbuilding

July2026

McKinsey

&Company

ElectricPower&NaturalGasPractice

PoweringAI:Howrealis

theriskofoverbuilding?

ThepowerinfrastructurebeingbuiltfordatacentersintheUnitedStatesisunlikelytobecomestranded—evenifcomputedemandfallsshortofcurrentprojections.

byHumayunTai,JesseNoffsinger,andSamDeFabrizio

withRaissaDantas

‘Arewebuildingtoomuchpower?’Asthegrowingdemandforelectricitytosupplydata

centershascometodominateconversationsintheUSpowersector,andforecastsfordata

centerdemandcontinuetoincrease,wearehearingthatquestioneverywhere.Thequestionhasatleasttwodimensions:whetherplayersinthedatacentervaluechainarebuildingtoomuch

datacentercapacitytosupportcompute,andwhetherplayersinthepowervaluechainareatriskofoverinvestingbasedonthatbuild.

Whilesomesignalsaremixed,ouranalysissuggeststhattheanswerforbothdimensionsisprobably“No.”Infact,forthepowersector,wefindthatashort-termshortfallislikely.Forpowersectorplayers,thegreaternear-termriskmightbeunderbuildingratherthan

overbuilding.

Inthisarticle,weassesstheoutlookforUSdatacenterpowerdemandandsupplythrough

2035,drawingondatacenterevolutionscenariosandastate-by-stateanalysisofgridcapacity.WeevaluatehowapotentialshortfallmaybefilledandexamineimplicationsandopportunitiesforvariousUSpower-sectorplayers.

Datacenteroverbuildisunlikely

Approximately75percentoftheanticipatedUSpowerdemandgrowthoverthenextdecadeisexpectedtocomefromdatacenters,whicharebeingbuiltataraterequiringtheequivalentofalmost30gigawatts(GW)ofpower1peryear.Whetherthatgrowthmaterializesdependson

whetherdemandforAIcomputewilllast.Severalindicatorssuggestthatitwill.

AccordingtoMcKinsey’s“ThestateofAIin2025“survey,roughlyone-thirdofrespondentsreportscalingAI,39percentreportmeasurableEBITimpact,and64percentciteinnovationbenefits.2Largelanguagemodelsarecontinuingtogetbetter,expandingtheirpotential

applications—withnosignofanimminenttechnologicalplateau.Investmentsareincreasinglytiedtocontractedcapacityutilizationandconcentratedamongscaled,investment-gradedatacenteroperators—factorsthatpointtodurable,committedgrowthratherthanspeculation.

Finally,demandisanchoredbysophisticated,well-capitalizedhyperscalers,whosecapital

spendinghasgrownapproximately50percentannuallyfrom2022to2026whilemaintainingstrongmarginsandcashflow.

Whileonbalancethesesignspointtosustainedgrowth,thetimingandextentofcompanies’AIadoptionremainsomewhatuncertain.Whilecompanies’intenttouseAIishigh,executionis

uneven.Manycitetalentandculturalbarrierstoadoption,and71percentoforganizationsreportnegativeimplementationoutcomes.Atthesametime,partsoftheAIecosystemexhibitbubble-likecharacteristics:Morethanhalfofthenewunicornsin2025wereAI-focused,including

severalmultibillion-dollarfirmswithoutcommercializedproducts.Outsidethehyperscalercore,someAI-nativeplayersandinfrastructureintermediariesarepursuingaggressiveexpansionwithhighleverageornegativecashflow.Broadermacroandgeopoliticalfactors—suchastighter

capitalmarkets,elevatedpowerprices,orsupplychaindisruptions—couldalsodampendemand

1Representsapproximately20gigawattsofincrementalITdemandplustheadditionalelectricityrequiredforcoolingsystems,powerdistributionequipment,andreliabilitybuffers.

2Respondentsincluded1,993individualsacross105nationsrepresentingthefullrangeofregions,industries,companysizes,functionalspecialties,andtenures.

PoweringAI:Howrealistheriskofoverbuilding?2

PoweringAI:Howrealistheriskofoverbuilding?3

andslowthepaceofdatacenterbuild-out.Theseuncertaintiescouldtempergrowthincomputedemand.

Howmightpowerdemandplayoutinthenextdecade?

GiventheuncertaintyaroundfutureAIdemand,playersinthepowersectorareevaluatingthe

riskofoverbuildingandstrandedassets.Theconcernisreasonable:eveninalowdatacenter

demandscenario,theUSpowersectorcouldaddmorethan150GWofpowercapacityto

supplytheITloaddemandby2030(seesidebar,“Countinggigawatts”).Butunlikethefiber-

opticoverbuildoftheearly2000s,whichcouldserveonlyonepurpose(deliveringhigh-speed

data),electricityinfrastructureservesabroadandgrowingbaseofdemandbeyonddatacenters(includingrefreshingaginginfrastructure),reducingtheriskthatnewpowerassetsbecome

stranded.

Countinggigawatts

Onthedemandside,datacenterITloadrepresentsthemaximumpowerconsumptionthatthesite

couldseefromservers,storage,andnetworkingequipment.Itisthemetricthatdatacenteroperatorstypicallyusetodescribetheircapacity,althoughthepowersectorneedsmultipleothermetricsto

understandwhatwillberequiredtoservethatload.Datacenterinterconnectioncapacityrepresentsthepeakpowerasitemightdrawatanyonetime,includingITcapacity,peakcoolingneeds,andanyengineeringbufferstoensurethatthecriticalequipmentisnotstarvedforpowerwhenitismost

understress.Thisfiguremightbe50–80percenthigherthantheITcapacityrequested,andit’s

importanttounderstandthatITcapacity(whathyperscalersreport)anddatacenterinterconnectionrequestsarenotapples-to-applesmetrics,althoughbotharemeasuredingigawatts.

Onthesupplyside,generationnameplatecapacityreferstothemaximumtheoreticaloutputofa

powerplantunderidealconditions,whilederatedcapacity/poweroutputadjuststhisfiguretoreflectthedependablecapacitythatcanrealisticallybedeliveredafteraccountingfortechnology-specificavailability,maintenance,outages,fuelconstraints,andweatherconditions.Forexample,foradatacenterconnectedtothegridthatisreportedas500megawatts(MW),thisITloadmayrequire900MWofinterconnectioncapacity.Thiscouldbeservedby1,000MWofgasplants,whichhavean

assumedoutageratioof10percent.Itiscriticaltounderstandwhichgigawattsarebeingdiscussed,toavoidmisunderstandingthepowerimplicationsbothforthedatacenterandthegrid.

PoweringAI:Howrealistheriskofoverbuilding?4

Tobetterunderstandtherangeofpossiblefutures,wemodeledthreescenariosfordatacenterdemandthrough2035.Anaccelerated-momentumscenarioassumesadoptiongrowsbeyondcurrentexpectationsaschipandalgorithmefficiencyimprove,andthattheindustryavoids

supplychainshortages.Thecontinued-momentumscenarioassumestrendscontinueroughlyonthesametrajectoryastoday,withmoderatebottlenecksinsupplychainsandinfrastructure.Andtheconstrained-growthscenarioassumessloweradoptionbecauseofsupplylimitations,regulatorypressure,andpublicconcernsaroundbothdataprivacyandcommunityimpactsofdatacenters.Communitypushbackisemergingasaforcerestrictingdatacenterdevelopment;fourgigawattsofprojectswerepostponedinthefirstquarterof2026asaresultofcommunityaction.

Thepowerdemandtrajectoryisrelativelycertaininallscenariosthrough2030,given

announcedprojects,securedinterconnectionqueues,andpubliclydisclosedcapitalplansfromhyperscalersandAIinfrastructureproviders.Ourmodelsuggestsdatacenterpowerdemand

couldgrowapproximately27percentannuallythrough2030,reaching121GWofdatacenterITdemand(Exhibit1).

Exhibit1

PoweringAI:Howrealistheriskofoverbuilding?5

Beyond2030,uncertaintyincreasesandthedifferenceacrossscenarioswidens,butallpointtoslowergrowthincapacityfrom2030–35.Thisslowdownreflectsapotentialsaturationin

demandforchipsandslowerAIadoption,aswellasashiftfrombuildingnewdatacenterstoreplacingtoday’scomponentswithmoreenergy-efficient,next-generationchipsthatadd

computeperunitofpower.Forthecontinued-momentumscenario,weexpectasevenfoldincreaseindatacenterITdemandby2035.

Swolleninterconnectionbacklogspaintadistortedpicture

Themassivebackloginloadinterconnectionpipelinerequestscouldbereadasevidenceofa

demandbubble.Yetmanyoftheserequestsarespeculativeandduplicative:Developersand

hyperscalersaresubmittingmultiplerequeststoseewhichsecurespowerfirst,andearly-stagedevelopersaretryingtosecureinterconnectionrightsbeforesellingaprojecttoawell-

capitalizedpartythatwilldothebuildingandinstalltheIThardware.Demandestimatesbasedonsuchinterconnectionrequestsarelikelyhighlydistorted.Indeed,ouranalysisshowsthat

large-loadinterconnectionpipelinesareninetimesaslargeasthe2030demandinour

continued-momentumdatacenterscenario(approximately84GWofnewITload,or

approximately120GWofnewtotalpowerdemand),notincludingoff-gridprojects(Exhibit2).Consideringonlycontractedandhigh-confidenceprojects(thoseexpectedtomoveforwardwithinthenext12months)stillamountstoatwofoldovershootofourprojecteddemand.

Exhibit2

PoweringAI:Howrealistheriskofoverbuilding?6

Distinguishingbetweencredible,financeableprojectsandspeculativeorduplicativeproposalsisdifficult,especiallygivenhowquicklypowerprojectsarebeingbuilttodayandthefactthatmostprojectsaregood-faithdevelopmentefforts,evenwithoutafuturetenantsecured.As

developersrushtosecurelandandpower,interconnectionrequestsoftenoutpacechipavailability,contributingtoconcernsaboutpoweroverbuild.

Ifsomeoftheseprojectsdonotpanout,inflatedrequestsforpowerwillstillcauseproblems

acrossthevaluechain.Theycaninterferewithelectricalequipmentorderingandleadtimes;

strainengineering,procurement,andconstruction(EPCs)issuancecapacity;complicateutilityplanningassumptions;increasestrandedcostrisk;andaffecthowinvestors,hyperscalers,

colocators,andneocloudprovidersallocatecapitalacrosstheirportfolios.Asaresult,utilities

havebegunimplementinglarge-loadtariffs,largerdownpayments,andothermeasurestocurbqueuegaming,incentivizeapplicationsthataremostlikelytobebuilt,andprotectthecustomerbasefrombearingcostsforprojectsthatdonotmaterialize.Afterimplementingalarge-load

tariff,AmericanElectricPowerOhiosawanapproximately81percentreductioninitslarge-loadpipeline,droppingfrom30.0GWto5.64GWofrequestedcapacity.3

PowerdemandextendsbeyondAI

Intheeventthatdatacentercomputegrowthdemandslows,generationandtransmissionbuilttosupportAIloadsareunlikelytobestranded.Theseassetscanserveotherpowerdemands

andwilllikelystrengthensystemreliabilityandresilience.Coalplantsstillprovide15percent4ofUSelectricitygeneration,andmanyofthesearelikelytoexitthefleetby2030astheypass

their65-yearlifetime(Exhibit3).Intotal,coalandagingthermalplantretirementscouldremove50–75GWofcapacityfromthesystemby2030.

Evenifdatacenterdemandslows,componentsofapowersystemthatwereexpectedtosupplyAIpowercouldberepurposedorredeployedtoservebroadersystemneeds,includingdemandfromlargecommercialandindustrialbusinesses.

PowerpressurespointtoatightUSgridinthecomingyears

OurscenariospointtoarangeofUSpowerdemandoutcomesinthecomingdecade.Weexpectthatsupplyingthedatacenterdemandwillrequireavarietyofpowersolutions,someofwhich

comeatahighercostandincuradditionalemissionstomeettherapiddemandgrowththan

wouldhavebeennecessaryatamoremeasuredpace.Notably,thoseoutcomeswillvarywidelybyregion.TobetterunderstandhowthesepressuresmayplayoutintheUSgrid,wetooka

moregranularlookatthepowergenerationsystem.

Wedevelopedapowergenerationtightnessmetricthatcombinescurrentstate-levelgeneration“headroom”(generationcapacityabovethesteadyload),plannedgenerationadditions(netof

retirements),andprojecteddemandgrowththrough2030(Exhibit4).

Aggregatedacrossallstates,theanalysisrevealssupplybottlenecksatthenationallevel.The

3Toensurethattransmissionupgradesthatexclusivelyservealargeloadsitearenotpaidbythebroadercustomerbase,manyutilitiesareinstitutingtariffs.

4“U.S.energyfactsexplained,”USEnergyInformationAdministration,April24,2025.

PoweringAI:Howrealistheriskofoverbuilding?7

Exhibit3

UnitedStateshasroughly40GWofdispatchableheadroomtoaccommodatenear-termloadgrowthandroughly100GWofcapacitycommittedtobebuilt.But50–75GWofcoaland

steam-gascapacityareexpectedtoretire,andprojecteddemandgrowthisapproximately120GW,5pointingtoanationwidecapacityneedfor30–55GWby2030.

Thisshortfallwillnotbeevenlydistributed.Loadgrowthwilllikelyconcentrateinexistingand

emergingdatacenterhubssuchasNorthernVirginia,Phoenix,Louisiana,andpartsof

Texas—regionsfavoredfortheirlandavailability,straightforwardpermitting,supportivetax

policies,androbustdigitalecosystems,butwheregenerationandtransmissioncapacityare

oftenalreadyconstrained.Mid-Atlantic,Gulf,andcertainMidwesternstates,whereprojectsarebeginningtomaterialize,arealreadynearlyoutofexistingheadroom.

IntheUnitedStates’largestpowermarket,regionaltransmissionorganizationPJM,which

encompassesmuchofthemid-Atlantic,thegridhasbeenstable.ButPJM’sverytightcapacitymarketsuggestsitmaybeapproachingsaturation.InTexas(managedpredominantlybythe

ElectricReliabilityCouncilofTexas,orERCOT),transmissionexpansionmaybemorefeasible,butequipmentandsupplychainconstraintsaredelayingnewgridinfrastructureandfirm

generation.Inotherpartsofthecountry,expandingthetransmissionnetworkwithnew,high-voltagelinescanoftentakemorethanadecade,meaningthatbothpowergenerationand

transmissioninfrastructurecanlimitdatacenterexpansion.Atthecurrentpaceofgrowth,

5IncrementalITdemandby2030(thatis,121–137GW)convertedintonameplategenerationcapacity.

Exhibit4

misalignmentbetweenwherestakeholderswanttobuilddatacentersandwheregeneration,energydemand,andgridinfrastructurecanquicklyscalerisksturningintoenergysupply

problemsinpartsoftheUnitedStates.

Toaddresstheseloominggapsandensuregridreliability,utilitiesarebringingretiredplants

backonlineandextendingthelifetimesofcoalandgasplants.Thesemeasuresprovide

importanttemporarysystemreliefbutarelikelyinsufficient,and,onbalance,theydelaythe

energytransitionwhilethebiggestbuyersofnewpower,thehyperscalers,maintaintheirpledgetoserveloadwithcleanenergy.

Demand-sideflexibility—shiftingelectricityuseawayfrompeaktimes—couldheadoffgrid

shortages,butdatacentershaveshownlittlewillingnesstocurtailAIworkloads,inpartbecausethevaluetocompaniesofAIcomputingfarexceedsthecostofpower.Otherapproaches,suchason-sitebatterystorageorcontractedvirtualpowerplants6,mayprovidemoreflexibilityto

reachthesameresult,buttheseapproacheshavereliabilitytradeoffs.Theimportantcaveat

hereisthatifthesenon-firmsourcesallowsitestoconnectsoonerthanwaitingforfirmpower,theymaybecomewidelyadoptedascompanieschoose“somepower”over“nopower”.

Ultimately,though,newenergy-producingresourceswillneedtobebroughtonline.

6Avirtualpowerplantisanetworkofpowersources,suchashomesolarpanels,smartthermostats,orbatteriesthatarecoordinatedbysoftwaretofeedelectricitytothegridorremovedemandwhenneeded.

PoweringAI:Howrealistheriskofoverbuilding?8

PoweringAI:Howrealistheriskofoverbuilding?9

Datacenterplayersareturningtoon-sitepower

Inthenearterm,datacenterplayersareturningtoon-sitepowerandmanagementsolutions

suchasgasenginesandturbines,aswellasfuelcellsandbatterystorage.TheMcKinsey2025NorthAmericaElectricPowerandNaturalGasMarketIntelligenceSurveyofpowerindustry

leadersrevealedthat65percentofrespondentsexpecttodeploysomeformofon-sitepowerbecauseofsystemuptimerequirements,resilienceconcerns,andaneedforspeedtomarket

(Exhibit5).7Nearly60percentofrespondentsexpecttohavepermanenton-sitegenerationby2030,evenafterthegridbecomesavailable—anunprecedenteddevelopmentforthemodern

USpowersystem.Ofthoseplanningtohaveon-sitepower,64percentexpecttorelyonnaturalgas.On-sitegenerationisshiftingfromacontingencytoacorepartofthepowerstack.

Whilenaturalgasisoftenviewedasthefastestpathtoaddingfirmpowercapacity,competitionforpipelineinfrastructurecouldcausedelaysinbuildinggas-poweredgeneration—bothinfrontofandbehindthemeter—particularlywhereredundantpipelineaccessisneededtomeet

reliabilityrequirements.Theseconstraintsareexpectedtoinfluencewheredatacenterscansecurepowerandscalemostrapidly.Sitingclosertogasbasinsreducestheinfrastructure

constraintsandburdenofconstructingnewpipelines,whererightsofwaycanbedifficulttoobtainwithintheshorttimeframemostdatacentersaretargeting.

Exhibit5

Datacenterplayersreportalikelypermanentshifttoon-sitepowergeneration,withgasexpectedtobetheprimarysource.

PreferredprimarypowersourceforNorthAmericandatacenters,%ofrespondents

On-sitegenerationHybrid(gridpluson-sitesolution)Gridconnected

20

45

35

Averageanticipateddistributionofon-sitegeneration,byintendedduration,2030,%

PermanentlycolocatedTemporarybridgetogrid

60

40

Averageanticipateddistributionofon-sitegeneration,bytechnology,2030,%

GastechnologiesRenewablesourcesNuclear

64

23

13

Source:McKinsey2025NorthAmericaElectricPowerandNaturalGasMarketIntelligenceSurvey(n=46datacenterrespondents)

McKinsey&Company

7Inthefourthquarterof2025,weconductedadouble-blindsurveyof145powersectorleaderstounderstandhowindustryleadersarenavigatingpowerprocurementandevaluatingpowersolutionsandproviders.Thesurveyexploredfourareas:

powerprocurementprocesses,preferencesacrosspowersources,willingnesstopayforselectattributes,andperspectivesonpowervaluechainproviders.Oftherespondents,46wereUS-basedexpertswithdeepdatacenterknowledge,representing

hyperscalers,co-locators,andutilitiesacrossthepowervaluechain.Morethanhalfwereseniordirectorsorabove.

PoweringAI:Howrealistheriskofoverbuilding?10

Howwillpowerneedsbemetafter2030?

Beyond2030,ouranalysespointtoawiderangeofoutcomes,butseveralstructuraldynamicsarelikelytohold.Inadditiontothegrowingroleofgas,weexpectsolarpairedwithbattery

storagetosustainstrongmomentum,givenitscostcompetitiveness,modularity,andspeedtodeploy,thoughthisiscontingenttosomedegreeonstablepolicysupport,interconnection

reform,andcontinueddecliningcostsofstorage.Evenwithaboostfromstorage,theinherentintermittencyofsolarmeansthiscombinationwillbepartofthebroadergridenergysystem

ratherthanthesoleon-sitesourceoflarge-scalepower.

Andevenasloadgrowthto2035andbeyondremainssomewhatuncertain,thesolutions

emergingtocovershort-termpowerneeds,particularlyextensionsofolderthermalplantsandapproachesthatcurtailpeakdemand,meanthatnewinfrastructurewillremainvaluable.

IntheUnitedStates,anymaterialgrowthintheroleofnuclearpoweroverthenextdecadeislikelytocomefromextensionsandupgradestoexistingplantsratherthanfromnewplants.Emergingtechnologiessuchassmallmodularnuclearreactorsandnext-generationgeothermalenergyareattractingincreasingcapitalandofftakerinterest,leadingtoascalingopportunity.Despitethe

promiseofthesesolutionstoaddlow-carbonfirmpower,theyareunlikelytomateriallyimpactsystemcapacitybeforethemid-2030s,evenasindividualprojectsgainmomentumandpointto