麦肯锡 -2026年全球能源展望 Global Energy Perspective 2026

GlobalEnergy

Perspective2026

September2026

GlobalEnergyPerspective2026

Contents

GlobalEnergyPerspective2026:Keytakeaways 1

Foreword 3

Whyenergyscenariothinkingmustevolve 5

Adecadeofshiftingassumptions 5

Affordabilitylensbroadensintoasystem-costview 8

Securityofsupplyrisksexposestructuraldependenciesinageopoliticallyfragmentedworld 14

AIchangesthedemandpicture,butremainshighlyuncertain 19

Thenewscenariomatrix 22

Eightleversthatmovetheenergysystem 24

High-andlow-demandboundaries 26

Howthescenariosaddressreliability,affordability,anddecarbonization 27

Scenariodeepdives:Exploringtheplausiblespaceofenergy-systemevolution 32

ContinuedMomentum:Thebaselinescenario 32

HydrocarbonResilience:Aworldinwhichfossilfueldemandkeepsrising 37

FragmentedEnergyOrder:Whengeopoliticsfracturestheenergysystem 38

AlloftheAboveEnergy:Utilizingeveryavailableresourcetoensurereliablepower 41

DecarbonizationDelivers:Thescenariowhereeverythingaccelerates 43

Implicationsforexecutives:Scenariothinkingatthecoreofstrategy 46

Movingfromscenariostostrategicaction 47

Aboutthisreport 49

GlobalEnergyPerspective20261

GlobalEnergyPerspective2026:Keytakeaways

SincethepublicationofMcKinsey’spreviousGlobalEnergyPerspective,theworld’senergysystemhas

onceagainweatheredunexpectedstormsthatimpactbothitsnear-termoutlookandlong-termtrajectory.

Energy-relatedshocksareincreasinglyglobalshocks,withthreerecent“grayswan”events—theclosingof

theStraitofHormuz,theRussia–Ukrainewar,andtheCOVID-19pandemic—havingsevereimpactsonenergyavailability,demand,andprices.1Asaresult,wehaverevisedourbottom-upenergymodelandshiftedthe

focusofthisyear’sreporttoabroaderenergy-systemviewthatexploresaffordabilityandsecurityalongsidedecarbonization.

TheGlobalEnergyPerspective2026presentsanewsetofscenariosthatreflecttheglobalenergysystemwithallitsuncertaintyandcomplexity.Executivescanusethesescenariosforstrategymanagementtohelpthemdecidewhichbetstomakenow,whichoptionstopreserve,andwhichsignalswouldjustifychanging

course.

Highlightsfromthisyear’sanalysis:

—Theenergytransitionhasbecomeanenergyexpansion.In2025,globalenergydemandgrew2.7

percent,withoil,gas,coal,andrenewablesallexpandingsimultaneously.Acrossnearlyeveryscenario,energydemandcontinuestogrow,withthecentralquestionincreasinglybeingwhatwillsupplythat

growth?

—Geopoliticalfragmentationcouldaddamaterialriskpremiumtoenergy.Intheeventofa

fragmentationscenario—FragmentedEnergyOrder—rebuildingconcentratedsupplychainsoutsideChinacouldraisesolarcapitalexpenditureby20to25percent,andbattery-storagecapitalexpenditureby40to

50percentintheEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStates.Tradefrictioncouldalsoraisefuelcoststhroughlongerroutes,higherinsurancecosts,andreducedtradingflexibility,makinggeopoliticsanincreasinglyimportantcomponentofenergyeconomics.

—Artificialintelligenceisthebiggestgrowthsegmentbutthepost-2030demandpictureremainshighlyuncertain.Whiledatacentersarethefastest-growingloadsegmentinOECDpowermarkets,

withelectricitydemandfromdatacentersalonegrowingataprojected24percentCAGRto2030intheContinuedMomentumbaselinescenario,thepipelinebeyondthattimeframebecomeshighlyuncertainandcouldbedampenedbyefficiencybreakthroughsincomputingpower.

—Thegridistheenergytransition’sultimatespeedlimit.Theworldwillrequiremoreenergy,anda

disproportionateamountofthatdemandgrowthcomesfromelectricity.Transmission,storage,firm

capacity,permitting,andinterconnectionnowdeterminehowquicklylow-costgenerationbecomes

reliable,usableenergy.Acrossallscenarios,infrastructurereadinessisalreadythemostcommonbindingconstraint.Whenitlagsbehind,electrificationstalls,regardlessofhowcheaprenewablesbecome.

1TheStraitofHormuzcrisisaffectedalargershareofglobalenergythananyotherdisruptioninthelastcentury(seeExhibit4).

2

GlobalEnergyPerspective2026

—Thenextenergycrisisisaslikelytobedrivenbyequipment,labor,batteries,orcriticalmineralsasit

isbybarrelsofoil.Anincreasinglyelectrifiedanddigitizedenergysystemintroducescriticaldependenciesacrossequipment,minerals,semiconductors,ports,grids,anddigitalinfrastructure.Energysecurityisnowasystem-architecturechallenge,notsimplyafuel-diversificationchallenge.

—Inahigh-growthworld,oildemandcouldreachnearly130millionbarrelsperdayby2035—a30percentincreasefromtoday.IntheHydrocarbonResiliencescenario,oildemandisprojectedtogrowbymorethan2.5millionbarrelsperdayannuallyoverthenextdecade—roughlytwicethegrowthrateoftheprevious

decade.Thisunderscorestheriskofunderinvestmentifcompaniesplanexclusivelyaroundanearlypeakin

oildemand.

—Nuclearreturnsasamajorsourceoffirm,low-carbonpowerintheDecarbonizationDeliversscenario.Averageannualnetnuclearadditionsmorethandoublethrough2050inthisscenario,from18gigawattsto

40gigawatts,asnuclearcostsdecline,timelinesimprove,andsmallmodularreactorsmovefromfirst-of-a-kindprojectstowardrepeatabledeployment.WithmostnuclearOEMslikelytobefromAsiainthelatterhalfofthiscentury,thecenterofgravityfornew-energytechnologymaycontinuetoshiftEast.2Risingdemandandtheneedforreliable24/7supplystrengthenthestrategicroleofnuclearpoweralongsiderenewables.

—Cheapergenerationmaynotmeancheaperenergy—thetotalsystemcostincreasinglymatters.Globaltransmissionanddistributioninvestmentisprojectedtorisefrom$443billionin2025to$970billionannuallyby2050,partiallyoffsettingfallinggenerationcosts.Energy-systemeconomicsincreasinglydependonthe

entiresystem—generation,grids,storage,firmcapacity,flexibility,andintegration—notonthelevelizedcostofelectricityalone.

—AllscenariosprojectawideninggaptotheParisAgreement-aligned1.5°Cwarmingtrajectory.

Thecurrentfocusonenergyaffordabilityandsecurityleavestheworldonaconcerningpathwaytowardintensifyingtemperatureincreases.EvenDecarbonizationDelivers—themostoptimistichigh-growth

scenariointhisyear’sreport—missestheParisAgreementtargetbyaprojected0.8°C.

—Thereisnosingle“mostlikely”energyscenario—therangeofplausibleoutcomeshaswidened

dramatically,increasingtheneedforexecutivestotakeastance.Whilescenarioshelpexecutiveteamsunderstandthepossibleevolutionoftheglobalenergysystem,thisinsightneedstobetranslatedintoan

organizationalpointofviewonwhichfutureismostlikelytounfoldifexecutiveteamsaretoavoiddecisionparalysis.Scenarioplanning,whilecritical,isnotasubstituteforstrategicaction.

2Thepathtoanewerafornuclearenergy,InternationalEnergyAgency,January2025.

GlobalEnergyPerspective20263

Foreword

Theglobalenergysystemismorediverse,morefragile,andmoreunpredictablethaneverbefore.Today’s

headlinescouldbeaboutrecord-breakinglow-carboninvestmentandrenewablecapacitybuildoutin2025.

Buttheyarenot.Instead,thezeitgeistreflectsthedisruptiveforcesofgeopoliticsandAI,structuralchallengesinthesystem,concernsaboutaffordability,and,ultimately,howtosecuresufficientenergytosupport

economicgrowth.TheunprecedentedlevelsofcapitalexpenditureinAI—2026spendingaloneisestimatedtoreachtheGDPofSweden3—andthedisruptiontoenergyflowsfollowingtheclosureoftheStraitofHormuz(thelargestdisruptioninmodernhistory)isakintothescaleoftheIndustrialRevolutionandmajorglobal

conflict,combined.

Thisyear’sGlobalEnergyPerspectivereflectsthisreality.Ittakesstockoftheenergysystemandexploresa

widerrangeofknownunknowns—whathappensiffossilfueldemandcontinuesgrowingtomeetrisingenergydemandanddatacenterbuildout?WhathappensifgeopoliticalfragmentationintensifiesandglobalGDP

decelerates?Andwhatifthecostsoflow-carbontechnologyfallfastenoughthatcleanenergycontinuestoscalewithoutsustaineddecarbonizationpolicies?Ournewenergy-systemscenarioswidentheaperturetocapturethesepossibilities.

Anyofthesescenarioscouldunfold,ascouldothersthatwecannotyetanticipate.Grayswanevents,such

astheCOVID-19pandemic,canchangetheworldovernight.Otherevents,suchasgeopoliticalconflict,

cyberattacksonenergyinfrastructure,orextremeclimateshocks,couldhaveequallymomentousimpacts,buttheirscaleandtimingaredifficulttopredict.Andthentherearethelessdramaticthoughhighlyconsequentialsurprisesthat11yearsoftheGlobalEnergyPerspectivehavetaughtustoexpect:Once-marginaltechnologiessuchassolarhaveexceededeveryannualprojection,whilehydrocarbonfuelshavesetnewrecordsdespite

expecteddeclines.

Ateverytwistandturn,theenergysystemhasbeenshapedbycontext,andtheworldlooksverydifferentfromhowitdidwhentheParisAgreementwassignedin2015.Thepost-2009eraofglobalcooperationandlow

interestratesprovidedfertilegroundforlow-carbontechnologytotakeroot.Itachievedsomethinggenuinelyimportant,fundingtheearlydeploymentofsolar,wind,andbatterytechnologiesuntiltheeconomicsbecamelargelyself-sustaining.In2025,low-carboninvestmentexceededfossilfuelinvestmentforthesecond

consecutiveyear,andrenewablecapacitygrewfasterthanatanypointinhistory.

Butwhatweareexperiencingisanenergytransitionthatisnotfullylivinguptoitsname.In2025,oildemandhititshighestlevelsince2019.Coalsetanotherconsumptionrecordandisprojectedtoremainpartofthe

systemoverthelongtermacrossmostscenarios.Naturalgasdemandexpandedacrosseverymajorregion.Theglobalenergysystemdidnottransitionin2025—itgrew,acrosseveryenergycarrier,at2.7percent.Totalenergydemandcontinuedtorise,andwillverylikelykeepclimbingforthenext25years.

How,then,shouldweplanforaworldandglobalenergysystemasunpredictableasthis?

Thecostofbettingonasinglecentralcase,ornotthinkingbroadlyenoughaboutpossibleoutcomes,has

neverbeenhigher.TheongoingdisruptionintheStraitofHormuzistheclearestillustrationofthisrisk.Withinweeksoftheconflict’sonset,maritimetrafficthroughtheworld’smostcriticalenergychokepointfellbymorethan90percent,energypricessurgedacrossfuelsandcontinents,andstrategiesbuiltarounddiversified

McKinseyDeepBlueanalysis,basedonrawautomaticidentificationsystem(AIS)vessel-trackingdata.

3SophieBerglund,“The$758billionquestion:PuttingAIspendinginperspective,”PeakAssetManagement,August4,2026.4

liquefiednaturalgas(LNG)supplywerestress-testedinrealtime.4

GlobalEnergyPerspective20264

5SpencerKimball,“OilpipelinesaroundtheStraitofHormuzwon’tendthethreatIranposestoMiddleEastcrudeexports,”CNBC,July17,2026.6

7

Despitethisdisruption,marketsweremoreresilientthanexpected.SaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmirateswereabletoreroutepartoftheirexportsthroughpipelines.5TheUnitedStatesreleasedstrategicpetroleum

reservesandexpandedproductionandexportcapacitytoprovideadditionalsupply.6Chinareducedimportsbydrawingonstrategicreservesandcurbingdomesticdemand.Ineachcase,advancepreparationpreventedthecrisisfromescalatingintoacatastrophicglobalsupplyshock.7

ThosewhopreparedadequatelyunderstoodthatHormuzwasacalculableconsequenceofstructural

dependencieswithintheenergysystem.ThesamelogicappliestoAI,geopoliticalfragmentation,and

technologycostbreakthroughs:Eachoftheseforcesisobservabletoday,eachcouldmateriallyreshapetheenergysystemwithinthedecade,andnonehasasingledeterministicoutcome.Importantly,theimplicationsofHormuzareexpectedtocontinuetoevolveanddeliversurprisesoverthenextthreetofiveyears;weshouldexpectthesamefromtheseotherforcestoo.

McKinsey’sGlobalEnergyPerspective2026respondstothisneweraforenergywithanexplicitwidening

ofourscenarioframework.Throughfivescenariodeepdives,thereportexploresarangeofdistinctand

plausibleoutcomesforhowtheenergysystemmayevolveto2050.Ouraimistosupportexecutivesinbetterunderstandingtherisksandopportunitiestheyfaceandthemarketsignalsthatmightwarrantachangein

strategicdirection,sotheycanformaviewonthetrajectoryoftheirindustry.

Thisisareportdesignedforatimeofgenuineuncertainty,inwhichthemostimportantstrategiccapabilityisnottheabilitytopickasinglecorrectforecast,buttobuildportfoliosthatremainrobustacrossarangeofpossiblefutures.

AriNatter,“U.S.begins86MMbblstrategicpetroleumreserverelease,”WorldOil,March13,2026.

RaviAgrawal,“Whyenergypricesdidn’tsoarhigherthisyear,”ForeignPolicy,July30,2026.

HumayunTai

LeaderoftheGlobalEnergyandMaterialsPracticeandSeniorPartner,

NewYork

DiegoHernandezDiaz

LeaderoftheGlobalEnergyPerspectiveandPartner,

Geneva

GlobalEnergyPerspective20265

Whyenergyscenariothinkingmustevolve

Theglobalenergysystemhasconsistentlydefiedlong-rangeoutlooksforenergycarriersandtheirprojected

makeupoftheoverallenergymix.Understandingthepatternofthosesurprisesacross11yearsofMcKinsey’sGlobalEnergyPerspectiveisnotahistoricalexercisebutthefoundationonwhichthisyear’sexpandedscenarioframeworkisbuilt.Itisalsoalensthroughwhichweassessourlong-termforecaststoinforma25-yearprojectiontothebestofourknowledgetoday.

SincetheParisAgreement,questionsabouthowtheenergysystemwillevolvehavealwayscenteredon

decarbonization,affordability,andsecurity.Thesethreeconsiderationsremainunchanged.Whathaschanged,however,istheirhierarchyandemphasis,asaffordabilityandsecurityofsupplymovetofrontofmindformanydecision-makers.ElementsincludingacceleratedGDPgrowthinemergingmarkets,fasterdatacenterbuildoutfollowingadvancesinAI,andanincreasinglyfractionalgeopoliticallandscapehaveeachcontributedtoshiftingprioritization.

Thisyear’sGlobalEnergyPerspectiveunpackstheforcesthathavepromptedanewsetofenergyscenarios.In

thischapter,weexploreshiftingenergy-systemassumptionsfromthepastdecade,whytheaffordabilitylenshas

broadenedtoasystem-costview,howsecurityofsupplyrisksareexposedinageopoliticallyfragmentedworld,andwhatAI-drivenenergydemandcouldmeaninthedecadestocome.

Adecadeofshiftingassumptions

Hydrocarbonenergyinfrastructureisinherentlylong-livedandcapital-intensive.Pipelines,LNGterminals,

refineries,powerstations,anddrillingplatformsrepresentdecadesofcommittedcapitalandcannoteasily

beidledorquicklyrepurposedinresponsetoshiftingmarketsignals.Thisphysical“stickiness”meansthat

inaccurateforecastingdoesnotself-correctquickly—anunderestimationofcoaldemandin2021cantranslateintounderinvestmentinminingandlogisticsinfrastructurethatmayonlybecomevisibleasasystemconstraintthree

tofiveyearsdowntheline.Theenormousinstalledbaseoftheworld’sconventionalhydrocarbonenergysystemgeneratesitsowndemandgravity.

6

GlobalEnergyPerspective2026

Thelow-carbonsystemfacestheoppositechallenge:Infrastructurethatdoesnotyetexistmustbebuilt

atapacethatalignswithenergy-systemprojections.Gridconnections,transmissionlines,long-duration

storage,dispatchablebackupcapacity,andoffshorewindprojectsallrequirecoordinatedinvestmentacrossmultiplestakeholders,andmanyhavelongleadtimes.Newgridinfrastructureoftentakesfiveto15yearstoplan,permit,andcomplete.8Criticalequipmentsuchascablesandlargepowertransformerscantaketwotofouryearstoprocure,andinoffshorewind,projectpermittingalonetakesnineyears,onaverage.9Whenanyelementlagsbehind—asgridupgradesconsistentlyhave—theentiresystemcanunderperformrelativeto

forecasts.

Thegrowingoperationalcomplexityoftheenergysystemitselffurthercompoundsthischallenge.Asthe

shareofvariablerenewableenergyrises,systemoperatorsmustmanagerapidfluctuationsinsupplyand

demand,balancingthesystemonasubhourlybasisratherthanaseasonalone.Annuallong-termmodelstendtosmoothoutthesepeaksandtroughs,furtherobscuringinvestmentrequirements.

Meanwhile,thelong-termimpactoftoday’senergy-systemdisruptionsarehardtopredict.Whiletheworld

appearstohavenavigatedtheenergycrisisrelatedtotheclosingofHormuz,themedium-to-longtermcostimplicationsofthedisruptionarelesscertain,witheconomicgrowthforecastsalreadycut.10Tyingsuch

impactsbacktofutureenergydemandoutlooksbecomesyetanotherconsiderationamonganincreasingsetofinterconnectedandinterdependentenergy-systemchallenges.

ThisinherentsystemcomplexitymeanspreviousGlobalEnergyPerspectiveprojectionshavenotalwaysgotitright.Sometechnologieshavebeenunderestimatedandothersoverhyped(Exhibit1).SolarPVdeploymentwaspersistentlyunderstated,forexample,withbuildoutacceleratedbyfaster-than-expectedcostdeclinesandChina’sdualroleinthemarket.Onthesupplyside,China’smanufacturingscaleandovercapacitypushedmodulepricesdownsharply,whileonthedemandside,Chinaitselfbecamethelargestsourceofnewsolar

deployment.CoalandlignitealsoexceededexpectationsasstrongdemandfromAsia,energy-securityconcerns,andthedurabilityofexistingassetshaveprolongedtheiruse.

Astheshareofvariablerenewableenergyrises,systemoperatorsmustmanage

rapidfluctuationsinsupplyanddemand,balancingthesystemonasubhourly

basisratherthanaseasonalone.

8

9

Electricity2026:Analysisandforecastto2030,InternationalEnergyAgency,February2026.

Buildingthefuturetransmissiongrid:Strategiestonavigatesupplychainchallenges,InternationalEnergyAgency,February2025;Renewables2023:Analysisandforecastto2028,InternationalEnergyAgency,January2024.

10

Pierre-OlivierGourinchas,“Wardarkensglobaleconomicoutlookandreshapespolicypriorities,”InternationalMonetaryFund,April14,2026.

GlobalEnergyPerspective20267

Exhibit1

PreviouseditionsoftheGlobalEnergyPerspectivehaveunderestimatedsometechnologiesandoverestimatedothers.

Deltaofpreviousprojectionsto2025actualvalues,¹%

Wind

Naturalgas

Powerdemand

Coalandlignite

Solarphotovoltaic

2022202320242025

30

20

10

0

–10

–20

–30

–40

–50

2021

Overhypedpotential

2025actual

Underestimatedforces

EditionofGlobalEnergyPerspective

1Powerdemandmeasuredinterawatt-hours;technologiesmeasuredasshareofthegenerationmix.

Source:McKinseyGlobalEnergyPerspective,2021to2025

McKinsey&Company

Wind,bycontrast,wasoverestimated,asrisingfinancingandequipmentcosts,failedauctions,andproject

cancellations—especiallyoffshoreprojectsin2023—sloweddeployment.Newtechnologiessuchascarbon

captureandstorage(CCS)andhydrogen,thoughnotshown,weresomewhatoverratedtoo,withhighcosts,limitedinfrastructure,andweakofftakedelayingdeployment.Powerdemandhasbroadlytrackedprojections.

Demand-sidemanagement,thoughnotshown,hasbeenanotherunderrecognizedlever,andmayneedtobecomeamoreactivesystemresourcegoingforward,giventhelongleadtimesforgridbuildout,newgeneration,and

firmingcapacity.ThisisparticularlythecaseinEurope,where50percentmoreflexibilitycouldbeneededby2030,yetmorethan70percentofhouseholdsintheEuropeanUnionstilllackdynamicpricingcontracts,smart-meter

rolloutremainsuneven,andpersistentmarketbarrierscontinuetolimitdemand-responseparticipation.11ThevalueofthislevercanbeseenintheUnitedStates,wheretheDepartmentofEnergyestimatesthatvirtualpowerplantsalreadyprovideabout30to60gigawatts(GW)ofcapacityandcouldreach80to160GWby2030,addressing

10to20percentofpeakloadandsavingabout$10billionayearingridcosts.

12

Thefundamentalchallengeisnot

whetherflexibilityisneeded,butwhetherthereissufficienteconomicvalueforthestakeholdersdeliveringittodriveinvestmentintothemarket.

11

Unlockingflexibility:No-regretactionstoremovebarrierstodemandresponse,EuropeanUnionAgencyfortheCooperationofEnergyRegulators,April

9,2025.

12“Virtualpowerplantsprojects,”U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,

,accessedAugust12,2026.

GlobalEnergyPerspective20268

Thisreflectiononpreviousprojectionsteachesusvitallessonswhenconstructingscenariosforthefuture

energylandscape:Technologyevolution(andhencecost)canmovefasterthananticipated,shiftsinpolicycanhavematerialimpacts,andthecompoundingeffectsoftheseforcescanhavesignificantconsequencesafewyearsdowntheline.

Acrossmostmajormarkets,utility-scalesolarandonshorewindarenowthe

cheapestsourcesofunfirmednew

electricitygeneration—notonapolicy-adjustedbasis,butonarawlevelizedcostcomparison.

Affordabilitylensbroadensintoasystem-costview

Decarbonizationwasthedefiningtrendofthepastdecade,drivenbytheambitionoftheParisAgreementandpolicyfavoringlow-carbontechnologydeployment,suchascarbonpricing,renewableobligationcertificates,andfeed-intariffs.

Thesepolicymechanisms,effectivelymadepossiblebysubsidiesandanassociatedtransferofwealth,

createdthemarketconditionsthatallowedsolar,wind,(andincertaingeographiesbatterytechnology)

toscalealonglearningcurvesuntilgenerationcostsfellbelowthoseoftraditionaltechnologies(when

transmissionanddistribution[T&D]costsarenotfactoredin).13Acrossmostmajormarkets,utility-scalesolarandonshorewindarenowthecheapestsourcesofunfirmednewelectricitygeneration—notonapolicy-

adjustedbasis,butonarawlevelizedcostcomparison.14Bycontrast,fortechnologieswheredeploymentisnotyeteconomicallyself-sustaining,suchasgreenhydrogen,sustainableaviationfuel(SAF),industrialdecarbonization,andCCS,deploymentremainslargelypolicydependent.

Whilethelevelizedcostofelectricity(LCOE)continuestofallformanytechnologies,globalinvestmentin

T&Disexpectedtomorethandoubleby2050,risingfrom$443billionayearin2025to$970billionayearin2050—anaveragegrowthof3.2percentperyear(Exhibit2).Thisgrowthisdrivenprimarilybytransmission,

whichisexpectedtoexpandata4.2percentCAGRfrom2025to2050,comparedwith1.1percentfor

distribution(excludinginflation).Theacceleratingbuildoutoftransmissioncapacityisrequiredtoconnect

Electricity2026:Analysisandforecastto2030,InternationalEnergyAgency,February2026.

13“Howcurrentpoliciesonrenewableenergyareshapingourfuture,”ACENRenewables,

,accessedSeptember2,2026.14

remoterenewablegenerationanddatacenterbuildout,andtoreinforceinterconnection.Transmission’sshareoftotalT&Dspendisexpectedtoincreasesubstantiallyoverthenext25years,pushinguptheoverallsystemcostofelectricityandpartiallyoffsettingLCOEsavingsonthegenerationside.

Exhibit2

GlobalEnergyPerspective20269

Globalinvestmentsintransmissionanddistributionareexpectedtomorethandoubleby2050.

Yearlyglobalinvestmentsinpowertransmissionanddistribution,$billion

Distribution1.1

637

Transmission4.2

20352050

443

2025

CAGR,

2025–50,%

+3.2%peryear

970

Source:McKinseyPlatformforIndustrialElectrification

McKinsey&Company

Theneteffectofthesetwoopposingforces—fallinggenerationcostsandrisingnetworkcosts—determines

thesystemcost,andthereforetheaffordabilityoftheenergytransitionforhouseholds,industry,andpublic

budgets.Itisalsowherethetransitionbecomesacountry-levelstoryratherthanaglobalone:LCOEsconvergegloballyastechnologiesmature,butsystemcostsareshapedbyeachcountry’suniquegenerationmix,networkconfiguration,andthepaceatwhichgridbuildoutmustcatchupwithrenewablesdeployment.Ultimately,the

waythesefactorstranslateintopricesisalocalizeddecisionthatissomewhatbutnotfullycorrelated,withregulatorsmakingdecisionssuchashowmuchofthepriceispassedontocustomers.

Inlargeemergingmarkets,includingChina,India,Indonesia,Mexico,SaudiArabia,andSouthAfrica,aswell

asincertainadvancedeconomiessuchasCanada,GDPgrowthisprojectedtooutpacesystemcostgrowth,

leadingtoanimprovingaffordabilitytrend,evenwhereabsolutesystemcostsarerisingquicklytofundnew

capacity(Exhibit3).ForthesemarketswithintheG20,affordabilityremainsafinancingandaccesschallenge

wherethekeyquestionishowtofundnetworkbuildoutandreliablesupplywithoutpricingelectrificationoutofreachforhouseholdsandindustry.

Bycontrast,manyadvancedeconomies,includingFrance,Germany,Italy,Japan,SouthKorea,andtheUnited

Kingdom,aswellasdevelopingnationsArgentinaandBrazil,couldseesystemcostsoutpacingGDPgrowthintheyearsto2050,eventhougha10percentreductionincostpermegawatt-hour(MWh)ishelpingtocontain

thegapinseveraloftheseG20markets.Forthisgroupofcountries,affordabilityisprimarilyapolitical-economychallenge:Howmuchoftheenergytransitionbillshouldbebornebyresidentialtariffs,industry,taxpayers,or

publicbalancesheets?

Exhibit3

GlobalEnergyPerspective202610

ThedualmovementofrisingsystemcostsandGDPshapesthea仟ordabilitytrajectoryforeachG20member.

permegawatt-hour2025–50%

Electricitysystemcosts¹versusGDPgrowth,2025–50Reductioninele