麦肯锡 -解锁美国联邦许可审批：可持续增长的必要举措 Unlocking US federal permitting A sustainable growth imperative

July2025

Mcsey

&company

PublicSectorPractice

UnlockingUSfederal

permitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative

Thepermittingprocessforlargeinfrastructureprojectsiscostlyandtimeconsuming.Acceleratingtimelinescouldhelpmeetcriticalinfrastructureneedsandfuelfuturegrowth.

byBobSternfels,AdiKumar,andBrodieBoland

withBoboStankovikjandTimCarter

BigplansareafoottobuildintheUnitedStates.Thecountryneedsadditionalenergy

generationcapacity,transmissionlines,broadband,raillines,andmore.Thegoodnewsisthatplentyofprovidersarelininguptobuildtheseprojects.Morethan650infrastructureprojectstrackedbytheUSPermittingDashboardareawaitingfederalapprovaltobeginconstruction.1Thebadnewsisthattheseprojectswilllikelybewaitingforalongtime.Largeinfrastructure

projectsintheUnitedStatesfacepermittingwaittimesstretchingforyears.

Theintentionsofpermittingaretosafeguardthehealthandpropertyrightsofcommunities,

preserveecosystems,upholdairandwaterqualitystandards,protectculturalandhistorical

landmarks,andmitigatetheeffectsofclimatechange.Manytimes,permittingstatuteshave

provedcriticalinprotectingAmericansagainstthepotentiallyharmfuleffectsofproposed

development.TheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct(NEPA)andtheNationalHistoric

PreservationAct(NHPA)weremeaningfuladvancementsthathaveaffordedlocalandtribal

groupsalegalplatformtoadvocatefor—andensure—robustenvironmentalreviewsontheir

traditionallands.2Naturalecosystemsareinvaluablebothintheirownrightandintheservicestheyprovidetosocieties—forexample,cleanair,cleanwater,qualitysoils,climaticregulation,

andrecreation.Permittinghasplayedanimportantroleinprotectingtheseecosystems,whosecriticalbenefitsmustbepreserved.

Yetasthegapgrowsbetweenthecountry’sexistinginfrastructureandwhatisneeded,many

stakeholdersareaskingwhetherpermittingcouldachievetheseobjectivesmorequickly.As

permittingincreasinglybecomesatopicoffocus,itisimportantthatproposedreformsimprovetheeffectivenessofpermittingbothinpreventingharmstopeopleandecosystemsandin

enablingdevelopmentthatwillbenefitthosepeopleandecosystems.Althoughsubstantialbenefitsmayarisefromshorteningpermittingtimelines,thoughtfulreformsdonotseektheeliminationofpermittingreview.EnsuringsocialandenvironmentalsafeguardsandmeetingAmerica’sinfrastructureneedsdon’thavetobezero-sumgames.

Tounderstandthescopeofthisproblem,weusedmultiplelensestoestimatethefederal

permittingtimelinecostsforUSinfrastructurestakeholders,includingthepublic.Weestimate

that$240billionto$280billionininfrastructurecapitalexpendituresacrosseightkeysectors

enterthefederalpermittingprocesseachyear.Wefindthateachdollar,onaverage,takes

aboutfourtofiveyearstomovethroughpermitting.Thesefindingscombinedsuggestthere

is$1.1trillionto$1.5trillionofinfrastructurecapitalexpenditurecurrentlyinfederalpermitting,

costingstakeholdersbillionsofdollarsinlostrevenueandwithholdingprojectbenefits,includingincreasedGDP,increasedpowergenerationcapacity,lowercarbonemissions,andopportunitiesforpublictransit.

Inresponsetotheseestimates,wehighlightreformsthatcouldempowertheUSfederalgovernmenttostreamlinepermitreviewsandunlocknecessaryinfrastructure.

Criticalinfrastructureisneededandsubjecttofederalreview

IntheUnitedStates,infrastructureprojectsmayfaceseverallayersofpermitting,includingatthefederal,state,andlocalormunicipallevels.Forsomesectors,suchashousing,permittingisprimarilyastateorlocalexercise.Largerinfrastructureprojects—inenergy,transport,

1“PermittingDashboard:FederalInfrastructureProjects,”PermittingCouncil,updatedJuly18,2025.

2DinéCitizensAgainstRuiningOurEnvironmentv.Bernhardt,No.182089,923F.3d831,USCourtofAppeals,10thCircuit,May7,2019.

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative2

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative3

communications,ormanufacturing,forexample—arelikeliertobesubjecttofederalpermitting,whichisthefocusofouranalysis.

TheUnitedStatesisstrivingtoaddressthegrowingneedforinfrastructure:TheInfrastructureInvestmentandJobsAct(IIJA)authorizedapproximately$1.2trillionforinfrastructure;the

CHIPSandScienceActdedicatedaround$53billiontosemiconductormanufacturing;and

environmentalinitiativesreceivedmostoftheapproximately$152billionininfrastructure

spendingfromtheInflationReductionAct.

3

Asthevolumeofinfrastructureprojectsincreases,sodoestheneedforpermittingefficiency.

Hundredsoftransportationprojectsareinprogress,pertheUSPermittingDashboard(Exhibit1A).

Exhibit1A

AlargevolumeofinfrastructureisproposedintheUnitedStates,acrossmanysectors.

HI3

Transportationprojectsinfederalpermittingdashboard,2025,numberinprogress

01022+Nodata

WA

14

OR

4

NV

6CA

124

AK

5

ND

2

SD

3

NE

2

KS

8

OK

3

TX

22

MN

8

IA

6

MO

6

AR

31

LA

2

MT

2

WY

1

CO

5

NM

2

NY11

PA12

WV

4VA10

NC8

ID

7

UT

13

AZ

22

ME0

MA4

RI0

CT5

NJ1

DE1

MD3

DC1

WI

5

IL

5

MI

6

IN

9

KY3TN9

VT2

NH1

OH

2

MS

7

GA

19

SC

9

PR

1

AL

5

FL

10

Source:USDepartmentofTransportation

McKinsey&Company

3AdieTomerandBenSwedberg,“Federalinfrastructurehub,”BrookingsInstitution,updatedonNovember25,2024;AdieTomeretal.,“Americahasaninfrastructurebill.Whathappensnext?,”BrookingsInstitution,November9,2021;

“InfrastructureInvestmentandJobsAct(IIJA)implementationresources,”GovernmentFinanceOfficersAssociationofthe

UnitedStatesandCanada,accessedJune2025;USDepartmentofCommerceBlog,“Twoyearslater:FundingfromCHIPS

andScienceActcreatingqualityjobs,growinglocaleconomies,andbringingsemiconductormanufacturingbacktoAmerica,”blogentry,August9,2024.

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative4

EspeciallyinthesouthernUnitedStates,hundredsofmilesofnaturalgaspipelineshavebeenproposed(Exhibit1B).

Exhibit1B

AlargevolumeofinfrastructureisproposedintheUnitedStates,acrossmanysectors.

Proposednaturalgaspipelineprojects,bystate,2025,number

Naturalgaspipelines

Pipeline-relatedprojects

No

projects

PA23

VA26

NC28

SC

WI

8

IL

112

TN154

AL

TX

20

LA

73

NM

OK

GA

Source:USFederalEnergyRegulationCommission,2025

McKinsey&Company

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative5

EveryregionoftheUSgridhasatleasthundredsofmilesofelectricaltransmissionlines

proposed,withsomeregionshavingasmanyas2,500milesofproposedlines(Exhibit1C).

Exhibit1C

AlargevolumeofinfrastructureisproposedintheUnitedStates,acrossmanysectors.

Ready-to-gomilesofelectrictransmissionlines,bysupplier,2023,number

05501,0001,4002,500Nodata

SPP³

SPP

ISO-NE⁹

NYISO⁸

WECC²

PJM⁷

CAISO¹

Southeast⁶

ERCOT⁴

¹CaliforniaIndependentSystemOperator.²WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil.³SouthwestPowerPool.⁴ElectricReliabilityCouncilofTexas.⁵MidcontinentIndependentSystemOperator.⁶SoutheasternElectricReliabilityCorporation.⁷PJMInterconnection.⁸NewYorkIndependentSystemOperator.⁹ISO-New

England.

Source:AmericansforaCleanEnergyGrid,2023

McKinsey&Company

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative6

Furthermore,recentinvestmentsundertheBroadbandEquity,Access,andDeployment(BEAD)Programcouldresultinhundredsofbroadbandprojectsenteringthefederalpermittingqueue,addressingthegapsinhigh-speedinternetaccessnationwide(Exhibit1D).

Exhibit1D

AlargevolumeofinfrastructureisproposedintheUnitedStates,acrossmanysectors.

Householdswithoutaccesstohigh-speedinternet,2024,%

0102030Nodata

HI3

WA

10

OR

9

NV

3CA

3

AK

30

ME10

MA1

RI1

CT0

NJ1

DE2

MD2

DC0

PR

-

ND

1

SD

6

NE

9

KS

7

OK

8

TX

5

MN

7

IA

7

MO

10

AR

11

LA

13

MT

22

WY

22

CO

7

NM

11

NY2

PA5

WV

22VA21

NC8

WI

15

IL

6

MS

16

ID

15

UT

5

AZ

7

MI

7

IN

6

KY11TN5

VT20

NH4

OH

4

GA

7

SC

4

AL

13

FL

4

Source:USFederalCommunicationsCommission,June2024

McKinsey&Company

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative7

LargerinfrastructureprojectstypicallyrequirefederalpermittingunderNEPA,which

requiresfederalagenciestoassessaproject’senvironmentalimpact,includingeffectson

naturalandhistoricresourcesandcommunities(seesidebar“NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct”).Roughly100,000actionsfaceNEPArevieweveryyear,fromthelargestinfrastructureprojectsinenergy,transportation,andmanufacturingtosmallerprojectssuchasshort-termlandusagebyindividualsandsmallbusinesses.

4

Projectsmayalsoneedtoobtainsomecombinationofapproximately60project-specific

federalpermitstrackedbythePermittingCouncil.

5

Specificprojectcharacteristicsdefinewhichpermitsareneeded(forexample,CleanWaterActandCleanAirActpermits;USCoastGuard

bridgepermits;migratory-birdpermits;andMarineProtection,ResearchandSanctuariesActpermits).Someofthesepermitprocessesremainunstandardized,decreasingthepredictabilityoftimelines.

Litigationcandelayprojectsandintroducenewexpenses.Approximately30percentofprojectsundergoinganenvironmentalimpactstatement(EIS),themostinvolvedtypeofreviewunder

NEPA,facelitigation;nearly90percentofplaintiffsinthesecasesclaimaNEPAviolation,

amongotherlegalobjections.

6

Theseclaimsarepresentedbyadiversesetofplaintiffs—

includingnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs),localgovernments,andindividuals—oftenalleginginadequateanalysisinanEISorfailuretoconsiderareasonablerangeofalternatives.

Specificprojectcharacteristics

definewhichpermitsareneeded.

Someofthesepermitprocesses

remainunstandardized,decreasingthepredictabilityoftimelines.

4“Factsheet:ModernizingCEQ’sNEPAregulations,”USCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,July15,2020;NationalNEPARegister,USBureauofLandManagement,accessedJune2025.

5PermittingDashboard,FederalInfrastructureProjects,accessedJuly23,2025.

6MichaelBennonandDevonWilson,“NEPAlitigationoverlargeenergyandtransportinfrastructureprojects,”EnvironmentalLawReporter,October2,2023.

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative8

NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct

TheNationalEnvironmentalPolicy

Act(NEPA)requiresagenciestoanalyzetheexpectedenvironmentalimpactsof

infrastructureprojects,withdifferent

proceduresdependingonaproject’s

anticipatedeffects.Projectswiththe

greatestpotentialimpactundergo

anenvironmentalimpactstatement

(EIS),whichtypicallytakesatleast

twoyears—excludingpreplanningand

potentiallitigation(exhibit).1ThelengthsofeachphaseoftheEISprocessvary

considerablydependingontheindustryandscaleofagivenproject.WhiletheEIS

permittingprocesstechnicallybegins

withthereleaseofanoticeofintent,

developersmaydedicatesubstantialtimeandcapitaltoprescopingactivities,suchascoordinatingwithconsultantsand

engineersandmeetingwithmembers

ofthepublicandwithrepresentativesof

federal,state,local,andtribalpoliticalandgovernmentalgroups.Effortsduringthisperiodoftenattempttogatherpreliminaryenvironmentaldata,anunderstandingofpotentialalternatives,andadeterminationofwhatdepthofNEPAassessmenta

projectwilllikelyundergo—forexample,if

theactionwillpotentiallyhaveasignificantenvironmentaleffect,itwilllikelyface

anenvironmentalassessment(EA);if

itisclearthattheprojectwillcauseasignificantenvironmentaleffect,itwilllikelyfaceanEISreview.2

WhilethedevelopmentoftheEISisacollaborativeendeavor,therelevant

leadfederalagencybearsresponsibility

forfulfillingtheprocessrequirements

andmanagingpotentiallitigation,while

theprojectdeveloperownsthepre-EIS

planningperiodandtheconstructionphase.

Exhibit

Year1Year2Year3Year4Year5Year6

Keymilestones

lA.ReleasenoticeofintentlB.PublishdraftEISlC.PublishfinalEISlD.Issuerecordofdecision

1EPAmandatesminimum45-daywaitingperiodfollowingdraftEISsubmission.

Source:CouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,2018;FederalPermittingImprovementSteeringCouncil,2019;NASA,2015;PermittingCouncil,2020;McKinseyanalysis

McKinsey&Company

Developercompletesearlyproject

planning(eg,feasibilityandpermittingneedsassessments,scoutingresearch)

LeadagencydraftsEIS(eg,scoping,

definingalternatives,testing,completingimpactassessments,compilingdraft)

Leadagencycollectspubliccomments(eg,solicitandconsiderfeedback)¹

Leadagencyrevisesplansbasedoninput(eg,addresspublicfeedback,

conductadditionaltestingasneeded)

Agencyawaitsapproval(eg,waitforEPAtopublishrecordofdecision)

Agencyrespondstopotentiallitigation(notuniversallyapplicable)

Developerbeginsconstruction(multipleyears;variesgreatly)

B

20–26

C

1–2

D7–13

1–7

12–18

Permittingtimelinescanstretchtomanyyearsforprojectsrequiringanenvironmentalimpactstatement.

Illustrativetimelineforprojectsrequiringanenvironmentalimpactstatement(EIS),1months

Year1Year2Year3Year4Year5Year6

3–9

A

1“Environmentalimpactstatementtimelines(2010-2024),”USCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,January13,2025;MarioLoyola,“Globalinfrastructurepermitting:Asurveyofbestpractices,”CompetitiveEnterpriseInstitute,July7,2023.

2Projectsthataren’texpectedtodeliversignificantimpactsonthehumanenvironmentmayreceiveacategoricalexclusionunderNEPAthatexemptsthemfromfurtherreview.“NationalEnvironmentalPolicyActreviewprocess,”USEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,updatedonApril11,2025.

Permittingtimelinesarelengthyandcostly

Whilelongfederalpermittingtimelineshaveattractedpublicattention,researchquantifyingtheireffectsoninfrastructuredevelopmentremainslimited.Ouranalysisaddressesthisknowledge

gap,usinggovernmentdatatocalculatetheimpactoflongtimelinesusingseveralmeasures(seesidebar“Methodology”).Foreachofouranalyses,theestimatedimpactwassubstantial.

Ourresearchconfirmsthatthepermittingprocessforlarger,moreexpensiveprojectsistypicallyfarlongerthanitisforsmallerprojects.Asaresult,calculatingtheaveragepermittingtime

acrossallprojects(agnostictoandundifferentiatedbysize)underestimatesthesubstantialsocialandeconomicimpactsofpermittingfortheselargerinitiatives.Weenlistweighted

averagestoaddressthisnuance.

Methodology

Eachmeasurementoftheestimated

economicandsocialimpactofUSfederal

permittingtimelinesreliesononeorbothoftwofundamentalinputsthatweestimated:expectedpermittingdurationandvolumeofcapitalexpendituresubjecttofederal

permitting.Whileexistingstudiesfocus

ondiscretecomponentsofthefederal

permittingprocess,theresearchdoesnotofferabroadviewoftotaltimelinesand

theirimpacts.Inrecognitionofthis,weadoptedamulti-lensapproachtoinformourestimations.

Tocalculatetheexpectedpermitting

durationbysector,weestimatedthe

durationspentonNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct(NEPA)review,additional

approvalsthatextendbeyondNEPA

review,andassociatedlitigation.WeuseddatafromtheCouncilonEnvironmental

Quality(CEQ),thePermittingCouncil,federalagencies,andacademic

researchtodevelopbaselineestimates

foreachsector.Basedonconsultation

withpractitioners(forexample,former

regulatorsandcompliancespecialists),

wethenadjustedbaselineestimatesfor

categoriesofprojectsineachsectorbasedonthefollowingcriteria:

—Projectsize.Basedonconversationswithindustryexperts,weestimated

thatboththedurationandlikelihoodofmorestringentNEPAreview,additionalpermittingapprovals,andlitigationarehigherforlargerprojectsandlowerforsmallerprojects.

—LevelofNEPAreview.Weassume

thatboththedurationandlikelihoodofadditionalpermittingapprovals

andlitigationarehigherforprojectswithmorestringentlevelsofNEPAreview(forexample,environmentalassessmentsandenvironmental

impactstatements)andlowerforprojectswithlessstringentlevelsofNEPAreview(forexample,

categoricalexclusions).

Ultimately,ourresultsarecapital-

expenditure-weightedduration;inotherwords,theyareestimatesoftheamountoftimetheaveragedollar(ratherthantheaverageproject)thatissubjecttofederalpermittingwillspendinthepermitting

process.Basedondatafromthe

PermittingCouncil,weassumethatthelargestprojects,thoughfewerinnumber,accountforthemajorityofcapitalexpenditure.

Toestimatethevolumeofcapital

expendituresubjecttofederalpermittingineachsector,weusedhistoricaldata

fromtwoUSCensusBureausurveys—

theAnnualCapitalExpendituresSurvey(ACES)andtheValueofConstruction

PutinPlaceSurvey(VIP)—andconsultedadditionalgovernmentsources(for

example,theBureauofTransportation

StatisticsandtheEnergyInformation

Administration)tosupplementestimatesforspecificsectorsnotfullycaptured

bytheCensusBureausurveys.Basedonavailabledataandconsultationwith

practitioners,wethenestimatedthe

proportionofinfrastructurecapital

expenditureineachsectorthatislikelysubjecttofederalpermitting.

Finally,toaccountfordatalimitationsandtheinherentuncertaintyassociatedwith

thisexercise,weconductedasensitivity

analysisonthreekeyvariablesthatwere

importantdeterminantsofourestimates

andhadcomparativelylimitedavailable

data:thedistributionofcapitalexpenditureacrossprojectsize,thedistributionof

projectsacrosslevelofNEPAreview,andtheproportionofinvestmentsubjectto

federalpermittingbysector.Thisprocessallowedustodevelophighandlow

estimates,resultingintherangesseenthroughoutthisarticle.

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative9

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative10

Throughthatapproach,weestimatethattheaverageproposedprojectdollartakesfourtofive

yearstomovethroughthepermittingprocess,withlargevariationsbysector:Manufacturing

dollarstaketwotothreeyearstomovethroughpermitting,forexample,whileminingdollars

takeeighttonineyears(Exhibit2).ThelongestwaittimesareforprojectsrequiringanEISreview,whichalsotendtobethelargestprojects.

Projectssubjecttolitigationindistrictcourtstypicallyfacedelaysof1.0to2.0years,andthosethatappealincircuitcourts(approximatelyone-thirdofallNEPA-relatedcases)requirean

averageof4.2yearstoresolve.

7

Despitethesetimelines,NEPA-relatedlitigationrarelyleadstomeaningfulchange;80percentofappealscasesbetween2013and2022weredecidedinfavoroffederalagencies.

8

Slowdownsinthepermittingprocesscanincreasecosts,hindereconomicgrowth,andcreate

negativeeffectsonsocietyandtheenvironment.Whilesomeamountofvaluewillalwaysbe

awaitingpermittingreview,unlockingbackloggedinfrastructurecouldreducetheselosses.Weestimatethatatanygiventime,reducingthefederalpermittingtimelinebyonlyoneyearcould

unlockaminimumof$22billioninreturnsoninvestedcapitalamongprojectsseekingapprovals.

9

Exhibit2

Weightedaveragepermittingtimeforprojectsvariesbysector.

Averagepermittingtime,byindustrysector,2025,years(range)

Mining Oilandgaspipelines EnergygenerationElectricitytransmission

Transportation OilandgasextractionBroadbandandtelecom

Manufacturing

0123456789

Years

Source:BLMNEPANationalRegister;BreakthroughInstitute;ColumbiaUniversity:USFSNEPADatabase;CouncilonEnvironmentalQuality:EISLength

database;FederalPermittingDashboard;FederalPermittingImprovementSteeringCouncil:BaselinePerformanceSchedules;FederalRegister:Section404Permits;GovernmentAccountabilityOfice;FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission;NOAA:EFHConsultation;PNAS;StanfordUniversity;UniversityofUtah

McKinsey&Company

7NikkiChiappaetal.,“UnderstandingNEPAlitigation:AsystematicreviewofrecentNEPA-relatedappellatecourtcases,”BreakthroughInstitute,July11,2024.

8JohnC.RupleandKaylaRace,“MeasuringtheNEPAlitigationburden:Areviewof1,499federalcourtcases,”EnvironmentalLaw,2020,Volume50,Number2;MichaelBennonandDevonWilson,“NEPAlitigationoverlargeenergyandtransport

infrastructureprojects,”EnvironmentalLawReporter,October2,2023;NikkiChiappaetal.,“UnderstandingNEPAlitigation:AsystematicreviewofrecentNEPA-relatedappellatecourtcases,”BreakthroughInstitute,July11,2024.

9Thisestimatereflectstheexpectedannualpostconstructionreturnsonthe$240billionto$280billionininvestedcapitalexpendituressubjecttopermittingacrosseightkeysectors.

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative11

Economicimpact

Whilepermittingrequiresbillionsofdollarsindirectspend—$5billionto$14billion,byour

estimate—italsoleadstoindirectcosts(Exhibit3).Thefour-to-five-yearpermittingtimeline

meansthattheunrealizedreturnsonprojectsinthepermittingpipelineamountto$100billionto$140billioneachyear,roughlyhalfoftheproposedcapitalexpenditureenteringthefederalpermittingpipelineeveryyear.Constructioncostscanincrease24to30percentoverprojecttimelines,spurredmainlybymaterialandlaborcostinflationandaddedoverheadcosts.

Capitaltiedupinpermittingdoesn’tcontributetotheeconomy,whichlimitsGDPgrowth.To

quantifythis,weestimatedtheinducedGDPeffects—includingunrealizedhouseholdspendingbyworkersandsupplierspaidtoexecutetheproject—ofcapitalinthepermittingqueueto

determinethesecond-ordereffectsofthesetimelines.Wefound$1.7trillionto$2.4trillioninunrealizedcumulativeGDP.

TheUSpermittingprocess

requires$5billionto$14billionindirectspend,byourestimate,andalsoleadstoindirectcosts.

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative12

Exhibit3

TheproblemwithslowpermittingintheUS

HiddencostsMissingimpact

$5billion–$14billion

indirectpermittingcostsperyear(eg,applicationfees,

legalfees)1

24%–30%

totalincreaseinconstructioncostduetopermittingdelays²

$100billion–$140billion

inunrealizedreturnsfrominfrastructurein

³permittingannually

$1.7trillion–

$2.4trillion

ofunrealizedGDPfrominfrastructurecurrentlystuckin

⁴permitting

Emissionsnotsaved⁵Energynotcreated⁶

CO₂emissionsequivalenttothosefrom

17million–26milliongas-poweredcarsintheUS

1milliongas-poweredcars

Enoughenergytopower38million–54millionUShouseholds

1million

households

That’s~80million–120millionmetrictonsinCO₂sav-ingseachyearfromclean-energyprojectsthatare

trappedinthepermittingstage

That’s~410–580terawatt-hoursofunrealizedelectricitygenerationfrompotentialcapacitytrappedwaitingfor

permits

1millionpublictransitrides

Publictransitnottaken⁷

~130millionpublictransitrides,or2%ofUSannualridership,islostannuallyinpublictransitprojectsstuckinpermitting

¹CommonGood,RetiefandChabalala,2009;OECDandMcKinseyGlobalInstitute,2020;TrackUnit.²CommonGood,2015.³BLMNEPANationalRegister;BreakthroughInstitute;ColumbiaUniversity:USFSNEPADatabase;CouncilonEnvironmentalQuality:EISLengthdatabase;FederalPermittingDashboard;FederalPermittingImprovementSteeringCouncil:BaselinePerformanceSchedules;FederalRegister:Section404Permits;GovernmentAccountability

Office;FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission;NOAA:EFHConsultation;PNAS;StanfordUniversity;UniversityofUtah.⁴OECDandMcKinseyGlobalInstitute.⁵EIACO₂cofactor,2024;WorldResourcesInstitute,2020.⁶EIAcapacityadditions,2025;EIAcapacityfactors,2023.⁷MTA,2022;PermittingCouncil,Apr2025;McKinseyanalysis.

McKinsey&Company

UnlockingUSfederalpermitting:Asustainablegrowthimperative13

Societyandtheenvironment

Acceleratingfederalpermittingcouldstreamlinethefulfillmentofcitizens’basicneeds,such

asaccesstoelectricity.Heightenedefficiencyacrosskeysectorssupportsenvironmental

objectivesbyincreasingaccesstorenewableenergyandpublictransportation.Thelengthy

paceofpermittingamountstoamissedopportunityfortheUnitedStatestopower38millionto54millionhouseholdsandreduceannualcarbondioxideemissionsequaltotheamountemittedby17millionto26milliongas-poweredvehicles,6to9percentofthetotalnumberofregisteredvehiclesintheUnitedStatesin2025.Inaddition,approximately2percentofallUSpublictransitjourneysaretiedupinpermitting.

Thesecostsandimpactsrepresentonlythosethatwecouldquantify.Othercostsareless

knowablebutarealmostcertainlypresent.Forexample,thedesiretoavoidlongerpermitting

reviewsmayincentivizesuboptimalprojectdesigns,suchasavoidingfederalland,thatminimizepermitexposure.Fearoflitigationoftenleadsto“litigationproofing,”whichcancauseagenciestosignificantlyexceedrecommendedEISpagelengths,durations,orboth,expendingmore

resourcesinanefforttopreemptlawsuitsandprolongingtheprelitigationperiodofthereviewprocess.

10

Furthermore,theUnitedStatescouldbelosingoutonprivatecapitalfrominvestorswhodeemtheriskandunpredictabilityoflengthytimelinesastoohigh.

Finally,thepermittingprocessisfeltsociallyandenvironmentally,asth