野村-中国：中国人民银行对人民币及全球失衡的立场-China：The P BoCs stance on RMB and global imbalances-20261008

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AsiaInsights

GlobalMarketsResearch

8October2026

Economics-Asiaex-Japan

China:ThePBoC’sstanceonRMBandglobalimbalances

China’sPBoChasjustissuedastatementonitspolicystanceonRMBandglobal

imbalances.ThePBoCsaidthatitmaintainsamarket-driven,managedfloatingRMB,

interveningonlyagainstextremevolatility.Itarguedthattradesurplusesdonotautomaticallycauseappreciation,ascapitalflowsandfinancialmarketsdominatevaluation.ThePBoC

rejectedtheclaimsofundervaluationandcompetitivedevaluation,anditviewsglobal

imbalancesasstructuralissuesspanningsavinggapsandbottlenecksinbothdeficitandsurplusnations.ThestatementemphasisedthattheChinesegovernment,throughits15thFive-YearPlan,supportsrebalancingbyboostingdomesticconsumptionandreforming

globalfinancialgovernance.ThePBoC’soverallviewisinlinewithourviewthatChina’s

surgingtradesurplusismoreduetothefallingrealeffectiveexchangerateratherthanthenominalone,pointingtotheneedforendingdeflationandboostingdomesticdemandin

China.ThestatementmightalsosuggestthatthePBoCisreluctanttoallow(nottomentionpushfor)fastRMB(nominal)appreciationtoaddresstheimbalance.

AyearofdebateoverChina'ssurplusandtheRMB

Wethinktoday’sPBoCRMBviewstatementisbestreadagainstayearinwhichChina's

externalsurplushasmovedtothecentreoftheglobalpolicydebate.Despitean

unprecedentedtariffwarwiththeUS,China'sgoodstradesurplusreachedarecordUSD1.2trnin2025,upnear-20%from2024,asexportsroseby5.5%,whileimportswereflat.ThesurplusreachedafurtherUSD806bninJanuary-August2026,up3.1%y-o-y,notwithstandingrobustimportgrowth.Thesedevelopmentssupportourview,whichwehavebeenhighlightingsinceDecember2025,thatthecurrent"Chinashock2.0",unlikethefirst,involveshighvalue-addedproductsthatcompetedirectlywithsomeDMs’industrialcore.

Anewthesishasbroadenedthedebateevenfurtherthisyear.Aresearchpaper

publishedbythePetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomics(PIIE)inMayextendedthecritiquetolow-andmiddle-incomeeconomies,arguingthata"Chinasqueeze"is

compressingtheirindustrialisationspaceandthatanundervaluedRMBmayhaveplayedarole.Meanwhile,theIMF's2026ExternalSectorReport,whichidentifiedChinaandtheUSasthemaindriversofexcessglobalimbalances,hasbeenwidelyreadassuggestingRMBundervaluationisaround20%.

Anever-wideningEU-Chinatradeimbalance

Europeisarguablywherethesepressuresaremostacute,inourview.China'sgoodssurpluswiththeEUrosetoUSD292bnin2025fromUSD132bnin2020.China'scustomsdatashowthatitaveragedaroundUSD30bnpermonthinJanuary-August2026,suggestingapotentialnewannualhighofaroundUSD364bn(Figure2).GermanChancellorFriedrichMerzhas

previouslycalledfor"PlazaAccord"-styletalksontheRMB,andECBPresidentChristine

LagardehascitedanIMFestimateof15-16%undervaluation.TheEU-ChinaTradeand

InvestmentConsultations(TIC),launchedinJunewithOctobersetasthefirstcheckpoint,arecurrentlyholdingtheirsecondministerialmeetingbetweenEuropeanCommissionerfortradeandeconomicsecurityMarošŠefčovičandChina’sCommerceMinisterWangWentaoin

Beijingthisweek(8-9October)amidheightenedtensions.WesuspectthetimingforreleasingthisRMBviewstatementbythePBoCmayhavebeencarefullychosen,asBrusselshasbeenthemostvocalcritiqueofBeijing’sFXpolicyoverthepastyear.

Furthermore,BeijinghasreportedlyrejectedanEUrequesttocapChinesehybridvehiclesatabout15%oftheEUmarket,downfrommorethanathirdcurrently(Source:FT).TheEuropeanCommissionisalsosaidtobeformallyconsideringsafeguardmeasures,

includinglimitingimportsofPHEVsfromChina(Source:Bloomberg).Morerecently,

BerlinandParishavejointlyproposedaninstrumentmodelledonUSSection301aheadofnextweek'sEUleaders'summit(Source:DowJonesNewswires).

ResearchAnalysts

AsiaEconomics

TingLu-NIHK

ting.lu@

+85222521306

HarringtonZhang-NIHK

harrington.zhang@

+85222522057

JingWang-NIHK

jing.wang@

+85222521011

ProductionComplete:2026-10-0815:27UTC

SeeAppendixA-1foranalystcertification,importantdisclosuresandthestatusofnon-USanalysts.

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TheG20turnsthespotlightonsurpluseconomies

TheG20FinanceMinistersandCentralBankGovernorsmeetingheldinNorthCarolina

on31August-1SeptembermaybeanotherimportantbackdroptothePBoC'sstatement.ChinawastheonlymemberthatdeclinedtoendorsetheUS-draftedtext,objectingtofourofitsparagraphs.Withoutunanimity,themeetingcouldnotadoptajointcommuniquéandinsteadtheUSissuedachair'sstatement.Thestatementcalledoncountriesto"eliminatenon-marketpoliciesandpracticesthatexacerbateimbalances".Italsourgedthosewith

"excessiveandpersistentexternalsurpluses"to"removedistortionsthatconstrain

domesticconsumptionandthatresultinanover-relianceonexportsforgrowth".US

TreasurySecretaryScottBessentlaterdescribedChina'scurrentaccountsurplusas

"unsustainable".PBoCGovernorPanGongsheng,forhispart,arguedthataddressing

globalimbalancesrequiresallcountriestopursuetheirownstructuralreforms.Inourview,thePBoC'sstatementinawayformalisesandexpandsPan'spositioninNorthCarolina.Itarguesthatglobalimbalancesrequirejointactionbysurplusanddeficiteconomies,and

thatdeficitcountriesshouldundertakefiscalconsolidation.

ThewideninggapbetweentheREERandNEERoftheRMB

BISdatapointtoawideningdivergencebetweentheRMB'snominalandrealeffective

exchangerates.Thebroadnominaleffectiveexchangerate(NEER)roseby8.8%

betweenmid-2025andAugust2026andreachedanall-timehighof114.3inJuly2026

(Figure1).ThisisbroadlyconsistentwiththePBoC'scharacterisationoftheRMBas

havingremainedstrongamongmajorcurrencies.Sinceend-2025alone,theNEERhas

appreciatedby5.1%,whiletherealeffectiveexchangerate(REER)hasrisenbyonly

2.6%,to91.8inAugust2026.TheREERremains14.5%belowitsMarch2022peak,

havingfalleninJune2025toitslowestlevelsinceNovember2011.Asaresult,theratiooftheREERtotheNEER,aproxyofChina'srealpricelevelrelativetoitstradingpartners,felltoarecordlowinJuly2026.Ithasdeclinedbyaround15%sinceearly2022andbyafurther2.3%inthefirsteightmonthsof2026.Inourview,thisreflectspersistentdomesticdisinflationarypressures,whichhaveoffsetmuchoftheRMB'snominalappreciationandpreservedthepricecompetitivenessofChineseexports.Withoutreflationofthedomesticeconomy,gradualnominalappreciationaloneisunlikelytonarrowChina'stradesurplusmaterially,aswepreviouslyhighlighted.

Fig.1:China'seffectiveexchangeratesinrealandnominalterms

Source:BIS,Wind,NomuraGlobalEconomics

Fig.2:China’smonthlytradesurpluswiththeEUreachedhistoricalhighsacrosstheEUBig4

Note:2026dataarefromJanuarytoAugust.

Source:GeneralAdministrationofCustoms,Wind,NomuraGlobalEconomics

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Appendix

Summaryof“ThePeople’sBankofChina’sPolicystanceontheRMBExchange

Rate”

ThisdocumentsystematicallyoutlinesChina’sRMBexchange-rateregime,theunderlyinglogicofcurrencymovementsandChina'sstrategiccommitmentstoglobaleconomic

rebalancing.ItdirectlyaddressesinternationalaccusationsofRMBmanipulation,clarifiesthecomplexrelationshipbetweenexchangeratesandthebalanceofpayments,andsetsforthmedium-tolong-termstructuralreformplans.

I.CorestructureofChina’sexchange-rateregime

Chinamaintainsamanagedfloatingexchange-ratesystemdrivenbymarketsupplyanddemand,adjustedwithreferencetoacurrencybasket.ThePBoCremainscommittedtomarket-orientedcurrencyreform.

•Market-drivenvaluation:Marketforcesplaythedecisiverole.ThePBoCdoesnottargetspecificexchange-ratelevelsandendedroutineforeign-exchangeinterventionsin2017tofostertwo-wayRMBflexibility.

•Targetedvolatilitycontrol:Policyinterventionisrestrictedtomanagingextreme

short-termvolatility.Undermajorexternalshocks,macro-prudentialtoolsguidemarketexpectations.Directinterventionisreservedstrictlyforextremescenariostocurbherdbehaviorandpreventdestructiveexchange-rateovershooting–anapproach

consistentwithinternationalnorms.

•EnhancedTransparency:Chinapublishesbalanceofpaymentsandforeign-

exchangedataundertheIMF’sSpecialDataDisseminationStandard(SDDS)andwillexpanditsforeign-exchangedatasubmissionstotheIMFstartingin2027.

II.RMBhistoricalperformanceanddecliningtradesensitivity

•Resilienceandstability:Sincethe2005currencyreform,theRMBhasremained

strong,whileexhibitingnaturaltwo-wayfluctuations.Chinaconsistentlyrejects

competitivedevaluation,maintainingexchange-ratestabilityduringmajorglobalcriseswithoutseekingunfairtradeadvantages.

•ReducedsensitivitytoFXswings:Chineseexportshaveshiftedtowardmid-to-high-endmanufacturedgoods,whileglobalsupplychainsshareexchange-raterisks.

Approximately30%ofChina'stradeissettledinRMB,andaround30%offoreign-

tradeenterprisesactivelyusecurrencyhedgingtools—bothmetricsareexpectedto

rise.

•Limitsofcentralbankintervention:GiventheimmensesizeofglobalFXmarkets,centralbankscannotalterlong-termexchange-ratetrendsthroughinterventionalone.

Sustainedcurrencyweaknessfailstoprovidelastingtradecompetitiveness.

III.Disconnectingexchangeratesfromcurrentaccountbalances

Exchangeratesareinfluencedbyacomplexmatrixofeconomicgrowth,monetarypolicy,capitalflows,geopoliticalrisksandmarketsentiment.Acurrentaccountsurplusordeficitalonedoesnotdictatewhetheracurrencyshouldappreciateordepreciate.

1.Dominanceofcapitalflows:Cross-borderfinancialtransactionsfarexceedtradevolumes,meaningcapitalaccountdynamicsfrequentlydrivecurrencymovements.

Forexample,theSouthKoreanwonandJapaneseyenhavedepreciateddespite

currentaccountsurpluses,whereastheUSdollarhasremainedstrongdespite

persistentcurrentaccountdeficits.

2.Capitaloutflowscounterbalancesurpluses:Evenwithsizeablecurrentaccountsurpluses,capitalflowsoutwardthroughforeigninvestment,maintaininganoverallbalanceofpaymentsequilibrium.Surplusesdonotautomaticallyleadtocurrencyappreciation.

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IV.LimitationsofIMFequilibrium-exchange-ratemodels

Academicconsensusremainselusiveonthemethodsforestimatingequilibriumexchangerates.TheIMF’sExternalBalanceAssessment(EBA)isabroaddiagnostictoolfor

externalimbalancesratherthanapreciseequilibrium-exchange-ratemodelanditsdistinctmodulesoftenyieldconflictingresults.

•Analyticalconstraints:Duetosampleselectionconstraints,parametersettingsandlimitedexplanatorypower,EBAoutputsshouldserveonlyasacademicreferences.

•Misinterpretationwarning:RealeffectiveexchangeratefindingsfromtheEBAmustnotbeconflatedwithjudgmentsonthenominalRMB-USDexchangerateorusedtojustifyclaimsofRMBundervaluation.

•IMFpolicyfocus:TheIMF’sactualpolicyadviceforChinaprioritizesstructuralreforms—suchasboostingdomesticdemand—ratherthanforcednominalRMBappreciation.

V.Multilateraldriversofglobaleconomicimbalances

Globaleconomicimbalancesstemfromevolvinginternationallabordivisions,structuralflawsintheglobalmonetarysystemandcross-countrysaving-investmentgaps.Theycannotbeblamedsolelyonsurplusnations.

•Reservecurrenciesandstructuralbottlenecks:Reserve-currencyissuingnationsmaintainchronicdeficitsdrivenbyfiscalexpansionandlowdomesticsavingrates.

Meanwhile,decliningindustrialcompetitivenessincertainnationsstemsfrom

domesticenergycosts,lagginginfrastructure,regulatoryburdensandinnovation

deficits.

•Rejectingprotectionism:Blamingexternalexchangeratesreflectsprotectionist

sentimentandavoidsnecessarydomesticadjustments.Bothsurplusanddeficit

nationsmustcommittomedium-andlong-termstructuralreformsratherthanrelyingonshort-termreactivemeasures.

VI.China’sstrategyforglobaleconomicrebalancing

Chinahasmadetangiblecontributionstoglobaldynamicrebalancingbyreducingitscurrentaccountsurplus-to-GDPratioandsignificantlyincreasingconsumption's

contributiontoGDPgrowth.

Underthe15thFive-YearPlan,Chinawilladvancestructuraleconomicadjustmentsby:

•Stimulatingdomesticconsumptionanddrivingeffectiveinvestment.

•Improvingthebusinessenvironmentandexpandinghigh-standardmarketopening.

•Acceleratingscienceandtechnologyinnovationwhilerefiningincomedistributionand

socialsecuritysystems.

•Developingthedomesticconsumermarketandparticipatinginglobalfinancial

governancereformstopromoteanopen,inclusive,andbalancedglobaleconomy.

Keytakeaways

TheRMBexchangerateisfundamentallymarket-determined,withpolicyinterventions

limitedtocurbingseveremarketovershooting.Nodirectlinearrelationshipexistsbetweenexchangeratesandcurrentaccountbalances.Resolvingglobaleconomicimbalances

requiresstructuraladjustmentsacrossallmajoreconomiesratherthancompetitivecurrencydevaluationsortargetedexchangerateclaims.

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Relatedreports

•EU-Chinatradetensions:Theslowburncontinues,10September2026

•EU-Chinatradetensions:Theslowburnaccelerates,13July2026

•China:Themuch-overlookedriskofEU-Chinatradetensions,24December2025

•China:Thegreatdivides,RMB,andthepolicydilemmaforBeijing,13December2025

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AppendixA-1

ThisreporthasbeenproducedbyNomuraInternational(HongKong)Ltd.(NIHK),HongKong.

SeeDisclaimersforNomuraGroupentitydetails.

AnalystCertification

We,TingLu,HarringtonZhangandJingWang,herebycertify(1)thattheviewsexpressedinthisResearchreportaccuratelyreflectour

personalviewsaboutanyorallofthesubjectsecuritiesorissuersreferredtointhisResearchreport,(2)nopartofourcompensationwas,isorwillbedirectlyorindirectlyrelatedtothespecificrecommendationsorviewsexpressedinthisResearchreportand(3)nopartofour

compensationistiedtoanyspecificinvestmentbankingtransactionsperformedbyNomuraSecuritiesInternational,Inc.,NomuraInternationalplcoranyotherNomuraGroupcompany.

ImportantDisclosures

Onlineavailabilityofresearchandconflict-of-interestdisclosures

NomuraGroupresearch

isavailableon/research

,Bloomberg,CapitalIQ,Factset,LSEG.

Importantdisclosuresmaybereadat

/research/m/Disclosuresor

requestedfromNomuraSecuritiesInternational,Inc.

Ifyouhaveanydifficultieswiththewebsite,pleaseemail

grpsupport@

forhelp.

Theanalystsresponsibleforpreparingthisreporthavereceivedcompensationbaseduponvariousfactorsincludingthefirm'stotalrevenues,aportionofwhichisgeneratedbyInvestmentBankingactivities.Unlessotherwisenoted,thenon-USanalystslistedatthefrontofthisreportarenotregistered/qualifiedasresearchanalystsunderFINRArules,maynotbeassociatedpersonsofNSI,andmaynotbesubjecttoFINRARule2241restrictionsoncommunicationswithcoveredcompanies,publicappearances,andtradingsecuritiesheldbyaresearchanalystaccount.

NomuraGlobalFinancialProductsInc.(NGFP)NomuraDerivativeProductsInc.(NDP)andNomuraInternationalplc.(NIplc)areregisteredwiththeCommoditiesFuturesTradingCommissionandtheNationalFuturesAssociation(NFA)asswapdealers.NGFP,NDPI,andNIplcare

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