麦肯锡 -首席执行官绝不可委派的六项战略职责 The six strategy roles a CEO must not delegate

October2026

McKinsey

Quarterly

Strategy&CorporateFinancePractice

ThesixstrategyrolesaCEOmustnotdelegate

Strategyisateamsport,butthevalueitcreatesultimatelydependsontheCEO'sinvolvement.

ThisarticleisacollaborativeeffortbyAndyWest,CarolynDewar,KurtStrovink,MichaelBirshan,TimKoller,andWhitneyZimmerman,representingviewsfromMcKinsey'sStrategy&CorporateFinancePractice.

FewthingsaCEOcandoaremorepowerfulthanleadingstrategywell.ACEOcanelevatethequalityofanorganization’sstrategicchoicesanditscommitmenttoactingonthem.Thisis

becauseCEOsareuniquelypositionedtoensurestrategiesaredesignedtoahighstandardandonstrongvalue-creationfoundations.Companiesgrowfasterandearnhigherreturnsafter

appointingCEOswithmorestructuredapproachestostrategy.1

NoneofthismeanstheCEOactsalone.Strategyisateamsport.Impactfulwork,suchas

developingforesight,research,ideation,analysis,anddecision-making,canbedistributed

acrossanorganization.ButtheCEO’sstature,perspective,andauthoritymeanthesuccessofastrategyultimatelydependsontheirinvolvement.

ThisarticlesetsoutsixrolestheCEOcannotdelegatewithoutputtingatriskthevaluea

strategycancreate:choosinghowtoengageinstrategy,owningthevaluecreationthesis,

makingthehardestreallocationcalls,changingthestrategictempowhennecessary,inspiring

theorganizationtoseeopportunityinuncertainty,andbeingacatalystforchange.Weexplain

eachroleandwhatittakestodoitwell.WeconcludewithadiscussionofhowthebeliefsaCEObuildsaboutstrategycanhelpthemfulfillthoseroles.

TheCEOchooseshowtoengageinstrategy

TheCEOshouldbecloseenoughtothedesignanddeliveryofstrategy—thedebates,decision-making,andtheflowofresourcestoopportunities—tobringtheirjudgmenttobearonthe

organization’smostconsequentialissues.

AccountabilityforhowstrategycreatesvaluecanfragmentwhentheCEOisnoteffectivelyengaged.Financeinfluencestheportfoliothroughhundredsofallocationdecisions,humanresourcesmanagesthetalentagenda,andbusinessleaderscontroltheirownoperations.AlthoughtheCEOoverseesthesefunctions,deliberatepracticesarerequiredtoknowthebusinesswellenoughtoactwhenitmattersmost.

ManyofthemoststrategicallyeffectiveCEOswehaveobservedsharecommonpracticeswhenengaginginstrategy.Theyengagewiththeportfolioataresolutionfineenoughtoknowwhichbusinessesarecreatingvalueandwhicharedestroyingit.Theyconveneregulardecisionson

whichinitiativestofund,whichtoshutdown,andwhichtoaccelerate.Theytreatnewresourcecommitmentsandcorrespondingreallocationsasinseparable,socapitalandtalentkeepmovingtowardwhatmattersmosttothestrategy.Theyinsistonpostmortemstoreviewwhetherthe

underlyingstrategicchoicesucceededorfailed.Theypersonallyengageintheplanningand

budgetingcycle,interveningwhenwhatgetsfundednolongerreflectsthestrategy.Andtheyensurethatastrategyfunction,ifitexists,hasaclearmandate.Thespecificsvarybycompanyandcircumstance.Thedisciplinebehindthespecificsshouldnot.

A.G.Lafley’stimeasCEOofProcter&Gamble(P&G)showsmanyofthesepracticesinaction.HeredesignedP&G’sstrategyreviews(previouslycalled“corporatetheater”)intofocused

1Mu-JeungYangetal.,“Howdochiefexecutiveofficersmakestrategy?,”ManagementScience,June2026,Volume72,Number6.Aone-standard-deviationincreaseinthestructureofaCEO’sstrategicpracticesisassociatedwithroughly15.5percentage

pointsofadditionalmarkupand9.5percenthigherfive-yeargrowth,witheffectslargestinindustriesofgreaterstrategic

complexity.PanelanalysisshowsthatthesegrowtheffectsmaterializeonlyaftertheappointmentofaCEOwithmorestructuredpractices,rulingoutthealternativethatbetterfirmssimplyattractbetterCEOs.

ThesixstrategyrolesaCEOmustnotdelegate2

ThesixstrategyrolesaCEOmustnotdelegate3

debatesonafewstrategicquestions.Nopresentationswereallowedduringthesereviews,andonlyafewpeoplefromthebusinessunitunderreviewcouldbeintheroom.ThisprocessgaveLafleythegranularknowledgeandcloseengagementheneededtoleadthecompany.Monthlyandquarterlymeetingsensuredengagementanddecision-making.Businessleaderssubmittedlettersdirectlytohimbeforeeachmeeting,andthesessionswereusedtosurfaceandresolvestrategicissuesratherthantoseekapproval.Lafleyalsoregularlydevotedfulldaysto

unstructuredstrategicthinking.

Lafleystayedexternallyorientedbyvisitingconsumers’homesandshoppinginstoreswheneverhetraveled.Hepersonallyledresourceallocation,divestingordiscontinuingmorethan90

brandsduringhissecondtenuretoconcentrateresourcesonthe65to70thatcreatedthemostvalue.Ontalent,hetookresponsibilityforplacingstaffintotherolesmostimportanttoP&G’s

strategyandwasdirectlyinvolvedindevelopingthecompany’stop150executives.Throughoutplanningandbudgetingcycles,hegroundeddiscussionsinthesamequestion:Doesthisreflectthestrategy?Whenstrategicbetsfailed,heinsistedonpostmortems.Atonepoint,hehad30

years’worthofunsuccessfulacquisitionsanalyzedtoidentifytherootcausesoftheirfailures.

TheCEO’sinvolvementinstrategycanrepresentameaningfulinvestmentoftime.Butwhatit

enablesissomethingnobriefingdocumentordelegatedprocesscanreplace:aCEOwhoknowsthebusinesswellenoughtoleadtheworkofstrategyandcreateoutsizevalue,andtodischargethefollowingroleswithconfidence.

TheCEOownsthevaluecreationthesis

Agreatstrategyrestsonaclearvaluecreationthesis:Howwillthiscompany—inthesemarketsandwiththesesourcesofadvantageandvisionofthefuture—earnreturnsthatjustifythe

resourcescommitted?Duringthestrategy’sdesign,manypeoplemaycontributetobuildingthatthesis.ButtheCEOmustownthethesisandisultimatelyaccountableforitsrigorandfor

ensuringitscontinuedrelevance.

Ownershipismorethanauthorship.TheCEOmustbuildgenuineconvictioninthemanagementteaminthethesisandthewiderstrategyitexplains.TheCEOandtheirteamneedtobeabletoarticulatethevaluecreationthesisintheirownwords,defenditunderchallenge,andrecognizewhentheevidencehasbeguntoinvalidateit.Athesisthatlivesonlyinthestrategydeckisnotownedbyanyone;athesisthatcanbeexplainedinanyforumis.Thedifferenceshowsupintheconsistencyofdecisionsmadeacrossthecompany.Whenanorganization—andattimesa

broaderecosystem—understandsastrategy’sthesis,leadersateverylevelcanmaketheirowndecisionsconsistentwithit.

JamieDimon’stwodecadesatJPMorganChaseillustratewhatitlookslikewhenaCEOownsandevolvesthevaluecreationthesisofthecompany’sstrategy.Hisoriginalthesiswasthatriskdisciplineisanengineforgrowth.A“fortressbalancesheet”letthebanklendthrough

downturnsandacquiredistressedcompetitorswhenotherscouldnot.2

2Inhis2007shareholdersletter,Dimonnoted,“Weoperateinriskybusinesses,andhavingafortressbalancesheetisastrategicimperative,notaphilosophicalbent.Itisalsoacriticaldifferentiatorforus—especiallyinuncertaintimes.”JamieDimon,

“ChairmanandCEOLettertoShareholders,”JPMorganChase,March8,2008.Thesecommentsreinforcethedifference

betweenaCEO’sgeneralbeliefsaboutstrategyandvalue(thatbalancesheetstrengthmattersinbanking)andtheirspecific

applicationtothedesignofacompany’sstrategy(thatafortressbalancesheetwillhelpJPMorganChasecreateoutsizevalue).

ThesixstrategyrolesaCEOmustnotdelegate4

ThethesiswasvindicatedwhenJPMorganwasinapositiontoabsorbBearStearnsand

WashingtonMutualin2008.Butby2015,Dimonwasalreadyrevisingthethesis,warning

shareholdersthat“SiliconValleyiscoming”andthatafortressbalancesheetwouldnotbe

enough.JPMorgan’stechnologybudgetdoubledoverthedecadethatfollowed,enabling

growthinattractivedigitalbanking,payments,andinternationalretailmarketswhiledevelopingnewsourcesofadvantageinscaleandcustomerembeddedness.Eachphasebuiltonthe

previousone:Thefortressfundedthetechnologyembrace,andthetechnologyembrace

extendedthefortressintomarketsthatbankbranchesalonecouldneverhavereached.ThesameimpulseisreflectedinDimon’spursuitofinnovationthroughartificialintelligence,

includingtrackingitsimpactonthebank’sP&L.

Dimonrearticulatesthevaluecreationthesisinanannualshareholderletterdetailedenoughtoensurethestrategyisunderstoodbymorethan300,000employeesaswellasclients,

investors,regulators,andpartners.JPMorgan’smarketcapitalizationgrewfromroughly$140billionwhenheassumedtheroleofCEOin2006toroughly$900billionin2025,with

cumulativetotalshareholderreturnsmorethanoneandahalftimestheS&P500overtheperiod.

StrategicallyeffectiveCEOscontinuallytesttheirstrategy’svaluecreationthesis.Theyholdaviewofthecompany’sintrinsicvalue,constantlyweighingitagainstthemarket’sshifting

expectations.Theycommitfirmlyenoughtoactonthethesisbutremainopentorevisingit.

Theyseekoutthepeopleandevidencemostlikelytoinformit,andtheyengagechallengersaroundthemtotestthecoherenceofthethesis.WhenCEOscannolongerarticulatewhythethesisisright,theytreatthatasasignaltostepback.

TheCEOmakesthehardestresourcereallocationcalls

Greatstrategiesoftenrequirecounteringanorganization’sinertiabyshifting

resources—especiallycapitalandtalent—fromanexistingbusinesstoanunprovenopportunity.ThesecanbethehardestcallsaCEOmakes,especiallyatenterprisescale.Theycannotbe

delegatedeffectively.WarrenBuffetthasobservedthatmostCEOsarriveattherolehaving

excelledinoperations,marketing,orengineering,onlytofindthemselvesresponsibleforcapitalallocation,acriticalskillthattheymayneverhavepracticedandisnoteasilymastered.3YetitispreciselybecausethesecallsaresohardthattheyseparatetheCEOswhocreateoutsizevaluefromthosewhodonot.

Thesedecisionsarehardforareason.Theunitlosingresourcesusuallyhasalongertrack

record,amorepolishedbusinesscase,andtheleadersmostadeptatdefendingwhattheyhave.Theunitgainingresourcesmayhaveuncertaineconomicsandathesisthattheorganization

findsattractivebutnotpressingenoughtofundattheexpenseofprovenbusinesses.

Dispassionateanalysisoftennarrowlyfavorsthenewcommitment;organizationalpolitics

overwhelminglyfavortheold.TheCEOistheonlypersonwhoseauthorityisgreatenoughtooverruleinertialthinking.

3WarrenBuffett,“Chairman’sLetter,”BerkshireHathaway,1987.Buffettobservesthat“theheadsofmanycompaniesarenot

skilledincapitalallocation,”notingthat“[m]ostbossesrisetothetopbecausetheyhaveexcelledinanareasuchasmarketing,production,engineering,administrationor,sometimes,institutionalpolitics.”

ThesixstrategyrolesaCEOmustnotdelegate5

SatyaNadella’sfirstyearsasMicrosoft’sCEOshowwhatthesedecisionscanlooklike.Earlyinhistenure,hemadetwomovesthatdependedonhisauthorityasCEO.Onewassubtraction:HeshutdownMicrosoft’sphonehardwarebusiness,unwindingtheNokiahandsetacquisitionhe

hadinheritedfromhispredecessor.Anotherwasredirection.NadellaconcludedthatmeetingusersontheirpreferredplatformswouldcreatemorevaluethandefendingWindows.Sohe

madeOffice,oneofMicrosoft’smostvaluablefranchises,availableoniOSandAndroid,despiteinternalresistance.

Toreallocateatthescalethestrategyrequired,Nadellahadtochangetheorganization.He

movedMicrosoftawayfromwhathecalled“aconfederationoffiefdoms”—theWindows-centricdivisionalmodelinwhicheveryreallocationriskedbeinganegotiationamongentrenched

parties—andcentralizedcapitalallocationdecisionsaroundcloudandplatforms.4Themost

consequentialreallocationwasthesustainedinvestmentinAzure,whichgrewfromanascent

cloudofferingintoabusinessgeneratingmorethan$75billioninannualrevenueby2025.Therestructuringalsofreedupcapitalandstrategicfocustosupportastringofadditional

investmentsthatpositionedMicrosoftforthegenerativeAIwave,including$7.5billioninGitHubandroughly$13.8billioninOpenAI.Microsoft’smarketcapitalizationrosefromroughly$300

billionwhenhebecameCEOin2014tomorethan$3trillionby2024,withcumulativetotalshareholderreturnsroughlythreetimestheS&P500inthatperiod.

Thedefaultinmostcompaniesisforreallocationtofallshortofwhatthestrategyneeds.Boldaspirationsbecomemodestadjustments,andtheportfoliochangesonlymarginally.TheCEOswhocreatethemostvalueresistthatpull.Theymoveresourcestothebiggestopportunities,andacceptthatdoingsosometimesmeansmakingpartoftheorganizationsmallersothe

strategycreatesmorevalue.

Equallyimportantisthedisciplineofensuringthatsomethingsstop.Inmanycompanies,newcommitmentsareannouncedwhiletheprojectstheyshoulddisplacequietlycontinue,

consumingcapital,talent,andmanagementattention.TheCEOisessentialtoensuringthatthebusinessabandonswhatislessvaluableinfavorofsupportingthestrategy.

TheCEOcanchangethestrategictempo

Everyorganizationmovesatadefaultstrategictempo,oftenreflectingitsbudgetcycle,

leadershipcomfort,andthemomentumofwhathasbeenworking.Thattempoisnotnecessarilywhatthestrategyrequires,yetintheabsenceofamajordisruption,itcanpersist.Amajor

strategicmovemayneedyearsofinvestmentandecosystemdevelopment,oritmayneedtoscalefasterthantheorganizationhasevermoved.TheCEOisuniquelyabletooverridethe

defaulttempo,imposingpatiencewhentheorganizationwantstorushorforcingaccelerationwhenitwantstotakemoretime.

Itisdifficulttobothspeedupandslowdownstrategictempo.Imposingpatiencerequiresthe

CEOtodefendaninvestmentwhosereturnshavenotyetmaterializedagainstthenaturalpullof

4SatyaNadella,GregShaw,andJillTracieNichols,HitRefresh:TheQuesttoRediscoverMicrosoft’sSoulandImagineaBetterFutureforEveryone,HarperCollinsPublishers,2017.

ThesixstrategyrolesaCEOmustnotdelegate6

thequarterlyreview,theactivistinvestor,ortheoperatingleaderwhowouldprefertoredirectthefundstosomethingalreadyworking.ForcingaccelerationrequirestheCEOtoabsorbthediscomfortofmovingbeforetheorganizationisready—launchingatscalebeforeeveryissue

hasbeenresolvedorcommittingcapitalbeforeeveryassumptionhasbeentested.Thedefaultisfororganizationstomoveatatempothatminimizesnear-termanxiety,whichisrarelythe

tempothestrategydemands.

ReedHastings’sleadershipofNetflix’stransitionfromDVDtostreamingillustrateswhat

changingthestrategictempolookslikeinbothdirections.By2007,Hastingswasconvinced

streamingwasthefuture.Hecouldhaveforcedarapidtransition;instead,helaunched

streamingasafreeadd-ontoDVDsubscriptionsandranbothbusinessesinparallelforfour

years.Hastingsfundedthestreamingbuild-outwithDVDcashflowswhilebroadband

penetrationgrewandthecontentlibrarymatured.Thestrategyrequiredpatience,sohe

imposedit,resistingtheorganizationalinstincttodemandreturnsfromabusinessthatneededyearstomature.Whenconditionschanged,heshiftedthetempo:splittingDVDandstreamingpricingin2011,committing$100milliontotheseriesHouseofCardswithoutapilot,and

launchingin130countriessimultaneouslyin2016.

Thetransitionalsoshowshowgettingthetemporightisn’taboutperfectionandwhataCEO-ledcorrectionlookslike.The2011Qwiksterannouncement—anattempttoacceleratethe

separationofDVDandstreamingintodistinctbrands—costNetflix800,000subscribersanda75percentdeclineinitsstockprice.AsHastingsacknowledged,“Thereisadifferencebetweenmovingquickly—whichNetflixhasdoneverywellforyears—andmovingtoofast,whichiswhatwedidinthiscase.”5Hereversedtheannouncementbutkeptthestrategiccommitment,

recognizingthathehadmisjudgedthepace,notthedirection.Netflix’smarketcapitalizationgrewfromroughly$1.5billionbeforethestreamingtransitiontomorethan$150billionbythetimeHastingssteppedbackasco-CEOin2023,faroutpacingtheS&P500.

CalibratingstrategictemporequirestheCEO’sjudgment.Whenthingsgowrong,theCEO

distinguishesbetweenamistakeinpaceandamistakeindirection.Theycorrectonewithout

abandoningtheother.TheCEOmustalsoguardagainsttheirowndefaults,becausethetempoastrategydemandschangesasconditionschange.

TheCEOcaninspiretheorganizationtoleanintouncertainty

Uncertaintymakesorganizationshesitate.Whenthecompetitivelandscapeshiftsinwaysthat

arehardtounderstandorpredict,thenaturalresponseistodelaycommitments,hedgebets,

andletthepictureclarifybeforeacting.Thecompaniesthatcreatethemostvalueinuncertainenvironmentsdotheopposite:Theymovetowardtheuncertaintywithapointofviewaboutwhyitfavorsthem.

Thatpointofviewdoesnotemergeonitsown,anditcannotbegeneratedbyanalysisalone.Analysiscansharpenathesis,butitcannotsupplyalltheconvictionneededtomobilizean

5ReedHastingsissuedthiscommentinawrittenstatement.See“Netflixscrapsplantospin-offDVDdeliveries,”BBCNews,October10,2011.

ThesixstrategyrolesaCEOmustnotdelegate7

organization.OnlytheCEO,conferringwithmembersoftheirteam,cansupplyit.TheCEOsitsattheintersectionofthecompany’shistory,purpose,capabilities,andambition,andholdsthe

authoritytocommittheinstitutiontoafuturethathasnotyetbeenvalidated.ACEOwho

refusestotakeapositionwillfindtheirorganizationdoingthesame.Thecostofthatpostureisrarelyvisibleinthemoment,becausenothinghasgoneobviouslywrong.Itshowsuplater,whentheperiodofuncertaintyresolves,andtheorganizationsthatcommittedearlyhavebuilt

positionsthelatemoverscannolongerchallenge.

DougMcMillon’stransformationofWalmartillustrateswhatthisactionlookslike.Whenhe

becameCEOin2014,theprevailingviewwasthatbig-boxretailerscouldnotcompeteine-

commerce.McMillonsawthesameuncertaintybutdrewadifferentconclusion.Walmart’s4,700storesintheUnitedStates,withintenmilesof90percentofthepopulation,wereanadvantageinthedigitalworldifthecompanycouldlearntousethemasfulfillmentenginesforpickupanddelivery.Heensuredthee-commercestrategywasdesignedaroundthatthesis,sostore

managersexperienceddigitalgrowthassomethingthatmadetheirbusinesseslarger,notsmaller.

Datareinforcedthestrategicframing.Customerswhoshoppedbothinstoresandonlinespentroughlytwiceasmuch.McMillongroundedtheorganizationonwhatwouldnotchange—low

prices,purpose,respectforassociates—sothatleadersateverylevelhadastableplatformfromwhichtodrivechange.McMillonmadethecasepublicly,statingina2017interviewthatthe

companyneededpeopleto“leanintothefuture.”6Thiswasamessagetoinvestorsandpartnersasmuchastotheorganizationitself.

McMillonlaterdescribedthetransformationsimply:“Thisstoryisactuallyaboutpeople

changing.”7Walmart’scategorybuyersandmerchandisershadtostrengthentheirproduct

managementanddigitaldesignskillstoshapeonlineshoppingexperiences.Storeoperators

hadtoacceptthattechprioritieswouldbesetbycustomerneeds,notbytheirownpreferences.Whenspecificbetsfailed—andseveraldid—McMilloncorrectedopenlywithoutlettingthe

setbacksbecomeanargumentforretreat.Bythetimehesteppeddowninearly2026,

Walmart’sglobale-commercerevenueexceeded$100billion,itsadvertisingbusinesshad

reached$6billion,andtotalshareholderreturnduringhistenurewasmorethan400percent,aheadoftheS&P500.

TheCEOcannotresolveuncertainty;noonecan.Butuncertaintyiswhenactionismostneeded.Often,onlyaCEOcaninspireanorganizationtoactwhenaleapoffaithisrequired,applying

experience,authority,andleadershipskills.Thatisthedifferencebetweenanorganizationthatwaitsforthefogtoclearandonethatleadsthroughit.

TheCEOisacatalystforchange

Astrategyusuallychangessomethingaboutthebusinessinpursuitofgreatervalue.Butsometimes,astrategyrequiresasubstantialpivotortransformationalchange,oftenasa

6AdiIgnatius,“Weneedpeopletoleanintothefuture,”HarvardBusinessReview,March–April2017.

7BenThompson,“AninterviewwithWalmartCEODougMcMillonaboutomnichannelretail,”Stratechery,April25,2024.

ThesixstrategyrolesaCEOmustnotdelegate8

consequenceofdecisionsCEOsmakeinfulfillingtherolesabove.Whenstrategyrequiressuchchange,theCEOisacriticalcatalyst—theoneleaderpositionedtosustainit.Otherexecutives

cancatalyzechangewithintheirowndomains,butonlytheCEOcanholdthewholeorganizationtoanewcourse.

CatalyzingchangetakespersistencefromaCEO.Theenergybehindastrategycandissipateasurgencyfadesandthenextproblemarrives,andtheorganizationslipsbacktowardhowitusedtowork.TheCEOisessentialtoovercomingthemanycollective-actionchallengesthatcan

thwartchange.8Positionedaboveindividualinterests,theCEOisuniquelysituatedtocatalyzethechange.TheCEOisneededtoholdfirmwhenthecostsofchangeareclearandthereturnsarenot,andretreatmayfeellikethemoreprudentoption.

DavidCote’stransformationofHoneywellshowshowaCEOcanbeacatalystforthechangesastrategyrequires.WhenhebecameCEOin2002,thecompanywasfocusedonmeeting

quarterlyresultsattheexpenseofinvestmentinthefuture.Cote’sstrategycalledforthe

companytodotwothingsatonce—performnowandsimultaneouslyinvestforthefuture.Thatrequiredchanginghowthecompanyworked,fromitsapproachtostrategydesignand

mobilizationtoitsoperatingmodeltoitsculture.ThesechangesdidnotcomeeasilyduetowhatCotetermedaformofentropy:thedrifttowarddisorderthataleadermustcontinuouslyseektocounteract.

Coteworkedhardtoholdthecompanytoanewcourse.Hesetahigherstandardforstrategy

andchangedhowitwasdebated,replacinglongannualpresentationswithfact-based

summariesandastandingrevieweverysixweeks.Asaresult,strategybecamecontinuousworkratherthanayearlyritual.Heended“makethequarter”meetingsandrebuiltaccountingto

betterreflecttherealitiesofvaluecreation.Coterejectedrequeststoreverttooldpractices

evenwhendoingsohurtreportedearnings.Heacceptedastretchoflaggingperformanceandastockpricethatfellabout25percentwhilethechangesmatured,thecostsvisiblelongbeforethereturns.

Coteultimatelyplayedacatalystroleforyearstoensurethechangesstuck,takingovera

decadetorolloutwhathecalledtheHoneywellOperatingSystemunderthemantra“goslowtogofast.”Hisstrategyandcommitmenttochangepaidoff.Overhistenure,Honeywell’smarketvaluegrewfromroughly$20billionto$120billion,areturnofabout800percent,roughlytwoandahalftimestheS&P500overtheperiod.9

Astrategycanbechosenquickly,butchanginganorganizationanditsvaluecreationtrajectorytakessustainedcommitment.Holdingtheorganizationtothatcommitment,foraslongasthe

strategyrequires,isworkonlytheCEOcando.

8Forafullertreatmentofthecollective-actionproblemsthatunderminetransformationsandtheCEO’sroleinresolvingthem,seeKurtStrovink,MathewLee,MeaganHill,andMichaelBucy,“Collectiveaction,collectivesuccess:ACEO’sroleintransformations,”McKinseyQuarterly,June15,2026.

9DavidM.Cote,WinningNow,WinningLater:HowCompaniesCanWinintheShortTermWhileInvestingfortheLongTerm,HarperCollinsLeadership,2020.

ThesixstrategyrolesaCEOmustnotdelegate9

Thepowerofbeliefsaboutstrategy

Carryingouttherolesoutlinedinthisarticleisdifficult.Theyrequireconfrontinghardtrade-offs,takingprofessionalrisks,andagreatdealofenergy.TheCEOswhofulfilltherolesbenefitfrommanysourcesofsupport,includingcollaborationwiththeirteamandboard,counselfrom

advisersandpeers,and,powerfully,beliefsaboutstrategyandvalue.

Bybeliefswemeanwaysofthinkingaboutvaluecreationthatenableleaderstojudgeevolvingsituationsandmakehardchoices.Beliefscanactasashorthandforwisdomthatleadershave

earnedfromexperienceandstudy,whichcanbeappliedtochallengesthatpagesofanalysisorhoursofdebatealonecannotsettle.ACEO’sbeliefsarebuiltovertheircareerthroughstudy

andlivedexperience.Lafleycametobelievethatwhatconsumersdorevealsf