麦肯锡 -随着世界秩序发生转变头部企业正紧跟这一趋势 As the world order turns,leading companies are keeping pace. Heres how

October2026

McKinsey

&Company

GeopoliticsPractice

Astheworldorderturns,leadingcompaniesare

keepingpace.Here'show

Leadingcompaniesaretrackingsixemergingpatternsofgeopoliticalchangeandrealigningtheirbusinessestoachieveresilience,seize

growth,andbuildcompetitiveadvantage.

byJanMischke,MattWatters,andShubhamSinghal

AsformerUSSecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRiceobservedatthe2026AspenSecurity

Forum,"I'mveryoftenasked,iswhatwe'reseeingarevolutionoranevolution?AndIsaythatarevolutioniswhathappenswhenyoudon'tseeanevolutioncoming."1

Forageneration,companiesandgovernmentshaveoperatedinabroadlypredictable

environmentofopenmarketsanddeepglobalintegration.Thatworlddeliveredenormous

growth,butitalsoleftbehindaseriesofimbalances,amongthem:awideningUS-China

tradegap,deepdependenceonforeignsuppliersforgoodscriticaltonationalsecurity,andintensifyingcompetitionforthesamelimitedsetofgrowtharenas.Tocorrectsomeofthese

imbalances,governmentsaretakinganincreasinglyactiveroleintheglobaleconomy,primarilythroughrapidexpansionofindustrialpolicy,tariffsandtradebarriers,sanctionsandexport

controls,andothermeasuresthatcandistorttrade.

Asgovernmentsactinthenationalinterest,therulesthatcompanieshaveoperatedunderfor

decadesarebeingrewritten.Manyhavefoundtheuncertaintyunnerving.Mosthavetakenactiontomitigaterisk-andevenpursueopportunity.Leadingcompaniesaretryingtounderstand

theirexposureatboththeproductandcountrylevel,foreachaspectoftheirbusiness;thespeedatwhichtheycanadjust;andthecostsassociatedwithdoingthat.Indeed,thesecompaniesareturningtheirunderstandingofsixpatternsillustratinggeopolitics'impactontradeand

competitionintotheirownnewplaybooksforgrowth.

Globalizationisnotinretreat—tradeisreconfiguringaccordingto

geopoliticallogic

Tradeisstillgrowing,butthegeopoliticaldistancetraveledbytradeisfalling:Globalgoodstradegrew6.5percentin2025,outpacingglobalGDPgrowthof5.4percentevenasUStariffsreachedtheirhighestlevelin80years?Buthowmuchthattradetraversesgeopoliticalboundaries,

orgeopoliticaldistance,isshrinking.Since2017,thegeopoliticaldistanceofglobaltradehasdeclinedbyaround8percent,andbynearly13percentfortheUnitedStates,evenas

geographicdistancehasgrownslightly(Exhibit1).3

Countriesaretradingmorewithgeopoliticallyalignedpeersandtradinglesswithdistantones.Forexample,China'sshareofUSimportsfell4.4percentagepointsbetween2024and

2025-morethantriplethedeclinerecordedbetween2017and2024.Meanwhile,USimportsfromAssociationofSoutheastAsianNationseconomiesandothercountriesinAsia-Pacificrosesignificantly.

1"TheStateoftheWorld2026,"AspenSecurityForum,July14,2026.

2"Geopoiticsandthegeometryofglobaltrade:2026update,"McKinsey

Globallnstitute,March

19,2026.

3"Geopoliticsandthegeometryofglobaltrade:2026update,"McKinsey

Globallnstitute,March

19,2026.

Astheworldorderturns,leadingcompaniesarekeepingpace.Here'show2

Exhibit1

Tradeisgrowing,butgoodsaretravelingshortergeopoliticaldistances.

Totalgoodstrade,$trillion

10-

Geographicdistanceoftrade,

thousandkm

6,000

4,000

2,000

00020052010201520202025¹

Geopoliticaldistanceoftrade,0-10scale

4-

Annualized

change,%

2017-24

4.7

2024-256.5

2017-242024-25

0.20.3

2017-242024-25

-0.9-1.2

togetherallowtheinferenceofmorethan90%ofglobaltradeusingnationalcustomsdata.Annualized2025valuesarebasednavailableyear-to-datedata,

12025siftsareesimatedbasedonagroupoflargeeconomies(AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations,Brazil,China[mainlandj,EU,India,andUS),which

d:Atlsytot;aEcPhI;rrgSautt;rriys.ta;GeneralAdministrationofCustomsofthePeople'sRepublicofChina;GovernmentoflndiaMinistryof

CommerceandIndustry;UNComtrade;UNDigitalLibrary;USCensusBureau;Voetendata,2017;McKinseyGlobalInstituteanalysis

McKinsey&Company

China,seeingitsaccesstotheUSmarketdecline,ispivotingtobecomethe“factorytothe

factories."In2025,China'sexportsofconsumergoodsfellforthefirsttimesince2019,while

exportsofintermediateandcapitalgoods-themachineryandinputsothercountriesneed

fortheirmanufacturing-roseby$175billion,muchofitflowingtofast-growingproductionhubs

inlower-incomeregions.

Asglobaltradeisincreasinglyinformedbygeopoliticallogic,companiesshouldanticipate

changingpatternsintheirproductflowsandsupplychains.Theseshiftsintradewillcreate

opportunitiesinsomecorridorsanddisruptionandchallengesinothers.Companiesthatrealignthemselveswithgrowingtradecouldmaximizeupsideandminimizedisruption.Forexample,

USimportsfromVietnam,oneofthefastest-growingcorridors,rose42percentin2025tonearly$195billionastradewasreroutedawayfrommoregeopoliticallydistantpartners.4Thereis

anopportunityforcompaniesthatarealreadytradinginthiscorridortocapturenewsourcesofvalueandastrongsignalofpotentialgrowthfornewcompaniesjustenteringthecorridor.

4"Vietnam,"OfficeoftheUSTradeRepresentative,accessedAugust2026.

Astheworldorderturns,leadingcompaniesarekeepingpace.Here'show3

Governmentsareactivelyopeningnewcorridors,too:IndiaandtheUnitedKingdomstruckabilateraltradeagreementin2025,andtheEuropeanFreeTradeAssociationsignedanewpactwiththeMercosurbloc.Bothagreementsarelikelytocreatemeaningfulopportunitiesfor

companiestocapturevalueinthoserespectivecorridors.5

Globalfootprints,onceseenprimarilyasasourceofcostorcomplexity,areagainbeing

consideredasourceofstrength.Theyimbuecompanieswiththekindofgeographicagilitytheyneedtominimizedisruptionandmoveswiftlytoexpandorenternewcorridors.Leading

companiesareleveragingtheirglobalfootprintsandinvestinginagilitytosource,sell,andmanufactureacrossawiderrangeofmarketsthanlessagilecompanies.

Buildingthatagilitymeansscopingrelevantdisruptionscenarios,quantifyingthevalueatstakefortheorganization,compilinganecosystemofinsightsbygatheringregionalintelligence,

consideringjointventuresoroptioncontracts,buildingredundantsourcing,andmuchmore.Inthisway,leaderscanmovetheirenterpriseupthe“tolerancecurve”tooperateingeopoliticallydistantenvironmentsratherthanretreatfromthem.

Agilityintoday'sgeopoliticalenvironmentmeansthatgeopoliticaldisruptionfromsomeis

opportunityforothers.Forexample,recentdisruptionsintheMiddleEastmayhaverattled

operationsformanyoftheregion'slargestaircarriers,butTurkishAirlineswasableto

leverageitsscenarioplanningtoquicklyreallocatecapacitytowardAsianandEuropeanroutes.ItexpandeditsseatoccupancyinAsiaby18percentandcapturedthelargestsecond-quarterloadfactorinitshistoryasdemandshiftedelsewhere.6

Countriesareprioritizingsecurityincriticalproductsandallowingmarketstoleadinothers

Globaltradeisnowgovernedbytwodifferentlogics.Onecoverswhatwecall“Achilles'heel”

products,wheregeopoliticallogicismorelikelytoprevailandstatesaremorelikelytoactivelysecuresupplychainswithlessemphasisoncost.Theothercoverstherestofproducttrade,

whichisprimarilygovernedbymarketlogic:price,speed,andqualitystillrule.Leadingcompaniesarelearningtorunbothplaybookssimultaneously.

Acrossmajoreconomies,one-quartertoone-thirdofmanufacturedimportsqualifyasAchilles'heelproducts-orgoodsexposedtoatleasttwoofthefollowingthreedependencies:criticaltonationalsecurity,concentratedamongahandfulofsuppliers,orsourcedfromgeopolitically

5"HistoricUK-IndiaFreeTradeAgreementisnowineffect,"UKDepartmentforBusinessandTrade,July₁7,2026;"EFTA-MERCOSURFreeTradeAgreement-Jointstatement,"Mercosur,September16,2025

6GrahamDunn,"TurkishAirlines'profitsdownasfuelcostsalmostdoubleinsecond-quarter,"FlightGlobal,August5,2026;WilliamSellars,"TurkishAirlinestightensfocusinresponsetoIranwar,"ArabianGulfBusinessInsight,May14,2026.

Astheworldorderturns,leadingcompaniesarekeepingpace.Here'show4

distantpartners?Rareearthmagnets,forinstance,meetallthreedependenciesfortheUnitedStatesandEurope.InApril2025,China'sexportlicensingonsevenrareearthsresultedina

roughly75percentreductioninmagnetexports,idlingproductionlinesacrossEuropethatwereseveralstepsremovedfromanydirectpurchasefromChina8

Thesedependenciescanbestructural:TheUnitedStatesismorethan70percentimport-reliantforroughly25criticalminerals,and,inthespecificcaseofrareearthmagnets,itsimportsfromChinaexceedthecombinedexportsofthesameproductfromallothereconomies(Exhibit2).9

Exhibit2A

Globalmarketscomewithdependencies,notallofwhicharedeemedacceptable.

USimportsofmanufacturedgoods,bytradedependency,2025,$billion

Shareofmanufacturedgoods

importswithtradedependencies,%

Atleast1dependency

2-3

dependencies

AII3

dependencies

71

25

Allmanufacturingimports

$3.0trillion

650

470

140

630

140

Geopoliticallydistant²

$400billion

Concentrated³

$1.4trillion

Critical

$1.3trillion

CriticalproductsaredefinedaccordingtotheDraftHarmonizedSystem(HS)CodeListofCriticalSupplyChains.

GeopoiticadstancesarecalculatedbasedonUNGeneralAssemblyvotingpatternsfrom2005-22andweightedbyshareofimports.GeopliticalldistantproductsaredefinedasthosewithanaveragegeopoliticaldistancefromtheUSexceeding7ona0-10scale,t0beingIran.

ConcentratedproductsaredefinedasthosewithaHerfindahl-HirschmanIndex(HHI)exceeding3,000.

Note:Figuresonlyincludetradeinmanufacturedgoods(linkedtoNAICScodes31-33),roundedtoatleastthenearest$10billion.Figuresmaynotsumtototals,duetorounding.

Source:USInternationalTradeCommission;McKinseyGlobalInstituteanalysis

McKinsey&Company

7"RampingupmanufacturinginAmerica?,"McKinseyGlobalInstitute,May21,2026.

8ChristinaAmannandLaurieChen,"China'srareearthsareflowingagain,butnotfreely,"Reuters,June29,2025.

9Mineralcommoditysummaries2026,USGeologicalSurvey,February2026;"UnitedStatesPermanentmagnetsandarticles

intendedtobecomeimportsbycountry,"WorldIntegratedTradeSolution,accessedAugust2026.

Astheworldorderturns,leadingcompaniesarekeepingpace.Here'show5

Astheworldorderturns,leadingcompaniesarekeepingpace.Here'show6

Exhibit2B

Technologyimportsandpharmaceuticalsaresubjecttothehighesttradedependencies.

SelectUSimports,bytypeoftradedependency,2025

Geopolitically

ImportsCriticalConcentrated²distant³

Laptops

Smartphones

Rareearthmagnets

Semiconductors

GLP-1drugs

Solarpanels

Toughenedglass

Tricycles

Videogameconsoles

Packagedmedicines

Vaccines

Semiconductormanufacturingmachinery

Pullovers

Vacuumcleaners

Smallpassengervehicles

Beer

CriticalproductsaredefinedaccordingtotheDraftHarmonizedSystem(HS)CodeListofCriticalSupplyChains.

2ConcentratedproductsaredefinedasthosewithaHerfindahl-HirschmanIndex(HHI)exceeding3,000.

GeopliticldistancesarecalculatedbasedonUNGeneralAsemblyvotingatternsbetween2005and2022andweightedbyshareoimports.GeopoliticallydistantproductsaredefinedasthosewithanaveragegeopoliticaldistancefromtheUSexceeding7ona0-10scale,10beingIran.

Source:USInternationalTradeCommission;McKinseyGloballnstituteanalysis

McKinsey&Company

China'sadvantagestartsupstreaminrefining,whereitleadsprocessingofnearlyeverycriticalmineral(Exhibit3).Ithasleveragedthispositionthroughexportcontrolsonselectedminerals.10Becauserefiningcapacityisdifficulttobuildquickly,securingsupplyislikelytorequiremanaged interdependenceratherthanfullself-sufficiencyinthenearterm.

ThecompaniesthatsawthiscomingactedearlytosecuretheirsuppliesofcriticalAchilles'heelproducts.Hyundaistockpiledayear'ssupplyofrareearthelementsafterChina's2025exportcontrols!1AndToyota,havingdiversifieditschipsupplierswellbeforethe2021shortage,keptitsNorthAmericanplantsrunningatupto90percentofcapacitywhilepeerscutproduction.2

10Tae-YoonKim,ShobhanDhir,AmritaDasgupta,andAlessioScanziani,"Withnewexportcontrolsoncriticalminerals,supplyconcentrationrisksbecomereality,"IEA,October23,2025.

"HeekyongYang,"HyundaiMotorhasarareearthsstockpilethatcanlastaboutayear,sourcesays,"Reuters,June10,2025.

2EamonBarrett,"HowToyota'sunorthodoxsupplychainmodelhelpedittopGMinUScarsales,"Fortune,January5,2022.

Exhibit3

Chinadominatescritical-mineralrefining.

Largestmarketshareofglobalminingandrefiningforselectcriticalmineralsamonglargesteconomies,2025ormostrecentyearavailable,%

■Advancedeconomies■China■Emergingmarketsanddevelopingeconomies

Mining

Refining

Graphite(natural)China

78

China

95

ManganeseSouthAfrica

38

China

95

RareearthsChina

69

China

92

CobaltDRCongo

74

China

78

LithiumAustralia

2

China

70

AluminumGuinea

34

China

61

CopperChile

23

China

43

NickelIndonesia

67

Indonesia

37

Source:InternationalEnergyAgency;USGeologicalSurveyMineralCommoditySummaries2026;RawMaterialsInformationSystem,EuropeanCommission;McKinseyGlobalInstituteanalysis

McKinsey&Company

Governmentsarehelpingtounderwritethisshift.InJuly2025,theUSDepartmentofDefensetooka15percentequitystakeinrareearthminerandprocessorMPMaterials,withaten-yearpricefloorandacommitmenttobuy100percentofoutputfromanewmagnetfacility.³TheUSgovernmentfollowedwithsimilarequitystakesinKoreaZinc,TrilogyMetals,USARareEarth,andVulcanElements.14

BeyondAchilles'heelproducts,tradecorridorsarelikelytokeepgrowingbasedoneconomics.Companies'decisionstoenternewmarketswillincreasinglydependontheirexistingfootprintandoperationsandwhetherthereareestablishedorstrengtheningtradecorridorsbetweentwocountries.Fortheirpart,topcompaniesarerewiringthemselvesnotjusttooptimizecostsbut

alsotobroadentheirfootprintssotheycanshifttomorefavorabletradecorridors.Forinstance,

3“MPMaterialsannouncestransformationalpublic-privatepartnershipwiththeDepartmentofDefensetoaccelerateU.S.rareearthmagnetindependence,"MPMaterialspressrelease,July10,2025.

4KathrynWatsonandEleanorWatson,"FederalgovernmenttotakeownershipstakeinTrilogyMetals,whichhasAlaskan

miningclaims,"CBSNews,October6,2025;"Trumpadministrationandprivateinvestorssignoffon$1.4billiondealwithrareearthstartups,"AssociatedPress,November4,2025;AhnSung-mi,"Washington-backedprojectaimstosecurestrategic

metalsamidChinaexportcurbs,"KoreaHerald,December15,2025;"TheDepartmentofCommerce'sCHIPSprogramfinalizesdefinitiveagreementwithUSARareEarthforupto$1.6billiontosupportthecompany's'mine-to-magnet'strategy,"NationalInstituteofStandardsandtechnology,USDepartmentofCommerce,June3,2026.

Astheworldorderturns,leadingcompaniesarekeepingpace.Here'show7

Astheworldorderturns,leadingcompaniesarekeepingpace.Here'show8

FoxconnisregionalizingAlserverassemblyintoMexicofortheNorthAmericanmarketratherthanconcentratingitinChina.5Thecompany'smoveisnotdefensive;leadersareplacingbigbetsonwheregrowthisheading.

Investmentcompetitivenessisanationalprioritycreatinggrowthopportunitiesforcompanies

Theshiftinggeopoliticalsandshavehighlightedthelackofinvestmentinstrategicindustriessuchasenergyandsemiconductors.McKinseyresearchshowsthatnetproductiveinvestmentin

theUnitedStatesandEuropehasstagnatedoverthepast30years,whileChina'sinvestmenthasboomed,keepingpacewithGDPgrowth.6McKinseyGlobalInstitute(MGI)research

comparingtensampleinvestmentcasesinfuture-shapingindustriesfoundthattheUnitedStatesandEuropehavelevelizedbreak-evencoststhatare50to300percenthigherthanthoseofgloballeaders,notablyChina.

Thereareavarietyofleversthatbothstatesandcompaniescanpulltoaddressthisconcern.

Capitalexpenditurescanbeindustrialized,acceleratedinpermittingandexecution,and

mademoreefficient.R&Dcanbeparallelized,andregulatoryoversightcanbereformed.Energysuppliescanbesignificantlyexpanded,andlaborproductivitycanbesuperchargedby

deployingAI.Companiescantakestepstoaddresssomeofthese,but,ultimately,addressingthestructuralchallengesbehindthecompetitivenesschallengeswillrequirecoordinated

publicandprivateaction.

Somegovernmentsareusingindustrialpolicytoleveltheplayingfieldintheshortterm:The

numberofglobalindustrialpolicyactionsincreasedby390percentbetween2017and2024.7Chinahasbeenthemostaggressiveproponentofindustrialpolicy,usingittoboostdomesticfirmstoglobaldominance:Forinstance,Huaweihasreceivedanestimated$75billioninstatesupportsincethe1990sandisnowtheworld'slargesttelecomequipmentsupplier:18

Chinaislikelytodeploytrillionsofdollarsinindustrialpolicyoverthecomingdecades.9In

response,theUnitedStatesandEuropehavelaunchedtheirowninitiativestosupportimportantsectorsoftheirrespectiveeconomies20TheUnitedStateshascommittednearly$40billioninCHIPSActgrantsandloansandtakensome$27billionofequitypositionsinstrategicsectors?1EuropelaunchedtheEuropeanChipsAct,withabout€3.3billioninfunding.Moreover,Europe'sNet-ZeroIndustryActandtheCriticalRawMaterialsActbothofferstreamlinedpermitsand

priorityaccesstofinancingincentives.

Leadingcompaniesaretreatingtheseprogramsasagenuineinputtocapitalstrategy,notanafterthought.Micronsecured$6.4billionindirectfundingtobuildfabsinIdahoandNew

York,anchoringa$250billionUSinvestmentplanthrough2035.Separately,Micronopened

15AmyStillman,"Foxconn'smega-AlplantinMexicotobereadyinayeardespiteTrumptariffs,"Bloomberg,March4,2025.

16"Catalyzingcompetitiveness:Whereinvestmenthappensandwhy,"McKinseyGloballnstitute,June30,2026.

"CindyLevy,MattWatters,ShubhamSinghal,andJameslvers,"Fromprotectiontopromotion:Thenewageofindustrialpolicy,"McKinsey,May16,2025.

Chuin-WeiYap,"StatesupporthelpedfuelHuawei'sglobalrise,"WalStreetJournal,December25,2019.

19GerardDiPippo,llariaMazzocco,andScottKennedy,Redink:EstimatingChineseindustrialpolicyspendingincomparativeperspective,CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,May23,2022.

20DanielGarcia-Macia,SiddharthKothari,andYifanTao,IndustrialpolicyinChina:Quantificationandimpactonmisallocation,InternationalMonetaryFundworkingpapernumber2025/155,August2025.

2Semiconductors:nformationonprojectsfundedtostrengthenU.S.supplychain,USGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,December11,2025;EvaRoytburg,"TheU.S.governmentinvested$27billionincorporatestakes.Goodluckfindingthem,"Fortune,July26,2026.

Astheworldorderturns,leadingcompaniesarekeepingpace.Here'show9

a$2.75billionassemblyfacilityinIndia,withnationalandstategovernmentsfundingupto

70percentofthecost?²Intelconverted$8.9billionofCHIPSandSecureEnclavegrantsintoaroughly10percentUSgovernmentequitystake,tradingdilutionforcapitalcertaintytokeepbuildinginOhio²³AndinGermany,Infineoncapturedroughly€900millioninstatefundingforitsnewfabinDresden?2

Companieshaveopportunitiestocaptureindustrialpolicyincentivesacrossmultiplegeographies,whichcanhelpthemunderwritesignificantcapitalprojects,easebalancesheets,andcompete

moreeffectivelyabroad.Whenconsideringsignificantcapitaldecisions,leadersshouldidentifypotentiallyrelevantindustrial-policyincentivesavailableincurrentgeographiesaswellas

exploratoryones.

Balancesheetsandeconomicpathwaysarediverging,reshapingthecostofcapitalandgrowthoutlook

Capitalisflowingfasterthantrade,makingitausefulearlysignalofwheretradeisheadednext.Foreigndirectinvestment(FDI)isoneimportantmetricofcapitalflows,andthegeopolitical

distancetraveledbyFDIhasfallenatroughlytwicethepaceoftradeitselfsince201725

Companies'recentinvestmentdecisionsreflectthisshift:TaiwanSemiconductorManufacturingCompany(TSMC)isupgradingitsfabinKumamoto,Japan-originallyplannedforolder-

generationchips-toadvancedthree-nanometerproduction,andhasframedthemoveasawaytodistributeadvancedmanufacturingamongtrustedpartners.?6Schaeffler,theGermanauto

partsandindustrialssupplier,iscommitting€100millionayeartoIndiaoverthenextfiveyears,withCEOKlausRosenfeldexplicitlycitinggeopoliticalreliabilityastherationalefordeepeningtieswithIndia.?7

Morebroadly,nationalbalancesheetsareunderstrain.USpublicdebtisroughly120percentofGDP,andinterestpaymentsnowexceeddefensespending?8China'scorporatedebtisabout170percentofGDP,roughlydoubletheglobalaverage.29Europehascapitalbutlacksan

integratedcapitalmarket,makingitmoredifficulttomarshalcapitalatscaleandboostgrowth.MGI's2026updateontheglobalbalancesheetshowsthatglobalassetsreachedarecord

$1.8quadrillionin2025,andglobalhouseholdwealthreachedarecord$570tillion,butonly20percentofhouseholdwealthgrowthcamefromrealinvestment.Mostweregainsonpaperasvaluationsrosealongsidedebt.IntheUnitedStates,equityvaluationsstoodat2.4times

22"MicronandTrumpadministrationannounceexpandedU.S.investmentsinleading-edgeDRAMmanufacturingandR&D,"Micronpressrelease,June12,2025;"MicronCelebratesOpeningofIndia'sFirstSemiconductorAssemblyandTestFacility,"Micronpressrelease,February28,2026.

23AdityaSoni,DavidShepardson,AndreaShalal,andMaxA.Cherney,"UStotake10%equitystakeinIntel,inTrump'slatestcorporatemove,"Reuters,August22,2025.

24"EUapproves920millioneuroGermanaidforlnfineonchipsplant,"Reuters,February20,2025.

25"TheFDIshake-up:Howforeigndirectinvestmenttodaymayshapeindustryandtradetomorrow,"McKinseyGlobalInstitute,September2l,g053.-na2n6o"tMreCCcOipproductioninJapan,investmentreportedat$17bilion,"Reuters,February4,2026;TsengYun-tingandShihHsiu-chuan,"TaiwangovernmentapprovesTSMC's3nmupgradeforsecondJapanfab,"FocusTaiwan,

March31,2026.

27ShubhangiBhatia,"Indiaisareliablepartnerforusamidglobalchallenges,saysSchaefflerCEO,"EconomicTimesAuto,

May29,2025.

28"Grossfederaldebtaspercentofgrossdomesticproduct,"FederalReserveEconomicData,FederalReserveBankofSt.LouisandUSOfficeofManagementandBudgetandFederalReserveBankofSt.Louis,2025;Finalmonthlytreasurystatement,

fiscalyear2025,USDepartmentoftheTreasury,October16,2025.

29"Theglobalbalancesheet2026:Imbalanceanddivergence,"McKinseyGloballnstitute,July23,2026.

thenetassetvalueofallfirmsattheendof2025,asearningsedgedtohistorichighsrelativetoGDPandinvestedcapital.

Therearethreewaystoaddresstheseimbalances:growoutofthem,inflatethemaway,orresetassetvaluesanddebt.Eachpathholdshighstakesforcorporationsandindividuals.Forthe

UnitedStates,MGlestimatesthatupto$160,000inpercapitawealthwillbeonthelineby2033:

Aproductivityaccelerationpathwouldadd$65,000inpercapitawealth,alongwithstronggrowthabove3percentannually,whileabalancesheetresetwouldinsteaderodewealthby$95,000andengenderalostdecade.

Meanwhile,China'shouseholdwealthcouldexpandbyasmuchashalfunderaproductivity-

drivenscenariowithcontinuedrapidgrowth.Conversely,itcouldgrowmoreslowlythanithasinagenerationifstructuralreformstoboostconsumptiondonotmaterializeandthecountry

continuesitsproperty-ledbalancesheetreset.Europecouldfaceadecadeofsluggishgrowtharound1percentandlowinterestratesoraccelerateifitmanagestostepupinvestment.Each

region'spathtoabetteroutcomerequiresadifferentlever:TheUnitedStateswillneedtosavemore,Europewillneedtoinvestmore,andChinawillneedtoconsumemore-eachonthe

orderof3to7percentofGDP30

Inherently,thesebalancesheetpathwayswillaffectcorporatestrategyandinvestmentdecisionsdifferentlyineachregionascorrectionsoccur.Leaderswhotracktherightsignpostsineach

region-USfiscaldeficitandearningsprojections,Europeanpro-investmentreforms,andChineseconsumptiongrowthandpro-consumptionpolicies-willseewhichcorrection,orcombinationofthem,istakingholdbeforeitshowsupineconomicdata.

AIisamajorgeopoliticalconcern,withleadersdiversifyingaccesstomodelsandinfrastructure

Alisoneofthecriticalareasaroundwhichglobaltradeflowsareconcentrating.Tradein

Al-relatedgoods-suchassemiconductorsanddatacentercomponents-grewbynearly

40percentin2025andaccountedforathirdofallgrowthinglobalgoodstrade.Thescale

ofinvestmentreflectsthedegreetowhichAlhasbecomeahotlycontestedarena.ThecombinedcapitalexpenditureandR&Dofeightleadingtechnologyfirmsrosefromroughly$25billion

in2005toabout$722billionin202531

TheUnitedStatesleadsinfrontierAlmodeldevelopmentandiswideningitsadvantageinAl

infrastructure.In2026,majorUStechnologycompaniesareonpaceforroughly$680billionincapitalspending,withasignificantsharedirectedtowardAlinfrastructure.USprivateinvestmentinAlis