为什么竞争和产业政策应该共存

Why

competition

andindustrialpoliciesshouldco-exist

Policypaper

Tableofcontents

Recommendationsandbestpracticesataglance 4

Introduction 5

Definingcompetitionpolicyandindustrialpolicy 7

Interplaybetweencompetitionpolicyandindustrialpolicy 8

Impactoftheinterplayofindustrialpoliciesandcompetitionpoliciesontheprivatesector 9

ICCrecommendationsindetail 11

Bestpracticesforintegratingindustrialpolicyconsiderationsincompetitionlawenforcement 15

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Recommendationsand

bestpracticesataglance

Giventheimportanceofcompetitionpolicyandlawinalmostallcountries

andthesurgeofsovereigntyasadriverofindustrialpolicy,ICCbelievesthatgovernmentsandcompetitionauthoritiesmustensureafruitfulco-existenceofcompetitionpolicyandindustrialpolicy.

ICCmakessevenrecommendationstoachievethisgoal:

1.Competitionauthoritiesmustbeindependent.

2.Competitionauthoritiesmustbetransparentandopentoengagement.

3.Competitionauthoritiesshouldbeabletoissuenon-bindingopinionstogovernmentabouttheimpactofnewindustrialpolicyprojects.

4.Governmentsorparliamentsmustbeabletoadaptsomefeaturesofthecompetitionpolicy.

5.Theinstrumentsofindustrialpoliciesshouldobeyrulesfixedbyparliamentsbutbecontrolledbyindependentauthorities.

6.Theinternationalimbalancescreatedbyindustrialpolicyshouldideallybekeptincheckbytheaboverecommendations.

7.Transparencyandaccountabilityinsubsidyregimesshouldbeenhanced.

Withinthisframework,thefollowingbestpracticescouldbeusefulinadvancingthedebates:

Craftingpro-competitive“green”and“digital”industrialstrategiesEnhancingcompetitionpolicyglobally

Reconciling“nationalchampion”narrativeswithrobustmergercontrolRestructuringpost-crisissupporttopreservestructuralcompetitiveness

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Introduction

Thetensionsbetweencompetitionpolicyandindustrialpolicy

havebeendiscussedfordecades.Itwasoftenviewedasa

confrontationbetweenatoolappliedobjectivelyandalmost

mechanically(competitionlaw,ratherthancompetitionpolicy),

aimingatprotectingthegoodfunctioningofthemarkets,while

beingagnosticaboutthestrategicoutcomes,andadiscretionarypolicyusedbygovernmentstopromotepredeterminedstrategicgoalsexante.Formanyyears,theconversationaround

competitionandindustrialpolicyhasbeenframedasazero-sumdebate.Advocatesofthelatterhaveoftenaccusedtheformerofstandinginthewayofnationalstrategieswhileadvocatesoftheformerhaveaccusedindustrialpolicyofharmingmarketsand

pickingwinners.

Thisbinaryviewdoesnotreflectthereality.Competitionlaw

isnotbeingcreatedinapoliticalvacuumandhasrarelybeen

appliedmechanically.Evenifcompetitionauthoritiesare

technical,regulatorybodies,theyhaveamarginofdiscretionin

theprioritisationoftheirworkandintheinterpretationofthelawtheyarecompetenttoimplement.Authoritiesalsoneedtobe

responsivetotheprioritiesofgovernmentsorcitizens’concerns.Authoritiescanusetheirpowersinwaysthatgobeyondwhat

wasenvisagedbythelegislators,likeusingthepressurecaused

byaninvestigationtopersuadecompaniestochangetheirways,withouthavingtoreachaformaldecision.

Moreover,thecharacteristicsofeachcompetitionlawregime

havebeenpoliticallychosen,whichisapoliticalchoiceand

reflects(amongothers)industrialpolicychoices,sometimes

extensively,othertimesmoremarginally.Forinstance,the

SouthAfricancompetitionregimeiswellknownforrequiring

thecompetitionauthoritytotakeintoaccounttheinterests

ofhistoricallydisadvantagedcommunitieswhenassessinga

merger.TheEuropeanUnion’sDigitalMarketsAct,adoptedin

2022,expandedtheEuropeanCommission’scompetitiontoolkit,reflectingthedecisionthatonesectoroftheeconomyshould

beconstrainedbyexanteruleswhiletherestoftheeconomy

couldbegovernedbyanexpostverificationofcompetition

lawcompliance.Thisalsoindicatesan“industrial”approachofcompetitionpolicy.ThecriteriaforevaluatingaconcentrationinChinaareessentiallyusualcompetitioncriteriabuttheyincludetheconcentrationimpacton“technologicalprogress”.

Therefore,eveninanunchangingworld,understandingthe

tensionsbetweenthetwopolicyareascannotbeunderstoodbyapplyingasimplisticanalyticalgrid.Theanalysisshouldinclude

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theextenttowhichcompetitionauthoritiestakenon-competition(industrialpolicy)issuesinto

account,thediscretiontheyenjoy,andwhatkindofchecksandbalancesshouldapply.Theimplicitpoliticalchoicesthatgoverneachcompetitionlawframeworkcouldbeshowcasedanddiscussed.Fromthepointofviewoftheprivatesector,thesediscussionscouldleadtoamoreholisticapproachofthepositionsadoptedinrelationtocompetitionorrelevantindustrialpolicyreforms.

However,thegeopoliticalandgeo-economicenvironmentthatbusinessesoperateinisincreasinglyaffectedbyfragmentation,tradetensions,aretreatfrommultilateralismandfromtheruleoflaw.

Tariffs,localisationrequirements,domesticincentivesandretaliatorymeasureshavebecome

widespreadtoolsofeconomicpolicy,negativelyaffectingbusinessesandconsumers.These

developmentsreflectabroaderreorientation:tradepolicyhasbecomeacentraltoolintherenewedfocusonindustrialpolicybypolicymakers,usedtoreinforcevariouseconomicandpolitical

goals,includingdomesticproductionobjectives,protectionofstrategicsectorsfromexternal

dependencies,andlong-termgoalssuchasdecarbonisationanddigitalleadership.Inaddition,competitionauthoritiesareunderpressuretoalsoaddresssomeofthesetensions,increasinglyfacingdirectpoliticalinterventionintheirday-to-daywork.

Whilecompetitionenforcementisdesignedtosafeguardmarketopennessandensurealevel

playingfield,authoritiesareincreasinglyconfrontedwithgovernmentinstrumentsthatareselectiveordiscriminatorybydesignandaredrivenbydomesticstrategicconsiderations.Inthiscontext,

itisevenlessviabletotreattradepolicy,industrialpolicy,andcompetitionpolicyasoperatingininstitutionalorconceptualsilos.

TheInternationalChamberofCommerce(ICC),theworld’sbusinessorganisation,considersthatbothindustrialpolicyandcompetitionpolicy(whichincludesthedesignofcompetitionlawanditsenforcement)matter,andtheyshouldco-exist.

ICCadvocatesforopentraderelations

betweencountriesbutalsoacknowledges

thattheworldisincreasinglyfragmentedandsubjecttoexogenousshocks.Inthiscontext,itisunderstandablethatgovernmentsfocuson

resilience,sovereignty,andcompetitivenessoftheirowneconomy.Industrialpolicyisthereforeareality.But,atthesametime,competition

isthemainengineofgrowth,innovationand

consumerswelfare.Itcanhelptocreatea

levelplayingfieldwithineachjurisdictionin

thisfragmentedworld.Whatremainsofthe

globalisedworldandmultilateralorganisations(whicharemuchmorerelevantthanwhatthepublicdebatemayindicate)shouldensurethatgrowth,investment,innovationandconsumerwelfarearemaximised.

Aboutthispaper

Againstthisbackdrop,ICChas

preparedthisnotetocontributeto

thiscriticaldebate.Bymappingthe

evolvingrelationshipbetweenthese

policyareas,thepapermakesconcrete

recommendationstohelpensurethat

industrialpolicyinterventionsremain

compatiblewithlegalcertaintyand

long-termmarketopenness.Indoingso,

ICCaimstosupportpolicymakersand

competitionauthoritiesindesigning

frameworksthatareeconomicallysound,practicallyimplementable,andresponsivetotheneedsandexpectationsofthe

businesscommunity.

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Definingcompetitionpolicyandindustrialpolicy

Competitionpolicyestablishesthegroundrulesforhowbusinessesengagewithconsumers

andwitheachother.Anation’scompetitionpolicyiscomposedofitscompetitionlawswhich

prohibitanti-competitivebehaviours,suchasagreementsbetweencompetitors,andregulate

marketconcentrationthroughmergercontrol.Arobustcompetitionpolicyiscriticaltoacountry’sprosperity1,asitpromoteslowerprices,increasesconsumerchoice,andfuelsinnovationand

economicproductivity.2

Inprinciple,competitionpolicyaimsmoreatsupportingahealthyeconomythanatachievingsomepreciseeconomicgoals,becauseitisessentiallybasedonasetofhorizontallawsthatapplytothewholeeconomy.However,whenonelooksindetailateachjurisdiction,thistheoreticalpresentationofcompetitionlawdoesnotalwaysapply.Asthetwoexamplesmentionedintheintroduction(SouthAfricanmergercontrolandtheDMAintheEU)show,thewayeverycompetitionpolicyisframedis

always,tosomeextent,areflectionofsomeindustrialorotherpolicy.

Industrialpolicyisbynomeansanewphenomenon–yetdefinitionsofthistermareoftenvague.Criscuoloetal.3defineitas“thesetofgovernmentinterventionsintendedtoimprovestructurallytheperformanceofthedomesticbusinesssector”,thusreferringtoawidesetofinstruments

usedbypolicymakersexcludingmacroeconomicpolicyorindustrialplanning.Ifweweretofocus,instead,ontheveryaimofindustrialpolicy,thedefinitioncouldbethatthesearethesetof

measuresthattargetspecificindustriesoreconomicactivitiestofostergrowth,competitiveness,orotherstrategicobjectives.

Anotherwell-establishedwaytocategoriseindustrialpoliciesisbydistinguishingbetweenbroad-based(so-called“horizontal”)measuresandselective(so-called“vertical”or“targeted”)measures.

Intheory,horizontalpoliciesareintendedtoapplyequallytoallfirmsregardlessoftheiractivity,

technologicalfocus,geographiclocationorownership.Inpractice,however,horizontalpolicies

cansometimesproduceoutcomessimilartotargetedpolicies—particularlywhentheirdesign

orexecutiondisproportionatelyfavours(orhinders)certainindustriesorbusinesses.Examplesofhorizontalinstrumentsincludetaxincentivesthatspurresearchanddevelopmentorencouragethegreentransitionofcompanies.Bycontrast,targetedpoliciesaredeliberatelylimitedtoa

specificsubsetofeconomicsectorsorregions,oftendeterminedbycriteriasuchastechnology,

fieldofoperation,orgeographicarea.Illustrationsofthisapproachrangefromspecialisedpublicprocurementaimedatselectedproductstolocalisedinterventionstailoredtotheneedsofa

particularplace.4

1Lang,J.(n.d.).www.Concurrences.Availableat:

/en/dictionary/competition-policy-89181

.

2Church,J.&Ware,R.(2000).IndustrialOrganization:AStrategicApproach.McGraw-Hill.

3Criscuolo,C.,Martin,R.,Overman,H.&VanReenen,J.(2022).AnIndustrialPolicyFrameworkforOECDCountries:OldDebates,NewPerspectives.OECDScience,TechnologyandIndustryPolicyPapers,No.127.OECDPublishing,Paris.Availableat:

https://doi.

org/10.1787/0002217c-en

.

4OECD(2024).Pro-CompetitiveIndustrialPolicy.OECDPublishing.Availableat:

/en/publications/pro-com-

petitive-industrial-policy_7c6b4708-en.html

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Interplaybetweencompetitionpolicyandindustrialpolicy

Agoodwaytoapproachthewaythetwopolicyareasinteractistoconsideroneofthesimplesthorizontalindustrialpolicydecisions:openinganeconomytointernationaltradeversusclosingittoprotectthenationalproducers.

Tosimplifythingsevenmore,letusconsiderahypotheticalcompetitionpolicywhosegoalisto

limitmarketconcentrationinsuchawaythatthereshouldbeatleastthreecompetitorsineach

market.Inanopenworld,thatcouldresultinthreeglobalgiantscompetingineachcountry.Ifthelocalindustrialpolicyclosesthemarkettoforeigncompanies,threelocalrivalswouldcompete.

Inthelattercase,therivalswillbesmallbyglobalstandards,whichcoulddeprivethemarket

ofthebenefitsofeconomiesofscale;costswillbehigh.Therefore,themaingoalthatthelocalcompetitionpolicyislookingtoachieve(mostsimplyexpressedinlowpricesandincreasedchoiceforconsumers)maybeunattainableduetothesmallsizeofthelocalcompetitors.Inaddition,

thesethreelocalcompanieswillnotbeconstrainedbythepotentialentryofforeignrivals.

Alternately,giventheclosureofthemarket,thiscountrycoulddecidetochangeitscompetition

policyandtoallowforahigherdegreeofconcentration,leadingtoonemonopolistabletobenefitfromeconomiesofscale,butwithalltheinconveniencesofmonopoly.

Thisultra-simplifiedmodelshowsthattheeffectivenessofcompetitionpolicycanbeaffectedbyindustrialpolicychoicesandthatanindustrialpolicycanbackfireifitdoesnottakethiseffectintoaccount.Realityisofcoursemuchmorecomplex,callingforasophisticatedapproach.

Eachpolicyshouldthereforebecalibratedbyconsideringitsimpactonanotherpolicy.Thebalanceisnoteasy,sincelegislatorsarenotalwaysabletocontrolforalleventualities.Forinstance,ifsome

countriesadoptrestrictionstointernationaltrade,othercountriesmayhavenootherchoicethantoacceptit,eveniftheyremainfreetoframetheirowncompetitionpolicy.Adaptingonepolicytotheotheronemaysometimesbeeasierthantoframethemjointly,but,forICC,ajointapproachisgenerallypreferable.

Targetedstateinterventionsleadtothesamekindofcomplexinterplay.Oneofthemaingoalsof

competitionpolicy,evenifitisnolongertheonlyone,istoprotectcompetition“onthemerits”.Anytargetedinstrumentwilloffersomeadvantagetooneorseveralmarketplayerswhomaythenbe

abletooutcompeteotheroneswithouthavingmore“merits”thanthem.Butsuchdistortionisrarelyisolated:therearesomanyrules,publicinstrumentsandotherfactorsthatmakethesituationof

everycompanysingularthatonetargetedinstrumentisrarelytheonlycauseofdistortion,whichdoesnotmaketheanalysisofinterplayeasy.

Itisalsoworthstressingthatcompetitionlawisnotadversarialtoindustrialpoliciesperse.Forinstance,the2024Draghireport5,preparedfortheEuropeanUnion,acknowledgesthecentralrolethatstrong

competitionpolicyandenforcementplayinenhancingthedriveforgrowthandinnovation.And

competitionauthoritiesarealreadyreceivingmessagesfromgovernmentswho,withoutchangingthelaw,requestneworrevisedapproachesinlinewiththeirgeneralgoals,suchastheUKgovernment’s

StrategicSteertotheCompetitionandMarketsAuthority(CMA),requiringtheCMA’sactivitiesto

supporttheUK’sgrowthandinnovationagenda.Thoserequestscanbemorespecific,liketherecent

5EuropeanCommission(2024),ThefutureofEuropeancompetitiveness.Availableat:

https://commission.europa.eu/topics/com-

petitiveness/draghi-report_en

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USExecutiveOrderrequestingantitrustinvestigationsofthefoodsupplychain,toinvestigatewhetherantitrustinfringementiscausingpriceincreasesorharmingthecountry’sinterests.

Thereareindicationsthatcompetitionauthoritiestakesuchmessagesintoaccountevenwhen

thelawremainsunchanged(seeCMA’sreactiontotheStrategicSteer6oritsincreasedopennesstowardbehaviouralremedies).Yettherearecertainlylimitstowhatcanbedonewithoutchangingcompetitionlaw,notablywherethereismeaningfuljudicialoversight(seethedifficultiesfaced

bytheUSadministrationunderJoeBidenincourtswhentryingtoimplementsomeofitsnewcompetitionpolicies).

ICCdrawsseveralconclusionsfromtheseobservations:

•Industrialpolicyandcompetitionpolicycannotbeanalysedandimplementedseparately,itisnecessarytoconsidertheirinterplay.

•Sincetherewillalwaysbesomeimpactofeachpolicyontheotherone,andsincebothare

useful.Asfarasindustrialpolicyisconcerned,thisusefulnessdependsonthecontext,the

politicalgoalsofgovernmentsandthetoolstheyuse.Governmentsanditsinstitutionsmustfindanappropriatebalancebetweenthetwoofthem.

•Adaptingcompetitionlawitself,notjustthewayitisenforced,couldmakesenseinsomesituations,butthatshouldbedoneprudently:competitionlawshouldcontinuetorestoneconomicscienceandevidence,and,giventhemagnitudeofthepenaltiesforabuseofcompetitionlaws,itsstabilityandpredictabilityareoftheutmostimportancetobusiness.

Impactoftheinterplayofindustrialpolicies

andcompetitionpoliciesontheprivatesector

Companiesmustbeabletocomplywithcompetitionlaws(e.g.prohibitions)andrespondto

incentives(prices,subsidiesetc.)thatareframedbypublicpolicies.Competitionpolicy’saimisto

ensurethatpricesarefixedatacompetitivelevel.However,sincecompetitionlawdoesnotoperateinavacuum,itcannotsimplybesaidthatanewindustrialpolicyinstrumentwillnecessarilycreateanon-competitiveincentive.

However,sinceindustrialpoliciesandcompetitionpoliciescreatedifferentkindsofprohibitionsandincentives,withdifferentgoalsinmind,itcanbesaidthat,atleast,thoseprohibitionsandincentiveseffectsmaynotnecessarilybealigned.

Forinstance,decarbonisationpoliciesinciteinvestorsandcompaniestomakeenergychoices

theywouldnothavemadeotherwise.Butcompanies,whenmakingthosechoices,areaware

ofcompetitionlawconstraints,andcanfeelthattheyarenotfreetofullyrespondtothe

decarbonisationincentives.Whencompaniesneedtopooltheirstrengthstoachieveadifficult

decarbonisationtarget,theyareawarethat,ingeneral,horizontalagreementsare,ifnotalways

illegal,atleastalwayspotentiallyhighlyrisky.Admittedly,competitionauthoritieshavenotremainedpassiveinfrontofthissituationandseveralauthoritieshaveissuedguidelinestohelpcompanies

framethesekindsofagreementsinawaythatremainscompliantwithcompetitionlaw.But,forcompanies,itisnotalwayseasytonavigatethosesoftlawconsiderations.Forinstance,some

6SeeU.K.Competition&Mkts.Auth.,PrioritisationPrinciples,CMA188,§3(Oct.30,2023),para1.3at

https://assets.publishing.

.uk/media/653f71b780884d0013f71cf4/CMA_Prioritisation_Principles__.pdf

.

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competitionauthorities(intheUK,intheNetherlands)aremoreopenthanothers(liketheEuropeanCommission)toconsideradecreaseofpollutantemissionthatonlybenefitstopeoplewhoarenottheconsumersoftheparties’products(knownas“outofmarket”benefits).

Anotherexampleiswhencompetitionpolicyisstable,ensuringthatstrongcompetitivepressure

existsbutwhenindustrialpolicyinvitesabruptchanges(seetheunpredictabilityofthesubsidies

toelectricvehicles,whichchangethecompetitiveadvantagesofcarmanufacturershavingmadedifferentstrategicchoices).

Thingsaremademoredifficultbythefactthatindustrialpoliciesandcompetitionpoliciesarealsoheterogeneousfromaninstitutionalpointofview.

First,theydonotnecessarilyapplytothesamegeographicarea,sothatthesamecompanycan

beimpactedbydifferentpolicies,especiallyrelevantinglobalmarkets.Onecompetitorcanreceiveasubsidy,forexampleinBrazil,andthencompetemorevigorouslyintheUnitedStatesagainst

competitorsthathavenotreceivedsuchasubsidy.

Second,inmanyjurisdictions,industrialpoliciesaredecidedbyparliamentsandgovernmentsand

mayevolveduetoshiftingpoliticalpriorities,whilecompetitionpolicyismorestableandgenerally

implementedbyindependentcompetitionauthoritiesandcourts.Thesecannotsimplyadaptto

governmentpriorities(eveniftheywantedto)becausetheyareboundbythesubstanceofthelaw

andmusttakeintoaccountthewaytheyarecontrolledbycourts.Admittedly,asalreadymentioned,therearefrequentinterventionsfrompoliticalpowersthatseektoinfluencecompetitionpolicyor

enforcement,yetchangingthesubstanceofcompetitionlawismoredifficultandoftenslowerthanchangestoindustrialpriorities.Thisisduetothefactthatcompetitionlawcanbeembeddedinlegalinstrumentswithmorelegalpower,likeintheEUwheretheverysubstanceofthelawisembedded

intheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,which,inpractice,isextremelydifficultto

change.And,itisalsotheresultoftheeconomicbasisofcompetitionlaw.Thelatterwouldloseitslegitimacyifitwerereframedwithoutconsideringthisrationale,evenifthatrationaleisnotperfect.

Asaresult,companiesmustprioritisecompetitionlawconstraints(becausetheyarestableand

thepenaltiesforbreachpotentiallyveryhigh)overindustrialpolicies,thatarelesssecureandmoresusceptibletochange.Italsomayleadpoliticianstoseecompetitionlawasanobstacletotheir

strategyandleadthemtoforgetthepositiveroleofcompetitionforahealthyeconomy.

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ICCrecommendationsindetail

2.Competitionauthoritiesmustbetransparentandopentoadvocacy.

C

4.Governmentsorparliamentsmustbeabletoadaptsomefeaturesofthecompetitionpolicy.

1.Competitionauthoritiesmustbeindependentauthorities.

6.Theinternationalimbalancescreated

byindustrialpolicyshouldbekeptincheck.

3.Competitionauthoritiesshouldbeabletoissuenon-bindingopinionsabout

newindustrialpolicyprojects.

7.Transparencyandaccountability

insubsidyregimesshouldbeenhanced.

5.Theregularlyusedinstruments

ofindustrialpoliciesshouldobeyrulesfixedbyparliamentsbutbecontrolledbyindependentauthorities.

ICCrecommendsthatgovernmentsaroundtheworldensurethatindustrialpolicyisas

pro-competitiveaspossibleanddoesnotdeprivecompetitionauthoritiesoftheirabilitytokeep

marketscompetitive.Atthesametime,governmentsandcompetitionauthoritiesmustensurethatantitrustenforcementdoesnotundermineindustrialpolicyinstruments’efficiency.Thatcouldbe

achievedbymakingthefollowingchoices:

1.Competitionauthoritiesmustbeindependentauthorities

Industrialpoliciesarepoliticallydriven,andthereforeinthehandsofgovernments.

Ifthesamehappensforcompetitionpolicy,itisunlikelythattherightbalancewillbeachieved.Acompetitionauthoritythatisfunctionallyindependentfromgovernmentwillbeableto

defendthestableprinciplesonwhichsuchpolicymustrestandactundertheruleoflawanddueprocess.Independenceneedstobeensuredandrespected.Independenceisguaranteedbyeffectivejudicialoversight,budgetaryindependenceandisolationfrompoliticalinfluence.Thecorollaryisthatindependentauthoritiesmustacttransparentlyandensuredueprocessintheexerciseoftheiractivitiesandbesubjecttomeaningfuljudicialreview.

However,independenceisnotenoughtoguaranteethattheapplicationofcompetitionlawwillnothinderotherlegitimateindustrialpolicies.Competitionlawcanevenbeanobstacleifauthoritiesarenotopentowhathappensaroundthem.Forthatreason,ICCunderstandswhysomejurisdictionsprefertheircompetitionauthoritiestobeunderdirectgovernment

authority.However,allconsidered,independenceishighlyrecommended,providedsuchopennesstodevelopmentsoutsidetheworldofcompetitionpolicyisstructured,

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2.Competitionauthoritiesmustbetransparentandopentoadvocacy

Competitionauthoritiesandotherpublicauthoritiesresponsibleforcompetitionpolicyineachcountryshouldbeopenforengagementwithcompanies,tradeassociations,consumerassociations,civilsocietyingeneralandacademia.

Thosecommentsshouldaddressthepossiblecompetitive(oranti-competitive)effectsofindustrialpolicyrulesandalsothepossibleobstaclestotheefficiencyofindustrialpolicycomingfromthemannerinwhichcompetitionlawiscurrentlyenforced.

Theopennessofcompetitionauthoritiesandotherpublicbodiesresponsibleforcompetitionpolicytoreceivecommentsfromcompanies,tradeassociations,civil

societyandacademiaregardingthepotentialcompetitiveoranti-competitiveeffects

ofindustrialpolicyrulesisessentialforfosteringmoreefficientandtransparentmarkets,

aswellasconfidenceinthecompetitionlawsystem,complianceandrespectfortherule

oflaw.Collaborativeinstrumentsthatenableactiveparticipationfromstakeholdersin

identifyingregulationsthatmayrestrictcompetitionmaketheregulatoryreviewprocess

moredemocraticandeffective.Byallowingprivatesectorrepresentativesandacademic

expertstohighlightrulesthatcouldcreatecompetitivedistortionsandexplaininvestment

incentives,aninstitutionalenvironmentisestablishedthatismoreconducivetosound

competitionpolicy,theearlydetectionofissuesandtheproposalofregulatoryadjustments.

Symmetrically,suchopennesswillallowcompetitionauthoritiestodetectasearlyas

possiblethenecessitytoadapttheirpractices,toissuerelevantguidelineswhenanewindustrialpolicyinstrumentisdevelopedortoengagewiththerelevantgovernment

ministriestoensurethatindustrialpolicyinstrumentsarecompetitivelyneutral.

Suchprocedurescanbestructuredinvariousforms–suchasordinary,extraordinaryorexofficioflows–ensuringbothflexibilityandcomprehensivenessinaddressingthedemandspresented.Inadditiontoincreasingthetransparencyofcompetitionadvocacyactions,

thisapproachstrengthenstheaccountabilityofpublicauthorities.

3.Competitionauthoritiesshouldbeabletoissuenon-bindingopinionsaboutnewindustrialpolicyprojects

Likeallotherpolicies,industrialpolicieshavegoals,thatare“political”bynatureand

means,thatrequirepoliticaltrade-offsandtechnicalchoices.Agoodindustrialpolicy

mustrelyon