国际可持续发展研究所IISD：2025全球碳边境调节BCA现状报告

TheStateofBCAs

2025

IISDREPORT

AntoineBonnetIevaBaršauskaite

IISD

InternationalInstitutefor

SustainableDevelopment

February2025

◎2025InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment|IISDorg

◎2025InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment

PublishedbytheInternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopmentThispublicationislicensedunderaCreativeCommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike4.0InternationalLicense.

InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment

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solutionsforastableclimate,sustainableresourcemanagement,

andfaireconomies.Ourworkinspiresbetterdecisionsandsparks

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TheStateofBCAs2025

February2025

WrittenbyAntoineBonnetandIevaBaršauskaitePhoto:iStock

Acknowledgements

WewouldliketothankAaronCosbey,GeorgeRiddell,andAliceTippingfortheirinsightfulcomments.

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111LombardAvenue,Suite325Winnipeg,Manitoba

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IISDorgiii

TheStateofBCAs2025

TableofContents

1.0Overview 1

2.0TheEUCBAM 4

2.1Contex 4

2.2KeyCharacteristicsandImpacts 6

3.0TheUKCBAM 8

3.1Contex 8

3.2KeyCharacteristicsandImpacts 9

4.0Australia'sCarbonLeakageReview 12

4.1Contex 12

4.2KeyCharacteristicsandImpacts 12

5.0WatchingThisSpace:OthercountrieswithongoingBCAdiscussion 17

6.0WTODiscussion 18

References 2

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ListofFigures

Figure1.CBAMpricephase-inandEUETSfreeallowancephase-ou 4

Figure2.ImportsofEUCBAMgoodsasashareoftotalEUimports(%) 5

Figure3.OriginofEUCBAM-coveredgoodstotheEU,202 6

Figure4.EU'stradingpartnersmostimpactedbyitsCBAM,intermsoftheshareoftheir

exportscoveredbythemechanism,2022 7

Figure5.ImportsofUKCBAMgoodsasashareoftotalBritishimports(%),2012-2022 9

Figure6.OriginofUKCBAMgoodstotheUnitedKingdom,202 10

Figure7.TheUnitedKingdom'stradingpartnersmostimpactedbyitsCBAM,

intermsoftheshareoftheirexportscoveredbythemechanism,2022 11

Figure8.ImportsofAustralia'shypotheticalBCAgoods,asashareoftotalAustralia's

imports(%)-limitedproductcoverage,2012-202 13

Figure9.ImportsofAustralia'shypotheticalBCAgoods,asashareoftotalAustralia's

imports(%)-extendedproductcoverage,2012-202 14

Figure10.OriginofAustralia'shypotheticalBCAgoodstoAustralia,2022-

limitedproductcoverage …………14

Figure11.OriginofAustralia'shypotheticalBCAgoodstoAustralia,2022-

extendedproductcoverage 15

Figure12.Australia'stradingpartnersmostimpactedbyitshypotheticalBCA,

intermsoftheshareoftheirexportscoveredbythemechanism,assumingextended

coverage,2022 ……………16

Figure13.Numberofstatements/proposalsconcerningBCAsatWTO,bymember

expressingthem,2020-2024 19

Figure14.DistributionacrosstimeofthetoneofBCA-relatedstatements,2020-2024

quarterlydat 20

Figure15.Typesofconcernsexpressedinoffcialstatements 21

ListofTables

Table1.KeyfeaturesoftheEUCBAM,theUKCBAM,andtheBCAdescribedin

Australia'sCarbonLeakageReview 2

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TheStateofBCAs2025

1.0Overview

Asanincreasingnumberofcountriesrampuptheirclimateambition,somemightconsiderimplementingabordercarbonadjustment(BCA)mechanismtopreventcarbonleakage.Carbonleakageisaphenomenonwhereclimatemitigationpoliciesand

theresultingemissionsdecreasesinonecountryarepartlyoffsetbyemissionsincreases

incountrieswithlessambitiouspolicies.Thisoffsettingisdrivenbyadeclineinthe

competitivenessoffirmsintheformercountryrelativetotheirinternationalcompetitors.

Oncethoughttobeatheoreticalrisk,OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationand

Developmentresearch(Teuschetal.,2024)findsthatleakagedoes,infact,occur:inone

study,13%ofemissionsreductionsachievedthroughcarbonpricinginonecountrywere

offsetbyincreasedemissionselsewherethroughcarbonleakage.Thestudyexamined140

countries'observedcarbonpricinglevelsandtheireffectsonsteelandcementemissions

andtradebetween2015and2021.Thereare,however,significantdifferencesacross

products,ascementproductionisestimatedtohavea23%“leakagerate”whilesteel'sis

3%.InternationalMonetaryFundresearch(Misch&Wingender,2021)usesdatafrom21widelyencompassingsectors(includingtheenergy,heavyindustry,manufacturing,and

miningsectors)in38countriesfrom2005to2015.Itexploitsdifferencesinenergypricesdrivenbytaxation.Itfindsanaverageleakagerateof25%acrossallsectorsstudied.Thesestudiesmaynotevencapturethefullpotentialamountofleakagethatcouldoccurbecause,duringtheperiodstudied,governmentswerealsousingtoolssuchasfreeallocationto

mitigateleakage.Asdiscussedbelow,carbonleakageriskmightincreaseifgovernmentsdiminishorphaseoutthesetools.

TheEuropeanUnion(EU)andtheUnitedKingdomwillsoonhavefully

operationalBCAs:theEU'sCarbonBorderAdjustmentMechanism(CBAM)issetto

enterfullimplementationby2026;theUnitedKingdom'sCBAM(UKCBAM)willbe

implementedby2027.Severalothereconomieshavebeendiscussingimplementingtheir

ownmechanisms.In2024,thedebatearoundanAustralianBCApickedupsteamthroughthecountry'sindependentCarbonLeakageReview,whichsupportedsuchamechanism.

DiscussionsareongoinginCanada,andintheUnitedStates,proposalsimposingfeesonimportedcarbonhavebeenpresentedcontinuouslytoCongressforthelastdecade.

BCAscanvarygreatlyindesign,whichinfluencestheirimpactsonthe

jurisdictionsimplementingthem,aswellastheirtradingpartners.ThosekeydesignfeaturesaresummarizedinTable1.

BCAshavebeenadefiningfeatureofrecenttradeandenvironmentdebates.They

haveprovokedmultiplediscussionsabouttheirroleinsupportingtheambitionofclimatepolicies,aswellastheircompatibilitywithWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)rulesandtheprinciplesoftheParisAgreement.Thispublicationsummarizesthemaindevelopmentsinthisspace,bothatthenationalandmultilaterallevels.

ThisreportpresentsinformationasofJanuary2025,exceptinthecaseoftheEUCBAM,forwhichtheFebruary2025proposedreformisalsoincluded.

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.

Table1.KeyfeaturesoftheEUCBAM,theUKCBAM,andtheBCAdescribedinAustralia'sCarbonLeakageReview

Designfeature

EUCBAM

UKCBAM

Potential

AustralianBCA*

Sectoral

coverage

Aluminum,cement,

fertilizers,hydrogen,ironandsteel,andelectricity.

2025review:possiblefutureextensionofthescopeto

additionalsectorsintheEmissionsTradingSystem(ETS),precursors,and

downstreamgoods.

Aluminum,

cement,fertilizers,hydrogen,andiron

andsteelsectors

startingfrom2027,withpotential

futureinclusionoftheglassandceramicssectors.

Corescenario:

cementand

clinker.

Extended

coverage:in

addition,steel,

glass,ammonia

fertilizers,lime.

Scopeofemissionscovered

Scope1emissionsonlyinmostcases;scope2emissionsforcement

andfertilizers.Selectprecursors-upstream

scope3emissions.

Bothscope1and

scope2emissionsacrossallcoveredsectors.Select

precursors一

upstreamscope3emissions.

Scope1emissionsonly.

Defaultvaluesforemissionsreporting

Reportingbasedondefaultvaluesispossibleasan

alternativetoreporting

basedonactualemissions.Reportingbasedon

defaultvaluesisthenormforreportingelectricityemissionsandindirect

emissions.

Defaultvalues

aresupported

asareporting

approachuntilatleast2030.

Defaultvaluesaresupportedasareportingapproach.

CBAMrate

CBAMcertificateprice;

universalacrossallCBAM

sectors;reflectsEUETS

price,tobeadjustedweekly

SetseparatelyforeachCBAMsector;reflectsUKETS

priceandcarbonpricesupport,tobeadjustedonaquarterlybasis.

TheSafeguard

Mechanismrate

isappliedonlyforemissionsabove

themechanism's

emissions-

intensitybaseline

Adjustmentforthird-countrycarbonprice

Onlyexplicitcarbonpriceswillberecognized.

Onlyexplicit

carbonpriceswillberecognized.

Theexplicitcarbonpricewouldbe

recognized.

Minimum

thresholdforliableimporters

50tonnesofimportedproductsperyear.*

GBP50,000over

a12-monthrollingperiod.

Notspecified.

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Designfeature

EUCBAM

UKCBAM

Potential

AustralianBCA*

Useof

revenues

Thegeneralbudgetof

theEUandofEUmemberstates.

Generalbudget.

Channelled

tosupport

implementation

andindustrial

decarbonization

objectivesintradepartnerdevelopingcountries.

Note:*AsdescribedwithinpreliminaryfindingsforthepurposeofconsultationintheCarbonLeakageReview'ssecondconsultationpaper.

**ThisdeminimisthresholdispartofproposedchangespresentedaspartoftheEuropeanCommission'sOmnibuspackageofFebruary2025.

Sources:DepartmentofClimateChange,Energy,theEnvironmentandWater,2024;EuropeanCommission,2024;EuropeanCommission,2025b;HMRevenue&Customs&HMTreasury,2024;

InternationalCarbonActionPartnership(ICAP),2024.

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2.0TheEUCBAM

2.1Context

UndertheEUETS,carbonleakageriskiscurrentlyaddressedbyproviding

additionalfreeallocationtoat-risksectors,butthisapproachisbeingphasedout

infavouroftheCBAM.OperatorsinETS-regulatedsectorslneedtoredeemallowances

correspondingtotheirgreenhousegasemissions.Allowancesareeitherauctionedorprovidedforfreetosaidoperators.Theycanthenusetheallowancestocovertheirownemissionsor

re-sellthemonasecondarymarket.Since2013,sectorsconsideredatriskofleakagehavereceivedmorefreeallocationthanothers.Theissuewithfreeallocationisthattheincentivetodecarbonizemightbeweakerthanafullyauctionedsystem(Bonnet&Cosbey,2024).

Therefore,theEUformallydecidedtoprogressivelyphaseoutfreeallocationfrom2026to2034aspartofitsFitfor55package(CounciloftheEU,2023).

Toaddresscarbonleakagewhilephasingoutfreeallocation,theEUintroduceditsCBAM

in2023(EuropeanCommission,2025a),thefirstpolicyofitskind.Underthetransitory

phase,runningfromOctober1,2023,toDecember31,2025,importersneedtoreporton

theembeddedemissionsofimportedgoodscoveredbythepolicy.From2026,importers

willneedtosurrenderCBAMcertificates,thecostofwhichwillreflecttheEUETS's,minusanadjustmentfactoraccountingforthefreeallocationthatwillstillbeavailableunderthe

schemeuntiltheircompletephase-out.

TheEUCBAM'scarbon-relatedcostswillprogressivelyconvergetowardtheEUETS'sprice,whilefreeallocationswillbephasedout.UndertheEU'splansasofJanuary2025,thefull

convergencebetweenCBAMandEUETSpricesissettotakeplacein2034(seeFigure1).

Figure1.CBAMpricephase-inandEUETSfreeallowancephase-out

Shareofprice(%)

—CBAMphase-in

一EUETSfreeallowance

phase-out

2025202620272028202920302031203220332034

Source:IllustrationbasedonEuropeanCommissionascitedinICAP,2023.

1TheEUETScoverscarbondioxide(CO₂)emissionsfromelectricityandheatgeneration,energy-intensive

industries,aviation,andmaritimetransport.Italsocoversnitrousoxide(N₂O)emissionsfromtheproductionofcertainchemicals.Additionally,itincludesperfluorocarbon(PFC)emissionsfromaluminumproduction.

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InFebruary2025,theEuropeanCommissionannouncedaproposedsimplicationofCBAM,mainlyincludingalaxerdeminimisclause.

AdditionaldetailsabouthowtheCBAMisexpectedtofunctionafterthetransitionalphasewillbereleasedoverthenext12months.Implementinganddelegatedactsplannedfor

adoptionin2025willcoverrulesregardingthefollowing:

·authorizationofCBAMdeclarants(importersintotheEU);

·thecalculationofemissionsandtheformatofCBAMdeclarations;

·verificationprinciplesandtheconditionsfortheaccreditationofverifiers;

·thedeductionofacarbonpricepaidinathirdcountryandthepriceofcertificates;

·adjustmentforfreeallocation;and

·thesaleandre-purchaseofCBAMcertificates.

Inaddition,theCBAMappliestothetradeofCBAMgoodstotheexclusiveeconomicarea/continentalshelfofEUmemberstates.Animplementingactwillprovidefurtherdetailsonthisspecificsituation.

TheEUisalsoreviewinghowthetransitionalphaseoftheCBAMhasworked.Beforetheendof2025,theEuropeanCommissionwillreporttotheco-legislators(EuropeanCounciland

EuropeanParliament)onlessonslearnedfromthetransitionalphaseoftheCBAMandontheinternationalimpactoftheCBAM.ItwillfocusontheimpactsoftheCBAMonleast-developedanddevelopingcountries,theassistanceprovidedtothirdcountries,andprogressmadeininternationalforumsonclimatechange.ThisreportwillincludeananalysisofthepossibleextensionofthescopetoadditionalsectorsintheETS,aswellastoprecursorsanddownstreamgoods.TheanalysiswillalsoaddressthepossiblecoverageofindirectemissionsfromelectricityproductionforalloftheCBAMsectors.

Figure2.ImportsofEUCBAMgoodsasashareoftotalEUimports(%)

Shareofimports(%)

20122013201420152016201720182019202020212022

Hydrogen

Cement

Electricity

Fertilizers

Aluminum

Ironandsteel

Source:Theauthor'scalculationsarebasedontheproductnomenclatureestablishedintheCBAMregulation(EU,2023)andBACI(CEPII,2024)tradedata.

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2.2KeyCharacteristicsandImpacts

TheEUCBAMwillimpactamoderateshareofEUimports.HadtheEUCBAMbeenappliedin2022,itwouldhavecoveredapproximately5%ofthebloc'simports(Figure2).AsdescribedinTable1,theCBAMfocusesonkeyupstreamproducts:in2022,ironandsteel

represented55%ofCBAM-coveredgoodsimports,followedbyaluminumandelectricitywith19%each(Figure3).

In2022,ChinawasthelargestexporterofEUCBAM-coveredgoodstotheEU(15%ofthetotal),followedbyTürkiye(10%)andtheUnitedKingdom(9%)(Figure4).ItsCBAMmightconsiderablyimpactsomeoftheEU'stradingpartners:in2022,theshareofCBAM-coveredexportstotheEUrepresented47%ofMontenegro'stotalexports,18%forAlbania,17%forBosniaandHerzegovina,and14%forMozambique.

Figure3.OriginofEUCBAM-coveredgoodstotheEU,2022

NORTHAMERICA

SOUTHAMERICA

ASIAEUROPE

China(15.0%)

Türkiye(10.2%)

GreatBritain(9.6%)

RussianFederation(8.7%)

India(6.6%)

Korea

Vietnam

UAE

Ukraine

Serbia

Japan

Malaysia

Bahrain

Indonesia

BosniaandHerzegovina

United

States

Canada

Egypt

South

Africa

Restoftheworld

Algeria

Mozam

bique

Brazil

AFRICA

Note:UAE=UnitedArabEmirates;Allcountrieswithtradeflowsrepresentinglessthan1%ofthetotalarereflectedinthe“Restoftheworld”part.

Source:Theauthor'scalculationsarebasedontheproductnomenclatureestablishedintheCBAMregulation(EU,2023)andBACI(CEPII,2024)tradedata.

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Figure4.EU'stradingpartnersmostimpactedbyitsCBAM,intermsoftheshareoftheirexportscoveredbythemechanism,2022

Montenegro47.0%

Albania18.0%

BosniaandHerzegovina15.0%

Mozambique13.7%

NorthMacedonia11.3%

Serbia11.1%

Ukraine10.7%

TrinidadandTobago6.9%

Bahrain6.5%

Bahamas6.4%

01020304050

ShareofexportscoveredbytheCBAM(%)

Source:Theauthor'scalculationsarebasedontheproductnomenclatureestablishedintheCBAMregulation(EU,2023)andBACI(CEPII,2024)tradedata.

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3.0TheUKCBAM

3.1Context

AfterleavingtheEU,andthereforetheEUETS,in2020,theUnitedKingdomadoptedthe

UKETS(DepartmentforEnergy,Security&NetZero&DepartmentforBusiness,Energy&IndustrialStrategy,2025).SimilarlytotheEUETS,leakageriskshavesofarbeenaddressedthroughfreeallocation.TheUnitedKingdomhasnotannouncedplanstofullyphaseoutfreeallocationasitadoptsitsCBAM.Yet,thegovernmentwillreduceauctionedpermitsby45%

between2023and2027whilealsodecreasingfreeallowances(HMRevenue&Customs&HMTreasury,2024).

TheBritishgovernment'sconsultationonaddressingcarbonleakage,launchedinMarch

2023,revealedbroadsupportforaUKCBAM(DepartmentforEnergy,Security&NetZero&HMTreasury,2023).ThiswasfollowedbyaspecificconsultationonapotentialCBAM

designinMarch2024.Initsresponsetotheconsultation,inOctober2024,thegovernment

confirmeditintendstorolloutsuchamechanismstartingJanuary1,2027,withouta

transitionphase:carbon-relatedfeeswillstartbeingimposedfromthatdate(HMRevenue&Customs&HMTreasury,2024).

InadditiontotheUnitedKingdom'sintentiontoreducefreeallocation,theintroductionoftheEUCBAMmayhavecreatedastrongincentivetoimplementasimilarmechanism:

industrystakeholdershaveexpressedconcernsthattheEUmechanismmaydisplace

emissions-intensivetradeflowstowardtheUnitedKingdom(Aylettetal.,2024).Ongoing

talksbetweentheUnitedKingdomandEUonthepotentiallinkageoftheirETSs(FinancialTimes,2025),asprovidedforbytheUK-EUTradeandCooperationAgreement,mayimpactthefunctioningofthetworespectiveregimesinduecourse.

TheBritishgovernmenthasyettoputforwardproposedprimaryandsecondarylegislationregardingitsplannedCBAM.Ithascommittedtoundertakingdetailedconsultationswith

industryandotherstakeholdersaheadoftablingitintheBritishParliament.Goingforward,aCBAMindustrygroupandaninternationalCBAMgroupwillbeformedtomaintain

engagementwithkeystakeholdersandothergovernments.

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3.2KeyCharacteristicsandImpacts

TheUKCBAMislikelytopresentdifferencesfromtheEUCBAM,accordingtothegovernment'sresponsetothepolicydesignconsultation(HMRevenue&Customs&HM

Treasury,2024).AsdescribedinTable1,theUKCBAMhassimilarproductcoverageastheEU's,exceptforelectricity:theUKCBAM'semissionscoveragewouldsystemicallyincludescope2.

LikeintheEU'scase,basedon2012-2021data,theUKCBAMshouldimpactamoderateshareofoverallimports(about3%;seeFigure5),mainlyironandsteel.

Figure5.ImportsofUKCBAMgoodsasashareoftotalBritishimports(%),2012-2022

Shareofimports(%)

4

Hydrogen

Cement

Fertilizers

2

Aluminum

Ironandsteel

20122013201420152016201720182019202020212022

Source:Author'scalculationsbasedonBACI(CEPIl,2024)dataandtheproductnomenclaturedescribedinthegovernmentresponsetothepolicydesignconsultationonaUKCBAM(HMRevenue&Customs&HMTreasury,2024).

In2022,thesegoodscamemostlyfromGermany(14%),followedbyChina(10%)andSpain(7%).TheUKCBAM'scurrentcoveragehasaverysmallimpactonitstradingpartners

comparedtotheEUCBAM:atmost,theUKCBAMcovers2%oftheUnitedKingdom'stradingpartners'totalexports(Figure6).

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Figure6.OriginofUKCBAMgoodstotheUnitedKingdom,2022

NORTHAMERICA

EUROPEASIA

Germany(13.9%)

Spain(6.5%)

China(10.3%)

Italy(5.4%)

Netherlands

Belgium

Türkiye

(5.0%)

India

Poland

Ireland

Portugal

France(5.3%)

Czechia

yawroN

Austria

UAE

Republic

ofKorea

Vietnam

Sweden

Russian

Federation

United

States

Egypt

Restoftheworld

South

Africa

AFRICA

Note:Allountrieswithtradeflowsrepresentinglessthan1%ofthetotalarereflectedinthe“Restoftheworld”part.

Source:Author'scalculationsbasedonBACI(CEPIl,2024)dataandtheproductnomenclaturedescribedinthegovernmentresponsetothepolicydesignconsultationonaUKCBAM(HMRevenue&Customs&HMTreasury,2024).

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Figure7.TheUnitedKingdom'stradingpartnersmostimpactedbyitsCBAM,intermsoftheshareoftheirexportscoveredbythemechanism,2022

Cocos(Keeling)Islands

lceland

Niue

SanMarino

EgyptMozambique

Portugal

LuxembourgTürkiyeGreece

0.0

1.52.0

0.4%

0.5

0.5%

0.5%

0.5%

1.6%

1.4%

1.0%

0.6%

1.8%

1.1%

1.0

ShareofexportscoveredbytheCBAM(%)

Note:ThisfigureshouldnotleadtotheconclusionthatanyofthesecountriesareparticularlyaffectedbytheUKCBAM,astheshareofallexportscoveredisverysmall.Forexample,theUnitedKingdomwasCocos(Keeling)Island'ssecondexportdestinationin2022,representing12%ofitstotalexports.Outofthese12%,asmallfractionconsistsofsteel(1.8%).

Source:Author'scalculationsbasedonBACI(CEPIl,2024)dataandtheproductnomenclaturedescribedinthegovernmentresponsetothepolicydesignconsultationonaUKCBAM(HMRevenue&Customs&HMTreasury,2024).

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TheStateofBCAs2025

4.0Australia'sCarbonLeakageReview

4.1Context

Australia'skeycarbonpricingtool,theSafeguardMechanism,pricescarbon

emissionsfromfacilitieswithemissionsexceeding100,000tonnesofCO₂equivalent

annually.Itcoversindustrialandwastefacilities,aswellastransportanddomesticaviation

(ICAP,2025).TheSafeguardMechanismcanbedescribedasanintensity-basedtradeable

ETS:operatorsincurcostsiftheyemitaboveacertainemissions-intensitybaseline.Ifthey

emitbelowthebaseline,theycansellemissionscreditstootheroperators.Thebaselineis

reducedatanannualrateof4.9%.Facilitiesfacinganelevatedriskofcarbonleakage,knownastrade-exposedbaseline-adjustedfacilities,mayreceiveaslowerbaselinereduction.

In2023,theAustralianGovernmentannouncedanindependentCarbonLeakageReview

(DepartmentofClimateChange,Energy,theEnvironmentandWater,2024)aspartofitsSafeguardMechanismreform.

ApreliminaryfindingoftheNovember2024secondandfinalconsultationpaperwasthat

anAustralianBCAonimportscouldbeanappropriatemeasuretoaddresscarbonleakage.(DepartmentofClimateChange,Energy,theEnvironmentandWater,2024).Sucha

mechanismisconsidereda“robustunderpinning”totheSafeguardMechanism,whichcouldeffectivelyaddressleakageriskwhilesupportingambitiousdecarbonization.Thereview

notesthatlowerbaselinedeclineratesfortrade-exposedbaseline-adjustedfacilitiesrestrict

theabilityofSafeguardMechanismsectorstocontributesignificantlytoAustralia'soverall

emissionsreductiongoals.Italsostatesthatsupporttosectorsatriskundertheformofpublicinvestmentwouldnotbeafiscallysustainablesolu