波士顿咨询-如何在创新与风险之间取得平衡创造人工智能价值 How to Create AI Value by Balancing Innovation and Risk

ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE

HowtoCreateAIValuebyBalancing

InnovationandRisk

ByMatthewKropp,JulieBedard,UlrikeSchwarz-Runer,StevenMills,AnneKleppe,LisaKrayer,MarcRomanFranke,andZeeshanShah

ARTICLEOCTOBER26,2026

High-profilesecurityincidentsinvolvingfrontierAlmodelsarekeepingmanyexecutivesupat

nightastheyshowagenticAI'sunpredictablenature.Theseeventshavelargelystemmedfromtrainingrunsofnot-yet-releasedmodels,butAlisincreasinglygivingrisetosometimescostly

hallucinations,aswellasbiasandprivacyviolations,viapublic-facingchatbots.LeadersarealsomindfulthatemployeescanintroduceriskwhentheycognitivelyoffloaddecisionmakingtoAlforbusiness-criticaltasks.Alltold,thisenvironmentissparkingaglobaldebateamongsenior

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leaders:CantheyencourageemployeestoexperimentwithAlandscaleimpactfulinnovationwhilemanagingtherisks?

Onthebasisofourlatestresearch,webelievetheycan.BCG's2026AppliedAIIndexsurvey

canvassed1,330leadersofglobalenterprisesandfoundthatcompaniesthatscaleAlinnovationaloneseetwicetheROIcomparedwiththosethathavelowlevelsofAlinnovation.Additionally,companiesthatscaleinnovationalongsideAlgovernanceseethreetimesthevalue.(SeeExhibit1.)

EXHIBIT1

ROIScaleswithInnovationandAccelerateswithGovernance

Aladdressablevalue

3x

3.7%

2x

1.2%

Scaleinnovationwithgovernance

(37%ofcompanies)

Scaleinnovationalone

(14%ofcompanies)

Lowinnovation

(36%ofcompanies)

Source:BCG's2026AppliedAIIndex.

Note:n=1,330.Valueistheaddressablerevenuepluscostsavingscalculatedthus:thesumofrealizedrevenuegrowthtimestheaddressablerevenuebaselinepluscostsavingstimestheaddressablecostbaselinefromAL.Thetrendshownwascalculatedfromaregressionmodelandcluteranalysisandpressuretestedwithunivariateandmultivariateeffectcomparisons.Thirteenpercentofcompaniesscaledgovernanceandaccountabilitywithoutscalinginnovation,achievinganROIof1.3%.Wedeterminedcompaniesthatscaleinnovationfromacompositemeasureofthefollowing:useoffrontiertechscouting,Aluseinresearchandideation,Aluseinproductdevelopment,workflow

reimaginationforAl,developmentofproductsthatintegrateAl,andstrategicclarityofAlambition.Wedeterminedcompaniesthatsclegovernancefromacompositemeasureofwhethertheyhaveimplementedthefollowing:responsibleAl,datagovernance,dataomplianceandprotecion,zero-trustcybersecurity,andagenticgovrnancecontrols.

Yet,thisvalueisn'tbeingwidelycaptured.ExecutivestellusthattheywanttouseAltocreateacultureofinnovationandthattheyrecognizethenextbigideacouldcomefromanywhereinthefirm.Theyalsounderstandthatthepersonwhoknowshowtooptimizeaworkflowissomeonewhoisexecutingthatworkfloweveryday.Butinaheightenedriskenvironment,leadersalso

realizethatasurgeinscaledAladoptionandcitizendevelopmentisn'tstraightforward.(See“WhatCanGoWrong?AnOverviewofRisksWhenEveryoneUsesAgenticAI.”)

-WhatCanGoWrong?AnOverviewofRisksWhenEveryoneUsesAgenticAl

Aldoesnotcreatenewcategoriesofenterpriserisk.Cybersecurity,dataandprivacy,technologyandoperations,peopleandworkforce,conductand

compliance—it'sthesamelistthatariskfunctionalreadymanages.Whatchangesistheradius,amplifiedbythreepropertiesofagenticsystems.

Breadth.Atasystemlevel,onedefectspreadsacrosseveryworkflowit

touches,whichmeansthatasinglecustomer-facingerrorhasthepotentialtoaffectthousandsofcustomersratherthanone.Inaddition,theuseofsharedmodels,plug-ins,andvendorsmeansthatafailureinoneplacecascades

intoothers,leadingtofailurechainsanddifficultyintracingtherootcause.

Atanindividuallevel,anyonewithageneral-purposeAImodelcanbuild

tools,offloadimportantdecisions,andautomateabusiness-critical

workloadthatrequiresahumanintheloop.Toolscangetdeployedoutside

centralizedITchannels,bypassingasecurityreviewandpossiblyeven

gainingaccesstosensitivedata.

Speed.Agentsact,anderroneousoutputsspreadandscaleerrors,bias,and

otherissuesfasterthanhumanscandetectorcatchthem.

Opacity.Assystemsbecomemoreautonomous,theirdecisionsgethardertoexplain—anditbecomesunclearwho,orwhichsystem,acted.Furthermore,thesameinputcanproducedifferentoutputs.Testingalonecannotprove

reliability,andnondeterministicbehaviorevadessignature-baseddetection.

Theconsequenceisasteepeningincidentcurve.TheAIIncidentDatabase

documentedthatreportedAIincidentsreached445in2025from106in2022,

and186havealreadybeenloggedin2026yeartodate.Moreover,AIriskdoesnot

requireabadactor.Infact,fewrecentpublicincidentshadanintentionallybad

actor.Mostresultedfromanagentdoingwhatitwasaskedtodobutusingapath

nobodyanticipatedandwithnobodywatching.Thatiswhyrigorouslytestingthe

toolsanddesigningtechnicalcontrolsforthebuildphaseareinsufficient:many

reportedincidentsinvolveasystembehavingcorrectlybyitsownlogic,in

production,afterreviewhadalreadybeenpassed.

Itisverydifficulttoidentifythemostimpactfulagenticworkflowsdevelopedbyindividual

employeesortoscaleagents’developmentandadoption

tocapturemeaningfulvalue

.Moreover,whenwesurveyedanadditional142leaderswhodevelopAIpolicyinanorganizationwithscaledAIdeployments,theyreportthat,onaverage,16%oftheiremployeesuseunapprovedtools

becausethesanctionedtoolsaretoorestrictiveortheyareunawareoftheiroptions.Thekeyquestionforexecutives,therefore,isn’tiftheycanstriketherightbalancebetweeninnovationandrisk,buthow.

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StartwithTransparencyandAccountability

TobetterunderstandhowenterprisesmanageAIrisk,wecombinedouranalysisofsurveydatawithinterviewsofmorethan30executivesfromorganizationsthatareattheforefrontofscalinginnovation—includingleadersinourownfirm.(See“OurMethodology.”)Overall,ourdata

identifiedtwocriticalleversforscalinggovernancealongsideinnovation.

OurMethodology

Inthisarticle,wedrewfromthreeprimarysourcesofdata:asurveyconductedbytheBCGInstitute,the2026AppliedAIIndexsurveyconductedbyBCG,anda

seriesofinterviewsconductedbyBCGwithexpertsinAIaccountabilityatBCGandotherorganizations.

BCGInstitutesurveyed142seniorleadersatlargecompaniesfromSeptember2,2026,throughSeptember11,2026.Everyrespondentworksatanorganization

thathasmorethan$1billioninannualrevenueandthathasdeployedor

activelypilotedAIinatleastonebusinessprocess.Mostrespondentshave

establishedAIprograms:52%runmorethan20AIusecasesinproductionand26%runmorethan50.

EveryrespondentisclosetoAIgovernancefortheirorganization:25%setAI

policyormakethefinaldecisionsonit,66%helpshapeitorsitonthebodythatapprovesit,and8%knowindetailhowitisappliedinpractice.Respondentsaredirectors(42%),vicepresidents(27%),seniorvicepresidents(18%),andboardorC-suitemembers(13%).MorethanhalfareintechnologyorITordataand

analyticsfunctions;therestworkinstrategy,salesandmarketing,operations,software,riskandcompliance,finance,HR,andlegal.

CompaniesareheadquarteredintheUS(64%)orEU(36%),and85%operate

globally.Eightsectorsarerepresented:technology,banking,andconsumergoodsandretail(25each),healthcareandlifesciences(21),insurance(19),fintech

(12),biopharma(11),andtelecommunications(4).Inaddition,33companiesare

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cautiousadopters,25areaccountableinnovators,59areunsupervisedadopters,

and17aretransparentexperimenters.

The2026AppliedAIIndexsurveycanvassed1,330firmsinaglobaldemographic

inthefollowingsectors:consumer;energy;financialinstitutions;healthcare;

industrialgoods;insurance;publicsector;travel,cities,andinfrastructure;and

technology,media,andtelecommunications.

Finally,wereliedon30interviewswithexpertsandseniorleadersinvolvedinAI

outcomesatorganizationsfortheexamplesthroughout.Theseleadersarefrom

largebusinesses(morethan$1billioninrevenue)thatarebasedintheUSor

EUandthatrepresentabreadthofindustries,includingbanking,retail,

insurance,biopharma,andtechnology.

Thefirstleveristransparency.LeadersneedtoknowhowAIisbeingused

andwhatagentsare

doing

intheirorganization,ideallyinrealtime.Todetermineorganizations’leveloftransparency,weassessedifrespondentsinoursurveyof142leadershavethreecontrolmechanisms:an

inventoryofAIsystemsandagentswithanamedproductownerforeach,systemicvisibilityintotheactionsofAIagentsandthepeopleusingthem,andthecapabilitytopauseorshutdownAI

systemsquicklyifsomethinggoeswrong.Ofcourse,thesemechanismsdon’trepresentsystemictransparencyaroundcitizendevelopment,whichisasignificantandunsolvedchallenge,buttheydoenableustomeasuretheadoptionofemergingcapabilitiesforenterprise-leveltransparency.

Thesecondleverisaccountability.EverydecisiononAItooldesign,deployment,andusageneedstohaveaclearowner,andthisaccountabilityoverdecisionmakingmuststartwithexecutives.Onthebasisofoursurveyquestions,weassessediforganizationsreporthavingcentralexecutive

accountabilityforAIdecisionmaking,formaldocumentationofaccountability,asingleorcoreresponsibilityframework,andaccountabilitythatexpandstotheenduser.Wealsoevaluatedwhetherrespondentsknowspecificallywhattheyareaccountablefor.

Ifwelookatthetwoleversinamatrix,weseefourcompanyarchetypesemerge.(SeeExhibit2.)

EXHIBIT2

GovernanceandROIRequireTransparencywithAccountability

High

ACCOUNTABILITY

MedianAlvalueimpactbyquadrant

Cautiousadopters

7%

Accountableinnovators15%

Unsupervisedadopters10%

Transparentexperimenters10%

Low

TRANSPARENCY

High

Source:BCGInstitute's2026AIGovernanceSurvey.

Note:n=134;8responseswereremovedfromtheanalysisbecausetheydidnotanswerthesurveyquestionsonROI.ValueisanincreaseinrevenueasapercentageoftotalannualrevenueplusadecreaseinannualcostsfromAlasapercentageoftotacostbase.Surveyquestionsaboutaccountabilityincludedonesabouthowdecisionsaremadeanddocumented,whoisaccountable,andhowwellthataccountabilityisdocumented.Survequestionabouttransparencyincludedonesaboutvisibilityintowhatagentsexistandtheactionsoftheagents,whilemaintainingcontrol.

Withlowaccountabilityandtransparency,unsupervisedadoptershavelittlecentralcontroloverinnovation.Theenterprisesinthisquadrantaretheleastlikelytodocumentdecisionsandtrackquestionsorrequeststhatgetescalatedtoseniorlevels.Theyarealsotheleastlikelytohaveclearprotocolsforpreventingemployeesfrombuildingunapprovedtools,formalAl-risk

requirementsforprocuringthird-partytools,orasingleplacetosendalluse-casequestions.

Transparentexperimentersarealmost50%morelikelythancompaniesinanyotherquadranttogivegeneral-purposeAlmodels—suchasChatGPTorClaude—toallemployeesbydefault.When

comparedwithaccountableinnovators,transparentexperimentersaremorethanthreetimesaslikelytodefaulttoaproceed-unless-told-to-stopapproachwhenAlusecaseapprovalscomeupagainstaprojectdeadline.Atthesametime,nearly50%donotrequireAltrainingforemployeesand65%donotextendaccountabilitytoendusers.Thismay,inpart,explainwhy24%ofthe

respondentsinthiscategoryreportthatmorethan20%ofemployeesuseunapprovedtools(so-calledshadowAl).

Cautiousadoptersarehalfaslikelytohave50ormoreAlusecasesinproductionthanaccountableinnovatorshave.(SeeExhibit3.)Employeesofcautiousadoptersareoftenafraidtoinnovate.

Alternatively,theyinnovatebyneglectingtheiraccountability,with46%oftheseorganizations

estimatingthat20%ormoreoftheiremployeesareusingunauthorizedtools.Whilecautious

adopters'speedofapprovalsisfaster(55%approveAlusecasesinunderfourweeksversus44%fortheaccountableinnovators),theymaybewastingtimeonunnecessaryapprovals:21%claimthatmorethanhalftheescalationstoacentralfunctioninthepastquartercouldhavebeen

answeredwithexistingguidance.

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EXHIBIT3

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AccountableInnovatorsScaleAIUseCaseswithAppropriateOversight

Accountableinnovatorsscale

innovationwithoutfeelingrestricted

RESPONDENTS(%)

AccountableinnovatorsarelesslikelytobuildanduseAlwithoutoversight

RESPONDENTS(%)

Accountableinnovatorshaveamore

efficientreviewprocessRESPONDENTS(%)

Accountableinnovators

Transparentexperimenters

Cautious

adopters

Unsupervised

adopters6

Source;BCGInstitute's2026AIGovernanceSurvey.

Note:n=140;2responseswereremovedfromtheanalysisbecausetheydidnotanswerthenecessaryquestions.

SixStepstoAccelerateInnovationAlongsideGovernance

Itisnosmallfeattofosteracultureofinnovationthatisanchoredinaccountabilityalongwithgovernanceandprocessesthatoptimizefortransparency.(SeeExhibit4.)Byresearchingthe

accountableinnovators,combinedwithourcollectiveexperiencehelpingleadersachievethesegoals,we'veidentifiedsixpracticesthatmakeaccountableinnovatorsstandoutfromthecrowd.

EXHIBIT4

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AccountableInnovatorsLeadAcrossCulture,Accountability,andGovernance

RESPONDENTSWITHEACHPRACTICEINPLACE(%)

Accountableinnovatorsfosteracultureofinnovationthroughtraining

ProvideresponsibleandethicalAltraining

HaveAfuencyoracompetencyframework

Providerole-specificaccountabilitytraining

Requiretrainingforallemployees

EnsureAluseisaformalperformanceexpectation

MakeAltoolsavailabletoallbydefault

76

88

Accountableinnovatorstakeaccountabilityseriouslyandmakebalancingriskandinnovationeasierwithsystemicrecording

SystemicallyrecordAldecisionsandreasoning

Nameaccountableexecutiveownersorcommittee

ExtendaccountabilitytoendusersofAl

Nameasingleaccountableexecutiveowner

Accountableinnovatorsdesigngovernance,includingpoliciesandprocesses,toprioritizetransparency

UsethreeormoreformalcriteriatoassessAIrisktier100

Conductformalrisktiering

UsetwoormoreexternalAl-riskframeworksforpolicymakingHavethreeormoreinternalfunctionswriteAl-riskpolicy

Ensurethedefaultistohold,pendingsign-off

Systemicallytrackescalations100

Establishoneclearlocationforintake

Systematicallycodifynovelgovernanceanswers

SetformalAl-riskrequirementsinprocurement

Varycontrolsbyrisktier

Haveusedakillswitchinthepast12months

◆Accountableinnovators▲Transparentexperimenters■Cautiousadopters●Unsupervisedadopters

Source:BCGInstitute's2026AIGovernanceSurvey.

Note:n=142.Eachrowcorrespondstoaspecifhcquestionaskedinthesurveyanddisplaystheresponsefrequencybyquadrant.

FosteringaCultureofInnovation,AnchoredonaZero-TrustAl-EngagementModel.Many

leadersarestillstrugglingtoencouragetheimpactfuladoptionofagenticworkflows,letalonetheresponsibleuseofAI.Simplethings,suchasoverlyanthropomorphizingAl,cancauseusersto

relytoomuchonAlandreducetheirwillingnesstotakeaccountabilityfortheirwork.

Inourinterviews,wefoundthataccountableAlleadersencourageeveryonetobuildanduseAlinawaythatisreminiscentofthecybersecurityconceptofzerotrust.Zero-trustcybersecurity

operatesontheprinciplethatnouserorsystemshouldbeautomaticallytrusted.Instead,

continuousauthentication,authorization,andvalidationofsecurityconfigurationsarerequiredbeforeaccessisgrantedtoapplicationsanddata.

ThistranslateswellintotheAlspace.Forexample,everyusershouldquestionwhetheritis

appropriatetouseAlforataskordecisiongiventhatcontextcanchangetherisklevel.Every

outputfromgeneral-purposeAlfrontiermodels(suchasClaudeorChatGPT)shouldbeverifiedwiththeassumptionthatsomethingiswrong,biased,orworse.Andeverycitizen-builtagentic

workflowinabusiness-criticalprocessshouldbethoroughlyvettedbeforeitisused.Takingsuchstepshelpstopreventthepropagationofbias,thespreadofvulnerablecode,andtheillegaluseofsensitivedata.TheyalsohelpensuredecisionsarenotbeingimproperlypassedontoAI.

BuildingtheNecessaryCompetenciesAcrosstheOrganization.Zero-trustengagementwithAlisnoteasyandrequiresnewcompetenciesacrosstheboard.Role-specifictrainingisatable-stakesbestpracticethatisalsorequiredbytheEUArtificialIntelligenceAct.Three-quartersofour

respondentsoffergeneraltrainingtoallemployees,and70%providetrainingonresponsibleorethicalAIuse.

Whatdistinguishesaccountableinnovatorsisthedesignoflearningpathsthatinfusetheir

desiredculturalattributesandaccountabilitymodelsintotheiremployees’dailywork.

AccountableinnovatorssettheexpectationthatAIshouldbeusedtoimproveperformance,buttheydonotmakeAImodelsandtoolsavailabletoallbydefault.Instead,theseleadersareone-and-a-halftotwotimesmorelikelytorequireemployeestocompletetrainingonAItools,take

responsibleAItraining,andhaverole-specifictraining.ThesebusinessesarealsomorelikelytodefineastandardofwhatemployeesareexpectedtoknowaboutAIthroughan

AIfluencyladder

oracompetencyframework.

Keepinmindthat

responsibleAIonlystartswithAItraining

.InajointstudywithMITSloan

ManagementReview,wefoundbroadconsensusamonggloballeadersacross29industriesthathumansneedtobuildandmaintainexpertisetoverifyAIsolutionsandoutputs.TheseleadersagreethatthemostsignificantAIriskiscognitiveoffloadingthatleadstooutcomesthatare

misalignedwithpublicvaluesorthatharmvulnerablegroups.

EstablishingAccountabilityandContinuousLearningattheTop.Someoneneedstobe

accountableforensuringtheAIgovernancesystemiseffectiveandscalabletokeepupwithcontinuouslyevolvingriskandopportunities.Thegoalistohaveaseniorexecutivebuildandoverseeamature

three-lines-of-defense

modelthatdividesresponsibilitiesamongfrontlineoperations,riskmanagement,andmonitoringandauditing.Themodelshouldalsobe

implementedacrosstheorganizationtopreventadiffusionofaccountabilityandpassingthebuck.

Executiveaccountabilityforenterprise-leveldecisionsaboutAIisatable-stakesbestpractice.Amajority(80%)ofthe142respondentsreportedthataccountabilityforenterprise-levelAI

decisionsismanagedbynamedexecutivesorastandingcommittee,thoughonlyaminority(lessthan10%)claimedit’sasingle-namedaccountableexecutive.Yet,evenwhenaccountabilityforenterprise-levelAIdecisionsisshared,whenaskedwhoholdsprimaryaccountabilityforAI

outcomesandrisksintheorganization,94%wereabletoselectasingleexecutive.

Itremainstobedeterminedwhotheaccountableexecutiveshouldbe:75%oforganizations

chooseamongthechiefAIofficer,chiefinformationofficer,andchieftechnologyofficer;onlya

minoritychosethechiefriskofficer.Regardless,thisindividualshouldbesupportedbyacross-

functionalcommitteewiththeexpertisetoevaluatedecisionsfromeveryfunctionalangle

becauseofthebreadthofAIimpact.Thecommitteeneedstobeabletodeterminehowdecisionsshouldbemade,scopeoutwhatnewrolesarerequiredforeffectiveoversight,andassesshowtoallowforsituationalnuancesthatbalanceriskandinnovation.

InfusingtheOrganizationChartwiththeNecessaryAccountableRoles.Accountabilityshouldcascadeacrossthethreelinesofdefensetoincludebusinessandfunctionalleadersandend

users.AsharedgovernanceapproachisespeciallycriticalsinceoutcomesfromAIworkflowscanbeproducedatascaleandspeednohumanreviewcommitteecanmatch.

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Cascadinggovernancetotheenduserisachallengeformostorganizations.Only52%ofsurveyrespondentssaidtheiraccountabilityforAIoutcomesextendstoendusers.Themajorityofthoserespondentsarewithaccountableinnovatorsorcautiousadopters.

Decidingwhoshouldbetheaccountableownerinanyscenarioiscontextspecific.Forexample,ifatoolhasbeendesignedwiththeexpectationthattheenduseracceptstheoutput(forinstance,ananswertoafirst-lineITquestion),thenthecentralfunctionthatbuiltthetoolmaybe

responsibleforitsoutputs.However,ifatoolisbuiltforgeneral-purposeuse,itmayrequiretheendusertohavefinalaccountability.

Atahighlevel,everydecisionshouldbemadebytheindividualswiththehighestlevelofvisibility,capabilities,andcontroloverthesituation.Everydecisionownerthenneedstobeclearly

documented,sotheyareeasytoidentifywhenaquestionorproblemarises.AIgovernancealso

introducesrolesforactivitiesthatdidnotpreviouslyexistatthisscale:redteamingnewbuilds,

assessingdrift,revalidatingwhenanAImodelversionchanges,aswellasmonitoringandauditingagentbehaviorinproduction.

Topreventthediffusionofresponsibility,everylineofdefenseneedsaclearlynamedownerwithclearlydocumentedhandoffs.AtBCG,weassignclearownershipspanningAIproductbuilds,

maintenance,andriskcompliance.WealsocreatenewrolestomonitorinternallybuiltAItoolsforcomplianceanddrift.Wethenensureeveryonecanbuildexpertiseintheirrole.Forexample,thepersonaccountableforensuringcompliancewiththeGeneralDataProtectionRegulationineveryAIimplementationneedstohavesufficientexpertiseandexperiencetoreviewanyAItooleffectively.

CreatingaUnified,Risk-TieredGovernanceFramework.Everyorganizationshoulddefinea

formalrisk-tieringframework,supportedbytriageandclassification,toidentifywhichusecases

arealowrisk(noreviewrequired),moderaterisk(somereviewrequired),highrisk(significant

reviewrequired),andcriticalrisk(no-flyzone).Thisformalclassificationprocessensuresthat

employeesanddecisionmakershaveaconsistentbasisfordeterminingwhatcanproceed,whatrequiresadditionalscrutiny,andwhatshouldnotbepursued.Accountableinnovatorsdonot

developtheseframeworksinisolation.Inadditiontotheirownenterprisestandards,they

reference,alignto,orarecertifiedbymultipleexternalgovernanceframeworks,suchastheEU

ArtificialIntelligenceAct,theISOandInternationalElectrotechnicalCommission42001standard,andtheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyAIRiskManagementFramework.

Still,becauseAIgovernancetouchesvariousfunctions,includingIT,legal,humanresources,dataprotection,andcybersecurity—eachofwhichaddressesdifferentrisksandoftenwithdifferentterminology—organizationsmayrunintoconflictsacrosspolicies;morethanone-thirdofour

respondentsreportedhavingaconflict.However,39%ofrespondentssaidtheyhavespecifiedacommitteetomakethecall—likelybecausetherewasnolegalrequirementinvolvedinthe

situation.

Whendesigningarisk-tieringframework,leadersshouldincludeawaytosystematicallydocumenteverydecisionalongsideitsunderlyinganalysisandassumptions.Thisdocumentationcanthen

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beusedtoautomateusecasetriageandriskclassificationtoscaledecisionmaking.Surprisingly,only50%ofrespondentsclaimedtodothis.Inaddition,only26%saidthatwhenanovelAI

questionisresolved,theanswerissystemicallyincorporatedintostandingguidanceforotherstofollow.

Theideaistoturnapolicylibraryintoaworkingsystemthatallowsforcontinuouslyimproved

decisionmaking.OrganizationsthatbothrecordandcodifyAIdecisionsaretwiceaslikelytohavemorethan50usecasesinproductioncomparedw