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GoldmanResearchSachs

EconoinicsResearch13November2026|12:13AMHKT

CHINA2027OUTLOOK

LessDrag,MoreUncertainty

GSMacroOutlook2027

Explore>

■In2026,theChineseeconomycontinueditsstructuralshiftfromoldindustriessuchaspropertytonewindustrieslikehigh-tech.Buttheyearalsobroughtmanysurprises.Onthepositiveside,exportssurprisedtotheupsideagain,andthe

economyshowedremarkableresilienceinthefaceoftheglobalenergysupplyshock.Onthenegativeside,however,thedomesticeconomyweakenedbymuchmorethanmanyinvestorsanticipated.

■Lookinginto2027,ourbaselineexpectationforgrowthisbenign:weexpectrealGDPgrowthtomoderateslightlyfrom4.6%in2026to4.5%in2027,assumingthatthegovernment'sgrowthtargetwillbenudgeddownfrom“4.5-5.0%”thisyearto“around4.5%”nextyear.

HuiShan

+852-2978-6634|hui.shan@GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.LC.

LishengWang

l+i-@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.LC.

YutingYang

yutingyyang@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.LC.

ChelseaSong

-g@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.LC.

AndrewTilton

+852-2978-1802|

andrew.tilton@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

■Thisbenigngrowthforecastisnotpredicatedonsignificantpolicyeasingora

propertymarketturnaround.Rather,itisbuiltonthearithmeticoflessdragfromexistinggrowthheadwinds.Byourestimates,thedragfromthepropertymarketshouldlessenfrom1.8ppofGDPin2026to1.3ppin2027,anetliftof0.5pp.

Similarly,weexpectChina'saugmentedfiscaldeficittodeclinemoreslowlyin

2027comparedwith2026,sothenegativeimpulsefromcontinuedfiscal

tighteningwillalsobecome0.5ppsmaller.Together,thesmallerpropertyandfiscaldragsshouldprovidearoughly1pplifttogrowthin2027relativeto2026.

■Althoughthebaselinegrowthforecastisbenign,weseeincreaseduncertaintyassociatedwiththeChineseeconomyin2027.BesidesAlcapexand

technology-relatedrisksthataffectglobalmarkets,wethinkUS-Chinarelationsmaybecomelessstablethanin2026whenfourmeetingsbetweenPresidentTrumpandPresidentXihelpedkeeptensionsincheck.Additionally,the21st

PartyCongressisscheduledforthesecondhalfofnextyear.Althoughthe

quinquennialpoliticaleventmakesstableGDPgrowthparticularlyimportanttothetopleadership,itcouldalsomeanintensifiedanti-corruptionefforts,

increasedsecurity-relatedrestrictions,andheightenedriskaversionatalllevelsofgovernment,noneofwhichissupportiveofeconomicgrowth.

■Comparedwithmarketexpectations,ourgrowthprojectionisslightlyabove

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html.

GoldmanSachs

itnpas2:w7wu.tlook

consensus,ourinflationforecastissignificantlybelowconsensus,andourcurrent

accountforecastisnotablystrongerthanconsensus.TheseprojectionsunderpinourviewsoffallingChineseinterestratesandastrengtheningCNY.

13November20262

13November20263

LessDrag,MoreUncertainty

Ouroutlooklastyear,titled“ExploringNewGrowthEngines,”highlightedtheChinese

economy’songoingshiftfromtraditionalindustriessuchaspropertyandinfrastructurebuildingtowardnewindustriessuchasAIandhigh-techmanufacturing(Exhibit1).Thisstructuralshiftcontinuedin2026,butthisyearalsobroughtamplesurprises.Onthe

positiveside,theChineseeconomyprovedmuchmoreresilientthanmanyexpectedinthefaceofthemostsevereoilsupplyshockindecades,despitebeingbyfartheworld’slargestoilimporter,andexportscontinuedtogrowrobustly.Onthenegativeside,thedomesticeconomyweakenedbymorethanmanyinvestorsexpected,withthepropertymarketwitnessinganotheryearofsharpcontraction,localofficialslackingincentivestocarryoutnewprojectsunderincreasedPartydisciplinaryscrutiny,andthefiscalstancetighteningsignificantlywithtaxcollectionenforcementstrengtheningandgovernmentexpenditurefalling.

Exhibit1:Theshiftfrompropertytohigh-techcontinues

PercentPercent

32.530.027.525.022.520.017.515.012.510.0 7.5

GDPShareIncludingUpstreamSpillovers

Propertysector*

High-techsector

32.530.027.525.022.520.017.515.012.510.07.5

2015202020252030

*Includingpropertyconstruction,realestateservicessector,upstreamsectors,move-inconsumption,andfiscal-relatedeffects.

Source:HaverAnalytics,NBS,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Ourbaselineprojectionforgrowthin2027isbenign(Exhibit2).ChineserealGDPisontrackfor4.6%growthin2026,andweexpect4.5%realGDPgrowthin2027,consistentwithapotentialgovernmenttargetof“around4.5%”nextyear.Thebroaderpictureof“strongexportsandweakdomesticdemand”isunlikelytochange,butthegrowthgapshouldnarrowabit.Weprojectrealexportgrowthtomoderatesomewhatfrom8.5%in2026to6.0%in2027,stillarobustpaceandwellaboveWTO’sforecastofglobaltradevolumegrowth.Inthedomesticeconomy,weexpectrealconsumptiongrowthinthe

officialdatatopickupfrom4.0%in2026to4.3%in2027,andgrossfixedcapitalformationgrowthtoincreasefrom2.0%to2.5%,stillsluggishpacescomparedtopreviousyears.

13November20264

Exhibit2:WeexpectrealGDPtogrow4.5%in2027

GDP

%yoy

2019

6.1

2020

2.3

2021

8.6

2022

3.1

2023

5.4

2024

5.0

2025

5.0

2026F

4.6

2027F

4.5

DomesticDemand

pp

5.4

1.7

6.9

2.5

6.0

3.4

3.4

3.4

3.5

Consumption

%yoy

6.3

-0.2

9.4

2.7

8.3

4.0

4.6

4.0

4.3

HouseholdConsumption

%yoy

6.1

-1.9

12.1

1.7

8.8

5.2

4.3

4.0

4.2

GovernmentConsumption

%yoy

6.9

3.8

3.5

5.2

7.2

1.2

5.2

4.0

4.5

GrossFixedCapitalFormation

%yoy

5.5

3.6

2.5

3.5

4.5

2.3

1.2

2.0

2.5

NetExports

pp

0.7

0.7

1.7

0.5

-0.6

1.5

1.6

1.2

1.0

ExportsofGoods(nominalUSD)

%yoy

0.5

3.6

29.6

5.6

-4.7

5.8

5.4

22.9

13.7

ImportsofGoods(nominalUSD)

%yoy

-2.7

-1.0

30.6

0.7

-5.5

1.0

0.3

28.3

12.3

Inflation

CPI

%yoy

2.9

2.5

0.9

2.0

0.2

0.2

0.0

0.8

0.5

CoreCPI

%yoy

1.6

0.8

0.8

0.9

0.7

0.5

0.8

1.0

0.6

PPI

%yoy

-0.3

-1.8

8.0

4.1

-3.0

-2.2

-2.6

2.9

0.3

Other

CurrentAccountBalance

%GDP

0.6

1.5

1.6

2.2

1.4

2.4

3.7

4.4

4.9

USDCNY(eop)

level

6.97

6.54

6.37

6.95

7.09

7.30

7.00

6.70

6.30

PolicyRate(eop)*

%

2.50

2.20

2.20

2.00

1.80

1.50

1.40

1.25

1.15

TSFStockGrowth(eop)

%

10.7

13.3

10.3

9.6

9.5

8.0

8.3

7.2

6.2

AugmentedFiscalDeficit

%GDP

11.8

16.8

11.5

12.6

11.8

10.9

11.4

10.0

9.5

*ThePBOCchangedChina'smonetarypolicyratefrom7-dayreversereporatetoovernightreversereporateinNovember2026.

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Thisbenignbaselineisnotbuiltuponassumptionsofsignificantpolicyeasingora

propertymarketturnaround.Infact,weexpectpropertyactivityandpricestocontinuetodeclineandfiscaltighteningtopersistnextyear.However,inbothcases,wethinkthedragshouldlessenfrom2026to2027.Forexample,weestimatethattheproperty

market’sdragonrealGDPgrowthincreasedfrom1.7percentagepoints(pp)ofGDPin2025to1.8ppin2026,butthisdragshouldnarrowto1.3ppin2027astheproperty

market’sshareofrealGDPcontinuestoshrinkandthepaceofpropertyactivitydeclinemoderatessomewhat.Similarly,ourestimatedaugmentedfiscaldeficit(AFD)declinedfrom11.4%ofGDPin2025to10.0%ofGDPin2026,whichshouldreducerealGDP

growthby0.7pp(=(11.4%-10.0%)*0.5),ontheassumptionofa0.5fiscalmultiplier.WethinktheAFDwilldeclinefurtherto9.5%ofGDPin2027,weighingonrealGDP

growthbyasmaller0.2pp.Inotherwords,whilevariousheadwindswillcontinueto

depressdomesticdemandnextyear,thesecondderivativeshouldturnpositive.Lessdragfromthepropertyandfiscalimpulseisthekeyreasonbehindourbenignbaselineforecast.

Tobeclear,theChineseeconomywillfacesignificantuncertaintiesin2027.BesidesthetrajectoryoftechdevelopmentandAIcapexthatcontinuestodriveglobalmarkets,

therearetwosetsofrisksuniquetoChina.Ontheexternalside,US-Chinarelationsmaybecomemorechallengingnextyearcomparedto2026asthefourTrump-Ximeetingshelpkeeptensionsincheckthisyear.Onthedomesticfront,sentimentappears

extremelyweak,strongindustrialoutputfailstotranslateintostrongemploymentandhouseholdincome,andthegovernmentdeadlineforexitsoflocalgovernmentfinancingvehicles(LGFVs)bymid-2027continuestoimposefinancialrisks.Mostimportantly,the21stPartyCongressisscheduledforthesecondhalfofnextyear.Althoughthe

quinquennialpoliticaleventmakesstableGDPgrowthparticularlyimportanttothetopleadership,itcouldalsomeanintensifiedanti-corruptionefforts,increased

security-relatedrestrictions,andheightenedriskaversionatalllevelsofgovernment,noneofwhichissupportiveofeconomicgrowth.

GoldmanSachsChina2027Outlook

Howtogetto4.5%growth?

Inourclientconversations,weareoftenaskedhowChina'srealGDPcangrow4.5%

giventheweakstateofthelabormarket,largeerosionofhouseholdwealthfromthe

housingbust,extremelystretchedlocalgovernmentfinances,andunsustainableexportgrowth.WeacknowledgethattheofficialrealGDPgrowthnumberlookshighrelativetoalternativemeasures.Forexample,realretailsalesofgoodsandservicesgrewbyless

than2%yoyandrealfixedassetinvestment(FAl)declinedbyaround10%yoyduringthefirstninemonthsoftheyear,makingthemathdifficulttoadduptotheofficialGDP

print.Ourimport-impliedrealGDPgrowthmeasureregisteredonly2.4%yoygrowth

duringthefirstthreequartersof2026.Thechangesfrom2025-26intheproperty

sector,exports,andthefiscalimpulsecollectivelyimplyaslowdown1.2ppsteeperthanshownintheofficialGDPdata;itisnotobviouswhatcomponentsofGDPexplainthis.Thatsaid,whenitcomestothe2026-27changeinrealGDPgrowth,lessdragfromthepropertymarketandfiscaltightening,asdiscussedearlier,shouldprovideameaningfulbuffertomaintaingrowthstability(Exhibit3).

Exhibit3:WeexpectlessdragtorealGDPgrowthfromthepropertymarketandfiscaltighteningin2027

Percentyoy

Percentyoy

5.0

-0.4pp

+1.2pP

6

+0.5pp+0.5pp

-0.2pp

-0.9pp

-1.1pp

ContributiontothechangeinChinarealGDPgrowth

(2025-26)

ContributiontothechangeinChinarealGDPgrowth2(2026-27)

2025GDPPropertyUnexplained2026GS

GrowthForecast

2026GDPPropertyFiscalUnexplained2027GS

GrowthForecast

"Property”isthechangeinourestimatedpropertycontributiontorealGDPgrowth."Exports"isbasedonofficialnetexportscontributiontorealGDPgrowth."Fiscal"iscalculatedusingouraugmentedfiscaldeficitestimates."Unexplained"istheresidualbetweenofficialrealGDPgrowthnumbersandourestimatesofproperty,exportsandfiscalcontributions.

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Wherearewedifferent?

ComparedtotheBloombergconsensusof4.4%realGDPgrowthinChinain2027,our

forecastof4.5%isslightlyhigher(Exhibit4).Ourinflationforecasts,however,are

significantlybelowtheBloombergconsensusandIMFforecast.WeexpectheadlineCPIinflationtodeceleratefrom0.8%in2026to0.5%in2027,whiletheBloomberg

consensusandIMFforecastshowanaccelerationtoward1.4-1.5%nextyear.The

ongoingdeflationarytrendamidChina'shousingdownturncoupledwithloweroilprices,isthedriverofourbelow-consensusinflationforecasts.Thissupportsour“Iowerfor

longer”projectionofChina'sinterestrates.Lastly,wemaintainourbullishviewon

China'scurrentaccountsurplusandprojectittoriseto4.9%ofGDPin2027from4.4%in2026,notablyabovetheIMFforecastof4.0%andtheBloombergconsensusof3.6%.OurconstructiveviewonChineseexportsandcurrentaccountsurplusunderpinsourlong-heldRMBappreciationview.

13November2026

GoldmanSachsChina2027Outlook

Exhibit4:RelativetoBloombergconsensus,weexpectslightlyhighergrowth,significantlylowerinflation,andnotablystrongercurrentaccountsurplusnextyear

Percent

2.0

2027ChinaCPIinflationforecast1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Bloomberg…IMFGSBloomberg.….IMF

PercentofGDP

GSBloomberg...IMF

Source:Bloomberg,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Trade:Nominalgrowthtoslow,realexportstoremainresilient

China'sexportshaveagainexceededexpectations,rising21.3%yoyinUSDtermsin

January-September2026.Priceeffectshaveplayedamuchlargerroleduringthisyear'sexportboom.Exportpricesrose11%yoyovertheperiod,largelydrivenbyAl-relatedproductsandotherchip-embeddedelectronics.Exportvolumesneverthelessgrewarobust9.5%yoy,supportedbythe“newthree”sectors-electricvehicles,batteriesandsolarpanels-aswellasbroaderstrengthinelectricalequipment.TheupturnthereforeextendswellbeyondAl-relateddemand(Exhibit5).

Exhibit5:A'sexportboostreflectsprices,notvolumes;realexportgrowthremainsconcentratedinhigh-techmanufacturingproducts

PercentagePercentagePercentchange,Percentchange,

pointContributiontoExportPrice(YoY,inUSD)pointannualizedContributiontoChinaExportVolumeannualized

30

ExportVolumeNon-EVvehicles

25Al-relatedOtherelecequipment25

Newthree/machinery

OldthreeChemicalsandrelatedproducts

10

Others

15

0-

-10

-20Total-20

Otherproducts

Fuels

-30Chip-embeddedelectronics**-30-10

Al-related*

-40

2019

2020202120222023202420252026

20222023202420252026

*A1-elatedproductsincludesemiconductors,printedcircuits,storageunits,procesingunits,andcomputerpartsandacessories.*Chip-embeddedelectronicsincludemainlycomputersandotherconsumerelectronics.

Source:CEIC,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Lookingahead,weexpectnominalexportgrowth(inUSDterms)toslowfrom22.9%yoyin2026to13.7%vovin2027.Thedecelerationmainlvreflectseasingexportprice

inflation,asweexpectyear-on-yearchippriceinflationtopeakin2026Q4andloweroil

13November2026

GoldmanSachs

itnpas2:w7wu.tlook

pricesin2027shouldfurthertemperpricepressures.Bycontrast,goodsexportvolumegrowthshouldremainresilient,moderatingfrom8.5%yoyin2026to6.0%in2027.

China’smanufacturingcompetitivenessandampleproductioncapacityshouldunderpinfurthermarketsharegains,particularlyinEMs(Exhibit6).

Exhibit6:Lowerpriceinflationshouldslownominalexportgrowth,butrealexportgrowthshouldremainresilientat5-6%overthenextfewyears

40

30

20

10

0

-10

40

30

20

10

0

-10

Breakdownofpriceandvolumecontributiontogoodsexports

Exportprices(USDterms)

Nominalgoodsexports

Percentchange,yearagoPercentchange,yearago

GoodsexportsvolumeGSe

15161718192021222324252627282930

Source:CEIC,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

AtougherEUtradestanceisakeyrisktotheexportoutlook,astheEUaccountsfor14%ofChina’snominalexportsandhascontributedabout2pptoexportvolumegrowthinJanuary-September.Still,ourbaselineassumesthatmutualeconomicinterestswilllimitescalationandkeepdownsideriskcontained.Chinaretainsstrongleverageovercriticalinputssuchasrareearths,whileEUpolicymakershaveincentivestopreserveaccesstotheChinesemarketandavoiddisruptingEuropeanmanufacturers.RecentEU-China

tradetalksalsosuggesttherelationshipremainsnegotiation-drivenratherthanpurelyconfrontational.FurtherEUcurbsmayalsoreshapeChina’sexportsratherthansimplyreducethem.Restrictionsondirectexports(e.g.,hybridvehicles)couldaccelerate

Chinesefirms’localizationofproductioninEurope,particularlyautos,whichwould

reducefinished-goodsexportsbutsustaindemandforChineseintermediateinputs(e.g.,batteries).

Higherpriceshavedrivenmostofthenominalimportgrowthin2026.Weexpectgoodsimportvolumestorise3.0%yoyin2026,supportedbystrongnon-monetarygold

importsbutweigheddownbyweakerenergyimports.Volumegrowthshouldslowfurtherto1.6%in2027assubdueddomesticdemandandChina’spushfor

self-sufficiencyconstrainimports.Lowerenergypricescouldencouragefuelrestockingbutareunlikelytooffsetthebroaderdemandweakness.Aschipandenergyprices

normalize,weexpectimportpriceinflationtoeasefrom18.9%in2026to4.5%in2027.Together,slowervolumegrowthandeasingpriceinflationshouldreducenominalimportgrowthfrom28.3%to12.3%in2027.

Weexpectthecustoms-basisgoodstradesurplustowidenfrom6.0%ofGDPin2026to

6.3%in2027.Theservicestradedeficitshouldnarrow,from1.0%to0.8%ofGDPin

2027,aseasiervisapoliciesandmorefavorabletax-refundarrangementssupport

inboundtourism.Together,thesedevelopmentsshouldliftthecurrentaccountsurplusfrom4.4%ofGDPin2026to4.9%in2027(Exhibit7).Inrealterms,weexpectnet

exports’contributiontoGDPgrowth,includinggoodsandservices,todeclinefrom

1.2ppin2026to1.0ppin2027.

13November20267

GoldmanSachsChina2027Outlook

Exhibit7:China'scurrentaccountsurplusissettorisefurther

ChinaCurrentAccountSurplusasShareof.

--ChinaGDP(left)

一WorildGDP(right)

8

0.8

6

4

2

0.2

0-

2000200420082012201620202024

0.02028

Percent10

0.60.4

Percent

1.0

Note:DashedlinesindicateGSforecasts.

Source:CEIC,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

WhileChina'scurrentaccountsurpluswasstrongin2026,itsfinancialaccountbalanceremainedweak.Thebalanceofpayments(BOP)datasuggeststhatChina'soutward

foreigndirectinvestment(FDI)continuedtooutpacetheinwardFDIoverthepastfewquarters.Combiningalargercurrentaccountsurplus,broadlyunchangedtotalportfoliooutflows,andcontinuednetFDIoutflows,weexpectChina'sbroadbalanceofpayments(BBoP)toimprovefrom2.9%ofGDPin2026to3.5%ofGDPin2027,whichisinline

withourviewofCNY'sgradualappreciationin2027(Exhibit8).

Exhibit8:WeexpectChina'sbroadbalanceofpayments(BBoP)toincreasein2027

(USDbn)

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026F

2027F

CAbalance

90

224

297

404

257

462

735

959

1178

CAas%ofGDP

0.6

1.5

1.6

2.2

1.4

2.4

3.7

4.4

4.9

Goodstradebalance

371

500

537

651

600

809

1061

1247

1467

Exports

2412

2539

3255

3397

3263

3523

3752

4612

5239

Imports

2040

2039

2718

2746

2663

2714

2692

3365

3772

Servicetradebalance

-252

-167

-131

-113

-221

-255

-238

-214

-191

Exports

232

210

284

310

300

347

385

443

478

Imports

484

377

414

422

521

602

623

657

670

Primarylsecondaryincome

-29

-110

-109

-134

-122

-92

-87

-74

-98

Directinvestment

50

99

165

-20

-174

-150

-77

-50

-70

Inward

187

253

344

190

51

43

80

100

100

Outward

-137

-154

-179

-210

-226

-192

-157

-150

-170

Portfolioinvestment

58

96

51

-289

-58

-179

-426

-270

-270

Equity

16

-51

-2

-9

-44

-138

-172

-70

-120

Bond

42

147

53

-280

-14

-42

-253

-200

-150

BBoP

198

419

514

95

25

133

232

639

838

BBoPas%ofGDP

1.4

2.8

2.8

0.5

0.1

0.7

1.2

2.9

3.5

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Propertymarket:Notbottomingyet,butitsgrowthdragshouldease

China'spropertydownturnisnowinitssixthyear.Manyhousingactivityindicatorshavefallenmorethanexpectedsofarthisyear,withmost—includingnewhomestarts,sales

13November20268

GoldmanSachs

itnpas2:w7wu.tlook

13November20269

andpropertyFAI—down60-90%fromtheir2020-2021peaks.Meanwhile,recent

propertypoliciesarealsoacceleratingtheshiftfromahigh-turnover,presales-led

businessmodeltocompleted-homesaleswithtighterproject-levelfundsupervision.Inourview,thistransitionmayaddfurtherdownwardpressuretotheseindicatorsoverthenextfewyears.

Reflectingthesetwodevelopments,werecentlyupdatedourestimateofthepropertysector’scontributiontorealGDPgrowth:thepropertysectorisnowexpectedto

subtract1.8ppfromChina’srealGDPgrowthin2026,slightlymorethan1.7ppin2025.Weestimatethatthesector’sshareofGDPfellfromapeakofaround30%during

2010-21toaround15%in2025,andexpectittodeclinefurtherbeforestabilizingataround8%from2030onward.Lookingahead,asthesectorshrinks,weexpectits

growthdragtonarrowbyaround0.5ppto1.3ppin2027andlargelydissipateby2030(Exhibit9).Thisnarrowingofthepropertysector’sdragshould,inturn,besupportiveforoveralleconomicgrowth.

However,anarrowergrowthdragfromthepropertysectordoesnotnecessarilyimplyabroad-basedstabilizationinhomeprices.Intop-tiercitiessuchasShanghaiand

Shenzhen,whereinventoryisalreadylow,homepricesmaybegintorecoversoon.By

contrast,fortherestofthecountry—particularlyinlower-tiercitieswithstill-significantinventoryoverhang—pricesmaycontinuetodeclineforafewmoreyears.

Exhibit9:Weexpectthepropertysectortosubtract1.8ppfromChina’srealGDPgrowthin2026,butthisdragshouldnarrowto1.3ppin2027

PercentagepointsPercentagepoints

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

HousingcontributiontoyoyrealGDPgrowth

Construction

Realestateservices

Upstream

Move-inconsumptionLandsalesfiscal

Total

GSe

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

020406081012141618202224262830

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

LaborMarket:Structuralandcyclicalchallenges

Thelabormarkethasbeenweakforthepastfewyears.Whiletheofficialunemploymentrateslookbroadlystable,investorsinourclientconversationsaremoredownbeaton

labor-marketconditionsandincreasinglyconcernedaboutAI-relatedjobdisplacement.Inaddition,thetighterenforcementofsocialinsurancecontributionsinrecentmonthshasraisedlaborcostsandweighedonhiringsentiment.OurrecentanalysisofChina’s

high-techpushsuggeststhatthesesectorswillsupportoutputbutdolessfor

employment,astheyarelesslabor-intensivethanpropertyandservicessectors.Asa

result,high-techexpansionisunlikelytodeliveraproportionatelifttohouseholdincomeandconsumption.The15thFYPcallsforsynchronizinghouseholdincomegrowthwith

13November202610

economicgrowth,butwedonotexpectmajoreffectivepoliciesbeyondincremental

measuressuchassmallsubsidiesforlabor-intensiveservicesandofflinebusinesses,ahigherminimumwage,andlowersocialsecuritycontributionsforlow-wageandflexibleworkers(e.g.,fooddeliverersandride-hailingdrivers).Altogether

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