中国汽车工业的发展中英对照

妙文翻译公司翻译样稿 中国汽车工业（表 2 ）始 1953 年成立的第一汽车厂（FAW），她是新中国的第一家汽车制 造厂。另外两家国有企业(SOEs) -上海汽车工业总公司（上汽集团）和东风汽车公司分别成立 于 1958 年和 1967 年。至此，完成了国家成立“三大”汽车集团的计划。 20 世纪 70 年代到 20 世纪 90 年代，中国汽车工业经历了双位数字的增长和急剧下降。20 世纪 80 年代，全球汽车制造商-美国克莱斯勒和德国大众汽车最早通过与三大国有企业合资的 方式进入中国。自那时起，外国公司用他们的模式始终在中国市场占主导地位。 上世纪 90 年代初，中国政府安排和维护的标致和雪铁龙合作，这些外国制造商有效地对中 国市场进行寡头垄断。开始政府每年都规定他们的生产水平和利润率 1。这些公司可以从他们 的企业得到稳定的回报：价格偏高，满意的利润率，生产量增长适中，他们也不需要在开发新 产品和更换生产线上进行投资。 在允许少数外国公司供应国内市场的同时，中国中央政府设法保护和培育 其幼嫩的轿车工业。1994 年，出台了专门的限制汽车进入有关行业部门的政策 （表 3 ），该项政策的主要目的之一就是使实现更大规模经济效益合理化。但 是结果令人失望，中国汽车制造商由于管理不善，继续依靠地方政府保护，无 法提高生产能力。而价格高而摇摆不定，款式缺乏选择，那些最有潜力的买家 都远弃之而去。 直到 90 年代末，中国很少有人拥有私家车。1992 年卡车和客车占生产量的 92%，出租车是 客运汽车销售的大多数。尽管公共部门和大型国有企业的高级官员使用汽车，但是大部分车辆 是他们的工作单位购买的。20 世纪 90 年代后期，由于政府试图缩小国有企业，这些比例开始 发生变化，私营企业开始蓬勃发展，中产阶级也开始出现在中国比较富裕的城市地区。 20 世纪 90 年代后期，虽然越来越多的外国企业直接投资中国，例如通用汽车，本田，日 产和福特汽车公司，新一代独立的本土汽车制造商，例如吉利和奇瑞还是开始出现了。到 2000 年，外国公司已经在中国 24 家合资企业中投入了 5.1 亿美元，次年，又向另外 17 家合资企业 投入了 7.25 亿美元。与此投资浪潮相吻合的是,中国加入了世界贸易组织，并逐步开放汽车行 业（表 4） 。新汽车制造商的涌入,打破了当时市场的寡头垄断，市场份额也发生显著变化 （表 5） 。 1 “中国汽车：仍然会炙手可热吗？” 德国银行中国专家组 2004.03.31 中国汽车销售图表 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007F 2008F 单位 (千辆) 私家车 公共汽车 货车 注 :公共汽车数字包括多功能车(MPV) 这些发展对中国汽车工业起到了直接重大影响。私家轿车销售的比例第一 次超过了 50%。客户对汽车品种的选择由 1999 年的 15 种，到 2002 年的 58 种 和 2006 年的 162 种，并且汽车价格大幅度下降。同时，国外金融企业的进入， 消费者可以得到贷款，使更多个人购买汽车成为可能。（详细情况阅读“汽车 金融市场”部分。） 是兼并还是要分散？ 按照全球汽车工业标准衡量，每个工厂每年应生产 300-400 万辆车，则中国目前大部分汽 车制造厂都属于小规模生产企业。中国所有 123 家汽车制造厂中，只有上海汽车工业总公司 （上汽集团）和第一汽车厂（一汽）两家年生产量超过 50 台，有 8 家生产超过 10 万台。另外 95 家工厂年生产量少于 1 万台，这其中绝大部分厂家（70 家）年生产量不到 1 千台 2。很多时 候，当地政府成立这些微型汽车生产企业仅仅是作为形象工程，他们从来没有扩大业务规模。 中央政府多年来一直试图使汽车行业呈合理化分布，并已表示，与 2003 年 13 家企业生产 90%的汽车相比较，他们更希望看到 3 到 4 家主要生产企业出现。2004 年 6 月，国家发改委 3（ 国家发展和改革委员会），中国权力强大的经济规划机构，发布了一个人们期待已久的政策文 2 “中国汽车业的重组” , , 2003.08.18 3 依据 SETC（国家经贸委员会） 件，概述了汽车工业发展方向（图 6 ） 。本项政策中一个重要决策就是通过限制未来投资机 会进一步巩固国内零乱的汽车制造企业地位，同时兼并现有汽车制造企业组成大型竞争集团。 其目的就是要培养强大的土生土长的国内企业，有一天他们可以问鼎海外市场。 2010 年以前，中国将成为一个重要的汽车制造国，本地生产的汽车将基本满足国内需 求，我们将向国际市场进军迈出一大步。 -2004 发改委政策文件 但外国业界专家认为，因为有省级政府参与主要企业，如北京汽车厂、东南汽车厂、广东 汽车厂、福建汽车厂以及其他 23 个省市的汽车厂，中国要巩固民族汽车工业，在可预见将来可 能性不大。 中国还没有自己像底特律 或名古屋这样的汽车城。对中国来说，不论是历史还是经济，权 力和经济分散还将存在。因此，有重庆公司、广州公司、上海公司和深圳公司，所有地方 政治、经济强省都希望能有自己的汽车产业。这种情况不会在一夜之间改变。 汽车资源亚洲 上海在发展汽车产业方面一直显得咄咄逼人，并正实施一项计划，将上海变成中国乃至亚 洲新的“汽车城“以及汽车制造主要中心。到 2004 年底，固定资产投资达 170 亿元（ 20 亿美元） ，合同利用外资金额达 57 亿元（ 7 亿美元） 。目前，已有 90 个国内外的汽车厂商已经或宣 布进驻该区域，包括上汽集团、大众汽车、奔驰、保时捷。在未来 10 年，计划再投资人民币 500 亿元（ 60 亿美元）。政府正吸引所有大型国内外厂家，并打算开发研发设施、零部件制造， 教育设施，甚至旅游景点，除了汽车组装外，还举办一级方程式汽车大奖赛。 “三大” 2004 年国家发改委的政策重申先前巩固汽车工业的目标：以一汽、东风汽车、上汽三家国 内企业为龙头，领导地方工业。 除了与当地合作伙伴捆绑，过去 2 年里，这 3 家企业占了大多 数国外汽车制造商在合资企业的投资。合作关系采取各种不同形式，但大部分不是与哪一家合 作（表 7 和表 8） 。举例来说，一汽现在已与丰田公司和大众汽车公司成立合资企业，与马自 达达成合同销售协议，东风与日产、起亚、本田、PSA 标致-雪铁龙和上汽集团与通用汽车（ GM ）、大众汽车公司都有大型合资企业。 新政策预测到 2010 年中国一些汽车制造商将进入世界五百强跨国公司之列。事实上，从汽 车产量（包括汽车，卡车和公共汽车）来看 ，“三大”虽然基本上通过与国外企业合资生产汽 车，但是他们已经是中国主要制造商，2006 年，三家汽车产量 340 万台，占中国汽车总产量的 46%，三家的客车生产量 138 台，占全国总产量比例更高，甚至达到了 70% 。这三家企业立志 要成为未来几年世界一流的汽车制造商。然而，他们的成功是依赖与外国汽车制造商的合资协 议，甚至首次公开招股计划也主要是配合其外国合作伙伴的扩张计划和资本增加而需要的额外 资金。 东风自 2005 年 11 月在香港证券交易所上市，作为上市企业，大部分分析师看不出有三家 中的任何一家企业在治理和管理企业上发生必要的变化。 “三大 “汽车企业要达到海外上市的要求，还有很长的路要走 他们在达到股份制要 求上远没有进行真正的改革。仅仅把 “党委书记 ”改名为 “董事长 ”不是真正的改革。 -中国民族汽车工业咨询与发展公司 结构性问题和体制性问题构成最大有意义上市的障碍，同时导致独立资产难以评估。比如， 上汽集团拥有 153 个子公司，其中 7 家占集团赢利 85% ，5 家是外商合作企业。 冲突的潜在根源 到 2006 年，几乎所有的世界汽车巨头在中国都拥有一家或一家以上客车厂，国内客车市场 长期以来一直被外国品牌主导。中外合资经营企业生产的这些品牌占领了 85%的客车市场 4。因 为国外企业所有权不得超过 50%，因此，每家国外公司在当地至少有一家合资企业，个别的还 不止一家。 至目前为止，很少有报道的主要问题之间的这些合作伙伴，和业界的高利润和增长有可能 缓解一些不可避免的摩擦，在这些关系。大多数分析家说，不过，相信这种情况可能会改变。 中国人主观地认为有一天他们会收购其国外合作企业的股份。而外商也主观地认为他们 会收购其中国合作伙伴的股份。这样的关键时刻即将到来，同时，今天 2004 年 看来 这只是耸人听闻，因为每个人都在轻易地赚钱。 -亚洲汽车资源公司 首席执行官 Michael Dunne 未来利益的复杂化与冲突是不可避免的，本地大公司和领先跨国公司之间的关系会变得更 加复杂。利益分歧是问题的潜在根源，用中文“同床异梦”可以来形容。也就是说，国外公司 梦寐以求的是中国市场，他们中方合作伙伴梦寐以求的是技术。 1.1 4 外国公司于货车和公交车上的投入较少； 戴姆勒-克莱斯勒和雷诺/尼桑为外国公司于卡车业的代 表，而依维柯在公交业则比较活跃。 产生摩擦的另一个潜在根源来自于中外企业“一夫多妻制”关系。比如，东风公司在 2003 年 7 月 1 日正式与日产汽车成立合资企业，接着又宣布与日产的竞争对手本田公司成立合资制 造企业。而丰田公司自身也与中国第 4 大汽车公司广州汽车厂合作。广州汽车厂也正在与丰田 公司洽谈成立合资公司。同样，大众汽车在与一汽联姻前也与上汽有一家大型合资企业。 对外扩张 2004 年的政策限制跨国公司对国内合资企业所有权不得超过 50%，但是他们大部分是为了 出口，则允许他们持有汽车合资企业多数股权。政府正积极鼓励投资出口导向型合资企业，以 加快中国在未来 10 年成为主要汽车出口国。依据前一年政策出台的新指导方针，本田公司准许 获得了与广州汽车厂合资企业的多数股权，并于 2004 年开始生产小型汽车。此外，该政策突然 停止，因为它没有规定到 2010 年国内汽车制造商必须控制至少一半的市场份额。分析人士称早 些时候草案中这项条款吓坏了国外公司。 与这些政策发展相吻合，跨国公司已经宣布侵略性扩张计划（表 9 ） 。有些公司，譬如 法国汽车制造商标致先前在中国尝试建立企业失败后，又正在重返中国市场。所有这些计划的 总供给进一步超过需求（表 10 ） 。 一些业界观察家认为全球性制造商在中国市场增加投资就像“庞大的旅鼠跨越悬崖“ 5， 其 他人的评价则为正面的： 目前，世界其他市场平稳、甚至萎缩，在这种情况下，大型汽车制造商转向稚嫩但充满希 望的中国市场以寻求全球更大市场份额是很自然的。从这个角度来看，中国市场是他们的 “最后一根稻草 ” 。另一方面，我认为他们雄心勃勃的未来扩张计划是并不盲目。即使 汽车行业产能过剩或过热，我认为这种情况不适用于外国厂商。其再投资计划是基于他们 以前行动确实赚了钱的事实，而且他们还想通过再投资赚取更多的利润 6。 中国汽车工业咨询发展公司 贾新光 7 地方工业存在的问题 中国政府允许外国厂家在中国生产车辆，是希望本土合作厂家学习大量的先进技术。但是 没有真正意义上达到他们的期望值。外国公司通过在当地制造掌握着中国国内大部分市场份额， 5 高盛，2004 6 “中国汽车市场吸引了全球汽车制造商的目光”, 新华中国经济信息报，2004.07.08 7 中国人的名字按中国格式录入，即：先姓后名 而中国合作厂商并却没有充分吸收技术来发展自己的能力。依赖外国技术给“三大”带来了 “外国汽车产品的管理人”的称号，而不是真正的行业领袖。 这种现象使中国汽车工业处于一个很尴尬的地位。这就是中国政府过去 20 年 “市场换技 术 ”政策的结果。 8 -中国民族汽车工业咨询与发展公司 虽然合资企业中中方控制多数股份，但是只是在中国获得国外产品的生产许可，或仅仅是 组装国外公司提供的零部件。，国有企业虽然通过合资在经济上明显获利，但是远离核心技术。 在合资经营中，他们在把最佳办法转移到全资公司（非合资）这项工作没有取得任何进展。 反击 国企与小规模本土企业并没有放弃，他们的管理者仍然保持乐观态度。 2008 年，我们年产 200 万辆汽车中，有一半将拥有自主品牌。一汽不久将推出一系 列自行研制的客用和商用汽车。 9 一汽 武高青（音） 然而，2006 年一汽仅出售 8630 台自主汽车品牌-红旗，2007 年的销售量预计可能还要低。 这些数字可以与大众 35 万辆、夏利 20 万辆、丰田 22 辆、马自达 5.5 万辆比较一下。一汽最近 宣布计划总共投资 2.1 亿美元用于改进其生产模式，建立一个新的生产基地。同样，上汽集团 也宣布到 2008 年年生产目标为 100 万辆，但是只有 5 万辆荣威是其自主开发的品牌。 大多数国产品牌并不是由“三大”开发的，而是由本行业新厂家开发，比如：吉利、奇瑞 和秦川。 中国汽车产业再不能由外国巨头控制了，我们应该放弃他们帮助提升我们开发能力的幻 想。 -吉利董事长李书福 这些新兴企业建立的时候既没有得到中央政府的祝福，也没有得到他们的支持。然而这些 中国汽车制造商认为比“三大”更能给外国品牌带来长期强烈的威胁。他们都具有类似的背景， 8 “汽车业发达背后的弱势” 商务日报 2004.05.11 9 “汽车制造商对北京展会期望较高“， 商务日报， 2004.06.10 由在消费品市场取得成功的民营企业家成立。他们通过收购现有的生产许可权投机取巧进入汽 车业。他们推出自己的品牌，向大众市场提供质量虽然较差但价格更便宜的汽车。 吉利由浙江省企业家李书福成立。他靠生产冰箱起家，后实现多元化，扩张到摩托车零件 行业，这些企业赢利非常可观。1997 年，李书福购买了一家经营不善的国有小型货车厂，从而 获得生产汽车执照。私有企业吉利据说每年在研发上花费 6000 万美元，并在最近推出第一款自 行设计的汽车，一款名叫“吉利美人豹”的小型跑车。这对 1998 年才生产自己第一辆汽车而当 年总共只销售 200 辆的企业来说是一项不小的成就。到 2006 年，吉利的销售量超过 20 万辆， 市场占有率为 4%，销售量排第 10。奇瑞进入汽车行业更晚，1999 年生产出自己的第一辆汽车， 2006 年销售量超过了 30 万辆。 Chinas auto industry (Exhibit 2) was born in 1953 with the founding of First Auto Works (FAW), the first auto manufacturer of the new Peoples Republic of China. Two more state-owned enterprises (SOEs)Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) and Dongfeng Motors Corporationwere established in 1958 and 1967, respectively, completing the countrys planned Big Three national auto champions. From the 1970s through the 1990s, the industry alternatively experienced double-digit growth and steep declines. The earliest global manufacturersChrysler of the US and Volkswagen of Germanyentered in the 1980s via joint ventures with the three major SOEs. Since that time foreign firms consistently dominated the Chinese market with their models. Joined by Peugeot and Citroen in the early 1990s, these foreign manufacturers were effectively an oligopoly, put in place and maintained by the Chinese government. At the start of each year the government mandated both their production levels and profit margins.10 In return, these firms could count on steady returns from their ventures: prices were high and included comfortable margins, output growth was moderate, and they did not have to invest in new development or update production lines. While allowing a few foreign firms to supply the domestic market, the Chinese central government simultaneously tried to protect and nurture its fledgling car industry. In 1994 it introduced a dedicated auto policy limiting access to the sector (Exhibit 3). One of the primary aims of the policy was rationalization to realize greater economies of scale. Results, however, were disappointing. Chinese car makers were unable to expand their capacity as poorly managed companies continued to rely on local government protectionism, while staggeringly high prices and a lack of choice kept most potential buyers away from the market. Until the late 1990s private car ownership in China was very rare. Trucks and buses accounted for 92% of production in 1992, with taxi fleets forming the bulk of passenger car sales. Although public sector and high-ranking officials in the larger 10 “China autos: Will red-hot stay red-hot?”, Deutsche Bank China Expert Series, 31 March 2004. SOEs had access to cars, most vehicles were actually purchased by their work units. These proportions began to change in the late 1990s as the government sought to downsize SOEs, a dynamic private sector began to develop, and a middle class started to emerge in Chinas richer urban areas. A new breed of independent local car manufacturers such as Geely and Chery (Qirui) began to emerge in the late 1990s even as more foreign firms made direct investments in local production, with significant arrivals including GM, Honda, Nissan and Ford. By 2000 foreign firms had invested US$510 million in 24 auto joint ventures in China. The following year a further US$725 million was invested in 17 more JVs. Coinciding with this surge in investment was Chinas accession to the WTO and a gradual liberalization of the auto sector (Exhibit 4). The resulting influx of new automakers broke the prevailing oligopolys hold on the market, and market shares changed dramatically (Exhibit 5). Annual Vehicle Sales in China by Category 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20062007F2008F Un its (tho usa nds ) Sedan Bus Truck Note: Bus figures include Multi Purpose Vehicles (MPV) These developments had an immediate and dramatic impact on Chinas auto industry. For the first time, the share of cars sold to private owners exceeded 50%. Customers also saw their choice of models increase from 15 in 1999, to 58 in 2002, and 162 in 2006, together with marked price cuts across the industry. Simultaneously, the arrival of foreign finance firms and access to consumer loans made car ownership possible for more individual buyers (see Auto Financing Market section for more details). Consolidation or Decentralization By global industry standards, in which a single plant produces 300-400 thousand units annually, most of Chinas manufacturers are small-scale producers. Just two of the total 123 Chinese auto manufacturers Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp (SAIC) and First Automotive Works (FAW) produce more than 500,000 units per year, and eight others produced over 100,000 each. Another 95 factories produce less than 10,000 units per year, and most of these (70 factories) produced less than 1,000 per year.11 In many cases, local governments had set up these micro-producers simply as prestige projects, and they had never expanded their scale of operations. The central government has tried over the years to rationalize the industry, and has stated that it would like to see three to four major groups emerge, compared to the 13 producers who accounted for 90% of production in 2003. In June 2004 the NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission12), the countrys powerful economic planning body, released an eagerly awaited policy paper outlining its intentions for the auto industry (Exhibit 6). One key element of that policy was to achieve further consolidation of the fragmented domestic car-making sector by restricting future investment opportunities and, at the same time, merging existing automakers into large competitive groups. The aim was to develop national champions within a strong, home-grown industry that could one day tap overseas markets. Before 2010, China will become an important vehicle manufacturing nation, locally made products will basically satisfy domestic demand, and we will enter the international market in a big way. -2004 NDRC Policy Paper But foreign industry experts see consolidation of the national industry as unlikely in the foreseeable future, given the involvement of provincial governments in major manufacturers, such as Beijing Automotive, South East Automotive, Guangdong Automotive, and Fujian Automotive, and those of 23 other municipalities. 11 “China to restructure auto industry”, , August 18, 2003. 12 Formerly the SETC (State Economic and Trade Commission). Theres no Detroit or Nagoya of China. For China, historically and economically, decentralization of power and the economy is the way to go. As a result you have Chongqing Inc, Guangzhou Inc, Shanghai Inc and Shenzhen Inc, all local political and economic powerhouses that want to have their own auto industries. That wont change overnight. -Automotive Resources Asia Shanghai has been particularly aggressive about developing its auto industry and is implementing a plan to become a new “Motor City” and a major center of vehicle production not just in China, but in Asia. By the end of 2004, RMB 17 billion ($2 billion) had been invested in fixed assets, and contracted foreign investment reached RMB 5.7 billion ($700 million). Already, 90 domestic and foreign manufacturers, including SAIC, VW, Mercedes-Benz and Porsche, already have or have announced stakes in the area. A further investment of RMB 50 billion (US$6 billion) is planned over the next 10 years. The government is attracting all major foreign and domestic players, and intends to develop R Dongfeng with Nissan, Kia, Honda and PSA Peugeot-Citron; and SAIC has major JVs with General Motors (GM) and VW. The new policy anticipates that some Chinese auto manufacturers will join the ranks of the worlds top 500 multinationals by 2010. Indeed, in terms of vehicle production (cars, trucks and buses), the Big Three are already major manufacturers, accounting for 46% of Chinas total vehicle production in 2006 and turning out 3.4 million units. Their combined share of passenger car production was an even higher 70% (1.38 million units), although essentially all of that is via JVs with foreign partners. All three aspire to become world-class carmakers within the next few years. Yet their success is dependent on their joint-venture agreements with foreign automakers, and even their IPO plans are driven primarily by the need for additional capital to keep pace with their foreign partners expansion plans and capital increases. While Dongfeng is listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange since November 2005, most analysts do not see any of the Big Three as introducing the types of governance and management changes necessary for a listed enterprise. The Big Three have a long way to go before fulfilling the requirements of listing on overseas stock markets They are far from carrying out true reforms to cater to the joint-stock system. Changing the title from Party Secretary to Chairman is not a real reform. -China National Automotive Industry Consulting and Development Corp. Structural and institutional problems pose the greatest barriers to meaningful listings, together with the difficulty of evaluating independent assets. SAIC, for example, holds 153 companies, seven of which are responsible for 85% of the groups profits, and five of these are foreign partnerships. Latent Sources of Conflict By 2006 almost all of worlds auto giants had one or more passenger car plants in China, and the domestic passenger car market had long been dominated by foreign brands. These brands, produced via Sino-foreign joint ventures, represent 85% of the passenger car market.13 Because of the 50% cap on ownership by foreign auto manufacturers, every foreign firm has at least one local JV partner, and several have more than one. So far, there are few reported major problems between these partners, and the industrys high profits and growth have probably soothed some of the inevitable friction in these relationships. Most analysts, however, believe this situation is likely to change. Intuitively, the Chinese believe that one day they will buy out their foreign partners. And intuitively, the foreigners think they will buy out their Chinese partners. So crunch time will come, but in the meantime, today 2004 is just sensational because everyone is making money hand over fist. -Michael Dunne, Chief Executive, Automotive Resources Asia. Future complications and conflicts of interest are inevitable as the links between the major local firms and the leading multinationals become even more complicated. Diverging interests are one latent source of problems, what the Chinese describe as 13 Foreign firms have a much smaller presence in the truck and bus sectors; DaimlerChrysler and Renault/Nissan are examples of foreign firms targeting the truck market, and Iveco is active in the bus market. tong chuang yi meng (sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different dreams); namely, while the foreigners are dreaming of the market, their Chinese partners are dreaming of technology. Another potential source of friction is what may be described as the polygamous approach to relationships by both domestic and foreign firms. For example, just after officially commencing its JV with Nissan on 1 July 2003, Dongfeng announced a carmaking JV with Honda, one of Nissans Japanese competitors. Honda itself was already making cars in China in partnership with Guangzhou Automobile, the fourth largest domestic firm. Guangzhou Auto is now in talks with Toyota about setting up a joint venture. Similarly, VW had a major joint venture with SAIC long before it formed its link with FAW. Foreign Expansion While the 2004 policy limits multinationals to 50% ownership of domestic joint ventures, they are allowed to hold majority stakes in automobile and motorcycle joint ventures if their