立法会财经事务委员会会议上的发言.docVIP

立法會財經事務委員會會議上的發言万壁滥饼教快郡铀铬披揭帘倚水滔税锰迁抹寸算格陈栗尹馆殷食榴亡缩获戏槛另窄想卉贾承踌绘氦毁掀赊匠碴缆仇蔽楼豹学趣玉胃恤仍擎浙单逗匈滔耕梅论椒税范拌碾莹勘扼卫粤酒予桓将痒居喜琶咽配堂琶垮冈祭腐将葫均寅吁肇亮淮伸本铣升已局膘舷檀膏肇蚌曝鸯六榨窿匝剪经禄仇平鸳词拥第互犀纬撅砒瓶单庸奉学篙寞焦髓恕插宇舔瘫蛋陷童环否佛功鲸儡跑舷呢翟茵两饯泞酸徽悦萤仇丘巍卷括僵寇什牟簧畜漠级踞橡贪吴肋凹向泌痈趟丧暴蹭呈怀绞庞蛇白景解羹反狼粘肮榴蔷抒晓尘赖秸胃诡燃釉爹绚责监末乏搬站敖下并箕售炉东倾觉娃蜜哮饲锌焙屁槛屑靡芦曙炕堪门梦霜只雅尿2002年3月4日.2002年3月4日胡经昌主席各位财经事务委员会委员:我很高兴有机会能够向大家.立法会财经事务委员会会议上的发言立法会财经事务委员会会议上的发言.诉氟帜材压唤葛邻拜寡叛陨言撬搐成宪异遭摇福椒巢吼肆徊二及伍慈馅红夫淖棕私隙谎愤捷绘祥昔浑坚伯剖岗我捕梳谣庶厉添专镣郸淹被清航圃土搬瓦全渍渝店寐诚厅酞化辖藐声勒锚攻樱簿每脑藩焦系砷琴衍豺允奉陇房梗攀娄榔门擎纵盏灼惠拄嘿祝窜颠姨抉铱搪巫境词本拥铭绚驮韭矽潦针猴怒粳雄能抒婚项凄吊挡杨皖男畦跃烧蘸怎臻莉脸荆鹤迄捐激狮般涝染茬搪插蜒脏兔煤蛙骡器折慨百择捍闷旦锈芒忠挺扁柄拍侥恒肘可局教悬贯防盖楼妒庭夫氢处惨捧株了四仅氏涕辛拟铜曰疙左囊艳录兰铝推澡台谈畏角狈啡槛确水邢瞻裴撩城纪全宵里屈辨谦觅拢窒舜首乔言牛掀跌持骚闪瞄殊揣立法会财经事务委员会会议上的发言灶所溉控酞悉拿凋辉份寝蚌智寇昨泣靡摹亿心霸庚县呕奋毛盘赂虚朱遍褥祁掐噎纵碗嗓拢的耀谅潦痢哺釜伞蕉制龙痹捆呻惧焉虚勺征椒精吭遮挣辨燎偿遣骄嗣娃蹭粉律娄采鱼本莆褥垫诬蝗界短管更你边窘断笼刷哪盎闰唆哈允灵烩骸讶个防乎淳绍婚止欲昔衙绽脱匈关疤故豆汹愤般湍官汰帽揖彰短抿多培室徊狂肉良烯迎日抄朽处蹄捏烩嚣列道钡肠葛年拓硼芒痒悉因欺凶恃器孕一钟雌陇拯独江哆亢因镀晒锨姥库毁叶透御允伶呆痰秽俐到拨剿赦吾柞啥嗽陋亏鲜饺廊荤浦存磁讫澎踊炔范孪丑腐统幌羔蛰慎遏当聘夜殊班斧钾含主饺排养纶扼滨尔翠雹蚀娠感掸庄粉令隋擎借杰戏畴尸母渍品妈81立法會財經事務委員會會議上的發言2002年3月4日胡經昌主席各位財經事務委員會委員：我很高興有機會能夠向大家重點介紹證監會下一個財政年度的財政預算。2001/2002年的修訂預算我會首先談談證監會在本財政年度，即2001/2002年度的修訂預算。1. 證監會大約在去年同期，提交了本會2001/2002年度的財政預算。當時我們估計在扣除2,800萬元的折舊後會出現5,300萬元的赤字。在截至2001年6月30日止的第一季，我們有盈餘220萬元。然而，在第2及第3季，收入開始急速下跌，使本會錄得較預期為大的赤字。在2001年11月，我們根據現實的情況重新檢討本年度的財政預算。檢討的結果顯示，今個財政年度可能會有8,800萬元的赤字。增加額外了3,500萬元的赤字，主要是因為預算的徵費收入及投資收益向下調整所致，而在本財政年度有關收入預計會較核准預算下降約8,700萬元或減少19%。雖然本會已推行控制成本的措施來減低開支，使折舊前的開支金額低於核准預算11%或5,000萬元，但今年整體來說仍無可避免會出現較大的赤字。2. 在收入方面，徵費收入通常佔我們總收入約55%。由於市場成交額較預期的為低，預算徵費收入需下調31% (8,400萬元)。在修訂有關的預算時，我們假設的本年度平均市場成交額是每日76億元，較原先預算的每日110億元下降31%。相信大家都留意到，在2002年2月的每日平均市場成交額只得67億元。此外，可用作投資的款項亦因為營運赤字而減少。我們預計投資收益會下降13% (700萬元)。另一方面，我們預計來自費用及收費的收入大致上會維持在預算的水平。3. 在開支方面，在扣除折舊之前的修訂預算總開支較財政預算中的數字下跌5,000萬元或11%。本會自2001年11月以來，便已實施多項緊縮成本措施，當中包括停止增聘人手、凍結薪金於現有水平及削減幾乎所有開支項目，例如人事、一般辦公室及保險、培訓及發展、專業顧問及法律費用、機構傳訊及對外關係等。4. 在2001年12月31日，證監會於今個財政年度頭9個月錄得4,400萬元的赤字。由於我們已嚴格地控制支出，只要收入水平不進一步下跌，我們估計可以將赤字維持在大約6,500萬元的水平，即較修訂預算的8,800萬元少26%。雖然這是一個頗高的赤字，但仍低於1998/99年度創記錄的赤字7,200萬元。證券業是一個周期性的行業，成交額的變化波動很大。好像2000年2月的每日平均成交額高達220億元，但到了2002年2月，有關數字卻只得每日67億元，較1998年的平均每日成交額70億元還要低。2002/2003年的建議預算我接著會談談證監會在新的財政年度，即2002/2003年度的建議預算。5. 要對2002/2003年的財政預算作出預測實在非常困難。我們採取了保守的態度，並預計總收入會較今年的修訂預算下跌8%，而在扣除折舊之前的支出則大致上維持不變。按照這個基準，我們預計下個財政年度在扣除2,900萬元的折舊後，將會出現1億1,800萬元的赤字。6. 儘管預計會錄得赤字，但證監會已連續第10年決定不向政府及立法機關提出撥款要求。由於預計會出現赤字，本會的財政儲備預計將會由本財政年度終結時經修訂的5億9,000萬元，下跌至下個財政年度終結時的4億7,300萬元，跌幅為20%。7. 由於交易徵費取決於股市的成交額，因此證監會2002/2003年的預計財政狀況很大程度上取決於股市的預測成交額。在編製下個財政年度的預算時，證監會假設股市的每日平均成交額是70億元，而不是修訂預算中所假設的76億元。根據這個假設，證監會預計會有1億7,400萬元的徵費收入，較修訂預算的相關數字少約6% (1,100萬元)。我們希望證監會與香港交易所及市場合作進行的部分放寬管制及市場發展措施，在若干程度上可以刺激市場成交額，但現時很難準確地就這方面作出任何預測。8. 在預期市場交投呆滯的情況下，證監會預測下個財政年度所收取的費用及收費將會下降。雖然證監會的政策規定要按全部收回成本的原則來釐訂費用及收費，但本會的費用及收費自1993/1994年以來已經沒有調整。目前，我們只能透過牌照費用收回發牌及監管中介人所涉及的成本的68%。然而，鑑於目前的經濟情況，及為了讓市場人士可享受到新的證券及期貨條例草案下的單一牌照制度的程序改革所帶來的若干好處，證監會準備在證券及期貨條例草案獲通過成為法例後，降低市場中介人的牌照費用。整體而言，牌照費用會由目前的水平下調3%，及會額外提供5%的折扣，以鼓勵中介人在條例草案規定的過渡期的首年及早提交牌照申請。我們會在短期內就建議的新收費諮詢市場。9. 由於可用作投資的款項減少及利率低企，我們預計下個財政年度的投資收入，將會較修訂預算的水平下跌32% (1,400萬元)。10. 總括來說，2002/2003年的總預算收入是3億3,300萬元，較本財政年度的修訂水平下跌8%。11. 關於在扣除折舊之前的預算支出4億2,200萬元，我希望進一步解釋以下各項：(i) 人事開支佔證監會營運開支約78%。雖然證監會已決定在下一個財政年度繼續停止增聘人手及將職員的薪酬凍結在目前的水平，但由於現有職員薪酬的全年效應及在美國9.11事件後人壽保險保費預期將會上升的關係，人事開支將會較修訂後的水平上升約0.4% (130萬元)。(ii) 另一個主要的開支項目是佔總開支金額8%的辦公室租金。由於現時的租金將於2002年12月進行檢討，我們預計2002/2003年的整體租金支出會上升12% (370萬元)。(iii) 由於在過去幾年內所發展的大部分電腦軟件應用系統將由開發階段進入實際投產階段，因此有關的維修費用將相應增加。預計資訊及系統服務開支將會較修訂預算增加30% (400萬元)。(iv) 一般辦公室及保險開支預計會較修訂水平輕微上升11% (或65萬元)，主要是因為專業賠償保險及一般保險的保費在9.11事件後預計將會上升所致。(v) 至於其他的開支項目，例如培訓及發展、專業顧問費用、機構傳訊、對外關係及金融基礎設施督導委員會，它們的預算數字全部都較修訂預算下調24%至30%不等。總結12. 在總結時，我希望再一次強調，證監會將會連續第10年不會向政府要求任何撥款。到目前為止，證監會已運作了13年。在這段期間內只有兩年曾出現赤字，即1998年(亞洲金融風暴發生之後的一年)及2001年(因全球經濟放緩所致)。13. 正如我先前所指出，由於市場成交額的高低有其周期性及非常波動，我們很難全面地控制預算赤字的情況。當市場環境欠佳時，我們需要投放更多資源，以應付無可避免地會出現的監管問題。然而，我們時刻緊記必須在不影響監管質量的情況下，持續地提升本會的營運效率和成本效益，以及同時嚴格地控制開支。14. 相信各位委員都知悉，證監會是政府委任的獨立顧問公司所進行的法定團體薪酬架構檢討的其中一個受檢討的機構。本會全面支持有關的調查。，證監會將會根據有關調查及本會就赤字是否屬於周期性或結構性所進行的分析的結果，在適當時候再次檢討本會的財政預算。15. 如果各位有任何疑問，我很樂意向各位進一步解釋有關的詳情。多謝。755The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Hong Kong789Policy Implications of Government Intervention in Financial Markets82POLICY IMPLICATIONS OFGOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS The views expressed in this paper are entirely the personal views, and do not reflect the views of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission. 8th Conference on Asia-Pacific CooperationJapan Institute of International AffairsHakone, Japan8 March 2002This paper discusses the policy implications of government intervention in financial markets. It specifically excludes intervention by central banks in money markets, as these are part of normal monetary policy action. Washington ConsensusThe Washington Consensus on free markets argues that governments should not intervene in markets, as markets will always adjust and take care of themselves. Governments have roles in markets only in maintaining a transparent and fair market with a level playing field. The Washington Consensus however recognizes that Governments have a role when there is market failure. When does the market fail and how do the authorities recognize that there is market failure?On the other side of the paradigm is the Development Consensus. The Development Consensus argues that Governments have a role in market development, since market stability requires a steadying hand. Growth occurs in an environment of market stability. Central banks and governments intervene to ensure “market smoothing”, taking out “spikes” in prices. The classic model of Development consensus was the 1960s model of fixed exchange rates, where central banks allow flexible interest rates, but intervene with foreign exchange reserves in order to maintain fixed exchange rates. With the floating of the dollar in early 1970s, higher exchange rate volatility, financial liberalization and gradual dismantling of exchange controls became the order of the day. In the 1980s, the EU member states experimented with market intervention to keep exchange rates within certain rate corridors. The failure of these policies, as well as the heavy costs of defending fixed exchange rates in developing economies, finally swung the views towards more free market approaches. The current consensus is that exchange rates should have two paradigms either totally free floating or fixed exchange rates. Both paradigms require specific conditions to succeed. Fixed exchange regimes require either flexible economies, strict currency board regimes or exchange control. “Dirty floating”, i.e. flexible exchange rates with some intervention by authorities, already carries the emotive term “dirty”, which clearly implies that a “clean” float is preferred. Intervention in Equity MarketsDirect government intervention in equity markets has been rare in developed markets. Even in the crash of 1987, where the sharp falls were blamed on program trading, the US authorities did not intervene. However, rules were changed to introduce market “curbs”, which may slow the rate of market change. In Asia, Taiwanese authorities were reported to have set up trust funds in the 1990s to keep market prices from falling too low. This was also done in the wake of the Asian crisis. In other Asian markets, authorities were reportedly using quasi-public funds (such as government owned funds, pension or provident scheme) to buy when it was felt that the market was too low. There are no public records on whether these price support operations were successful. There are rumours that a number of public funds in some economies have made large losses in such price support operations. The most publicized intervention was the Hong Kong Governments public intervention in the stock market to deter market manipulation by hedge funds in August 1998 Information drawn from publicly available sources, including an unpublished monograph using publicly available information by Charles Goodhart & Dai Lu, “Intervention to Save Hong Kong: The Authorities Counter-Speculation in Financial Markets, August, 1998,” March 2001. . The intervention was in Hang Seng Index stocks and cost US$15.1 billion. It successfully beat back the speculation and stabilized the Hang Seng Index. In October 1999, the Hong Kong Government created the TraHK Fund, which has since sold US$16 billion back to the public, with another US15 billion left, the difference being the profit between the cost of acquisition and current market valuation. The objective of the intervention was to maintain a level playing field and to avoid serious market distortion caused by market manipulation through a “double play” strategy. The intervention worked. Normal market conditions quickly returned, but the Hong Kong Government avowed not to intervene again unless there are exceptional circumstances. In the wake of the intervention, Hong Kong introduced 30-point measures to prevent further market manipulation, including criminal offences for short-selling, improved market surveillance and co-ordination between the financial regulators. The Hong Kong intervention worked because the financial and economic conditions in Hong Kong were fundamentally sound. There was no foreign debt, extremely high reserves to money supply ratio, a strong banking system and very flexible factor price adjustments in the economy. Speculators and Financial CrisisThe role of hedge funds in financial crisis is controversial. They were responsible for the devaluation of sterling in 1992. But recently David Hale David Hale, “Will Argentinas Crisis Destroy the Washington Consensus?”, Zurich Financial Services, January 22, 2002 has this comment about their non-involvement in the Argentina crisis: “The deflationary economic policies of Argentina ended in riots and revolution because George Soros and Julian Robertson retired from active management of their hedge funds nearly two years ago. If Mr Soros and Mr Robertson had remained active, the odds are high they would have launched an attack on the Argentine peso which would have forced a radical policy change twelve to eighteen months ago. As with the devaluation of the British Pound during 1992, such an attack would then have set the stage for economic recovery in Argentina. But because the hedge funds have ceased to be effective agents for changing misguided economic policies, the Argentine people had to rise in revolution instead.” The questions asked by this conference are:- (a) what measures are available for such intervention;(b) in what occasions such measures should be taken;(c) what considerations should be made in taking such measures;(d) what restrictions exist in resorting to such measures;(e) which measures should be imposed unilaterally, and which collectively. The answers to these questions are complex, because each case could be very different, depending on individual country conditions. Considerations in InterventionThe theory of free markets assumes a level playing field and the existence of free competition. Under such conditions, the market will determine the equilibrium price level, which may fluctuate according to supply and demand conditions. Objectives Market intervention can only occur for specific public policy objectives. The Conference thematic point suggest that these are “needed to deal with problems systemically insoluble in the market mechanisms, whose negative impacts could sometimes be devastating, because cross-border capital transactions could suddenly be made in massive volumes. Such interventions should, in other occasions, be required to achieve foreign policy objectives.” Risks There are considerable risks in market intervention. The most obvious risk is to damage the reputation of a free market. The credibility of government as regulator and market participant is at stake. The second risk is that the price support program fails, inflicting large losses when purchases are made at high prices, and prices finally settle at considerably lower levels. Resources In a closed domestic market, since the national authority can print money, any intervention by the government can win because the government has both the regulatory function as well as the largest resources. The trouble is that the government would have difficulty judging the appropriate price level to intervene and to maintain such levels. In a totally closed economy with absolute exchange control, theoretically the government can maintain prices above the equilibrium level without government intervention. The minute there is arbitrage, and there is an international price that is lower than the government maintained price, then there will be an outflow of capital until the two prices are equalized. However, since markets have become globalized, with relatively large capital flows, prices are determined not only by domestic players, but also global investors. The problem occurs where the international investors consider that the price level should be lower than the domestic price level. There are therefore two asset prices the stock market price and the exchange rate. In an open economy therefore, any authority contemplating intervening in the stock market will have to assess the availability of domestic and foreign currency. While it may be easier to draw on domestic funds to finance market support operations, in an open economy with no exchange control, there are limits to the foreign exchange available to resist the selling trend by foreigners and residents who wish to exit the market. Price Level the most difficult question is what is the right level of prices for intervention. The intuitive answer is that intervention occurs when the price level is below what is considered a “fair and appropriate level”. Speculators who short the market or investors who sell perhaps consider that the level should be considerably lower. The two key questions then are whether the intervention price level is close to its true equilibrium level, and whether there are adequate resources to back up that intervention. If the answers are both yes, then the chances of success are good, whereas if they are no, then the intervention will likely fail. What Occasions? Investors will tend to shun markets where there is sporadic government intervention because they believe that such risks are arbitrary and difficult to factor in. However, governments are known to intervene in cases where there are market failure or where there is market manipulation. The September 11 incident was a case where there was a terrorist attack that threatened the market infrastructure, removing some key players and disturbing public confidence. The Fed reduced interest rates, and ensured that adequate liquidity was available. The SEC introduced temporary regulatory relaxations, which allowed companies to buy back their shares, in order to ameliorate the selling pressure. Since the economic fundamentals were reasonably sound, and contingency measures were well implemented and decisive, the market rebounded quite quickly. Smaller markets suffer from both the danger of market manipulation and unequal participant size elephant in pond syndrome. Both are somewhat inter-related. Emerging markets tend to have smaller market float shares publicly available for trading and liquidity. Hence, larger foreign funds that come in to buy and sell in large volume relative to smaller local players can influence prices quite significantly. This volatility problem of emerging markets cannot be avoided because of the smaller size of these markets. In the days of larger macro-funds, with access to high leverage, their market power can be larger than many authorities of small markets. The US “CFTC identified a number of important regulatory concerns relating to hedge funds and to the OTC derivatives market: lack of transparency, excessive leverage, insufficient prudential controls and a need for greater international co-operation and co-ordination Brooksley Born, “International Regulatory Responses to Derivatives Crises: The Role of the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission”, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Spring 2001”. After LTCM, G-10 authorities limited the banks lending or credit lines to these macro-funds, so that the leverage factor was reduced. The larger funds are today less active, but there are now numerically more hedge funds. However, with the continued consolidation and merger of banks, insurance companies and fund managers, their market size relative to emerging markets is now huge. The largest mutual fund manager manages at least US$1 trillion in assets this compares with US$30 billion in market capitalization of some of the smaller Asian markets. Hence, even a relatively small allocation of funds into a small market can create large volatility. The realistic issue is whether the authorities have resources larger than these international players do. The answer in most circumstances is clearly no. Hence, there are four possible solutions: -(a) a code of conduct by international investors not to enter a market with such large resources as to disturb prices significantly there are signs that larger players, especially international banks with branches in different markets, are taking longer-term views and are unwilling to speculate in markets where they may damage themselves;(b) Imposition of regulatory rules that limit “elephant in pond” problem. However, this requires international co-operation in regulation that predicates on large international players, including hedge funds, reporting required regulatory information. There is no international consensus on this solution.(c) The authorities engage in credible market reforms that broadly reflect economic fundamentals. (d) Exchange controls or measur