企业财务控制机制与企业绩效基于价值的管理系统案例.doc

本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译原文：Corporate Financial Control Mechanisms and Firm Performance: The Case of Value-Based Management SystemsEffective corporate governance and financial control includes the use of monitoring and incentive mechanisms to align divergent interests between shareholders and managers and encourage the creation of shareholder value. Value-based management systems (VBM) provide an integrated management strategy and financial control system intended to increase shareholder value by mitigating agency conflicts. In concept, VBM reduces agency conflicts and helps create shareholder value since it reveals value-increasing decisions to employees, allows for easier monitoring of managers decisions, and provides a method to tie compensation to that create shareholder value. However, the degree to which VBM systems actually improve the economic performance of publicly held firms is an open question. To gain insight into this issue, we examine the use and economic efficacy of value-based management systems by 84 firms that adopt VBM systems from 1984 to 1997.Our primary goal is to examine whether the adoption of a VBM system improves economic performance. We recognize that firm performance and the decision to tie compensation to a VBM metric can be endogenous, which creates a potential sample selection bias. For instance, firms that are performing poorly face tougher challenges to creating economic value and could be more likely to tie compensation to VBM to provide managers the incentives to overcome these challenges. Alternatively, managers who expect to achieve a certain level of performance can negotiate a compensation contract based on the VBM metric that essentially assures a bonus payout. Our sample includes firms that base compensation on VBM metrics, but also firms that use VBM for analysis and evaluation only. Thus, we can examine why firms choose to tie compensation to VBM, which allows us to control for potential sample selection bias that results from endogenous relations between compensation plans and firm performance.The literature on property rights and agency theory maintains that different incentives lead to conflicts between shareholders and managers of the public firm that result in a loss in firm value. Ultimately, the shareholders bear this loss. Value-based management provides an integrated management strategy and financial control system designed to mitigate these agency conflicts and increase shareholder value. VBM systems attempt to accomplish this goal by providing managers with a set of decision-making tools (metrics) that, at least in theory, identify which alternatives create or destroy value, and often by linking compensation and promotions to shareholder value. Firms can use these metrics to monitor and reward management performance. They provide a mechanism for linking managers decisions to firm performance outcomes that create shareholder value and provide a means to further align shareholder and managerial interests.We identify four variations of VBM metrics from these articles in the popular press. All of the metrics are similar in that they are single-period measures of performance that take into account return on invested capital and the relevant cost of capital. They are all consistent with discounted cash flow valuation. Although consulting firms have popularized these metrics, many companies apply their own versions of the metrics. We do not take any given metric to represent the work of a consulting firm that may have popularized the method. Despite the attention afforded value-based management techniques and their widespread application, we have scant evidence on their ability to improve firm performance. Much of the existing empirical research, often conducted by the consulting firms who market value-based management systems, focuses on the relations between the metrics (or value-drivers) and shareholder value. These studies by consultants document positive relations between performance metrics and historical stock-price performances. In contrast, an academic study by Biddle, et al., (1997) concludes that EVA explains shareholder returns no better than earnings. Copeland (2002) argues that contemporaneous measures of common value-based management metrics do not do a good job of explaining changes in stock prices, and that changes in expectations need to be considered. Copelands argument underscores the difficulty in testing for any relation between the uses of VBM systems and stock price improvement. Ideally, we would like to examine the direct relation between the adoption of a VBM system and stock price appreciation. Since the market capitalizes expected future cash flows in the firms stock price and firms can potentially use financial policy decisions to signal expected improvements in advance of the public disclosure of operating results, it is difficult to construct direct tests of the relation between the adoption of VBM systems and shareholder wealth. Additionally, the decision to adopt a VBM system generally cannot be observed by investors, and it is rarely possible to identify a specific event date. However, we can test the prediction that adopting a VBM system should result in an increase in future cash flows net of the firms cost of capital, i.e., residual income. Thus, we investigate the relation between a firms economic performance, measured by residual income, and its adoption of a VBM system.To create financial value, a firm must generate cash flow in excess of that required to cover the firms cost of capital, e.g., the firm must earn an economic profit. To measure economic performance we use residual income as a proxy for economic profit earned by the firm. Conceptually, the market value added by a firm is the present value of expected future residual income discounted at the cost of capital. To examine the economic efficacy of VBM systems, we compare residual income for periods pre- and post-adoption of a VBM system. In addition to the basic relation between VBM adoption and residual income, we also examine effectiveness based on whether the firm ties compensation to the VBM system, growth opportunities, the pre-adoption level of capital expenditures, and the pre-adoption level of net working capital. As robustness checks, we also control for corporate restructuring, insider ownership, and timing of adoption. Residual income is affected by after-tax operating profit, invested capital, and the cost of capital. To examine whether any one component of residual income drives the post-adoption performance improvement, we examine median changes in each of the three components relative to matched firms for each of the five post-adoption periods. The results show that no one component of residual income drives the results, but rather, all three components appear to work together. Operating profit (cost of capital) shows steady increases (decreases) throughout the post-adoption period. A comprehensive VBM system typically ties executive compensation to the VBM metric, usually with a cash bonus. A strong relation between compensation and the VBM metric should align managers interests with those of shareholders and provide them with the incentives to improve economic performance. To examine the influence of tying compensation to the VBM system, we classify firms as to whether or not compensation is tied to the VBM metric, as reported by responding companies. We present these results in Table 5. The median firm that ties compensation to VBM improves residual income for all post adoption intervals. Firms that do not base compensation on the VBM metric also experience positive changes for all post-adoption intervals, which are statistically significant for all intervals. Thus, despite the proposed incentive alignment, firms that base compensation on VBM do not appear to improve economic performance better than those firms that do not use VBM for compensation. This result is consistent with Riceman, One possible explanation, mentioned above, is that firms that tie compensation to VBM face tougher obstacles to improving economic performance and use the VBM metric to provide managers with greater incentives. We will explore this possibility in our multivariate model, which includes controls for sample bias.High-growth firms derive a greater proportion of their value from future investments as opposed to assets in place (Myers, 1977). Performance improvements associated with VBM could be higher for growth firms if the system helps these firms identify those portions of their investment opportunities that can be converted into cash flows. Alternatively, greater information asymmetries characterize high-growth firms, which make it more difficult to design corporate governance systems for these firms. Holmstrom (1979) argues that contracts based on observable outcomes (e.g., stock price appreciation) result in a second-best solution. He suggests that contracts can be improved if firms obtain additional information about the managers actions. If VBM generates information about which actions create value, then VBM could be more effective for high-growth firms.To examine the relation between growth opportunities and VBM effectiveness, we classify firms based on the market-to-book ratio of assets. We define high-growth firms as firms with market-to-book assets above the sample median in the year prior to VBM adoption, and low-growth firms as those below the sample median. For our sample, the median market to book asset ratio is 1.49. Table 6 presents the analysis of residual income segmented by growth opportunity. Our findings suggest that VBM is no more or less effective for the high-growth firms than for the low-growth firms. Both groups of firms experience positive changes in relative residual income divided by invested capital for all post-adoption periods. To examine the relation between working capital and VBM effectiveness, we classify firms as having either high net working capital or low net working capital. High-net-working capital firms have a level of net working capital as a percentage of assets that is above the sample median, and low-net-working-capital firms have a level of net working capital as a percentage of assets below the sample median. We measure net working capital as current assets minus current liabilities divided by total assets in the year prior to adoption of a VBM system.Stock ownership by insiders could confound our results. Managerial ownership possibly substitutes for a VBM system and serves as an alternate mechanism for aligning manager and shareholder interests, or it could complement the VBM system and provide managers with greater incentives to make the VBM implementation successful. We gather ownership data from proxy statements when available and from the Value Line Investment Survey if the proxy is not available. To examine the influence of managerial ownership, we classify firms based on whether the level of managerial ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding is high or low. We do not find any significant differences in post-adoption performance based on the level of managerial stock ownership. Our evidence suggests that VBM is effective in both high- and low growth firms. However VBM metrics focus on the current period and provide incentives to reduce invested capital. This combination leads to a natural question: Does the increase in short-term residual income in high-growth firms come at the expense of capital investment? If so, any gains from a myopic investment strategy may come at the expense of shareholder value. To shed light on this issue, we examine the relation between VBM adoption and the change in industry-adjusted capital expenditures as a percentage of sales for both high-capital expenditure firms and high-growth firms. If, as conjectured, VBM provides incentives to mitigate the overinvestment problem, we expect that firms that invest more than their matching firm will cut capital expenditures following the VBM adoption. If the single-period nature of the VBM metric induces an unintended short-term focus we expect High-growth firms to cut industry-adjusted spending following the adoption of a VBM system. We present the results from our analysis in Table 9.We find that the typical firm in our sample significantly improves residual income following the adoption of VBM. No one component of residual income (after-tax operating profit, invested capital, or cost of capital) drives the result, but rather all three components appear to work together. VBM does not appear to be more or less effective when used for compensation or when adopted by firms with high or low levels of capital expenditures, growth opportunities, or investment in working capital. We do not find any indication that gains in residual income come at the expense of long-term investment.In sum, our analysis suggests that VBM produces improvements in economic performance. Overall, matched-firm-adjusted residual income is higher in all five post-adoption years relative to the year prior to adoption. The use of value-based management systems is associated with improved economic performance for a sustained period.Source: Harley E.Ryan Jr, Emery A.Trahan, 2007. “Corporate Financial Control Mechanisms and Firm Performance: The Case of Value-Based Management Systems”.Journal of Business Finance&Accounting, vol.34, nos.1-2, January/March, pp.111-138.译文：企业财务控制机制与企业绩效：基于价值的管理系统案例有效的公司治理和财务控制包括监控和激励机制来调整股东与管理者的利益并鼓励不同利益的股东创造价值。基于价值的管理系统（VBM）提供一个综合管理战略和财务控制系统，通过减少代理冲突来增加股东价值。从概念上讲，VBM减少代理冲突并帮助创造股东价值，因为它揭示了员工决定价值的增加，使得管理者的决策更容易得到监控，并给出了一种领带补偿方法来创造股东价值。然而，何种程度的VBM系统可以提高公司公开的经济业绩是一个待解决的问题。为了深入了解这个问题，我们研究在1984年和1997年间被84个公司采用过的VBM系统的使用和经济效益。我们的主要目标是研究VBM系统的采用是否能提高经济业绩。我们发现公司业绩和决定以配合补偿的VBM指标可以是内生的，它创建了一个潜在的样本选择偏差。举例来说，业绩不佳的企业在创造经济价值方面面临严峻的挑战，而更容易配合提供补偿，以管理人员的激励机制来克服这些挑战。另外，一些经理希望达到一定水平的业绩，可以以VBM标准签订补偿协议，从而本质上保证了奖金的支付。我们的样本包括那些以VBM标准为基础补偿的公司，也有那些只用VBM分析和评估的公司。因此，我们就可以研究，企业为什么企业选择VBM系统补偿法，使我们控制潜在样本的选择性偏差，而得到补偿性计划和公司绩效的内生性关系。关于产权和代理理论的文献认为，不同的激励导致股东和公共公司的管理者之间的冲突，最终，是股东承担这一损失。基于价值的管理提供了一个综合管理战略和财务控制系统，旨在减轻这些代理冲突，增加股东价值。VBM试图通过为经理提供一套决策制定工具来完成这一目标，至少在理论上，可以确定哪些方案是创造价值还是毁灭价值，把股东价值将补偿和升职联系起来。企业可以利用这些指标来监测和奖励管理业绩。他们提供了一个把管理者的决策和公司业绩结果联系的机制，创造股东价值并提供进一步调整股东利益机制和管理的手段。我们将从大众媒体的这些文章中确定VBM指标的四个变化。所有的指标都是相似的，考虑到投资资本和资本回报采取相关费用，它们都是单周期性的。它们都符合现金流量折现报价。虽然咨询公司有推广这些指标，但许多公司用的是适合他们公司本身的指标。我们不接受任何给定的指标以代表一家可能推广这方法的咨询公司工作。对VBM技术和它们广泛应用的关注，我们有足够的证据证明它们可以提高企业业绩的能力。那些交易VBM系统的咨询公司利用现有的实证研究关注指标和股东权益之间的联系。相反，比德尔（1997）的一现学术论文，认为VBM解释了股东收益和收入是一样的。科普兰（2002）认为，同样的VBM指标并不能很好的解释股票价格变化，且预期的变化需要被考虑。科普兰的说法强调了测试VBM系统和股票价格提高的关系的难度。理想的情况下，我们应该研究VBM系统的采用和股票价值增值的直接关系。由于市场资本化期望股票价格中的未来现金流量以及公司可能利用的金融政策决定，提前改善公开披露的操作结果。构造直接测试采取VBM系统和股东财富关系是非常难的。此外，采用一个VBM系统的决策一般不能被投资者观察到，并且它几乎不可能确定一个特定的日期。然而，我们可能预测，采用VBM的制度导致未来现金流量的增加公司的资本即剩余收益净成本。因此，我们探讨一个企业的经济绩效的关系，以剩余收益来衡量，其系统采用了VBM系统。为了创造财务价值，公司必须产生现金流，以支付该公司的资本费用，例如，企业必须赚取经济利润，为了衡量经济绩效我们用剩余收益作为公司经济利润收益的替代。从概念上讲，一家公司的市场增加值是现值的预期收益。为了研究VBM系统的经济效益，我们比较期间前后采用VBM系统的剩余收益。此外对于采用VBM和剩余收益之间的基本关系，我们同样研究企业是否用补偿的VBM系统，成长机会，资本支出前应用水平，以及采用前的运营资金净额。作为稳健性的检查，我们也控制企业重组，内部人持股和时间的采用。税后营业利润，投入资本和资本成本影响剩余收益。研究剩余收益的任何一个部分对事后采用业绩有提高作用，我们研究三个因素相关的匹配