天津大学PPT模板.ppt

目录,1.Introduction2.LiteratureReview3.Model3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicy3.2CostStructure3.3InformationStructure3.4ContractTypesandPayoffs3.5SignalingGame4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformation5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventory5.1Resource-BasedContract5.2Performance-BasedContract6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6.1Resource-BasedContract6.2Performance-BasedContract7.Extensions:EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies7.1EndogenizingInventoryVerifiability7.2PoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers8.Conclusions,1.Introduction,供货商,买方,产品,PBC,RBC,可靠性私有信息,使用,备用库存,维护,背景介绍,文献回顾,2.LiteratureReview,PBCforoutsourcedservicesasymmetricinformationinoperationsmanagementtheuseofwarrantiesasasignalingmechanism,建模,3.Model,3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicyN:identicalcopies;B:inventorybackorder;s:inventory;TheexpectedbackordersinsteadystateisAvailabilityisequalto,建模,3.2CostStructureEachtimeaproductfailureoccurs,thebuyerincursafixedcostr0.ThebuyersexpectedcostisequaltoThevendorsexpectedcostisequalto,建模,3.3InformationStructureWeassumethattheproductofferedbythevendorisoneoftwopossibletypes,LorH,whereLdenoteslowreliabilityandHdenoteshighreliability.Hazardrateordering（危险率序）:Excesswealthordering（剩余财富序）:,建模,3.4ContractTypesandPayoffsWecanwritethebuyersexpectedpayoffasThevendorsexpectedpayoffisgivenbyRBC:PBC:,建模,3.5SignalingGameWeassumethatthevendor,whopossessesprivateinformationaboutthereliabilityofanewlydevelopedproduct,choosescontracttermsandproposesthemtothebuyer.Thebuyerthenacceptsthecontracttermsifhisexpectedpayoffexceedsanoutsideoptionvaluedat.WeseekaperfectBayesianequilibrium(PBE)thatisalsorenegotiation-proof.,建模,4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformation,Giventhevendortype,thefirst-bestoutcomeisobtainedbysolvingtheoptimizationproblem.,建模,5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventory,Wenowconsiderthesettinginwhichthevendorpossessesprivateinformationaboutproductreliability.,5.1Resource-BasedContractThevalueofsetbythevendorinhercontractmayrelayinformationaboutwhetherornottheproductisreliable.,建模,5.1Resource-BasedContract,Insummary,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorispossibleunderRBCwhenherinventorychoiceisverifiable,butitcomesatacostsincethevendorhastoleavepositivesurplustothebuyer.,建模,5.2Performance-BasedContract,Therefore,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorcanbedoneunderbothRBCandPBCwhentheinventoryisverifiable.However,PBCpresentsanadvantagebecauseitsrisksharingmechanismismoreamenabletosignalingthanthatofRBC.,建模,6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory,6.1Resource-BasedContractWithinventorynolongerverifiable,thepayofffunctionsforthevendorandthebuyerunderRBCremainthesameasthoseoftheverifiableinventorycase.Anunderinvestmentininventorycauseseconomicinefficiency.,建模,6.2Performance-BasedContractThereliablevendoroverinvestsininventoryinequilibrium.Overall,wefindthattheinteractionbetweenthevendorsdiscretionaryinventorychoiceandhersignalingincentivecreatessubtledynamicsthatimpacttherelativeefficiencyofafter-salesservicecontractsinnontrivialways.,建模,Whichcontracttypewillthereliablevendorprefer?Thus,thereliablevendorfindsthattheabilitytosignalhertypewithPBCmorethancompensatesforthecostassociatedwithoverinvestmentininventoryandanybenefitpresentedbyRBC,whichdoesnotimproveuponapoolingoutcome.,扩展,7.Extensions:EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies,EndogenizingInventoryVerifiabilityPoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers,结论,8.Conclusions,Suggestions:Thekey