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Department of EconomicsAdvanced Microeconomics - Course Outline and Reading GuideLecturer: Yew-Kwang Ng (phone: 65642051; Room 112;Email: K.au )Students who have solid background and are not adverse to a mathematical approach may use H.R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, Norton, 3rd edition, 1992. An alternative advanced text emphasizing game theory is David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press, 1990. Even more advanced texts includes:Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green, 1995. Microeconomics Theory. Oxford University Press. (An advanced textbook in microeconomics theory.) However, the following texts are referred to frequently.Geoffery A. Jehle & Philip J. Reny (2001). Advanced Microeconomic Theory (2nd Edition). Boston: Addison-Wesley. (JR)Y.-K. Ng, Mesoeconomics: A Micro-Macro Analysis, London: Harvester, 1986. A simpler alternative to JR is:David G. Luenberger (1995). Microeconomic Theory. McGraw-Hill. (DL) The following topics are provided for reading. The lectures may not cover all topics and may not proceed in the same order.: (0)Mathematical Introduction (May be skipped if students are already familiar)JR: Ch. A1 & A2 DL: Appendix C(1)Basic Consumer TheoryMainly on consumer preferences and the existence of utility functions, properties of demand functions, the composite commodity theorem, and the Slutsky equation.DL: Ch. 4 JR: Ch. 1, 2, 3.Ng, Welfare Economics, App.1B.H.A.J. Green, Consumer Theory, Chapters 1-7P.R.G. Layard and A.A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory, McGraw-Hill, Sections 5.1 and 5.2Varian, Chapters 7-9(2)Some ExtensionsR.H. Frank, “If Homo Economicus could choose his own utility function, would he want one with a conscience?” American Economic Review, September 1987, 593-604; June 1989, 588-596.Y.-K. Ng, “Step-optimization, secondary constraints, and Giffen goods”, Canadian Journal of Economics, November 1972, 553-560.Y.-K. Ng, “Diamonds are a governments best friend: Burden-free taxes on goods valued for their values”, American Economic Review, March 1987, 77: 186-191.Y.-K. Ng, “Mixed diamond goods and anomalies in consumer theory: Upward-sloping compensated demand curves with unchanged diamondness”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 1993, 25: 287-293.(3)UncertaintyDL: Ch.11Gravelle & Rees, Chapters 19 and 20Green, Chapters 13, 14 & 15Y.-K. Ng, “Why do people buy lottery tickets? Choices involving risk and the indivisibility of expenditure”, Journal of Political Economy, October 1965, 530-535.Varian, Chapter 11Y.-K. Ng, “Expected subjective utility: Is the Neumann-Morgenstern utility the same as the neoclassicals?” Social Choice Welfare, 1984, pp. 177-186.(4) Production and Marginal Productivity TheoriesDL: Ch. 5 JR: Ch. 2, 3.Baumol, Chapter 11Henderson & Quandt, Chapter 3Varian, Chapters 1-5R.H. Frank, “Are workers paid their marginal products”, American Economic Review, 1984, 549-571.L. Borghans & L. Groot, “Superstardom and monopolistic power: Why media stars earn more than their marginal contribution to welfare”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1998, pp.546-(5)Introduction to Mesoeconomic AnalysisY.-K. Ng, Mesoeconomics: A Micro-Macro Analysis, London: Harvester, 1986.Y.-K. Ng, “Business confidence and depression prevention: A mesoeconomic perspective”, American Economic Review, May 1992, 82(2): 365-371.Ng, “Non-neutrality of money under non-perfect competition: why do economists fail to see the possibility?” In Arrow, Ng, and Yang, eds., Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp.232-252.(6)General EquilibriumDL: Ch. 7; JR: Ch.5K.J. Arrow & F. Hahn (1971), General Competitive Analysis, Chapter 1F. Black (1995), Exploring General Equilibrium, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.J.S. Chipman, “The nature and meaning of equilibrium in economic theory”, in D. Martindale, ed., Functionalism in Social Sciences; reprinted in H. Townsend, ed., Price Theory, Penguin.Gravelle & Rees, Chapter 16W. Nicholson, Appendix B to Chapter 19, “The existence of general equilibrium prices”, Microeconomic Theory, 1985, The Dryden Press, 684-694.Starr. R.M. (1997). General Equilibrium Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.Varian, Chapters 17 & 21S. Zamagni, Microeconomic Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, Ch. 16.(7)Selected Topics in Microeconomic Analysis(a) Adverse selection, signalling, and screening.Akerlof, G. “The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 89: 488-500.Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., Microeconomic theory New York : Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 13.(b) The principal-agent problemHolmstrom, B., (1979), “Moral hazard and Observability”, Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., Microeconomic theory New York : Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 14.(c) Incentives and mechanism designMirrlees, James A. “An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation”, Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38:175-208.Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., Microeconomic theory New York : Oxford University Press, 1995, Ch. 23.(d) Should the benefit/cost ratio for public projects/spending be higher due to the excess burden of raising public revenue?Feldstein, Martin “How Big Should Government Be?” National Tax Journal50 No.2 (June 1997): 197-213. Kaplow, Louis “The optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation.” National Tax Journal 49 No.4 (Dec.1996): 513-533.Ng, “The optimal size of public spending and the distortionary cost of taxation”, National Tax Journal 53 No.2 (June 2000): 252-272.(e) Relative-income effects, economic growth, environmental quality, and welfare: Further considerations on the optimal size of public spending.Ng, Relative-Income Effects and the Appropriate Level of Public Expenditure, Oxford Economic Papers, June 1987, pp. 293-300.Ng & Wang, J. Relative Income, Aspiration, Environmental Quality, Individual and Political Myopia: Why May the Rat-Race for Material Growth be Welfare-Reducing?, Mathematical Social Sciences, 1993, Vol. 26, pp. 3-23.Ng, Siang & Ng, Yew-Kwang, “Why do governments increase with growth but happiness remains unchanged?”, Social Choice and Welfare, 2001.NG, Yew-Kwang (2003), From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare economics”, Social Coice and Welfare, 20: 307-50. (g) One answer to two parodoxes?Ng, The Older the More Valuable: Divergence between Utility and Dollar Values of Life as One Ages, Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift fr Nationalkonomie), 1992, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 1-16.Ng, The Paradox of the Adventurous Young and the Cautious Old: Natural Selection versus Rational Calculation, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1991, Vol. 153, pp. 339-352. Sun, Guangzhen & Ng, “A Theory of Age-Dependent Value of Life and Time ”, typescript.(h) Specialization and Economic OrganizationYang, Xiaokai, Economics: New Classical versus Neoclassical Frameworks, Blackwell, 2001, Chs.5-7, 11.Yang, Xiaokai & Ng, Y.-K. Specialization and Economic Organization: A New Classical Microeconomic Framework. In Contributions to Economic Analysis, Vol. 215, 1993, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. xvi + 507. (Mainly Chs.0-2, 5.)Yang, Xiaokai & Ng, Siang, “Specialization and Division of Labour: A Survey”, in Kenneth J. Arrow, et al,

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