内部控制信息披露译文.doc

Investor reactions to disclosuresof material internal controlweaknesses投资者对内部控制信息资料披露缺陷的反应The implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) Sections 302 and 404changed the requirements for making public disclosures regarding internal controls.Section 302 of the Act requires that the chief executive officer and the chief financialofficer in the periodic statutory financial reports evaluate the effectiveness of the internalcontrols and disclose any weaknesses in internal controls. Section 404 of the Act requiresthat public firm annual filings (10-K) contain the managements assessment of thedesign and the effectiveness of the firms internal controls. Moreover, it also demands theauditor to provide a separate opinion on managements assessment and the auditorsevaluation of the internal controls. Research on both Sections 302 and 404 disclosures萨班斯 - 奥克斯利法案的实施（SOX，2002年）第302和404部分要求作出有关内部控制的公开披露的改变。该法第302条规定，首席执行官和首席财政官员在法定的定期财务报告中需要评估内部的有效性管制和披露内部控制中的弱点。该法第404条规定公众公司的年度报表（10-K）要包含的对管理层的评估设计和公司内部控制的有效性。此外，它也要求审计人员对管理层的评估提供独立意见和审计内部控制的评价。研究302和404两部分披露show that internal control weakness disclosures are associated with firms that aresmaller, financially weaker, rapidly growing, more complex, have less expertise on theaudit committee, less independent auditors, and recent auditor changes(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007b; Zhang et al., 2007). As expected,weaknesses in internal controls are also related to decreased financial statement quality(Doyle et al., 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008). In existing literature, Beneish et al.(2008) find a negative investor reaction to Section 302 disclosures but no reaction toSection 404 internal control weaknesses. Hammersley et al. (2008) study the reactionsto Section 302 disclosures and find that the information content of the internal controlweakness disclosures depend on the severity of the weakness.In this paper, the abnormal returns, the change in volatility, and the changein systematic risk around the announcement of the auditors internal controlweakness disclosures are examined. The contribution of this paper is threefold. First,it provides further evidence on the abnormal returns around Section 404 internalcontrol weaknesses. Second, the volatility and systematic risk effects of internal controlweakness disclosures are analyzed. Third, as suggested in previous literature two eventdates are studied, the customary 10-K filing date (Jones, 1996; Beneish et al., 2008;Hammersley et al., 2008) and the date of the actual event, i.e. the audit report date(Carter and Soo, 1999; Knechel et al., 2007).表明存在内部控制信息披露缺陷的公司一般都规模较小，经济实力较弱，生长迅速，内部结构复杂，审计委员会专业知识偏少，缺乏独立的审计师和近期审计师的更换（Ashbaugh-Skaife等人，2007; Doyle等人，2007年b; Zhang等，2007）。正如所料，内部控制的缺陷也波及到了财务报表质量的降低（Doyle等人，2007年a;Ashbaugh-Skaife等人，2008）。在现有的文献中，Beneish等。（2008）发现了消极的投资者对第302条披露的反应，但对第404条的内部控制缺陷没有反应。哈默斯利等（2008）研究了第302披露反应，发现内部控制的信息内容弱点披露取决于弱点的严重性。在本文中，对超额收益，波动性的变化，和围绕核数师内部控制的通知系统性风险变化披露进行检查。本文的贡献是一举三得。首先，它提供了进一步的证据，围绕第404部分的超额收益控制弱点。第二，对内部控制缺点披露中的波动性和系统性风险的影响进行了分析。第三，在以前的文献中提出了两个事件日期并进行了研究，习惯性的10-K申请日（琼斯，1996; Beneish等人，2008;哈默斯利等，2008）和实际事件的日期，即审计报告日（Carter和洙，1999; Knechel等人，2007）。The initial findings suggest that the weakness disclosure is good news to theinvestors. Abnormal returns are positive and partly significant around the audit reportdate as well as the 10-K date. Following Beneish et al. (2008) the sample is split basedon the preceding managements internal control assessment. The results show that theabnormal reaction is positive and significant when the audit report is consistent withthe management report, and negative when the audit report is conflicting with themanagement report. Beneish et al. (2008) report the similar (but insignificant) directionsfor abnormal returns for the “Bad, Bad” and “Good, Bad” firms. Finally, this paperreports a significant increase in volatility around the audit report date and a significantdecrease around the 10-K date.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The hypotheses are developedin Section 2, Section 3 reports the sample and the methodology, Section 4 containsresults, and Section 5 concludes the paper.初步调查表明，弱点披露对投资者来说是个喜讯。超额收益为积极性，且在审计报告日期前后尤为显著以及10-K日期。以下Beneish等（2008）的样本分裂是以在前面的管理层的内部控制评价为基础。结果表明，当审计报告和管理层报告相一致，该异常反应是积极和显著的；当审计报告和管理报告相互冲突时，该反应消极。 Beneish等（2008）报告了类似（但不显著）的方向为“坏，坏”和“好，坏”公司的超常收益。最后，本文报告审计报告日期前后波动性显著增加，10-K日期前后波动性显著减少。本文的其余部分安排如下，假设发展在第2结，第3节报告了样品和方法学，第4节中包含研究结果，还有第5节总结全文。Research on both Sections 302 and 404 disclosures show that internal control weaknessesare associated with firms that are smaller, financially weaker, rapidly growing, morecomplex, and have ongoing restructuring (Doyle et al., 2007b; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.,2007). Zhang et al. (2007) find firms with less financial and non-accounting financialexpertise on their audit committees, less independent auditors, and recent auditor changesare more likely to disclose internal control weaknesses. Furthermore, Doyle et al. (2007a)and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) find that internal control weaknesses are associatedwith lower quality accruals. Schneider and Church (2008) find that weaknesses in internalcontrols reduce the lenders confidence on financial statements. In general, weaknesses ininternal controls can affect the quality of financial statements by either allowing moreintentional earnings management or unintentional errors. The evidence (Ashbaugh-Skaifeet al., 2008) suggests, however, that weaknesses are more likely to lead to unintentionalErrors.研究302和404两部分的披露显示，内部控制缺陷与公司的规模较小，经济实力较弱，快速增长的关联，更复杂，并有持续的结构调整（Doyle等人，2007年b;Ashbaugh-Skaife等，2007年）。 Zhang等人（2007）发现企业用更少的财务和非财务核算在他们的审计委员会，缺乏独立的审计师和近期审计师更换的更有可能披露内部控制缺陷。此外，Doyle等人 （2007年a）和Ashbaugh-Skaife等 （2008）发现的内部控制缺陷与低质量的权责发生制有关联。施耐德和教堂（2008）发现了内部控制缺陷降低了贷款人对财务报表信心的这一弱点。在一般情况下，内部控制弱点能影响财务报表的质量，无论是因为允许更多有意的盈余管理还是无意的错误。证据（Ashbaugh-Skaife等人，2008）表明，然而，缺点是更有可能导致无意错误。Previous studies suggest that there is a negative abnormal reaction to theannouncement of managements Section 302 internal control weaknesses (Beneish et al.,2008; Hammersley et al., 2008). Beneish et al. (2008) report that the auditor quality andclient size attenuates the reaction to Section 302 disclosures, and Hammersley et al.(2008) find that the reaction depends on the characteristics of the weakness. Theempirical evidence suggests that auditors Section 404 internal control weaknessdisclosures are not associated with abnormal returns around the announcement(Ogneva et al., 2007; Beneish et al., 2008). Beneish et al. (2008) conclude that theinformation environment of firms that are required to report under Section 404 is richerand this attenuates the surprise or that Section 404 reports may reflect a low materialitythreshold for disclosure. In an additional analysis, Beneish et al. (2008) study the costof capital effects of internal control weakness disclosures. They report that forSection 302 reports increased the cost of capital, whereas Section 404 reports do not.Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) in their working paper find a significant negative marketreaction to Section 404 reports, and also their cross-sectional test indicates that thesystematic risks are higher for firms disclosing internal control weaknesses. Similarly,Schneider and Church (2008) find that the bank loan officers assessments are negativelyaffected by disclosed internal control weaknesses. In contrast, Ogneva et al. (2007) findthat internal control weaknesses are not associated with higher cost of equity.以往的研究表明，有一个消极异常反应针对管理层对第302条的内部控制缺陷公告（Beneish等，2008年;哈默斯利等人，2008）。 Beneish等（2008）报告中指出，审计质量和客户端大小衰减反应第302条披露，以及哈默斯利等（2008）发现，反应依赖于弱点的特性。该经验证据表明，审计师第404条的内部控制缺陷披露不与周围的公告超额收益相关（Ogneva等人，2007; Beneish等人，2008）。 Beneish等（2008）推断的结论信息环境下要求公司报告的第404条款是丰富的，还有这变弱了惊喜，或者第404条报告可能反映低重要性门槛披露。在一个额外的分析中，Beneish等（2008）研究了成本对内部控制缺陷披露的资本效应。他们的报告指出，为第302条报告增加了资金成本，而第404条报告没有。Ashbaugh-Skaife等（2009年）在其工作文件中找到一个显著的负面市场反应第404条报告，以及它们的横截面的测试表明，该系统性风险更高若为公司披露内部控制缺陷。同样，施耐德和教堂（2008）发现，银行信贷人员评估受披露的内部控制缺陷的消极影响。与此相反，Ogneva等（2007）发现内部控制的弱点不是与更高的股本成本有关。Most previous studies, use abnormal stock returns to measure the investor reactionsto qualified audit report announcements. However, as Fargher and Wilkins (1998)point out, stock prices reflect both the expected size of the future cash flows and theexpected risk of the future cash flows. The internal control weakness disclosure hasthe potential to add uncertainty to the stock markets, i.e. increase the risk of future cashflows, since the internal control weaknesses may have implications on financialinformation quality, management reliability, or management competence. As a result,the weaknesses may complicate the estimation of future cash flows of the firm and thiswill increase the risk of the firm, i.e. the chance that the future cash flows will bedifferent from what is currently expected. By recognizing that audit reports may affectthe risk of the firm, it is important also to examine the change in risk. In this study,the change in volatility and change in systematic risk are used to measure whether anadjustment in the risk levels has occurred as a result of the auditors internal controlweakness disclosure. 大多数以往的研究中，使用异常股票收益来衡量投资者的反应合格审计报告的公告。然而，随着Fargher和威尔金斯（1998年）指出，股票价格反映预期的未来现金流的大小预期未来现金流的风险。内部控制的弱点信息披露可能增加股票市场的不确定性,即增加未来现金的风险流,因为内部控制的弱点可能会对金融信息质量、可靠性管理或管理能力有所影响，其结果，弱点可能会复杂化的估计公司的未来现金流，这一点估计将增加公司的风险，即有机会的未来现金流会不同于目前所预期的。通过认识到审计报告可能影响该公司的风险，同样重要的是检查该风险的变化。在这项研究中，波动性的变化和系统性风险的变化用来衡量是否调整风险水平的发生是由于审计的内部控制弱点披露。这项研究测试有以下假设：H1A.审计的内部控制缺陷披露与负相关超额收益。H1B.审计的内部控制缺陷披露与关联增加波动性。H1C.审计的内部控制缺陷披露与关联增加系统性风险The sample of this study includes Russell 3000 index constituents with auditorsinternal control weakness disclosures.