Philosophy of Science.doc

03秋 社會研究方法社會系 關秉寅老師一些科學哲學上的思考n 科學知識是什麼？幾種不同的觀點1. Wallace (1979: 18): Elements in the Scientific Process“There are at least four ways of generating, and testing the truth of, empirical statement: authoritarian, mythical, logico-rational and scientific. A principal distinction among these is the manner in which each vests confidence in the producer of the statement that is alleged to be true (that is, one asks, Who says so?); in the procedure by which the statement was produced (that is, one asks, How do you know?); and in the effect of the statement (that is, one asks, What difference does it makes?).” (Wallace, 1979: 11)“. Among these four modes of generating and testing empirical statements, the scientific mode combines a primary reliance on the observational effects of the statements in question, with a secondary reliance on the procedures (methods) used to generate them. Relatively little weight is placed on characteristics of the producer per se; but when they are involved, achieved rather than ascribed characteristics are stressed - not for their own sakes, but as prima facie certifications of effect and procedure claims.” (Wallace, 1979: 13)2. Collins (1979): Why is Sociology not a Science?“My contention is that sociology can be a successful science and that it is well on the way to becoming so. The problem is to understand just what is involved in this. There are a number of different goals that have been set for sociology (and for the social sciences generally); . As things stand now, we have badly confused the explanatory, practical, ideological, and aesthetic aspects of the social sciences.” (Collins, 1979:1)“The scientific ideal is to explain everything, and to do it by making causal statements which are ultimately based upon experience. The most powerful scientific theory is the one that can get the most explanatory mileage out of the most concise body of principles. Science is a way of extrapolating from things we know to things we do not, a way of seeing the novel as another arrangement of the familiar.” “This aim is no different when applied to sociology than to physics, however different the empirical materials may be.”(Collins, 1979: 2)“The basic method of explanatory science is that of controlled comparison. The essence of methodological empiricism - and that is what science is - is to explain a phenomenon not by looking at it in isolation but by comparison and contrast to other things. To understand a thing, we must compare where it occurs with where it does not occur, and note the difference of in the accompanying conditions.” (Collins, 1979: 4)3. Turner (1991: 2) : Types of KnowledgeIs knowledge to be empirical?YesNo Ideologies; or beliefs Religions; or beliefs Yes that state the way the that state the dictates world should be of supernatural forces Is knowledge to be evaluative? Science; or the belief Logics; or the various that all knowledge systems of reasoning No is to reflect the that employ rules of actual operation of calculation the empirical world “. There are different ways to look at, interpret, and develop knowledge about the world. Science is only one way. Science is based upon the presumption that knowledge can be value free, that it can explain the actual working of the empirical world, and that it can be revised on the basis of careful observations of empirical events. However, even this portrayal of science is questioned by many who regard it as rather idealized. For these critics, values always figure into what we study. The empirical world is not just there; rather, it is filtered through concepts and presuppositions. And rarely are facts dispassionately collected to test theories; indeed, there are always organizational politics, revolving around vested interests and resources, that influence what facts we collect and how we interpret them.” “Perhaps even more fundamental than criticisms of sciences assertion of neutrality and objectivity is the belief among many sociologists that the very nature of the social universe precludes science as a useful mode of inquiry. Humans are creative and can change the nature of their world; as a consequence, they can obviate and make obsolete or irrelevant theories that purport to explain human interaction and organization. There are no timeless, universal properties of human organization, and hence there can be no laws like that those in natural sciences. Human constantly remake their universe in ways that render scientific theories inappropriate.” (Turner, 1991: 3-4)4. Alexander (1985: 632-633): Positivist and Post-Positivist Views of Science among Social ScientistsA. The major postulates of the “positivist persuasion”:(1) A radical break exists between empirical observations and non-empirical statements. (2) Because of this assumed break between general statements and observations, it is widely believed that more general intellectual issues - philosophical or metaphysical - are not fundamentally significant for the practice of an empirically oriented discipline. (3) Since such an elimination of the non-empirical (purely intellectual) reference is taken to be the distinguishing feature of the natural sciences, it is believed that any objective study of society must assume a natural scientific self-consciousness. (4) Questions which are of a theoretical or general nature can correctly be dealt with only in relation to empirical observations. There are three important corollaries to this fourth point: (a) Regarding the formulation of scientific theories, the positivist persuasion argues that the process of theory formation should be one of construction through generalization, a construction consisting of inductions from observation. (b) Regarding the problem of theoretical conflict, the positivist persuasion argues that empirical tests must in every case be the final arbiter between theoretical disputes. It is crucial experiments rather than conceptual dispute that determine the outcome of competition between theories. (c) If the formulation of theories and the conflict between them can be entirely reduced to empirical material, there can be no long-term basis for structured kinds of scientific disagreement. Social-scientific development is viewed as a basically progressive one, that is as linear and cumulative, and the segmentation or internal differentiation of a scientific field is viewed as the product of specialization rather than the result of generalized, non-empirical disagreement.B. The fundamental postulates of the post-positivist persuasion, which all point to the rehabilitation of the theoretical:(1) First, all scientific data are theoretically informed. The fact/theory distinction is not concrete, does not exist in nature, but is analytic. Calling statements observational is a manner of speech. We use some theories to provide us with the hard facts, while we allow others the privilege of tentatively explaining them.(2) Empirical commitments are not based solely on empirical evidence. The principled rejection of evidence is often the very bedrock upon which the continuity of a theoretical science depends.(3) The elaboration of general scientific theory is normally dogmatic rather than skeptical. Theoretical formulation does not proceed, as Popper would have it, according to the law of fiercest struggle for survival ., when a general theoretical position is confronted with contradictory empirical evidence which cannot be simply ignored (which is often the first response), it proceeds to develop ad hoc hypotheses and residual categories which allow these anomalous phenomena to be explained in a manner that does not surrender a theorys more general formulations.(4) Fundamental shifts in scientific belief will occur only when empirical challenges are matched by the availability of alternative theoretical commitments. . The struggle between general theoretical positions is among the most powerful energizers of empirical research, and it must be placed at the heart of major changes in the natural sciences.5. Sayer (1992): A Realist Approach of KnowledgeA. Some important claims of the realist view of knowledge: (1) The world exists independently of our knowledge of it. (2) Our knowledge of that world is fallible and theory-laden. Concepts of truth and falsity fail to provide a coherent view of the relationship between knowledge and its object. Nevertheless, knowledge is not immune to empirical check, and its effectiveness in informing and explaining successful material practice is not mere accident. (3) Knowledge develops neither wholly continuously, as the steady accumulation of facts within a stable conceptual framework, nor wholly discontinuously, through simultaneous and universal changes in concepts. (4) There is necessity in the world; objects - whether natural or social - necessarily have particular causal power or ways of acting and particular susceptibilities. (5) The world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events, but objects, including structures, which have power and liabilities capable of generating events. These structures may be present even where, as in the social world and much of the natural world, they do not generate regular patterns of events. (6) Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept-dependent. We therefore have not only to explain their production and material effects but to understand, read or interpret what they mean. Although they have to be interpreted by starting from the researchers own frames of meaning, by and large they exist regardless of researchers interpretations of them. In view of 4-6, the methods of social science and natural science have both differences and similarities. (7) Science or the production of any other kind of knowledge is a social practice. For better or worse (not just worse) the conditions and social relations of the production of knowledge influence its content. Knowledge is also largely - though not exclusively - linguistic, and the nature of language and the way we communicate are not incidental to what is known and communicated. Awareness of these relationships is vital in evaluating knowledge. (8) Social science must be critical of its object. In order to be able to explain and understand social phenomena we have to evaluate them critically (Sayer, 1992: 5-6).B. Knowledge in context:“. I shall argue that knowledge is primarily gained through activity both in attempting to change our environment (through labour and work) and through interaction with other people, using shared resources, in particular a common language. Although the development of knowledge may be furthered through passive contemplation of the world, it always presupposes the existence of these two contexts, which provide a kind of feedback or test for our ideas and a language in which and with which to think.” (Sayer, 1992: 15)“To develop knowledge we need raw materials and tools on which and with which we can work, These are linguistic, conceptual and cultural as well as material. . Science is not a thing but a social activity.” (Sayer, 1992: 16)“I shall argue that different types of knowledge are appropriate to different functions and contexts; for example, engineering for the task of making nature move to our designs, ethics to the harmonization of the conduct of people in society. But these contexts are not mutually exclusive but overlapping. Scientific practice embraces several types of knowledge, including some which are generally excluded as non-science or even anti-science by scientism. For example, many philosophers who have adopted this stance of scientism have treated ethical decisions as a-rational, purely with matters of fact, with rational and objective questions of what is the case. Yet science is also a specialized type of social activity and as such it requires rules governing what is proper and improper conduct; without ethical principles such as those concerning honesty of reporting and refusal of illogical argument, science could not exist.” (Sayer, 1992: 17)“Knowledge is developed and used in two main types of context - work (or labour) and communicative interaction.” (Sayer, 1992: 17)“Understanding social phenomena is by no means just a question of understanding concepts in society and the meanings of practices. . Social phenomena have crucial material dimension and are closely associated everywhere to relationships with nature, both in its virgin and its artificially transformed states.” (Sayer, 1992: 28)“. the situation in social science is more complex for two reasons: 1 the unavailability of experiments makes it more difficult to use such material interventions for scientific purposes; 2 social phenomena can be changed intrinsically by learning and adjusting to the subjects understanding.” (Sayer, 1992: 27-28)n 自然、生命與社會科學之比較一、自然科學是研究物質的現象，生物科學是研究由物質構成之生命的現象，而社會科學是研究生存在物質世界之人類這種生命體所建構成之社會文化世界。因此不論是何種科學都與物質世界之各種不同面向有關聯。二、生命及社會雖有物質基礎，但生命與社會都有emergent phenomena，不是物質之現象與知識所能完全解釋的。而生命及社會科學之重點應即是在了解這種emergent 現象。譬如說，人類語言之複雜繁多，即為一種emergent 現象。三、從社會學的角度來看，科學的活動的另一個重要的基礎就是社會。科學的活動是一種社會的活動。例如，科學知識的根源，傳播及科學家的教育及互動，都是在社會文化之環境中發生，並受其影響。某種程度來說，一種知識或活動是靠科學家的社群來認定是否屬於科學、合乎科學的要求。四、不論是自然或社會科學其知識之核心是理論及觀察，亦即理性及經驗的結合。正如Turner et al. (1995:10)所說“Through concepts, speculation, and logic, the facts of the empirical world would be understood; and throu