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Situationism and Confucian Virtue Ethics Deborah S. Mower Accepted: 11 October 2011 /Published online: 9 November 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011Abstract Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors thatinfluence behavior. Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications forethics, and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents anempirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, they arguethat situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as a foundation forethical behavior and moral development. I offer a response from moral psychology using aninterpretation of Xunzia Confucian virtue ethicist from the Classical period. This Confucianaccount serves as a foil to the situationist critique in that it uncovers many problematicontological and normative assumptions at work in this debate regarding the prediction andexplanation of behavior, psychological posits, moral development, and moral education.Xunzis account of virtue ethics not only responds to the situationist empirical challenge byuncovering problematic assumptions about moral psychology, but also demonstrates that it isnot a separate empirical hypothesis. Further, Xunzis virtue ethic responds to the theoreticalchallenge by offering a new account of moral development and a ground for ethical norms thatfully attends to situational features while upholding robust character traits.Keywords Situationism . Confucian . Virtueethics . Moraldevelopment . Xunzi . Charactertraits . Moralpsychology . Ritual . Doris . Harman1 Introduction 1Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors that influencebehavior. 2 Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications for ethics,and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents anempirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, theyargue that situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as afoundation for ethical behavior and moral development. Virtue ethicists did not take suchchallenges lightly, and a vast literature developed in response. Many responses address theconception of character or virtue assumed by Harman and Doris, while others target theimplications drawn from and the quality of situationist research. Doris refined thesituationist challenges in his recent book Lack of Character and argued that “divestingethical reflection of an empirically discredited psychology of character will facilitateemotional, evaluative, and deliberative habits that are more defensible, more sensitive, andmore conducive to ethically desirable behavior” (2002, p. 2). The debate rages on at nearimpasse, both sides fully entrenched.Unsurprisingly, the debate is framed via Western conceptions of character and virtue; 3 afterall, the protagonists are Western scholars embroiled over the implications of psychologicalresearch for modern ethical theory. In contrast, I offer a response from moral psychologyusing a Confucian conception of virtue ethics. Xunzi is an early Confucian philosopher whois very aware of situational effects on behavior, and builds this awareness into his account ofmoral development and program of moral education. I suggest that Xunzi holds an“embeddedness model” of moral development, 4 in which deliberation focused on andembedded in the determinative features of situations is the normative ground for ethics andthe apex of moral development. Consequently, one project of this paper is to present andargue for this interpretation of moral development in Xunzis account.Secondly, I argue that this account serves as a lens to critique key ontological andnormative assumptions about moral psychology and moral development within thearguments posed by the situationists Harman and Doris. In a sense, Doris and I share thesame project: we each want to divest virtue ethics of problematic assumptions and thenaddress the implications of rejecting those assumptions for moral education. However, wepart company in the end: my project is to divest Harman and Doris of their problematicassumptions using an interpretation of Xunzis model of moral development. Although myargument stems from an account of Confucian virtue ethics, the scope of this paper is quitebroad in that it not only deflates the situationist challenges, but it also invites a revision ofany account of virtue ethics that relies on these unwarranted and problematic assumptions. 5Finally, I argue that Xunzis account offers a unique response to the situationist challengesand a new avenue to conceive of virtue ethical moral psychology and moral education. Xunzisaccountrespondstothesituationistempiricalchallengebyuncoveringproblematicassumptionsabout moral psychology, and to the theoretical challenge by offering a new account of moraldevelopment that fully attends to situational features. What is so unique and promising aboutXunzis account is that it not only provides a normative ground for deliberative situationalembeddedness without making the normative and ontological assumptions that plaguesituationism (and indeed which, situationists charge, plague other accounts of virtue ethics),butalsooffersawaytomoveforwardbyputtingsituationistresearchfromsocialpsychologyinthe service of detailing a Xunzian account of virtue ethics.2 The Challenges of SituationismDoris and Harman mount their empirical challenge to Western accounts of virtue ethics bycritiquing globalism: an account of moral psychology committed to the theses that virtue orcharacter traits are stable, consistent, and integrated. On a dispositionalist account, virtues orcharacter traits such as courageousness or honesty produce behavior because they arepsychological dispositions to behave in specified ways. Doris explains that character traits arestable when they are “reliably manifested in trait-relevant behaviors over iterated trials ofsimilar trait-relevant eliciting conditions” (2002, p. 22). For example, if I am honest, I wouldreturn extra money to a cashier whether (a) in Starbucks, (b) in the grocery store, or (c) at thebank. He defines character traits as consistent when they are “reliably manifested in trait-relevant behavior across a diversity of trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary widelyin their conduciveness to the manifestation of the trait in question” (Doris 2002, p. 22). Forexample, if I am honest, I would (a) return money to the cashier upon receiving extra change,(b) report all my income to the IRS, and (c) register for all philosophy conferences attended.Character traits are integrated when “the occurrence of a trait with a particular evaluativevalence is probabilistically related to the occurrence of other traits with similar evaluativevalences” (Doris 2002, p. 22). For example, if I think my friend is trustworthy, I may alsoassume that she is honest. Doris explains that to attribute a virtue is to assert a conditional: “Ifa person possesses a trait, that person will exhibit trait-relevant behavior in trait-relevanteliciting conditions with markedly above chance probability p” (2002, p. 19). However, thishonesty-attribution does not merely express a correlational claim that my friend will displayhonesty in honesty-eliciting situations, but that the reason she returns the money is becauseshe is honest; honesty, as a psychological trait, is causally efficacious for or productive of herbehavior. Attributing virtues to others not only helps to explain their behavior, but it alsoallows for fairly reliable predictions. When a cashier accidentally returns an extra $20 inchange to my honest friend, I can predict with some confidence that she will return the moneydespite the fact that she recently lost her job.Doris explains that stability, consistency, and integration are the three key theses ofglobalism. However, he notes that they are three separate theses: stability and consistencyare theses about the nature of traits, while integration is a thesis about personality and traitorganization (2002, p. 23). My interests in this paper focus on the first two theses ofglobalism: the characterization of virtues as stable and consistent psychological traits. ForDoris and Harman, the lack of stability and consistency in character traits provides strongevidence against virtue ethics, whether dispositionalist or intellectualist. On a disposition-alist account, as described above, character traits are robust when they are stable throughtime, consistent across situation types, causally efficaious, and allow for reliable predictionsand explanations of behavior. On an intellectualist account, virtue is the correct perceptionof and response to the morally salient features of a situation (e.g., perceiving a situation asone which requires honesty, and then performing the honest action, such as returning theextra change to the cashier). 6 Doris claims that the attempt to explain virtue as a perceptualcapacity or sensitivity still requires that such traits be stable and consistent in order to beconnected to behavior. Consequently, he holds that the same arguments can be leveledagainst both accounts of virtue ethics.Although a virtue ethicist might point to regular exhibitions of honest behavior asevidence of the psychological trait or virtue of honesty, Harman and Doris begin theempirical challenge by arguing that there is a competing hypothesis: the behavioralregularity we observe may be due to the stability and consistency of situations rather thanstable and consistent character traits (Doris 2002, p. 26; Harman 1999, p. 317). Situationistresearch, Harman argues, shows that “aspects of a particular situation can be importantto how a person acts in ways that ordinary people do not normally appreciate, leadingthem to attribute certain distinctive actions to an agents distinctive character ratherthan to subtle aspects of the situation” (2003, p. 91). Situationist research illustrates themyriad ways that situations produce or elicit behavior, indicated most clearly by changesin behavior as a consequence of situational variation. As Doris notes, “the problem is notthat substantial situational factors have substantial effects on what people do, but thatseemingly insubstantial situational factors have substantial effects on what people do”(2002, p. 29). Given this, Harman concludes that “despite appearances, there is noempirical support for the existence of character traits” (1999, p. 330, my emphasis). ForHarman, the fact that researchers can manipulate behavior by varying situational featuresdemonstrates that situational regularity, not robust psychological character traits, yieldsbehavioral regularity. 7Doris adopts a more temperate position: given that situationist research casts seriousdoubts on virtues as globally stable and consistent psychological traits, the empiricalevidence favors situational regularity over robust character traits as a behavioralexplanation (2002, p. 26). Although Harman abandons character traits, Doris suggests thata modified conception of character traits may have some explanatory value. 8 In contrast torobust or global character traits which are stable through time and consistent across a widevariety of situations, Doris proposes that character traits may be local or limited to narrowlyspecified situations. He explains that the disposition for “battlefield physical courage”would yield courageous behavior whenever one engaged in a physical contest on abattlefield, but not during storms on the high seas, while being tortured, or upon steppinginto a den of snakes (2002, p. 62). The fact that one does not behave courageously whenconfronted with snakes or when tortured is not a mark of instability or inconsistency; rather,it is simply not a disposition that is productive of behavior in such cases. Although Dorisdoubts the empirical adequacy of global character traits, he thinks that local character traitsmay offer an explanatory alternative more compatible with situationist research. However,local character traits offer no solace to virtue ethicists. Doris explains that “local traits arenot likely to produce the patterns of behavior expected on broad trait categories likecompassionate or courageous: even seemingly insignificant variations in situation maytap different dispositions, effecting inconsistent behavior” (1998, p. 507). Local charactertraits, subject to situational fluctuations, are of no use to accounts of virtue ethics thatdepend on the situational invariance of global character traits. The empirical challenge to robust character traits supports Harmans sweeping theoreticalchallenge to virtue ethics as a foundation for ethical behavior and moral development. Hearguesthatanempiricallysuspectpsychologicalmodelofcharactertraitsundercutsanaccountof moral behavior defined in terms of virtue. As Harman notes, “if we know that there is nosuch thing as a character trait and we know that virtue would require having character traits,how can we aim at becoming a virtuous agent?” (2000, p. 224). If virtues do not exist, thenthe moral ideals assumed by virtue ethics are untenable, and the attempt to develop virtueand character is a waste of time and effort. 10 Harman holds no punches.Harmans challenge, if it succeeds, goes for the jugular, but Doriss challenge is no lessformidable. Doris charges that “the approach to moral psychology suggested bysituationism enjoys certain advantagesas a foundation for normative thought” (1998, p.505). He suggests that rejecting the assumption of robust global character traits may yieldmore ethical behaviora counter-intuitive consequence to many virtue ethicists. Ratherthan getting into situations likely to elicit unethical behavior and mistakenly relying on the“strength” of ones character, he argues that situationism suggests attention to the featuresand avoidance of enticing but sinful situations. For example, quaffing wine while attendinga private dinner at the home of a handsome and flirtatious colleague while his spouse isaway is a situation loaded with sinfully enticing features (Doris 1998, p. 516). Relying onones character is foolhardy. Doris argues that “the way to get things right more oftenisby attending to the determinative features of situations,” and that “the implication of this isthat our duties may be surprisingly complex, involvinga sort of cognitive responsibilityto attend, in our deliberations, to the determinative features of situations” (1998, p. 517).His challenge, if it succeeds, undercuts virtue ethics by offering a new foundation forethical behavior and moral development. In the next few sections, I introduce Xunzi and theimportance of ritual, explain how his account of moral development and program of moraleducation develops attention to situational features as a moral action, and show how hisvirtue ethic can withstand these empirical and theoretical challenges.3 Xunzi and the Importance of RitualAlthough Confucius (551479 BCE) is as well known as Aristotle (384322 BCE), manyWestern scholars are less familiar with the philosophers that follow Confucius. Mencius(372289 BCE) and Xunzi (approx. 310215 BCE) 11 are philosophers of the Classic periodof Confucianism. The Classic period is delineated by the Warring States period (479221BCE), in which a number of independent feudal states vied for supremacy. The Classicperiod ended in 221 BCE, when the state of Qin conquered all to create the first unifiedstate and dynasty in China.As was common for many philosophers of his time, Xunzi served as a political figure,holding posts in several states. In each, he expounded Confucian views on morality,education, and political policy. He also was a leading figure at the prestigious JixiaAcademy, akin to a modern “think-tank” for the intellectuals of the day, in which he cameinto contact with proponents of all the major Sinitic schools of philosophical thought (suchas Daoism and Mohism). In contrast to texts like the Analects and the Mencius, whichcapture aphoristic quotations or record conversations, the Xunzi is a treatise composed ofessays on specific topics. In this text, Xunzi develops focused arguments against otherschools of thought and other interpretations of Confucianism, and builds a systematicargument with integrated theses on metaphysics and human nature, moral education,political philosophy, philosophy of language, action theory, and aesthetics. 12Mencius and Xunzi offered competing interpretations of Confucianism, and Xunzisemphasis on the importance of ritual is often seen as direct response to Mencius and his viewson human nature. Mencius famously claimed that human nature was “good,” or that thecomponents of morality are innate. (For a modern Western parallel: one might claim that anempathic ability is innate.) Xunzi is often credited with the contrasting claim that human natureis “bad.” However, his position is not that human nature is evil, but that it is crude, unformed,and contains possibilities for both good and evil: to claim that human nature is “good” is toaccountforonlypartofournature.XunzithoughtMenciussviewsweredangerouslysimplisticbecause they implied that morality could develop naturally and minimized the importance ofmoral education. For Xunzi, moral education is necessary to shape the myriad innate capacitiesof human nature: without moral education, individuals will not develop into moral p