SUDDEN DEATH Conflict De-escalation as Government Strategy in Nigerias Niger Delta Region.doc

willem jaspersp/a oude kerkstraat 115281 ba bsudden death?conflict de-escalation as government strategy in nigerias niger delta regionsupervisor:dr. isabelle duyvesteynuniversiteit utrechta word of thanks“if you would hit the mark, you must aim a little above it.” henry wadsworth longfellow.writing is never done alone. that is, even a student of conflict studies can have a detrimental effect on his social environment, despite the fact that he has supposedly learned how to deal with conflicting demands, spoiler groups and lets be frank: war. i would therefore first like to thank the people who had to encounter me at times of severe stress, deep depression or euphoria which, by the way, were stages i often passed through within five consecutive minutes.second, there are the people that need to be named because of their help regarding the content of this thesis. first and foremost, id like to thank isabelle duyvesteyn of utrecht university. id also like to thank corinna hauswedell of bicc for interesting discussions about de-escalation and for the amount of work she put into editing an article i wrote on contemporary conflict in the niger delta. ive used many of the ideas from that paper in this study. thank you. the structures of both the introduction and the first chapter were aided enormously by the ideas of petra vlamings, whom i also like to thank for motivating me, both for this thesis as well as in general. thank you!third, some smaller thanks need to be said. to jonas horner for language editing, christopher fitzpatrick for comments on a very early draft of chapter one, sayuri matsuno for looking at the introduction and the bonn international center for conversion for letting me use their facilities.bonn/maastricht/boxtel, 19 september 2005contentsintroduction 5chapter 1 101.1 definition of conflict 111.2 actor model 151.3 what is escalation 201.3.1 definition 201.3.2 process 211.3.3 phenomenal image or actor image of escalation? 221.4 de-escalation? 231.4.1 the concept 231.4.2 defining the concept 241.4.3 how and where does de-escalation occur? 251.4.3a internal processes 251.4.3b external processes 271.4.4 policies of de-escalation 271.5 relationship de-escalation and escalation 281.6 structure of case studies 30chapter iibiafra: nigerias civil war 31landmark points 33description of conflict 34escalation 35de-escalation and actions by the nigerian government 38de-escalation and actions by other parties 41conclusion 42chapter iiithe ogoni crisis: burned-out conflict? 45landmark points 48description of conflict 48escalation 50de-escalation and actions by the nigerian government 53de-escalation and actions by other parties 55conclusion 56chapter ivthe nigerian government as a third-party mediator? the case of warri 59landmark points 60description of conflict 61escalation 62de-escalation and actions by the nigerian government 63de-escalation and actions by other parties 66conclusion 66chapter vconclusion: the paradox of the powder keg 70bibliography 80introductionsolving crises by de-escalation?the niger delta, especially port harcourt, made the international headlines in september and october 2004. a simmering conflict between two rivalling militias escalated when one militia leader threatened to engage in full-scale war with the oil companies, to blow up pipelines and installations and kill foreign oil workers in the region. nigeria: niger delta rebels surrendering weapons for cash irin 29 october 2004 nigerias economy is extremely dependent on oil, with oil exports accounting for 98.5% of total exports. world bank group “nigeria at a glance” available via /cgi-bin/sendoff.cgi?page=/data/countrydata/ag/nga_aag.pdf accessed august 14 2005. if indeed carried out, the militia attacks would have had grave consequences for nigerias oil production, since virtually all its onshore production takes place in the niger delta. in fact, the threat itself had major effects because oil prices, already under pressure because of several other reasons, shot to an all-time high of more than usd50 per barrel. nigeria is the worlds fifth largest exporter of oil, and the largest african producer. the situation in and around the major oil city of port harcourt, rivers state, at the end of september 2004 was deemed serious enough by the federal government (fg) to invite the two most important militia leaders to abuja, in order to hold talks. these resulted in a peace agreement, which was signed by the two militia leaders and supported by the federal government, though the latter was not a signatory to the agreement. the agreement was only signed by the leaders of the two strongest south-south militias; niger delta peoples volunteer force and niger delta vigilante. the text of the peace deal was short, it included no tangible goals and it constituted no more than an agreement to hold further talks. it did turn out to be enough to calm down the situation and even resulted in the militias handing in some of their weapons. the agreement could have constituted a starting point of a process of conflict resolution in the niger delta, but so far little evidence can be found that this is actually taking place. the conflict, rather, has been managed and the current de-escalation seems to constitute a prolonging of conflict. de-escalation has been defined as a decrease in conflict intensity. it is usually taken as the first step of conflict management - or resolution.the port harcourt crisis was by no means a unique event in the south-south area, as the niger delta is also known. the region has been experiencing conflict of different magnitudes ever since nigeria gained independence from great britain in 1961. this is not to say that violent conflict did not occur in the niger delta before independence. however, the pre-colonial and colonial periods are not the focus of this study. conflict and fighting has not exclusively been between local populations and the nigerian security forces, but has also taken the form of inter-community fighting, intra- community fighting and seemingly random outbursts of violence. furthermore, the oil companies operating in the area have been the target of violent protests or outright attacks by villagers or armed groups.the different levels of conflict make the analysis of violence in the south-south difficult and provide a stretched patchwork of dynamics rather than one overall conflict. according to international observers, there is no war in the niger delta, but meanwhile there are estimates that between 628 and 1,000 people die violent deaths in the area every year. the first number is taken from amnesty international “are human rights in the pipeline?” afr 44/020/2004 (london 2004), the second from wac global services “peace and security in the niger delta, conflict expert group baseline report” (unpublished report, 2003).on several occasions, recently in port harcourt, successive nigerian governments seem to have opted for a strategy aimed at de-escalation, instead of a holistic approach aimed at conflict resolution, in trying to cope with conflict in the area. it is obvious that the nigerian government lacks the institutions, skills, strategies and tools for efficient conflict transformation. willem jaspers “ldiebstall, rebellenbewegungen und korruption: die konfliktdynamik im niger-delta als herausforderung fr deeskalation in: ulrich ratsch et al. friedensgutachten 2005 (mnster 2005) 106-115. instead, a short term and ad hoc approach is taken, which seems to be aimed at de-escalation. this results in a reduction of conflict intensity, while at the same time the underlying causes of conflict remain in place. this approach is sometimes successful, though often unsuccessful, and seems to never result in a lasting improvement of the situation on the ground. coping with conflict and trying to resolve it are two different things.in order to prevent violent conflict from breaking out again, it is necessary to remove the triggers of a conflict as well as the root causes. john vasquez points this out by saying that: “all wars begin with issues, but not all issues are resolved by war”. john a. vasquez the war puzzle (cambridge 1993) 124. the latter points to the difference between root causes (underlying causes) and triggers (proximate causes) of conflict. it implies that the factors that caused conflict might not be the same as those that cause its continuation. ludger haller “conflict escalation and decision making” (frankfurt am mainz, 2003) taking such a holistic approach is easier said than done and many strategies therefore focus on containing and managing a conflict, rather than resolving it. this is both an active as well as a passive process. actively, governments aim to keep violence under a certain level of intensity, so that it is still acceptable. passively, governments show too little interest or are too tied up in other issues to be able to use time and resources for conflict resolution. sometimes policies are faulty and simply do not have the desired effect or, as becomes more and more clear in the case of the niger delta, some influential government and army officials might even be profiting from the situation as it is. stakeholder democracy network “the gangs of port harcourt” (forthcoming) 4. this reduces incentives to try and counter violence. compare: human rights watch, the price of oil (london, 1999), amnesty international are human rights in the pipeline? (london, 2004), human rights watch violence in rivers state (london, 2005), wac global services baseline report (unpublished).francis deng et. al. state that in internal government “the management, rather than the resolution of conflict is the maximum attainable goal”. francis m. deng et al, sovereignty as responsibility: conflict management in africa (washington d.c., 1996) 41. this seems to gain ground in nigeria. conflicts among domestic groups are rarely eliminated; they are only reduced or contained. the underlying causes of conflict continue to exist and there is a high probability of conflict rising up again at a later stage, when conflict parties have regrouped, re-emerged, rearmed, or when the issues are taken up by a different group. william i. zartman (ed), governance as conflict management: politics and violence in west africa (washington d.c. 1997) 9.if indeed one accepts that the management of conflict is the maximum possible outcome in intrastate conflict, aiming at de-escalation is the best option in coping with conflict. this stresses the need for more research into the topic of de-escalation. at the moment, this research is lacking there are chances, as well as dangers attached to de-escalation. it becomes a coping strategy rather than a process ultimately to be followed by the resolution of a conflict, or attempts to resolve conflict. where it provides chances to cope with conflict in a pragmatic way, there is also the danger of superficiality, which will hinder conflict resolution and make conflict linger on. hauswedell, corinna de-escalation: paradigma fr konfliktforschung? wissenschaft und frieden vol.2 (2005) 7-10. this study will investigate processes of de-escalation in the niger delta, brought about by successive nigerian regimes and governments. the main question to be asked in this study is if policies aimed at de-escalation, undertaken by different nigerian governments, have had positive effects on conflict dynamics in the niger delta in terms of conflict resolution. this question will be investigated by focussing on efforts by the nigerian government to end, transform or manage violent conflicts in the niger delta area, concentrating on its strategies to end violent conflict and the successes and failures in three particular conflicts: the biafra war, the ogoni crisis and the warri crisis. . the hypothesis posed here is that in the case of the niger delta, it is de-escalation - through conflict management - rather than resolution, which prolongs conflict.three case studies were undertaken for this study. the first one is the biafra war, also known as the nigerian civil war. starting in 1967 after the south-western region of nigeria declared itself the independent republic of biafra, the conflict caused more than three million casualties. it ended in 1970 with the unconditional surrender of the then military leader of biafra. the second is the ogoni crisis, roughly from 1990 to 1999. though different in size, scope and, one could easily argue; basic ontology, it constitutes another event that forced the government of nigeria to apply conflict management skills. this was a task it was seemingly unable to fulfil, given the continuing stand off between ogonis and the oil companies. oil companies are still unable to resume oil exploitation in ogoniland because the local population will not let them do this. self-governance might be an overstatement here, the case could also be made convincingly that government is absent. the last case that will be examined is the violence in and around the city of warri, delta state. here, the conflict was not so much between population and the government, but the fighting took the form of interethnic violence, placing itsekiri militias against ijaw militias, while at the same time, different groups clashed with the security forces. two instances will be examined closely, those in 1999 and 2003. the reason for inclusion of this last conflict is that it provides a chance to study policies and actions of the nigerian government in a case where it was not necessarily one of the main protagonists but management skills were called upon.the structure of this study will be as follows: chapter one will give a general introduction to the literature on de-escalation and provide an overview of the concepts of conflict, escalation, de-escalation, conflict management and resolution. an understanding of the differences and similarities between the concepts will help in assessing the case studies in the following chapters. the consequences and dangers of de-escalation as a goal in itself will be described. the chapter will conclude with an overview of how the case studies are structured. chapter two will deal with the biafra conflict, the nigerian civil war. the sheer size and impact of this conflict outweighs the other case studies by far. in chapter three, the ogoni crisis is typified as an unresolved conflict that has temporarily died down. chapter four aims to show that in warri, specific new dynamics of conflict can be found and that this development might point to problematic results of a culture of containment. the analysis of all cases will be within the chapters themselves. chapter five is the concluding chapter; it will summarise the results of the case studies and draw conclusions.chapter 1“we act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg (.)”. bill clinton, quoted in: stacy bergstrom haldi, why wars widen; a theory of predation and balancing (london 2003) 7.it is hard to typify the violence that has occurred and still occurs in the niger delta. as always, conflicts and crises are multifaceted and complicated, involving different actors and different goals, and changing dynamics over time. furthermore, the three case studies undertaken in this study differ greatly from one another in terms of intensity, length and, one could easily argue, basic ontology. it cannot be stressed enough, therefore, that the goal of these studies is not to compare one with the other, but to investigate de-escalation policies adopted by nigerian governments in these cases over a longer period of time. in order to be able to compare the activities of the nigerian government in the three cases to be examined, it is necessary to come up with a general structure. the case studies will take the following form: after a brief description of the background and history of the conflict, the escalatory process will be described. the guiding principle behind this is that escalatory processes and de-escalatory processes are not opposites. actions aimed at de-escalating conflict can backfire and deepen conflict, for instance, when the adversary interprets it as a sign of weakness. this can also work the other way around, a sudden escalation of conflict can foster de-escalation, for instance because the escalation comes with costs that are unbearable for one of the parties.after the escalatory process, the strategies of the conflict parties will be examined. the same paragraph will describe the de-escalatory process that has taken place. there are three reasons for this: first, it will provide a chance to immediately evaluate the effectiveness of policies and actions by the government. second, and with the same underlying thought, in the conceptualisation of de-escalation as given below, emphasis is very much on the man-made aspects of the process; de-escalation (as escalation) is a game of action and reaction. third, there is an overall lack of material on the de-escalation of wars joseph w. elder, nee